USA v. ADAMS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ERICK LEVAR ADAMS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	2:16-cr-00063-LEW-1
) 	2:25-cv-00122-LEW
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Respondent 	)
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION
Following a guilty plea, Petitioner was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and one count of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the Court sentenced Petitioner to 300 months
in prison. (Judgment, ECF No. 231.) The First Circuit affirmed. United States v. Adams,
971 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2020).
In May 2021, Petitioner filed a motion seeking habeas relief in accordance with 28
U.S.C. 2255. 	(Motion to Vacate, ECF No. 286.) 	The Court denied Petitioner’s motion.
(Order, ECF No. 321.) 	The First Circuit subsequently denied Petitioner’s request for a
certificate of appealability. (Judgment, ECF No. 326.)
Petitioner later filed a motion seeking postconviction relief ostensibly pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which the Court construed as a motion pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. 	(Motion, ECF No. 331;
Order, ECF No. 332.) Petitioner also filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision to
construe Petitioner’s filing as a 	§ 2255 motion. (Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No.
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335.) 	The Government contends that the § 2255 motion should be dismissed because it
constitutes a second or successive § 2255 motion. (Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 338.)
Following a review of the record and after consideration of Petitioner’s filings and
the Government’s request for dismissal, I deny the motion for reconsideration and
recommend the Court grant the Government’s request and dismiss Petitioner’s § 2255
motion.
D ISCUSSION
A prisoner typically has “one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from [a]
conviction” because Congress has placed “stringent limits on second or successive habeas
applications.” 	Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507 (2020). 	After a district court enters
judgment on a first petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) prohibits subsequent petitions unless a
court of appeals authorizes a district court to consider a new claim based on a prima facie
showing that the claim “relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or . . . it
alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish [the petitioner’s] innocence.”
Id. at 509; see also Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443, 446, 450 (2025); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)
(applying to § 2255 motions the same limits applicable to state prisoners seeking federal
habeas relief).
In May 2021, Petitioner filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence based on an alleged unreasonable search and seizure, an alleged sentencing error,
alleged due process violations, and the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 	(First
Section 2255 Motion, ECF No. 286.) 	As noted above, the Court denied the motion, and
the First Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
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Because Petitioner does not allege that any of the recognized exceptions permits a
second-in-time § 2255 motion without prior authorization, and because the record does not
establish that Petitioner received prior authorization from the First Circuit, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a new § 2255 motion. See Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57
(1st Cir. 1997) (the “prior approval provision allocates subject-matter jurisdiction to the
court of appeals by stripping the district court of jurisdiction over a second or successive
habeas petition unless and until the court of appeals has decreed that it may go forward”).1
Petitioner requests reconsideration of the decision to construe the motion as a § 2255
motion because he contends it was brought properly pursuant to Rule 52(b). (Order, ECF
No. 	332; 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration, 	ECF 	No. 	335.)2 Courts 	have 	long 	rejected
Petitioner’s argument, however, because Rule 52 applies to direct appeals, not collateral
attacks. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982) (“the ‘plain error’ standard
1 A later-filed petition does not qualify as “second or successive” in certain circumstances, including when:
(1) the prior petition was withdrawn or dismissed for technical or procedural reasons unrelated to the merits,
such as failure to pay a filing fee, see Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998), (2) the
claims challenge an intervening criminal judgment, such as one following a plenary resentencing after a
reversal on appeal, see Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 339 (2010), and (3) there was no prior
opportunity to assert the claims because they were not ripe, such as when the challenged conduct occurred
after the resolution of the first petition. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007); Restucci v.
Bender, 599 F.3d 8, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2010).
2 After construing Petitioner’s motion as a § 2255 motion, I ordered the Government to answer the § 2255
motion. (Order, ECF No. 337.) 	Petitioner then sought clarification because the Government had been
ordered to answer a § 2255 motion while there was a pending motion to reconsider the construction of the
motion as a § 2255 motion. (Motion for Clarification, ECF No. 343.) I granted the motion for clarification
and informed Petitioner that the Court would consider Petitioner’s arguments regarding Rule 52(b) when it
considers the merits of Petitioner’s motions and the Government’s motion. (Order, ECF No. 344.)
Petitioner filed an objection. (Objection, ECF No. 347.) Because the Court can rule on these related issues
after the issuance of this recommended decision, and because Petitioner will have another opportunity to
file an objection to this recommended decision, I discern no reason to wait for the Court to resolve the
objection to the order on the motion for clarification before issuing this recommended decision.
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is out of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction
after society’s legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has been perfected by the
expiration of the time allowed for direct review or by the affirmance of the conviction on
appeal”); United States v. Houston, No. 23-11127, 2024 WL 2748477, at *2 (11th Cir. May
29, 2024) (“In short, while [Rule 52] governs appellate review on direct appeal, it does not
grant independent authority for the district court to hear a collateral motion attacking [the
movant’s] sentence after the direct appeal”).
Because Petitioner previously exhausted his direct appeal and because the relief
Petitioner seeks is for the Court to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, the motion is in
substance a § 2255 motion. 	The Court, therefore, denies Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, because the motion is a second or successive § 2255 motion,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion.
First Circuit Rule 22.1(e) provides that if a second or successive § 2254 or § 2255
petition is filed in the district court without the required authorization from the First Circuit,
the district court “will transfer the petition to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1631 or dismiss the petition.” Because the current motion does not appear to be based on
newly discovered evidence of innocence or a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive on collateral review, the interests of justice do not support transfer to the First
Circuit.3 Dismissal, therefore, is appropriate.
3 In general, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced,” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), but
“new substantive rules”—those that “alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes”—
apply retroactively on collateral review. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 276 (2021). Petitioner invokes
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), which considered the “lengthy mandatory prison terms on
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C ONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, I deny the motion for reconsideration. 	An
evidentiary hearing is not warranted on the § 2255 motion under Rule 8 of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Cases. I recommend that the Court deny Petitioner’s motion for
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and grant the Government’s motion to dismiss. 	I
further recommend that the Court deny a certificate of appealability pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases because there is no substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
NOTICE
Any objection to the order on the motion for reconsideration must be
filed within 14 days of being served with a copy of the order.
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de
novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
Dated this 31st day of December, 2025 	U.S. Magistrate Judge
certain defendants,” like Petitioner, “who have previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug
offenses on separate occasions” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. at 825. The Erlinger
Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions, rather than a judge making the
determination under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which is permissible only for the fact of a
prior conviction. Id. at 825, 835. Because Erlinger did not “alter the range of conduct or class of persons
that the law punishes” and altered only the manner of determining guilt and penalty, the new rule of
procedure established in Erlinger is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See United
States v. Charles, No. 14-CR-10252-PBS, 2025 WL 3687935, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025) (collecting
cases).
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