FARIDANI v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROSEMARY F., 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00021-SDN
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
Commissioner of 	)
Social Security, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION
The Plaintiff in this Social Security Disability appeal contends that the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by failing to explain why he did not include
any mental limitations in his residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment after
finding earlier in his decision that the Plaintiff’s mental impairments resulted in mild
limitations. 	See Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 10). 	I discern no error and recommend
that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I. Background
The Plaintiff applied for benefits in May 2022. 	See Record at 18. 	After her
claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels of review, she requested a
hearing before an ALJ. See id. That hearing took place in November 2023, following
which the ALJ issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff had the severe impairments
of fibromyalgia and obesity with deconditioning as well as the nonsevere medically
determinable mental impairments of intermittent mood stability and generalized
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anxiety disorder. See id. at 18, 22-23. The ALJ went on to find that the Plaintiff had
the RFC to perform light work with several additional exertional limitations. 	He
ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a
paralegal and legal secretary with such an RFC and was therefore not disabled.
See id. at 28-29. 	The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s request to review the
ALJ’s decision, see id. at 1-4, making that decision the final determination of the
Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
II. Standard of Review
A final decision of the Commissioner is subject to judicial review to determine
whether it is based on the correct legal standards and supported by substantial
evidence. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence in this context means evidence in the administrative record that
a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support an ALJ’s findings. See Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019). 	If an ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, they are conclusive even if the record could arguably support a
different result. 	See Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 955 F.2d 765,
769 (1st Cir. 1991). 	But an ALJ’s findings “are not conclusive when derived by
ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.”
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
III. Discussion
The Plaintiff’s sole argument relates to the interplay between the ALJ’s
evaluation of her nonsevere mental impairments at Step 2 and his subsequent RFC
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assessment. I will begin, then, by sketching out the regulatory framework applicable
to Step 2 and the RFC assessment.
At Step 2 of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ considers “the medical
severity” of a claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment
is severe if it “significantly limits” a claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Conversely, an impairment is not severe if it does
not significantly limit a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 	See id.
§ 404.1522(a).
When evaluating the severity of a mental impairment, the ALJ must consider
the claimant’s degree of limitation under the so-called Paragraph B criteria consisting
of four broad categories of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or
applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. See id. § 404.1520a(b), (c).
In doing so, the ALJ uses a five-point scale—none, mild, moderate, marked, or
extreme—to rate the degree of limitation. See id. § 404.1520a(c)(4). 	If the degree of
limitation in each category is “none” or “mild,” the ALJ will generally conclude that
the impairment is not severe. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).
The limitations identified at Step 2 “are not an RFC assessment but are used
to rate the severity of mental impairment(s).” 	SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4
(July 2, 1996). The “mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation 	process 	requires 	a 	more 	detailed 	assessment 	by 	itemizing 	various
functions contained in the broad categories” of mental functioning. Id.
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When the claimant has both severe and nonsevere impairments, the ALJ must
still consider the impact of the nonsevere impairments when assessing the claimant’s
RFC. See id. § 404.1545(a)(2); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (“In assessing RFC,
the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an
individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’ 	While a ‘not severe’
impairment(s) standing alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability to do
basic work activities, it may—when considered with limitations or restrictions due to
other impairments—be critical to the outcome of a claim.”).
With this framework in mind, I now turn to the ALJ’s decision in this case.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that the Plaintiff’s “medically determinable mental
impairments 	of 	intermittent 	mood 	stability 	and 	generalized 	anxiety 	disorder,
considered singly and in combination,” were “non-severe” because they did “not cause
more 	than 	minimal 	limitation 	in” 	her 	“ability 	to 	perform 	basic 	mental 	work
activities.” Record at 22. In doing so, the ALJ explained in detail why he found that
the Plaintiff had only mild limitations in each of the four broad categories of mental
functioning:
The first functional area is understanding, remembering or applying
information. In this area, the [Plaintiff] has mild limitation. The record
reflects that [she] frequently denies difficulty with remembering or
making decisions. 	Additionally, she was often described as being
oriented and also displaying good long-term memory. 	Although there
was one notation that [she] lost track of and distorted information in her
short-term memory, this supports a finding of mild limitation in the area
of understanding, remembering, or applying information.
The next functional area is interacting with others. 	In this area, the
[Plaintiff] has mild limitation. 	[She] is routinely reported as being
pleasant albeit sometimes depressed. She displays good social judgment
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and is cooperative. 	Additionally, her . . . prior work history, in which
she worked for one employer for approximately seven years, shows she
is capable of interacting with others, although her recent spell of being
terminated supports a finding of mild limitation in interacting with
others.
The third functional area is concentrating, persisting or managing pace.
In this area, the [Plaintiff] has mild limitation. The record reflects that
[she] frequently denies difficulty with concentration. 	Additionally, the
record reflects that she often presents with normal concentration.
However, her history of panic attacks supports a finding of mild
limitation in the areas of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.
The fourth functional area is adapting or managing oneself. In this area,
the [Plaintiff] has mild limitation. 	[She] occasionally reports some
anxiety, and as noted above, she has a history of panic attacks and has
been terminated by her most recent employers, although she has a
history of being consistently employed. These support a finding of mild
limitation in the area of adapting or managing oneself.
Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted).
The ALJ went on to note that, while “the limitations identified in the”
Paragraph B criteria were not, in and of themselves, an RFC assessment, his RFC
assessment “reflect[ed] the degree of limitation” he “found in the” Paragraph B
“mental function analysis.” 	Id. at 23. 	He also acknowledged his obligation “to
consider all of the [Plaintiff’s] impairments” when assessing her RFC, “including
impairments that are not severe.” Id. at 20.
In his RFC assessment, the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s reported mental
health 	symptoms 	of 	forgetfulness, 	anxiety, 	depression, 	trouble 	sleeping 	and
concentrating, problems handling stress, and difficulties “get[ting] along well with
others,” and found that, while her “medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” her “statements concerning
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the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [the] symptoms [were] not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Record at 25.
The ALJ found “persuasive” the opinions of agency nonexamining consultants
Stephen Kleinman, M.D., and Lisa Fitzpatrick, Psy.D., both of whom opined that the
Plaintiff’s mental health impairments were nonsevere and that she had “only mild
limitations in the four ‘Paragraph B’ criteria.” Id. at 27. Conversely, the ALJ found
“unpersuasive” the opinion of treating provider Sarah Grace Alvarez, M.D., saying,
“Dr. Alvarez’s opinion that the [Plaintiff] has . . . additional limitations as a result of
her mental impairments is unsupported by and inconsistent with the record as a
whole . . . .” 	Id. 	The ALJ also found the opinion of psychological examiner
James F. Whelan, Psy.D., “largely unpersuasive” to the extent Dr. Whelan suggested
that the Plaintiff would “respond with anxiety and withdrawal when faced with
stress” because that opinion was “vague” and “unsupported by and inconsistent with
the detailed findings in the record supporting the adopted [RFC] and the opinions of
Drs. Kleinman and Fitzpatrick.” 	Id.
Ultimately, the ALJ did not include any mental limitations in his RFC
assessment. See id. at 24.
The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to
articulate why he did not include the mild mental limitations he found at Step 2 in
his RFC assessment. See Plaintiff’s Brief at 2-6, 9-15. She asserts “that an ALJ must
either include limitations he finds credible” at Step 2 “in his RFC” assessment or
“explain why he is omitting these credible limitations from the RFC” to satisfy SSR
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96-8p’s requirement that the ALJ provide a more detailed assessment of the
Plaintiff’s mental functioning as part of his RFC analysis. Reply Brief (ECF No. 13)
at 1-2. And she argues that the ALJ’s purported error was not harmless because the
ALJ found her capable of returning to her past skilled work, which involved
significant mental demands. See Plaintiff’s Brief at 6-8.
I find the Plaintiff’s arguments unavailing.
In his decision, the ALJ acknowledged the proper regulatory framework,
discussed the Paragraph B criteria in detail, indicated that his RFC assessment
accounted for the Plaintiff’s nonsevere mental impairments and the degree of
limitation he found at Step 2, discussed and evaluated the Plaintiff’s alleged mental
health symptoms in his RFC assessment, explained his reliance on the opinions of
two 	medical 	experts 	who 	opined 	that 	the 	Plaintiff’s 	mental 	limitations 	were
nonsevere, and explained his rejection of the opinions of two medical experts who
opined that the Plaintiff had more significant mental health limitations. 	No more
was required to satisfy the regulatory requirements outlined above. 	See Robles v.
Comm’r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	No. 	19-1148 	(GLS), 	2021 	WL 	3553788, 	at 	*4-5 	(D.P.R.
Aug. 11, 2021) (holding that an ALJ adequately considered a claimant’s “credited
mild mental limitations when formulating the RFC not only by incorporating the step
two analysis but also by considering [the claimant’s] allegations and medical evidence
on record in making the RFC determination”); Munoz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
22-1492-BJM, 2024 WL 1172666, at *9 (D.P.R. Mar. 19, 2024) (same); Taylor v.
Dudek, No. 1:24-cv-10533-JEK, 2025 WL 756078, at *3-5 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2025)
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(same); Marshall v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-cv-11431-JEK, 2025 WL 2207245, at *8-9
(D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2025) (same).1
The Plaintiff’s argument that further detail was required under SSR 96-8p
ignores the context of that ruling, which does not require “additional detail for its
own sake, but rather with the aim of itemizing broad categories . . . into specific,
actionable 	limitations 	in 	the 	RFC.” 	Landers 	v. 	O’Malley, 	No. 	24-cv-20-amb,
2024 WL 4929847, *6 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 2, 2024). 	SSR “96-8p’s ‘more detailed
assessment’ presumes that the mental health impairments identified at step two
actually impact [the claimant’s] ability to work, and so require limitations in the RFC,
which . . . must be more fleshed out and specific than a mere restatement of the
paragraph B categories.” 	Id. at *7. 	But when, as here, an ALJ finds a claimant’s
mental impairments do not significantly impact her ability to work—i.e., that they
are nonsevere and cause only mild limitation—there may well be no corresponding
limitations to flesh out in the RFC. See id.
The 	Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	relies 	too 	heavily 	on
boilerplate language incorporating his Step 2 findings into his RFC assessment to
permit meaningful judicial review. See Reply Brief at 3. It is true “that some courts
have concluded that similar incorporation-by-reference language constitutes empty
boilerplate where the ALJ did not discuss or give a reasoned consideration in
1 That the ALJ explicitly considered the Plaintiff’s mental impairments in his RFC assessment
distinguishes this case from Anderson v. Berryhill, 368 F. Supp. 3d 128, 136 (D. Mass. 2019), a case
cited by the Plaintiff where an ALJ’s decision was remanded because the ALJ “did not mention” the
claimant’s “mental and cognitive limitations” in her RFC assessment and it was “unclear from the
record whether the ALJ considered [the claimant’s] mild mental limitations and found them to have
no bearing on his RFC or whether she ignored those impairments altogether in determining his RFC.”
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formulating” 	a 	claimant’s 	RFC. 	Green 	v. 	Comm’r 	of 	Social 	Sec., 	No.
2:24-CV-1381-DAD-DMC, 2025 WL 2229369, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2025) (rec. dec.),
aff’d, 2025 WL 2644699 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025). But the ALJ’s analysis in the case
“is not mere empty boilerplate,” where he “provided a detailed analysis at Step 2” and
“then provided further analysis of [the] Plaintiff’s mental limitations, which included
a discussion of the medical opinion evidence, which [the] Plaintiff does not challenge.”
Id. 	When read as a whole, the ALJ’s decision makes clear that he considered the
Plaintiff’s nonsevere mental impairments in assessing her RFC and leaves little
doubt as to why he did not include any mental limitations.
Finally, the Plaintiff’s primary reliance on Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061
(10th Cir. 2013) is misguided. 	See Plaintiff’s Brief at 9, 14; Reply Brief at 3. 	The
ALJ’s decision in Wells was ultimately remanded because it was not supported by
substantial evidence, not because the ALJ failed to provide the “more detailed
assessment” required by SSR 96-8p. As the Tenth Circuit explained in a later case,
Wells held that, in light of the Commissioner’s regulations, a conclusion
that the claimant’s mental impairments are non-severe at step two does
not permit the ALJ simply to disregard those impairments when
assessing a claimant’s RFC and making conclusions at steps four and
five. . . . In Wells, however, the ALJ, in addition to his statement about
the RFC at step two, separately discussed the claimant’s nonsevere
mental impairments in his RFC analysis at step four. 	We stated that
his discussion, though far from systematic, may have been adequate to
fulfill his duty at step four to determine the claimant’s mental RFC.
Ultimately, the problem in Wells was that the discussion was not
supported by substantial evidence.
Alvey v. Colvin, 536 F. App’x 792, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
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If anything, Wells lends further support to the idea that an ALJ who finds a
claimant’s mental impairments nonsevere at step 2 and discusses those nonsevere
impairments in his RFC assessment—even if “far from systematic[ally]”—satisfies
the requirements of SSR 96-8p. 	Wells, 727 F.3d at 1065; see also Suttles v. Colvin,
543 F. App’x 824, 825-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (“After finding [the claimant’s] depression
non-severe at step two, the ALJ recognized that a distinct mental RFC assessment
was required at step four . . . . 	At step four, the ALJ discussed evidence relating to
depression and then pointedly omitted any limitation associated with that mental
impairment [from] the RFC . . . , though the ALJ admittedly could have been more
explicit in tying the former discussion to the latter conclusion. 	. . . Taking common
sense, not technical perfection as our guide, we hold that the ALJ conducted a mental
RFC assessment separate from the non-severity determination made at step two.”
(cleaned up)).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate
Judge’s 	report 	or proposed 	findings 	or 	recommended 	decisions 	entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District
Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
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Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s
order.
Dated: February 4, 2026
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge
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