USA v. LAPIERRE

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES LAPIERRE,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
2:25-cr-00102-SDN-1
ORDER
In this matter, the Government has charged Defendant James Lapierre with
attempted sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and
1594(a) by indictment dated July 9, 2025. ECF No. 26. Mr. Lapierre now moves to dismiss
the indictment for entrapment, see ECF No. 28, and selective prosecution, see ECF No.
29. He also moves to suppress “all evidence obtained as a result of his arrest,” arguing his
arrest was not supported by probable cause. ECF No. 41 at 1. Mr. Lapierre further moves
for “discovery of all government documents, memoranda, or other items that informed
the government’s decision not to charge another similarly situated individual in federal
court, as opposed to state court,” in pursuit of his selective prosecution claim. ECF No. 51
at 2, ¶ 15. On October 27, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Lapierre’s motion for discovery
without prejudice by written order. ECF No. 54. On Monday, November 17, 2025, the
Court held a hearing to address each of Mr. Lapierre’s pending motions. For the reasons
discussed herein and based on the testimony and argument from the hearing, I now deny
each of Mr. Lapierre’s pending motions.
BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2025, law enforcement agents posted two separate advertisements on
a website commonly used to advertise commercial sex acts. See Gov’t Exs. 2 & 3. Each
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
advertisement contained a contact phone number, images of what appeared to be a young
female, and language advertising the availability of commercial sex acts. On or about April
24, 2025, the number listed in the advertisements received a text message from a number
ending in -5721 in response to the advertisements, and a conversation ensued where the
user of -5721 asked what services were provided and the rates for such services.
In the first text message exchange (“Gov’t Ex. 4”), the undercover chatter1 stated
within the first three messages sent to Mr. Lapierre that her fourteen-year-old sister
Emma was offering the services. In response to his requests, the undercover chatter
provided Mr. Lapierre with three different photographs of the purported minor: one of
her standing with her face obscured, one of her lying on a bed with her face obscured, and
one of her lying on a bed depicting her face.2 During the text conversation, Mr. Lapierre
wrote that he was “interested just a bit nervous about how young she is” and texted the
chatter, “You do understand what a risk I am taking engaging with a minor.” In response,
the undercover chatter told Mr. Lapierre “i have a lot to lose w my sis so if u dnt want to
come then thats fine” and “i gte its a risk. if u dont want to then dont its not for everyone
hun.” Throughout the conversation, Mr. Lapierre and the undercover chatter negotiated
the rate for services and arranged for the meeting location in South Portland. In the text
message exchange in response to the second advertisement (“Gov’t Ex. 5”), Mr. Lapierre
asked the undercover chatter posing as the minor’s older sister if she also provided
1 At the hearing, the Government witness testified that several different law enforcement officers
acted as undercover “chatters” and posed as the adult sister for the purported minor throughout
the conversations with Mr. Lapierre.
2 The Government witness also testified the photographs depicted another undercover officer who
actually is older than 18. The government argues the appearance of the person in the photograph
nonetheless is consistent with that of a 14-year-old and relevant to demonstrate Mr. Lapierre’s
state of mind—that is, he intended to engage in commercial sexual activity with a minor.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
services. In response, the undercover chatter stated, “no not me this is all about my sis
hun.”
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lapierre arrived at the agreed-upon meeting location of a
hotel in South Portland, Maine. Mr. Lapierre proceeded to approach a woman who was
another undercover law enforcement officer (“UC2”) posing as the advertisement author
and Emma’s older sister. Mr. Lapierre confirmed he was there for “Emma” and stated he
had the money but asked to speak with the adult sister alone in her room. UC2 declined
Mr. Lapierre’s request to speak alone, provided him with a hotel key to the room of the
purported minor, and walked away. After she left, law enforcement officers apprehended
Mr. Lapierre and took him into custody.3 Following his arrest, officers recovered two
condoms and around $160.00 in cash on Mr. Lapierre’s person, and his personal phone
and work phone in his vehicle, the latter of which rang when officers called the telephone
number ending in -5721.
During the hearing held on November 17, 2025, the Court heard testimony and
oral argument on Mr. Lapierre’s pending motions. Specifically, the Court heard testimony
from multiple witnesses involved in the “sting” operation that led to Mr. Lapierre’s arrest,
including Maine State Police Detective Dezarae Fillmyer, who was both an undercover
“chatter” and the undercover officer who engaged in face-to-face contact with Mr.
Lapierre upon his arrival to the hotel.
At the hearing, Mr. Lapierre’s counsel also argued that the Government lacked
probable cause to arrest Mr. Lapierre, based, in part on the fact that “Emma’s” photo was
3 In its papers and at the hearing, the Government asserts that Mr. Lapierre proceeded to approach the
hotel room door before law enforcement apprehended him. The defense disputes that Mr. Lapierre began
to approach. The video depicting the events is from the perspective of law enforcement officers and is
inconclusive. Either way, this issue is not determinative to the Court’s conclusion.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
actually that of a legal adult. Counsel asserted that, contrary to the Government’s
argument that Mr. Lapierre refused to pay until he saw the purported minor, Mr. Lapierre
asked to speak with the “older sister” in the privacy of her hotel room in order to convince
the “older sister” to provide services to him. The Government responded by arguing Mr.
Lapierre took multiple steps in furtherance of the attempted criminal conduct, engaging
in commercial sexual activity with a minor, despite being provided multiple “off ramps”
by the undercover chatters to not engage.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss for Entrapment
A. Arguments
In his motion to dismiss for entrapment, Mr. Lapierre argues the indictment
against him should be dismissed as a “matter of law” because the “essential elements of
entrapment [are] uncontradicted.” ECF No. 28 at 2 (citing United States v. Price, 945
F.2d 331, 332 (10th Cir. 1991)). Mr. Lapierre argues the text message exchange between
himself and the undercover officer demonstrates that the Government “attempted to
improperly persuade or talk the Defendant into committing the crime” and that Mr.
Lapierre was “clearly uncomfortable with the nature of a commercial sex transaction[]
involving a minor.” Id. at 2, 3. Mr. Lapierre contends that he asked the undercover officer
if she, presumably an adult, also “provided services” but was “steered away from getting
what he asked for” and instead “steered toward a minor.” Id. at 3. Mr. Lapierre asserts the
chatter stated via text that the minor was “really experienced [a]nd likes doing it,” which
implied the Defendant would be doing the minor a favor by paying her money for
something she liked doing. Id. Next, Mr. Lapierre argues that he showed reluctance to
commit the offense by stating how nervous he was about the minor’s age and by stating
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
upon arrival at the hotel that he wanted to speak alone with the adult. Mr. Lapierre asserts
he was “persuaded to overcome his reluctance” by the undercover officer during the
multiple-hour-long text message exchange. Id.
The Government responds that Mr. Lapierre’s motion to dismiss based on
entrapment is untimely and is instead a matter for trial. ECF No. 44 at 9–10. The
Government further contends that even at trial, Mr. Lapierre would not be entitled to a
jury instruction regarding an entrapment defense because he has failed to show any
inducement on the part of the government. Id. at 10.4
B. Analysis
“Entrapment is an issue of fact and is therefore an inappropriate subject for a
motion to dismiss.” United States v. Towne, 705 F. Supp. 2d 125, 136 (D. Mass. 2010);
see United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Because the entrapment
defense requires factual determinations about government conduct and its likely effect
upon a defendant, the question of entrapment is generally one for the jury, rather than
for the court.” (quotation modified)); United States v. Schaffer, 586 F.3d 414, 426 (6th
Cir. 2009) (“It is seldom appropriate to grant a pre-trial motion to dismiss based on an
entrapment defense, because the defense focuses on a defendant’s state of mind, an
evidentiary question.”); Jackson v. United States, No. 4:11CV01687, 2012 WL 1185029,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2012) (finding counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise
4 In support of this argument, the Government states that 1) Mr. Lapierre was informed at the
inception of the text message exchange that the subject of the commercial activity was a fourteen-
year-old female, 2) the officer clearly communicated that the adult “sister” was not partaking in
the sex activity herself, 3) Mr. Lapierre continued to engage and negotiate prices, and 4) he
willingly came to the hotel room and brought the agreed-upon cash and his own condoms. ECF
No. 44 at 11–13.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
entrapment defense prior to trial, because entrapment is an issue of fact and question for
the jury rather than the court).
Contrary to Mr. Lapierre’s assertion, Price does not support the proposition that
this Court may find entrapment as a matter of law if the evidence satisfying the essential
elements of entrapment is “uncontradicted.” ECF No. 28 at 2 (quoting Price, 945 F.2d at
332). Should Mr. Lapierre feel it is warranted, he should, at trial raise the issue of
entrapment for the Court’s consideration as to whether the question should go to the jury.
Accordingly, Mr. Lapierre’s motion to dismiss on the basis of entrapment is denied.
II. 	Motion to Suppress
A. Arguments
In Mr. Lapierre’s amended motion to suppress, he argues the police lacked
probable cause to arrest him, and as a result, all physical evidence and statements
obtained following his arrest must be suppressed in advance of trial. See ECF No. 41 at 1.5
Mr. Lapierre’s primary argument appears to be an extension of his argument in his
motion to dismiss for entrapment, as he recounts his telling of the factual allegations and
his argument that the Government “engaged in improper persuasion, undue appeal to
sympathy, and false statements to overcome the Defendant’s reluctance to engage with a
minor.” See id. at 1–2. Specifically, Mr. Lapierre contends his action of refusing to pay any
money “until he has a private conversation with the adult” demonstrates he was not
prepared to “commit this particular criminal act with a minor” and thus evidences a lack
of unequivocal criminal intent. Id. at 4.
5 Aside from a brief mention in the introduction of his amended motion, Mr. Lapierre does not
make any specific argument regarding the suppression of his post-arrest statements to law
enforcement officers, other than his general probable cause argument.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
In its opposition, the Government argues that Mr. Lapierre “conflates trial
arguments with the much lower threshold for probable cause,” which requires only “‘a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.’” ECF No. 45 at 3 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)).
Indeed, Mr. Lapierre appears to argue that the standard for probable cause to arrest
requires a “lack of unequivocal criminal intent.” ECF No. 41 at 4. However, this standard
comes from case law interpreting the First Circuit pattern jury instruction for the crime
of Attempt at § 4.18.00, rather than the much lower standard required for probable cause
to arrest. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that in
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crime of attempt, if conduct
constituting a “substantial step” toward the commission of the substantive offense is the
sole proof of criminal intent, “then those steps unequivocally must evidence such a[
criminal] intent”).
Next, the Government asserts that the “overwhelming evidence reveals that 1) the
defendant intended to commit the substantial offense of sexual trafficking with a
minor . . . and (2) took a ‘substantial step’ towards committing” the offense. ECF No. 45
at 4. In support of this argument, the Government highlights numerous facts tending to
establish probable cause to arrest: Mr. Lapierre contacted the advertisement author
advertising commercial sexual activity with a minor, continued to communicate after
confirming “Emma’s” age was fourteen, was sent three photographs of a young female
consistent with a 14-year-old girl, negotiated prices for the commercial sexual activity,
drove to the location provided by the undercover officer behind the advertisement
number, confirmed he was there for “Emma,” and took the hotel room key and
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
approached the room where he was told the purported minor was waiting. Id. at 5–6.6 In
response to Mr. Lapierre’s argument that he wanted to engage with the adult sister rather
than “Emma,” the Government asserts the “undercover officers clearly closed the door to
this possibility multiple times more than one hour before the defendant’s arrival at the
Hotel.” Id. at 6.7
Regarding Mr. Lapierre’s argument to suppress his post-arrest statements to law
enforcement officers, the Government contends Mr. Lapierre does not challenge the
voluntariness of any statements nor allege a Fifth Amendment violation, and asserts that,
in any event, Mr. Lapierre made statements to law enforcement officers after being
advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 9; see Def. Am. Mot. to Suppress, ECF No. 41 at 2
(“Following Miranda, the government then interviewed the Defendant and obtained a
statement.”). The Government thus argues that Mr. Lapierre’s motion to suppress for lack
of probable cause should be denied, with respect to both the physical evidence and
statements obtained by law enforcement officers.
B. Legal Standard
“‘[P]robable cause exists when an officer, acting upon apparently trustworthy
information, reasonably can conclude that a crime has been or is about to be committed
and that the suspect is implicated in its commission.’” United States v. Flores, 888 F.3d
537, 543 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2009)).
“Whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is determined by viewing the totality
6 The Government also includes the fact that Mr. Lapierre brought the agreed-upon amount of
cash and condoms to the hotel. Because these items were recovered from Mr. Lapierre’s person
following his arrest, the Court does not consider these facts as part of the probable cause analysis.
7 For example, in response to Mr. Lapierre’s question on whether the adult sister provides services,
the undercover officer responded, “no not me this is all about my sis hun.” ECF No. 45 at 6.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
of 	the 	circumstances 	from 	the 	perspective 	of 	an 	objectively 	reasonable 	officer.”
Karamanoglu v. Town of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2021). “The relevant inquiry
is whether, on balance, the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest support
probable cause.” Id. at 88. Further, “probable cause is not a creature of certainty and does
not require either the level of proof needed to secure a conviction or even an ‘unusually
high degree of assurance.’” United States v. Centeno-González, 989 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir.
2021) (quoting United States v. Clark, 685 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2012)). Rather, “an
officer’s conclusion that probable cause exists requires only objective reasonableness.”
Karamanoglu, 15 F.4th at 88. Probable cause is “a fluid concept” and “requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.” Flores, 888 F.3d at 543 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 243 n.13). “Probable
cause is a common sense, nontechnical concept that deals with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [wo]men, not legal
technicians, act.” United States v. Vongkaysone, 434 F.3d 68, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2006)
(quotation modified).
C. Analysis
The totality of circumstances and the facts known to officers at the time of Mr.
Lapierre’s arrest support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Lapierre had committed the
crime of attempted sex trafficking of a minor. The text message exchange between
undercover officers and Mr. Lapierre demonstrates his awareness of the purported
minor’s age and intent to engage in sexual activity with the minor. Mr. Lapierre drove to
the location provided and upon arrival, confirmed with the undercover officer that he had
the agreed-upon amount of cash and received the hotel room key.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
The fact that Mr. Lapierre may have expressed some reluctance or discomfort with
the age of the purported victim does not alter the fact that law enforcement observed Mr.
Lapierre continue to engage in conversation with undercover chatters and negotiate
prices for the commercial sexual activity, drive to the hotel, and speak with who he
believed to be the victim’s older sister regarding the intended sexual activity, all after
learning of the purported minor’s age. The First Circuit and other appellate courts have
repeatedly found that similar conduct is sufficient for a conviction of attempted
commercial sex trafficking of a minor or other, similar charges, let alone sufficient for
probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 139–41 (1st Cir. 2011)
(affirming conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor where defendant responded
to multiple online advertisements and made plans to engage in commercial sexual activity
with a minor, including driving to arranged meeting location); United States v. Saldaña-
Rivera, 914 F.3d 721, 723–26 (1st Cir. 2019) (affirming conviction for attempted coercion
and enticement of a minor where defendant engaged in conversation with purported
eleven-year-old girl and drove to location for purpose of engaging in sexual activity); see
also United States v. Slim, 34 F.4th 642, 647–48 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming finding of
probable cause for attempted sex trafficking of a minor where defendant continued
conversation after being informed of minor’s age and drove to arranged meeting location
with cash and condoms). Accordingly, when viewing the facts known to officers at the
time of Mr. Lapierre’s arrest, the officers’ determination of probable cause was objectively
reasonable as it established “a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.”
Flores, 888 F.3d at 543 (quotation modified).
I similarly find unavailing the defense’s argument that the fact the photographs
provided to Mr. Lapierre depicted an adult woman evidences a lack of probable cause. As
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
relevant to the arresting officers’ determination of probable cause, Mr. Lapierre believed
he was shown a photo of a fourteen-year-old girl and proceeded to drive to the provided
location with the intent to engage in commercial sexual activity with the purported minor.
Mr. Lapierre’s motion to suppress for lack of probable cause, with respect to both physical
evidence and his post-arrest statements,8 is denied.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss for Selective Prosecution
A. Arguments
Mr. Lapierre also requests that the indictment be dismissed on the basis of
selective prosecution, arguing the decision to selectively prosecute Mr. Lapierre over a
similarly-situated defendant was based not “upon a comparison of criminal histories;
[but] rather a distinction between the Defendants based upon their proficiencies in
English.” ECF No. 29 at 1. Mr. Lapierre makes this argument based on the Government’s
decision to decline to prosecute another individual in federal court while bringing charges
against Mr. Lapierre. Id.9 Mr. Lapierre contends the decision was not based upon a
difference in the individuals’ criminal histories or mitigating or aggravating roles in the
offense, noting the “conduct of each Defendant was identical” in responding to the same
advertisement and location to engage in sex with the purported minor. Id. at 3.
8 In neither his motion nor at oral argument has Mr. Lapierre further developed the argument as
to why his post-arrest statements should be suppressed with respect to voluntariness or any other
constitutional issue. Because “issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by
some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived,” Mr. Lapierre’s motion to suppress
his post-arrest statements also fails. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
9 According to Mr. Lapierre, the other individual was arrested in the same federal string operation
as Mr. Lapierre and was later charged in state court on similar charges, where he faces no
mandatory minimum punishment and a maximum of 5 years in state prison, as compared to the
10-year mandatory minimum Mr. Lapierre faces. Id.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
In response, the Government argues Mr. Lapierre has failed to demonstrate the
Government’s decision to prosecute him, and not the other individual, was motivated on
the basis of any protected characteristic. See ECF No. 42 at 5–6. Further, the Government
contends, without conceding the issue, that even if the decision to prosecute Mr. Lapierre
resulted in a discriminatory effect, Mr. Lapierre cannot demonstrate that the Government
intended such a result. Id. at 6. The Government asserts that Mr. Lapierre’s “fluency in
English does not make him a target for discriminatory prosecution but rather is a vital
factor in the United States’ ability to proceed to trial . . . .” Id.; see also id. (“If evidence
showed that the defendant had difficulty understanding English, this would cast doubt on
whether he understood the nature of the agreement that he entered . . . which goes to the
heart of the United States’ burden at trial.”). Additionally, the Government further
disputes Mr. Lapierre’s contention that his conduct and the other individual’s conduct
were identical, noting Mr. Lapierre did not assert whether the other individual also gave
a post-Miranda confession or brought condoms or cash to the hotel. Id. at 8.
B. Legal Standard
“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains broad discretion as to
whom to prosecute.” United States v. Cameron, 658 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (D. Me. 2009)
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). In bringing a prosecution,
the Government is entitled to a presumption that “the prosecutor acted ‘in good faith for
reasons of sound governmental policy.’” United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d
833, 837 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1st Cir.
1981)). Once made, prosecutorial decisions enjoy a “presumption of regularity” which
“can be overcome only by a proffer of ‘clear evidence’ that the prosecutor acted
impermissibly in pursuing a case.” United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
(quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). “A showing of selective
prosecution can, of course, undercut the presumption of regularity.” Id. Such a showing
requires the defendant to “adduce clear evidence of both the discriminatory effect of the
prosecution and the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent.” Id.
To overcome the presumption of regularity, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing “(1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded
against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has
been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government’s discriminatory selection
of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of
constitutional rights.” Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d at 838 (quoting United States v.
Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1978)).
In reviewing prosecutorial discretion on the decision to prosecute, the First Circuit
has noted that a “multiplicity of factors legitimately may influence the government’s
decision to prosecute one individual but not another.” Lewis, 517 F.3d at 27 (citing Wayte,
470 U.S. at 607). These factors “may include, inter alia, the comparability of the crimes,
the similarities in the manner in which the crimes were committed, the relative efficacy
of each prosecution as a deterrent, and the equivalency of the evidence against each
prospective defendant.” Id. “This broad [prosecutorial] discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. Indeed, “[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the
prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
C. Analysis
For many of the same reasons discussed in my prior order denying Mr. Lapierre’s
motion for discovery in pursuit of his selective prosecution claim, see ECF No. 54, I rule
now that his motion to dismiss for selective prosecution is denied. The Government
asserts that its decision to prosecute Mr. Lapierre, while declining to prosecute the other
individual, was based upon their evaluation of the weight of the evidence and strength of
the case against each individual. As compared to the other individual—who is not a native
English speaker—the fact that Mr. Lapierre is fluent in English is particularly relevant in
this case, where a crucial part of the Government’s burden at trial will be proving that the
Defendant understood the nature of the agreement he was entering, namely, to engage in
commercial 	sexual 	activity 	with 	a 	purported 	minor. 	These 	type 	of 	factors 	and
considerations involving prosecutorial discretion are “not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d at 837
(quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). Moreover, even if Mr. Lapierre could establish that the
Government’s decision resulted in a discriminatory effect, he cannot further establish that
the decision to prosecute him in federal court, while declining to prosecute the other
individual, was made for a discriminatory intent or purpose.10 Accordingly, Mr. Lapierre’s
motion to dismiss for selective prosecution is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lapierre’s motions to dismiss for entrapment, ECF
No. 28, and for selective prosecution, ECF No. 29, are each DENIED. Further, Mr.
10 During oral argument at the November 17, 2025, hearing, Mr. Lapierre’s counsel conceded that
he could not prove discriminatory intent on the part of the Government in choosing to prosecute
Mr. Lapierre in federal court. Without establishing discriminatory intent, Mr. Lapierre’s selective
prosecution claim must fail. See Lewis, 517 F.3d at 25.
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
Lapierre’s amended motion to suppress for lack of probable cause, ECF No. 41, is likewise
DENIED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
Case 2:25-cr-00102-SDN Document 58 Filed 12/19/25 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>