CAREY v. SUNDAY RIVER SKIWAY et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SETH T. CAREY, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00384-SDN
)
SUNDAY RIVER SKIWAY and 	)
DARREN TRIPP, 	)
)
Defendants 	)
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW
Because I granted Seth T. Carey’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, see
ECF No. 4, his complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before me for preliminary review in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In his complaint, Carey brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(CRA), and state tort law against his former employer Sunday River Skiway and its
head of security Darren Tripp (collectively, Sunday River). Carey argues that Sunday
River discriminated against him when it refused to reemploy him, alleging that its
decision was motivated by his ADHD rather than his criminal history, as Sunday
River claimed. 	Inconsistently, Carey also alleges that Sunday River discriminated
against him when it declined to rehire him based on his criminal history.
Carey’s complaint is subject to dismissal for several reasons.
First, Carey’s complaint lacks sufficient cogent detail to state claims under the
ADA and the MHRA because it lacks adequate facts to show that Sunday River
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refused to rehire him based on his disability. 	Sunday River’s alleged knowledge of
Carey’s ADHD diagnosis (which, according to him, never caused any performance
issues during his prior employment at Sunday River), and his speculation that it
viewed him as mentally ill when it described his behavior in seeking to be rehired as
“inappropriate” 	are 	not 	enough 	to 	satisfy 	the 	Twombly/Iqbal 	standard.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that a complaint
fails to state a claim when it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice” to state a claim for relief.).
Second, Carey fails to state a claim under Title VII of the CRA because having
a 	criminal 	history 	does 	not 	make 	him 	a 	member 	of 	a 	protected 	class.
See Casillas-Guardiola v. Bayer P.R., Inc., No. 22-1167 (GMM), 2025 WL 2806814,
at *23 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)) (“Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on an ‘individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”).1
Third, Carey’s state law tort claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (IIED) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) fail because he
has not alleged facts showing that Sunday River engaged in extreme or outrageous
conduct or that it owed him a duty of care. See Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage,
Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 25, 48 A.3d 774 (noting that a claim of IIED requires a showing
1 Carey briefly states that Sunday River also discriminated against him based on his sex, see
Complaint at 9, but his complaint lacks any cogent details to support that claim.
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of conduct “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and
must be regarded as atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community”); Curtis
v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶¶ 18-19, 784 A.2d 18 (explaining, in the NIED context, that
there is no “general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm,” but rather
that this duty is recognized in “very limited circumstances” such as in “bystander
liability actions” or where “a special relationship exists between the actor and the
person emotionally harmed”).
Finally, Carey’s claim under Maine’s “An Act Relating to Fair Chance in
Employment” fails because that law does not—as Carey asserts—forbid an employer
such 	as 	Sunday 	River 	from 	considering 	a 	job 	candidate’s 	criminal 	history.
See 26 M.R.S.A. § 600-A (Westlaw Nov. 3, 2025) (prohibiting employers from asking
about criminal history on initial application forms and requiring employers to give
an otherwise qualified applicant the opportunity to explain any convictions).
For these reasons, I recommend that the Court DISMISS Carey’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate
Judge’s 	report 	or proposed 	findings 	or 	recommended 	decisions 	entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District
Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s
order.
Dated: November 3, 2025 	/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge
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