Faster Than Prime et al v. Mad Dog LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of 101 West Lombard Street
GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Chief United States District Judge 410-962-4055
October 15, 2026
MEMORANDUM TO PARTIES RE: Faster Than Prime, et al. v. Mad Dog LLC,
et al.
Civil Action No. GLR-25-652
Dear Parties:
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs Faster Than Prime (“FTP”) and 1984 Group LLC’s
(“1984 Group”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) Motions for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF Nos. 24–25). The
Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Motions without prejudice.
Factual Background
The Court previously outlined the facts of this case as follows:
This action arises out of allegedly false submissions of intellectual
property (“IP”) claims by Defendant [Mad Dog LLC d/b/a Hot Feet
(“Hot Feet”)]. (Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs FTP and 1984
Group “are in the business of lawfully acquiring and re-selling
various consumer products for profit.” (Id. ¶ 17). Hot Feet is “in the
business of manufacturing and distributing apparel products,
including products sold under the Hot Feet” trademark. (Id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiffs allege that Hot Feet, with the assistance of [Defendant
Ariel Dor], a Hot Feet affiliate, submitted numerous false IP
infringement claims to Amazon that accused Plaintiffs of selling
counterfeit Hot Feet socks and restricted Plaintiffs’ ability to sell
products on Amazon. (Mem. L. Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Default J. [“Mot.”]
at 5, ECF No. 14; Compl. ¶¶ 8, 79, 95–97).1
Plaintiffs allege that [Hot Feet and Dor’s (together, “Defendants”)]
actions restricted Plaintiffs’ ability to sell Hot Feet socks, damaged
their relationship with their customers and Amazon, caused
deactivation of listings and, in FTP’s case, suspension of their entire
Amazon seller account. (Mot. at 5; Compl. ¶¶ 76–79, 95–97, 103–
04, 111–12, 126–27). Subsequently, Plaintiffs assert that these false
1 Citations to page numbers refer to the pagination assigned by the Court’s Case
Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system.
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reports constitute an actual controversy between the parties and seek
to clear their name. (Compl. ¶ 92, 98). As such, Plaintiffs seek (1) a
declaration from the Court that they have not violated Defendants’
trademark rights or other rights under federal or state law,
(2) injunctive relief, and (3) monetary damages. (Id. at 20; Mot. at
5).
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on February 27, 2025. (ECF No. 1).
Defendants failed to respond, so on March 27, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
a Motion Requesting Entry of Default (ECF No. 8), which the Court
granted on March 28, 2025, (ECF Nos. 9–12). On May 12, 2025,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
(Nov. 24, 2025 Letter Order at 1–2, ECF No. 17). The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default
Judgment on November 24, 2025. (ECF No. 17). In its November 24, 2025 Order, the Court
granted Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, denied their request for injunctive relief, and
ordered them to provide additional information as to monetary damages and to file a petition for
attorneys’ fees and costs. (Nov. 24, 2025 Letter Order at 6–7).
On January 23, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Response to
the Court’s Order Dated November 24, 2025. (ECF No. 22). In their Supplemental Memorandum,
Plaintiffs provided additional information pertaining to their request for monetary damages and
asked the Court to enter a judgment entitling FTP to recover $13,319.00 in attorneys’ fees and
costs and entitling 1984 Group to recover $12,060.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Suppl. Mem.
L. Resp. Ct.’s Order Dated Nov. 24, 2025 at 2–7, ECF No. 22). On August 14, 2026, the Court
issued an Order finding that Plaintiffs had provided adequate information to support their request
for monetary damages and ordering them to further supplement their requests for attorneys’ fees
and costs by providing billing records containing, at minimum, the services performed by counsel,
date of service, hourly rate, and duration of each task. (Aug. 14, 2026 Order at 1–2, ECF No. 23).
Plaintiffs filed the instant Motions for Attorneys’ Fees on August 28, 2026. (ECF Nos. 24–25).
FTP now requests $18,119.00 in attorneys’ fees, (Decl. Gregory E. Purdy Supp. Faster Than
Prime’s Claim Att’ys’ Fees [“Purdy Decl.”] ¶ 6, ECF No. 25), and 1984 Group requests
$18,155.50 in attorneys’ fees, (Decl. Stephen Farrell Supp. 1984 Group LLC’s Claim Att’ys’ Fees
[“Farrell Decl.”] ¶ 6, ECF No. 24). To date, Defendants have not filed an opposition.
Standard of Review
FTP asserts that it has incurred attorneys’ fees in the amount of $18,119.00. (Purdy Decl.
¶ 6). 1984 Group asserts that it has incurred attorneys’ fees in the amount of $18,155.50. (Farrell
Decl. ¶ 6). As support, FTP has filed a declaration of its sole proprietor, Gregory Purdy; 1984
Group has filed a declaration of its President, Stephen Farrell; and each Plaintiff has filed a
spreadsheet summarizing the invoices issued to it by the law firm of Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP
(“TKD”) and local counsel Eliezer Lekht, who rendered legal services to both Plaintiffs in
connection with this case. (ECF Nos. 24, 24-1, 25, 25-1).
To determine the reasonableness of requested fees and costs, the Court uses the lodestar
approach to ascertain “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
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reasonable hourly rate.” Knightsbridge, LLC v. DKW Commc’ns, Inc., No. PX-19-2381, 2021
WL 593527, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 16, 2021) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983)). “An hourly rate is reasonable if it is ‘in line with those prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’” Piña v.
Pakalex Inc., No. TDC-15-638, 2015 WL 7294369, at *3 (D.Md. Nov. 18, 2015) (quoting Riveros
v. WWK Constr., Inc., No. PJM-15-193, 2015 WL 5897749, at *4 (D.Md. Oct. 5, 2015)). This
Court uses Appendix B to the Local Rules as a reference for rates that are presumptively
reasonable. Id. Further, the Fourth Circuit has recognized the following factors to consider in
determining reasonableness:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal
services rendered; (4) the attorney[s’] opportunity costs in pressing
the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the
attorney[s’] expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount
in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the
case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney
and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., 560 F.3d 235, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The
Court is not required to analyze each factor individually or even examine every factor but may
instead consider the factors as a whole. Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 151 F.App’x. 275, 283 (4th
Cir. 2005). Ultimately, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the requested fees are
reasonable. Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395, 404 (4th Cir. 2015).
Analysis
As stated above, FTP requests an attorneys’ fees award in the amount of $18,119.00,
(Purdy Decl. ¶ 6), and 1984 Group requests an attorneys’ fees award in the amount of $18,155.50,
(Farrell Decl. ¶ 6). Each Plaintiff states that local counsel Lekht, two TKD attorneys, and one TKD
paralegal billed it for services rendered in connection with this case. (Purdy Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7–11;
Farrell Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7–11). Lekht billed Plaintiffs at an hourly rate of $450.00. (Purdy Decl. ¶ 7;
Farrell Decl. ¶ 7). Mark Berkowitz, a TKD partner, billed Plaintiffs at an hourly rate of $680.00 in
2025 and $730.00 in 2026. (Purdy Decl. ¶ 9; Farrell Decl. ¶ 9). Michael Benzaki, an associate at
TKD, billed Plaintiffs at an hourly rate of $550.00 in 2025 and $595.00 in 2026. (Purdy Decl. ¶ 10;
Farrell Decl. ¶ 10). According to Plaintiffs, Lehkt, Berkowitz, and Benzaki all have experience in
litigating “commercial, e-commerce[,] and intellectual property matters.” (Purdy Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9–10;
Farrell Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9–10). Finally, Jennifer Doran, a TKD paralegal, billed Plaintiffs at an hourly
rate of $365.00. (Purdy Decl. ¶ 11; Farrell Decl. ¶ 11).
The spreadsheets Plaintiffs provided show that Lekht, Berkowitz, Benzaki, and Doran
(collectively, “Counsel”) billed FTP for a total of 33.00 hours and 1984 Group for a total of 32.90
hours. (FTP Spreadsheet at 4, ECF No. 25-1; 1984 Group Spreadsheet at 5, ECF No. 24-1). The
work that Counsel performed in this case includes drafting and revising the Complaint; conferring
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with the process server to effect service of the Complaint; reviewing client documents and relevant
caselaw; drafting a default judgment motion; responding to the Court’s August 25, 2025 Order to
show cause why the Court should not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, (ECF No. 15); and
responding to the Court’s November 24, 2025 and August 14, 2026 Orders to supplement
Plaintiffs’ requests for monetary damages and attorneys’ fees, (see generally FTP Spreadsheet;
1984 Group Spreadsheet).
The Court finds the requested fees unreasonable for two reasons. First, most of the items
for which Counsel billed FTP are duplicative of items for which they billed 1984 Group. The
duplicative spreadsheet entries make up 31.7 of the hours of work and $17,355.50 of the fees for
which FTP seeks an award and 31.62 of the hours of work and $17,310.50 of the fees for which
1984 Group seeks an award. (See generally FTP Spreadsheet; 1984 Group Spreadsheet). The Court
finds that the approximately thirty-three hours of work for which Counsel billed Plaintiffs is
commensurate with the length of time and amount of effort required of counsel in a case of this
nature. See Monge v. Portofino Ristorante, 751 F.Supp.2d 789, 800 (D.Md. 2010) (finding that
20.8 hours of work on litigation involving an uncontested default judgment was reasonable where
counsel drafted a complaint, two motions for entry of default, and two default judgment motions);
Aguirre-Amaya v. Medpacific Flavors, Inc., No. DLB-21-2143, 2024 WL 4732776, at *2 (D.Md.
Nov. 8, 2024) (finding that fifty-seven hours of work on litigation involving an uncontested default
judgment was reasonable where counsel, among other tasks, investigated and researched the
plaintiff’s claims, drafted a complaint and motion for default judgment, corresponded with the
process server to effect service on the defendant, reviewed filings and directives from the Court,
and prepared status reports and requests to the Court). FTP and 1984 Group cannot, however,
recover duplicative attorneys’ fees for the same work. See Stone v. Automoney, Inc., No. 19-CV-
1035, 2020 WL 13582169, at *1 (M.D.N.C. June 11, 2020) (“Should the plaintiffs prevail, no trial
court would award attorneys’ fees for the same work more than one time, and some sort of
allocation between any successful plaintiffs will patently be needed . . . .”); cf. Seoul Broad. Sys.,
Int’l, Inc. v. Ro, No. 09cv433, 2011 WL 4478566, at *8 (E.D.Va. Sep. 26, 2011) (finding that
plaintiffs’ counsel were not entitled to recover duplicative attorneys’ fees where multiple attorneys
billed for the same, overlapping services). The Court would need to allocate the duplicative fees
between the Plaintiffs, which it could do. See Monge, 751 F.Supp.2d at 800 (“When entering a
default judgment, the Court may make an award of attorney[s’] fees for a lesser amount than the
moving party requested.”). This brings us, though, to the second deficiency in Plaintiffs’ requests.
Second, Plaintiffs have not provided the information necessary for the Court to determine
whether the hourly rates charged by Counsel in this case are reasonable. As stated above, this Court
uses Appendix B to the Local Rules as a reference to rates that are presumptively reasonable. Piña,
2015 WL 7294369, at *3 (citing Riveros, 2015 WL 5897749, at *4). Appendix B instructs the
Court to determine reasonable hourly rates using “declarations, affidavits, stipulations by the
parties, or other evidence.” Local Rule App. B.3 (D.Md. 2025). It further provides that the
2 The 0.1-hour discrepancy arises from nearly identical entries in Plaintiffs’ spreadsheets
of a May 12, 2025 charge by Lekht for work performed “[r]eview[ing] and revis[ing] Brief and
proposed order for default.” (FTP Spreadsheet at 2, ECF No. 25-1; 1984 Group Spreadsheet at 2,
ECF No. 24-1). According to the spreadsheets, Lekht billed FTP for 1.10 hours to complete this
work and billed 1984 Group for only 1.00 hour to complete the same work. (FTP Spreadsheet at
2; 1984 Group Spreadsheet at 2).
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Fitzpatrick Matrix, an annually adjusted matrix of hourly rates for attorneys with varying years of
experience who litigate in federal court in the District of Columbia, may provide a “useful
guideline for hourly rates . . . with a reduction of 5% to 20% (to reflect differences between the
legal markets in Washington, D.C. and Maryland).” Id.; see U.S. Att’y’s Off. for D.C., Civ. Div.,
The Fitzpatrick Matrix (2026);3 Schrider v. Devlin Contracting & Maint., Inc., No. BAH-24-2978,
2026 WL 110330, at *5 (D.Md. Jan. 14, 2026) (relying on lawyer affidavits and the Fitzpatrick
Matrix in determining reasonableness of hourly rate). The declarations accompanying Plaintiffs’
Motions for Attorneys’ Fees make no mention of Lekht, Berkowitz, and Benzaki’s respective years
of legal experience, such that the Court cannot use the Fitzpatrick Matrix as a tool for determining
the reasonableness of their hourly rates.4 (See generally Purdy Decl.; Farrell Decl.). Further,
Plaintiffs have provided no other information from which the Court can determine whether the
hourly rates charged by Counsel in this case are in line with rates customarily charged by attorneys
of like experience for like work. See Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244 (“In addition to the attorney’s own
affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market
rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award.” (quoting Plyler
v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990))). Thus, the Court is unable to determine whether the
rates charged by Counsel—or, as a result, the attorneys’ fees requested by Plaintiffs—are
reasonable.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions for Attorneys’
Fees (ECF Nos. 24–25) are DENIED without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to MAIL a copy of
this memorandum to Defendants’ last known addresses and PROVIDE a copy of the same to all
counsel of record. Despite the informal nature of this memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of
the Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.
/s/
George L. Russell, III
Chief United States District Judge
3 The Fitzpatrick Matrix, current as of 2026, is available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
dc/media/1449156/dl?inline.
4 With one exception. The Fitzpatrick Matrix’s hourly rates for paralegals are not linked to
years of experience, such that the Court is able to determine whether the rate charged by Doran is
reasonable. The Court finds that it is not. Plaintiffs indicate that Doran billed at an hourly rate of
$365.00 for her services. (Purdy Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 25; Farrell Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 24). Even
before factoring in the 5% to 20% reduction suggested by the Local Rules, Doran’s hourly rate
exceeds the Fitzpatrick Matrix’s rates for paralegals: $255.00 per hour in 2025 and $273.00 per
hour in 2026. U.S. Att’y’s Off. for D.C., Civ. Div., The Fitzpatrick Matrix (2026).
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