BRITO PACHECO v. SHEPLEY et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
CARLOS ALBERTO BRITO 	)
PACHECO 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00151-JAW
)
CRAIG SHEPLEY, 	)
in his official capacity as 	)
Deputy Chief Patrol Agent of 	)
Fort Fairfield Sector, U.S. Customs 	)
and Border Protection, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen without a bond hearing
violates due process, the court grants in part and denies in part the noncitizen’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders the government to conduct an initial
custody determination within forty-eight hours of this order. 	If the government
decides to continue detaining the noncitizen, the court further orders the government
to obtain an authorizing warrant and to provide the noncitizen a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge within fourteen days of this order.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Carlos Alberto Brito Pacheco, a resident of Portland, Maine, is an ethnically
indigenous Ecuadorian citizen who fled his home country after experiencing racial
1 	For the purposes of Mr. Brito Pacheco’s petition and consistent with the parties’ stipulation,
the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in Mr. Brito Pacheco’s March 26, 2026 amended
verified petition and accompanying attachments. Min. Entry (ECF No. 6); Order (ECF No. 14).
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mistreatment. Am. Verified Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(1)(A) and R. 65(a) ¶¶ 1-2 (ECF No. 12) (Am. Pet.). Mr. Brito Pacheco entered
the United States in August 2022 without inspection or detention by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 	Id. 	He fears returning to Ecuador and
intends to apply for asylum. Id.
On March 12, 2026, DHS agents arrested and detained Mr. Brito Pacheco while
he was working and delivering packages. Id. ¶ 3. Respondents transferred Mr. Brito
Pacheco to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) custody in Fort Fairfield,
Maine before CBP subsequently transferred him to Van Buren Station in Van Buren,
Maine, where he is currently detained. Id.; Min. Entry (ECF No. 9).
On March 21, 2026, alleging that his detention violates federal law and due
process, Mr. Brito Pacheco filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking
his immediate release from immigration detention. Verified Pet. for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 1). That same day, the Court issued a seventy-two-hour emergency
order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr. Brito Pacheco outside the District
of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of Removal (ECF No. 3).
At the teleconference of counsel on March 23, 2026, Respondents confirmed
Mr. Brito Pacheco was in their custody in Van Buren, Maine when he filed his
petition, clarifying there were no issues of personal jurisdiction or venue for the Court
to consider. Min. Entry. The parties also agreed that, for purposes of this order, there
are no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this matter and stipulated to the
facts in Mr. Brito Pacheco’s verified petition and its accompanying attachments. The
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parties also agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing and oral argument, allowing the
Court to resolve this matter on the parties’ briefing only.
That same day, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr. Brito
Pacheco’s petition should not be granted, and extended the Court’s March 21, 2026
no-transfer order pending further order of the Court, but authorizing Respondents to
remove Mr. Brito Pacheco outside the District of Maine if necessary for him to attend
a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. O.S.C. (ECF No. 10).
On March 26, 2026, Respondents filed their response to the order to show
cause, opposing Mr. Brito Pacheco’s petition. Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 11) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n). On March 26, 2026, Mr.
Brito Pacheco filed his reply. Pet’r’s Reply to Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 13) (Pet’r’s Reply). That same day, Mr. Brito
Pacheco also filed an amended verified petition. Am. Pet.2
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Mr. Brito Pacheco alleges his detention violates the Immigration Nationality
Act (INA) and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 	Id. ¶¶ 26-44. 	Mr. Brito Pacheco maintains he is illegally categorized
as a mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than a discretionary
detainee under § 1226(a). 	Id. 	He argues Respondents’ failure to conduct an initial
2 	On March 26, 2026, the Court issued an order, permitting but not requiring Respondents to
file an amended response in opposition to Mr. Brito Pacheco’s amended petition. Order. The Court
explained that if Respondents did not file an amended response, it would rule on the filings then before
it. 	Id. 	That same day, Respondents notified the Clerk’s Office they would not file an amended
response. The Court therefore rules on the briefing before it.
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custody determination and issue a warrant within forty-eight hours of his detention
violates the INA, associated regulations, and his due process rights. 	Id. 	¶¶ 26-29.
He seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release. Id. at 16.
In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Brito Pacheco is properly
categorized as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling
agency precedent. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2. 	However, Respondents acknowledge that
“the caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s
interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Brito Pacheco’s petition is not
substantially distinguishable from that line of caselaw. Id.
In his reply, Mr. Brito Pacheco argues that Respondents have failed to show
cause why his petition should not be granted. Pet’r’s Reply. Consistent with the body
of caselaw within this District, combined with Respondents’ concession that his
petition is not substantially distinguishable from that line of cases and their failure
to produce the warrant authorizing his arrest, Mr. Brito Pacheco urges the Court to
order his immediate release pending a bond hearing. Id. at 3-11.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.
Brito Pacheco’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief
‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to
relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always
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been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). 	Furthermore, under habeas law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over
this matter, because Mr. Brito Pacheco filed his habeas petition when he was in
custody in the District of Maine.
B. 	The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Brito Pacheco, and
he is therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to an
initial custody determination and, if denied release, a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge to review that initial custody determination.
1. 	Statutory Framework
a. 	Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	287 	(2018) (plurality 	opinion). 	Relevant 	here 	is
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§ 1225(b)(2).3 	Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”). 	As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several
conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 	Specifically, the
noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 	Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).
b. 	Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). 	Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
3 	Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV). Respondents do not assert that Mr. Brito Pacheco is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(1).
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Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	“establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention 	framework 	for
noncitizens.” 	Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2025). 	However,
§ 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one exception: immigration authorities
“shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved in certain enumerated criminal
activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those criminal activities is at issue here.
Once 	arrested 	under 	§ 1226(a), 	immigration 	authorities 	make 	an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). 	If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
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at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
2. 	Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have
prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by
over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)
mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));
Caiza v. Scott, 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (D. Me.
Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).
The phrase “‘seeking admission’ is undefined in the statute but necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 218. As other
courts to reach this issue have explained, ‘seeking admission’ “contemplates that
those arriving, i.e. those who appear at the border or a port of entry, [who] must be
inspected.” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025); see also Walizada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *11 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio v.
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Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *64-71
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805
F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-94 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
As a noncitizen continuously residing in the United States since August 2022,
Mr. Brito Pacheco is not “seeking admission,” and he is therefore not subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	See Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-
JAW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234386, at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v. Scott,
804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025). 	Rather, as a noncitizen “already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings,” Mr. Brito Pacheco is subject to
discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and he is entitled
to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.
Therefore, any determination as to Mr. Brito Pacheco’s detention must be
conducted under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which
“governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered
the United States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the
United States pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. 	Tumba Huamani v.
Francis, No. 25-cv-8110 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288).
3. 	Detention without a Warrant
Mr. Brito Pacheco’s petition also challenges his detention on the grounds that
Respondents’ failure to conduct an initial custody determination and issue a warrant
authorizing his continued detention violates the INA, applicable regulations, and due
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process. 	Am. Pet. ¶¶ 26-29; Pet’r’s Reply at 13-15. 	He maintains that his ongoing
detention is unlawful and, because Respondents never performed an initial custody
determination or ever produced a warrant authorizing his ongoing detention, the
appropriate remedy is his immediate release pending a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge. Pet’r’s Reply at 14-15.
Discretionary detention under § 1226(a) requires a warrant. See Jennings, 583
U.S. at 302; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 256-61 (“[A]bsent a warrant
a noncitizen may not be . . . detained under [§] 1226(a)”). Although the INA provides
limited exceptions for warrantless interrogations and arrests, in order to continue to
detain a noncitizen under § 1226, federal law, applicable agency regulation, and
caselaw from this District require immigration authorities to conduct an initial
custody determination and obtain a post-hoc warrant within forty-eight hours of
initially detaining the noncitizen. See Makuiza v. Wesling, No. 2:26-cv-00044-LEW,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18216, at *3-12 (D. Me. Jan. 30, 2026) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1226(a), 1357(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 287.3(d)). In other words, “when arrests
are made without a warrant, a custody determination must ordinarily be made within
48 hours, accompanied by a notice to appear, and in the case of continued custody a
warrant will be issued post hoc.” 	Id. at *5-6, *7-13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d))
(ordering § 1226(a) immigration detainee released after authorities failed to conduct
an initial custody determination and obtain a post-hoc warrant justifying continued
detention within forty-eight hours of warrantless arrest).
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The Court agrees with Mr. Brito Pacheco that because he is subject to
discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Respondents are required by law to conduct
and 	initial 	custody 	determination 	within 	forty-eight 	hours 	of 	his 	detention,
accompanied by a post-hoc warrant. 	However, the Court does not agree that this
conclusion requires his immediate release. 	Instead, the Court concludes that the
forty-eight-hour clock for Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination
begins at the date and time of this order. 	Unlike in Makuiza, in which the
Government initially detained the noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a) but “neglected to”
“justify[ ] its arrest decision[ ],” id. at *3-4, 11, in this case, Respondents do not
concede Mr. Brito Pacheco is subject to § 1226(a) but rather maintain, consistent with
controlling 	agency 	precedent, 	he 	is 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), which does not require an initial custody determination or warrant.
Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2 (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sep. 5,
2025)). 	Moreover, to retroactively apply the Court’s § 1226(a) determination in this
matter would place Respondents in the untenable position in future cases presenting
similar circumstances, in which Respondents must decide whether to deliberately
violate controlling agency precedent in anticipation of a possible objection a detainee
may or may not raise in a future habeas petition not yet before this Court, and then
further guess how this Court might rule. See Yepez v. Stamper, 1:26-cv-00113-JAW,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56166, at *18 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 2026).
Rather, in this case, given that Respondents have maintained since his arrest,
that Mr. Brito Pacheco is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), the
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forty-eight-hour custody determination clock begins to run at the time of this Court’s
determination that Mr. Brito Pacheco is subject to § 1226(a). 	Id. 	Accordingly, the
Court will order Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination of Mr. Brito
Pacheco pursuant to § 1226(a), at which point they may either release him or continue
to 	detain 	him. 	If 	Respondents 	continue 	his 	detention, 	they 	must 	obtain 	an
authorizing warrant and, as the Court concludes below, later provide Mr. Brito
Pacheco a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.
4. 	Bond Hearing
Because Mr. Brito Pacheco is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to
the full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D. Mass. 2025), which provides that he will
not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST .
amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). 	As the petitioner,
however, Mr. Brito Pacheco bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance
of the evidence that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 	See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d
691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)).
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To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 	See
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247 at
261-264 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to the detention of noncitizen
held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test); Sampiao, 799 F. Supp 3d at 30, 34
(same). 	Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the 	function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. 	Private Interest
In his petition, Mr. Brito Pacheco asserts “the most elemental of liberty
interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690
(“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms
of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates
their due process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who
requires the government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
noncitizen poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the
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evidence that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency
of their removal proceedings. 	See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. 	In this case,
Respondents have refused Mr. Brito Pacheco the bond hearing he is guaranteed
under § 1226(a) and have failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as
due process requires. 	Mr. Brito Pacheco has therefore clearly established the first
Mathews factor weighs in his favor.
b. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The 	second 	Mathews 	factor 	is 	“the 	risk 	of 	an 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk
of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
that Mr. Brito Pacheco presents any public safety or flight risk. 	Accordingly, the
second Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.
c. 	Government Interest
Finally, 	the 	third 	Mathews 	factor 	considers 	the 	“Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 	Id. 	Respondents do
not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Brito Pacheco’s continued detention
without a bond hearing. 	See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (identifying
governmental 	interest 	in 	favor 	of 	immigration 	habeas 	petitioners’ 	continued
detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an inapplicable
statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without a hearing. See
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Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens
“imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor weighs against
Respondents and in favor of Mr. Brito Pacheco.
The Court concludes that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Brito Pacheco without
a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates his due process rights.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Carlos Alberto Brito Pacheco
Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A) and R. 65(a) (ECF No. 12) and DISMISSES as moot his Verified Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). The Court ORDERS Respondents to conduct
an initial custody determination of Mr. Brito Pacheco pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
and associated agency regulation within forty-eight hours of the time and date of this
order. If Respondents release Mr. Brito Pacheco, the Court ORDERS Respondents to
return any of Mr. Brito Pacheco’s personal property in their possession to him at the
time of release. 	If Respondents continue Mr. Brito Pacheco’s detention, the Court
ORDERS Respondents to provide Mr. Brito Pacheco a bond hearing in accordance
with 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a)(2) 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	that 	custody
determination. 	The Court further ENJOINS Respondents from denying Mr. Brito
Pacheco an initial custody determination or a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) applies to him.
Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within twenty-
four 	hours 	of 	conducting 	his 	initial 	custody 	determination, 	stating 	whether
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Respondents released or continued detaining Mr. Brito Pacheco, accompanied by the
grounds supporting their determination and the warrant authorizing continued
detention. If Respondents continue detaining Mr. Brito Pacheco, the Court ORDERS
Respondents to file a status report within five days of Mr. Brito Pacheco’s bond
hearing, stating whether he has been granted bond, and, if his request was denied,
the reasons for that denial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 27th day of March, 2026
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