DOUGLAS et al v. LALUMIERE et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOEL DOUGLAS, et al., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 2:20-cv-00227-JDL
)
SCOTT LALUMIERE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON BANGOR SAVINGS BANK AND ROBERT BURGESS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Joel Douglas, Steven Fowler, and James Lewis (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring
this action against Scott Lalumiere and twenty-five other defendants (collectively,
“Defendants”), asserting seventeen claims arising out of an alleged scheme to defraud
the Plaintiffs and obtain control or ownership of their real estate properties for the
purpose of borrowing against the properties’ equity. 	In total, the Defendants have
filed thirteen motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”)
(ECF No. 11) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 	This order addresses Bangor Savings
Bank (“BSB”) and Robert Burgess’s (collectively, “BSB Defendants”) motion to
dismiss the claims asserted against them under the Racketeer Influenced and
1 The following defendants have filed motions to dismiss: Androscoggin Savings Bank (ECF No. 37);
Camden National Bank (ECF No. 61); TTJR, LLC, LH Housing, LLC, and Eric Holsapple (ECF No.
65); LOSU, LLC and David Hirshon (ECF No. 70); Bangor Savings Bank and Robert Burgess (ECF
No. 98); Wayne Lewis (ECF No. 110); Machias Savings Bank (ECF No. 111); Coastal Realty Capital,
LLC, Michael Lyden, and Shawn Lyden (ECF No. 118); Andre Bellucci (ECF No. 147); BLR Capital,
LLC (ECF No. 197); F.O. Bailey Real Estate, LLC and David Jones (ECF No. 203); Russell Oakes (ECF
No. 223); and David Clarke (ECF No. 225). 	Only Defendants Scott Lalumiere, MECAP, LLC, and
Birch Point Storage, LLC have not filed motions to dismiss.
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Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2021), and state
law (ECF No. 98). For the reasons that follow, I grant the BSB Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, deny the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery,2 and deny as moot the
Plaintiffs’ objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Limited Discovery.
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges the following facts, which I treat as true for purposes of
ruling on this Motion to Dismiss.
The Complaint asserts that Scott Lalumiere and other defendants engaged in
three distinct but intertwined schemes to defraud the Plaintiffs. In the first scheme,
the Complaint alleges that Scott Lalumiere, funded by various banks and private
lenders, fraudulently induced several vulnerable individuals, including Plaintiffs
Steven Fowler and Joel Douglas, who lacked access to conventional credit, to enter
into unfavorable lease/buy-back agreements. Under the terms of the agreements, the
title of the victim’s property would be transferred to a corporate entity controlled by
Lalumiere with the victim, as the lessee, retaining a purchase option. The Lalumiere-
controlled entity would subsequently mortgage the property to banks and private
lenders, and, when the entity defaulted on its loan, the mortgagees foreclosed on the
property, frustrating the victim’s option to purchase.
2 I recognize that Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison denied the Motion for Limited Discovery on
January 21, 2021 (ECF No. 156). His order expressly recognized, however, that the Plaintiffs’ request
for limited discovery should be revisited as part of the Court’s assessment of the Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, I have treated the earlier order denying the motion as a deferral of action on the motion.
Further, I have considered the merits of the motion and, for the reasons explained herein, I deny the
motion.
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In 	the 	second 	alleged 	scheme, 	Fowler 	entered 	into 	an 	agreement 	with
Lalumiere whereby he would provide labor and materials at a discounted rate to
renovate certain properties controlled by Lalumiere, with the understanding that
Fowler could purchase the properties back upon the completion of the renovations.
However, 	Lalumiere 	frustrated 	Fowler’s 	right 	to 	purchase 	the 	properties 	by
defaulting on the mortgages, causing the mortgagees to foreclose on the properties.
In the third alleged scheme, several of the Defendants agreed to pay-off and
discharge Plaintiff James Lewis’s defaulted mortgage and to lend him money to make
improvements to his property in exchange for him deeding the property to a
corporation and making certain payments. 	After the title was transferred, they
refused to loan him the money and subsequently foreclosed on the property.
The Plaintiffs’ claims against the BSB Defendants involve the second scheme
noted above in relation to one property: 33 Sanborn Lane in Limerick, Maine. In May
2016, Fowler entered into an agreement with Lalumiere whereby Lalumiere would
pay Fowler for renovation work on the Sanborn Lane property in exchange for the
right to purchase the property for the payoff amount on the outstanding conventional
mortgage once the work was complete. 	In November 2016, BSB extended a loan to
Lalumiere secured by a $139,200 mortgage on the Sanborn Lane property. 	Fowler
was given control of the Sanborn Lane property, where he rented out the house
portion and used the garage portion for his business. Fowler paid Lalumiere rent for
the Sanborn Lane property from October 2016 to November 2019. 	In March 2020,
David Jones, another defendant, denied Fowler access to 33 Sanborn Lane and
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removed 	Fowler’s 	personal 	property. 	Even 	though 	Robert 	Burgess, 	a 	BSB
representative, denied that BSB delegated authority to Jones, the Complaint alleges
that “David Jones claimed to be acting under the authority of BSB.” ECF No. 11 at
¶ 123.
The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Limited Discovery from the BSB Defendants
in connection with the Plaintiffs’ response to the Motion to Dismiss. On January 21,
2021, Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison entered an order denying the Plaintiffs’
limited discovery request without prejudice, stating that “[t]he Court will consider
Plaintiffs’ [discovery] requests as part of the Court’s assessment of each defendant’s
motion to dismiss.” 	ECF No. 156 at 3. 	On January 28, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a
timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order (ECF No. 162). Below, I address the
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery and the Plaintiffs’ objection to Magistrate
Judge Nivison’s order as it relates to the BSB Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must
“accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader’s favor.” 	Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez,
711 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72
(1st Cir. 2011)). 	To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
53 (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012)). Additionally,
a court may consider inferences “gleaned from documents incorporated by reference
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into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.”
Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)).
To assess the complaint’s adequacy, courts apply a “two-pronged approach,”
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011): First, the court
must “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels
and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements,” and, second, the court
will “take the complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as
true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly
narrate a claim for relief,” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d
50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). 	To determine the plausibility of a claim is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although legal conclusory
statements may “provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” 	Id. 	The court must determine whether the factual allegations
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
In addition, the Plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims are subject to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a complaint “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” 	To satisfy this requirement, the complaint must
set forth the “time, place and content of an alleged false representation.” 	Howell v.
Advantage Payroll Servs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-438-NT, 2017 WL 782881, at *6 (D. Me.
Feb. 28, 2017) (quoting Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985)). 	The
Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are based in part on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud,
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which 	“must 	satisfy 	the 	particularity 	requirements 	of 	Rule 	9(b).” 	Ahmed 	v.
Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 889 (1st Cir. 1997).
This Order addresses four claims against the BSB Defendants: (A) the RICO
claim, (B) the contract claim, (C) the Maine Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice
(“MUTPA”) claim, and (D) the unjust enrichment claim. The RICO claim is one count
against the alleged enterprise operating the conspiracy. The contract claim, MUTPA
claim, and unjust enrichment claim stand for themselves. I address each category in
turn. 	The Complaint also alleges an illegal eviction claim (Count XII) and a
conversion of personal property claim (Count XIV) against the BSB Defendants, but
the BSB Defendants do not move to dismiss those claims. 	Thus, I do not address
those claims.
A. 	RICO (Count IV)
The Complaint asserts that the BSB Defendants participated in a RICO
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) (West 2021). 	“To prove a RICO conspiracy
offense, the [plaintiff] must show that ‘the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy,
agreeing 	with 	one 	or 	more 	coconspirators 	“to 	further 	the 	endeavor, 	which, 	if
completed, would satisfy all the elements of a substantive RICO offense.”’” 	United
States v. Velazquez-Fontanez, 6 F.4th 205, 212 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019)). It is not
necessary to “prove that the defendant or his co-conspirators committed any overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Leoner-Aguirre, 939 F.3d 310, 317
(1st Cir. 2019).
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Here, the Complaint alleges that the BSB Defendants conspired to violate
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a), which makes it unlawful to use or invest income derived from
a pattern of racketeering activity under certain circumstances:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . in which
such person has participated as a principal . . . to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.
An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity.” 	18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (West 2021). 	“To establish a pattern of
racketeering, a plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of ‘racketeering
activity’, as the statute defines such activity, and must establish that the ‘predicates
are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’”
McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 788 (1st Cir. 1990)
(quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239). 	“Racketeering activity”
encompasses mail fraud under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2021), wire fraud under
18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2021), and money laundering under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956
(West 2021). 	18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). 	A plaintiff asserting a § 1962(a) claim must
further prove that he was “injured ‘in his business or property by reason of’ the
defendant’s violation.” 	Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de France v. New England
Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 91 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West
2021)).
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The Plaintiffs’ theory is that the BSB Defendants conspired with the Lalumiere
Defendants3 to reinvest the income from a pattern of racketeering activity back into
the enterprise. The alleged racketeering activity was money laundering and mail and
wire fraud. The Plaintiffs assert that the BSB Defendants knowingly conspired with
Lalumiere because the BSB Defendants were privy to information that the funds used
to purchase the Sanborn Lane property were part of a larger conspiracy to launder
the enterprise’s money. 	Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the Sanborn Lane
property was paid for with proceeds from a fraudulent transaction involving the
property at 75 Queen Street, Gorham, Maine. 	The BSB Defendants argue that the
Complaint fails to plausibly allege that they knowingly joined the overall conspiracy.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the Complaint’s generalized allegations
regarding the BSB Defendants’ knowledge are not sufficient to establish the required
element of knowledge.4
First, the Complaint alleges that the BSB Defendants were “informed of the
fraudulent conduct in late November 2019.” However, while knowledge can be pled
generally, it cannot be alleged vaguely. 	The BSB Defendants were not involved in
the Queen Street transaction and the Complaint does not allege that the BSB
Defendants knew Lalumiere’s purchase of the Sanborn Lane property was funded by
the proceeds from fraudulent transactions involving the Queen Street property. The
3 This term refers to Defendant Scott Lalumiere and the corporate entities he controlled: Defendants
Birch Point Storage, LLC and MECAP, LLC.
4 As I will explain, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege that the BSB Defendants knowingly joined
Lalumiere’s conspiracy. For this reason alone, the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim against the BSB Defendants
fails. Therefore, I do not address the BSB Defendants’ additional argument that the Complaint fails
to sufficiently plead a plausible pattern of racketeering activity.
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conclusory allegation that the BSB Defendants were “informed of the fraudulent
conduct” is not sufficient to survive the BSB Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Second, the Plaintiffs assert that the BSB Defendants knew Lalumiere was
involved in lease/buy-back agreements, and this information should have put the BSB
Defendants on notice that the transaction for the Sanborn Lane property was
fraudulent. 	However, this assertion is made for the first time in the Plaintiffs’
opposition to the BSB Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and is not contained in the
Complaint. Regardless of the failure to properly plead this allegation, the Complaint
fails to point to any of the specific terms of the lease arrangement that, without more,
would have put the BSB Defendants on notice that this transaction was used to
launder money. The allegations thus suggest nothing more than a bank engaged in
arm’s-length financing in the normal course of business. 	See Terry A. Lambert
Plumbing, Inc. v. W. Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Bankers do not
become racketeers by acting like bankers”). The Complaint’s conclusory allegations
to the contrary are not enough to survive the BSB Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, 	the 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	allege 	facts 	that, 	if 	proven, 	would
demonstrate that the BSB Defendants knowingly joined the conspiracy. 	Therefore,
the RICO claim against the BSB Defendants is dismissed.
B. 	Contract Claim (Count X)
The Complaint asserts one claim against the BSB Defendants based on
Lalumiere’s misrepresentation that Fowler would be able to purchase the Sanborn
Lane property: breach of contract. The problem, as the BSB Defendants point out, is
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that the BSB Defendants were not parties to the allegedly fraudulent transaction. In
response, the Plaintiffs argue that there was an enforceable contract but do not
contest the fact that the BSB Defendants were not parties to that contract. Without
more, the Complaint cannot sustain a claim against a party that was not involved in
the agreement at issue.
C. 	MUTPA Claim (Count XIII)
The Complaint asserts that the BSB Defendants violated MUTPA, 5 Me. Rev.
Stat. tit. 5, §§ 205-214 (West 2021). Specifically, the Complaint alleges that, pursuant
to Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 6030 (West 2021), “[i]t is an unfair and deceptive trade
practice in violation of [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 207 (West 2021)] for a landlord to
require a tenant to enter into a lease or tenancy at will agreement for a dwelling unit
. . . in which the tenant agrees to a provision that has the effect of waiving a tenant
right” under various tenant-protection laws.
MUTPA provides “a private right of action to consumers who are injured as a
result of the use of unfair or deceptive business practices.” 	McGahey v. Fed. Nat’l
Mortg. Ass’n, 266 F. Supp. 3d 421, 435 (D. Me. 2017). By its terms, however, MUTPA
applies only to transactions that are made “primarily for personal, family or
household purposes.” 	Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 213(1) (West 2021); see C-B Kenworth,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 (D. Me. 1988) (“[MUTPA] creates a
private right of action only for those who have purchased goods, services or property
‘primarily for personal, family or household purposes.’” (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5,
§ 213(1)); Seacoast RV, Inc. v. Sawdran, LLC, 2013 ME 6, ¶ 5, 58 A.3d 1135, 1137
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(concluding the plaintiff did not purchase a car “primarily for personal purposes, and,
therefore, cannot bring a private cause of action pursuant to the [M]UTPA”). 	The
Complaint alleges that Fowler “rented out the house portion” of the Sanborn Lane
property and “used the garage portion for his business.” ECF No. 11 at ¶ 119. There
is no allegation that Fowler used the property for personal, family or household
purposes. Thus, the Complaint fails to allege that Fowler, or any other plaintiff, ever
used the property for non-business purposes.
Notwithstanding the lack of personal, family or household purpose, the
Plaintiffs’ MUTPA claim otherwise fails to state a violation of Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5,
§ 207. 	The Plaintiffs assert their MUTPA claim is based on Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14,
§ 6030, which prohibits landlords from requiring a tenant to enter into a lease or
tenancy at will agreement, in which the tenant agrees to a provision that has the
effect of waiving a tenant right. 	The Complaint, however, does not allege the BSB
Defendants were landlords or that they required Fowler to enter into a tenancy at
will agreement. Thus, the Complaint does not allege any violations of Me. Rev. Stat.
tit. 14, § 6030, and therefore there is not any MUTPA claim.
Because Fowler used the Sanborn Lane property for business purposes, and
because the Complaint does not state a violation of Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 6030, the
MUTPA claim against the BSB Defendants is dismissed.
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D. 	Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count XVII)
The 	Complaint 	asserts 	a 	claim 	for unjust 	enrichment 	against 	the 	BSB
Defendants based on the alleged “extraction of equity from the homes at 661 Allen
Avenue and 57 Queen Street.” ECF No. 11 ¶ 255.
A claim for unjust enrichment requires proof that “(1) [the complaining party]
conferred a benefit on the other party; (2) the other party had appreciation or
knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention of the benefit was under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.” 	Knope v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 ME 95, ¶ 12,
161 A.3d 696, 699 (quoting Me. Eye Care Assocs., P.A. v. Gorman, 2008 ME 36, ¶ 17,
942 A.2d 707, 712).
The Complaint’s unjust enrichment claim fails for two reasons. 	First, the
Complaint does not allege that a benefit was conferred on the BSB Defendants. The
Complaint also fails to allege that the BSB Defendants had any involvement in the
Allen Avenue or Queen Street transactions, nor does it assert an unjust enrichment
claim arising from the Sanborn Lane renovation work. 	Although Fowler suffered
harm through the frustration of his right to purchase the Sanborn Lane property and
his alleged eviction, the Complaint fails to plausibly assert facts that would establish
that a resulting benefit was conferred on the BSB Defendants. 	There cannot be an
unjust enrichment without a “conferred benefit.”
Second, the Complaint does not allege that the BSB Defendants had or should
have had “appreciation or knowledge” of the benefit received. 	The agreements that
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Lalumiere allegedly never intended to honor were entered into before the BSB
Defendants became involved. Further, for the reasons I have already discussed, the
Complaint fails to allege facts which, if proven, would establish that BSB knew or
should have known of the fraud when it made its loan to Lalumiere.
In sum, the Complaint fails to plead facts which, if proven, would establish a
right of recovery based on unjust enrichment.
E. 	Motion for Limited Discovery
A dismissal is not automatic once the lower court determines that Rule 9(b)
has not been satisfied. 	New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290
(1st Cir. 1987). 	Instead, after the Rule 9(b) determination, a “court should make a
second determination as to whether the claim as presented warrants the allowance
of discovery and if so, thereafter provide an opportunity to amend the defective
complaint.” 	Id. 	The plaintiff may have a right to limited discovery, to the extent
necessary to cure a Rule 9(b) defect about “the details of just when and where the
mail or wires were used.” 	Id. 	A court also has “some latitude” to allow discovery
“where a plausible claim may be indicated ‘based on what is known,’ at least where
. . . ‘some of the information needed may be in the control of the defendants.’”
Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Here, Plaintiffs seek limited discovery from the BSB Defendants to reveal
“communications between [BSB] and the other defendants” who were allegedly
involved in the conspiracy. 	ECF No. 129 at 3. 	Under the Plaintiffs’ theory, they
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believe that BSB had exclusive access to communications which are necessary to
prove the elements of fraud. 	BSB opposes the motion, asserting that the Plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate a right to limited discovery because they have not pled a
plausible claim and limited discovery is generally granted to cure particularity
deficiencies, not plausibility defects.
The decisions in Becher and Menard establish two possible grounds for
granting limited discovery. 	First, under Menard, where modest discovery may
“provide the missing link” to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, the court
may allow limited discovery “at least where . . . ‘some of the information needed may
be in the control of the defendants.’” 698 F.3d at 45 (quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi,
678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)). 	Here, however, the Complaint is not lacking a
“missing link.” The Complaint does not plausibly suggest that BSB had information
that would provide the “missing link” needed to remedy its deficiencies.
Second, as discussed in Becher, a court may allow discovery as to “the details
of just when and where the mail or wires were used” in a “RICO mail and wire fraud
case.” 	829 F.2d at 290; see also Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997). Here, however, the Complaint already contains factual allegations as to how
the scheme involved the use of interstate wires. 	There is no doubt that BSB uses
interstate wires in the course of its regular business activity. Additional information
as to how the conspiracy used the mail or wires would not cure the Complaint’s failure
to sufficiently allege that BSB knowingly joined the conspiracy.
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Neither Menard nor Becher offers a basis to grant limited discovery for the
Plaintiffs as against BSB. 	Thus, the Motion for Limited Discovery as to the BSB
Defendants is denied, and the Plaintiffs’ objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order
deferring action on the Motion for Limited Discovery until the Court assessed the
motions to dismiss, is denied as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Bangor Savings Bank and
Robert Burgess’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 98) is GRANTED. 	The Amended
Complaint 	(ECF 	No. 	11) 	as 	to 	Bangor 	Savings 	Bank 	and 	Robert 	Burgess 	is
DISMISSED in part as to all claims except Count XII and Count XIV. The Plaintiffs’
Motion for Limited Discovery (ECF No. 129) is DENIED and the Plaintiffs’ Objection
to the Magistrate Judge’s Order on Limited Discovery (ECF No. 162) is DENIED AS
MOOT as to Bangor Savings Bank and Robert Burgess.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2021
/s/ JON D. LEVY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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