United States of America v. Vinton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTONIO VINTON, JR.,
Defendant.
2:18-CR-20553-TGB-DRG-1
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE (ECF NO. 125) AND
MOTION TO APPOINT
COUNSEL (ECF NO. 141)
Presently before the Court is Defendant Antonio Vinton, Jr.’s
Motion for Compassionate Release. ECF No. 125. Defendant filed his
initial 	motion 	pro 	se, 	but 	eventually 	secured 	counsel, 	who 	filed 	a
supplemental brief in support. ECF No. 130. The Government responded
in opposition. ECF No. 134. Defense counsel withdrew before filing a
Reply, and Defendant filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. ECF No. 141.
For the following reasons, Vinton’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF
No. 141) and Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 125) will be
DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The FBI first started investigating Vinton in 2018 for suspected
coercion and enticement of a minor. On January 8, 2024, Vinton pled
guilty to a single count for transfer of obscene material to a minor in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470. While his case progressed through the
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federal criminal system, Vinton was diagnosed with Esophageal Cancer
in 	2021. 	Pre-Sentence 	Report 	(“PSR”), 	ECF 	No. 	118 	(sealed),
PageID.1035. The cancer had reached Stage IV by that time.1 Id. Vinton
completed 12 rounds of chemotherapy, as well as two months of radiation,
and eventually went into remission in December 2022. Id. At the time of
sentencing, on March 19, 2024, Vinton’s cancer was still in remission,
and he was taking preventative medicine, Nivolumab, which is marketed
as Opdivo. Id. During the sentencing hearing, Vinton’s counsel asked for
a designation to a medical facility and stated that Vinton “has had some
very difficult medical issues, but he’s in remission at this time,” and he
is “still receiving chemotherapy and immunotherapy.” Tr., ECF No. 129,
PageID.1139. The Court explicitly addressed Vinton’s medical condition
when imposing a sentence of 72 months, in accordance with the plea
agreement:
He’s had serious health problems here. And a person who is
Mr. Vinton’s age and with serious health problems is in a
totally different situation than someone who is healthy and
younger. . . . [His statement] suggests . . . that even at a more
advanced stage when he got out he might still think that this
was okay.
Id. at PageID.1145.
1 Stage IV means the cancer has spread to other parts of the body. See
AMERICAN 	CANCER 	S OCIETY, 	Treating 	Esophageal 	Cancer 	by 	Stage,
available 	at 	https://www.cancer.org/cancer/types/esophagus-
cancer/treating.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2025).
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Vinton arrived at FCI Butner on May 13, 2024. ECF No. 135-4
(sealed), PageID.1383. Vinton was seen by BOP doctors regularly to
monitor and follow up on his various medical conditions, including his
history 	of 	esophageal 	cancer. 	See 	Medical 	Records, 	ECF 	No. 	135-3
(sealed); ECF No. 125, PageID.1108. In June 2024, a doctor reported
“mild thickening distal esophagus into gastric cardia,” and in September
2024, the doctor reported “stable thickening” while on Nivolumab. ECF
No. 	135-3 	(sealed), 	PageID.1215. 	On 	October 	10, 	2024, 	the 	doctor
identified a “malignant neoplasm of esophagus” during a consultation for
Vinton’s “Stage IV Esophageal Cancer with progressive dysphagia.” ECF
No. 125, PageID.1108.
Vinton 	believed 	these 	were 	signs 	of 	a 	possible 	progression
downward suggesting a recurrence of his Stage IV cancer. As a result, on
October 18, 2024, he filed a request for compassionate release with the
Warden, stating he had a terminal illness with an end-of-life trajectory.
See 	ECF No. 125, PageID.1110. The Warden denied the request on
October 24, 2024, stating Vinton did not meet the criteria under Program
Statement 5050.50 because he did not have a terminal illness, with a life
expectancy of less than 18 months, and he was independent with his self-
care. ECF No. 135-2 (sealed), PageID.1208. id. On November 22, 2024,
Vinton submitted a request for administrative remedy, stating a recent
amendment to the sentencing guidelines removed the need to provide a
specific life expectancy prognosis for compassionate release. ECF No.
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135-1 	(sealed), 	PageID.1203. 	The 	request 	was 	properly 	received 	on
December 3, 2024,2 and the Warden denied it on December 9, 2024
because Vinton’s status had not changed since October 2024, and Vinton
did not have a terminal illness with a life expectancy less than 18 months.
ECF No. 135-2 (sealed), PageID.1207-06. On December 18, 2024, he
asked the BOP Social Work Department for help regarding his request,
which responded that “[a]t this time the program statement has not
changed the way the Bureau processes CR/RIS requests” and explained
that Vinton could utilize the administrative remedy process to appeal the
determination. ECF No. 125, PageID.1110. But Vinton did not appeal the
decision to the Regional Director. Instead, on December 31, 2024, Vinton
filed the instant Motion for Compassionate Release, claiming he had a
terminal illness, and it did not matter what his life expectancy was. Id.
at PageID.1093. The Motion was mailed on January 6, 2025, and received
by this Court on January 13, 2025. Id. at PageID.1117.
In supplemental briefing and responses, the parties submitted
additional medical records shedding light on Vinton’s evolving medical
situation. In November 2024, the doctor noted “high grade dysplasia” but
“no obvious cancer seen” and “neg[ative] for invasive malignancy.” ECF
No. 135-3 (sealed), PageID.1215. But on January 16, 2025, during a visit
2 The November 22, 2024 request was denied because Vinton had not
completed the correct form nor included enough specific detail. ECF No.
135-1 (sealed), PageID.1197.
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to 	evaluate 	the 	“status” 	of 	Vinton’s 	esophageal 	cancer 	“post
chemotherapy and radiation therapy completed in 2022,” doctors noted
an “uptake in the distal esophagus SUV [standardized uptake value] max
4.25,” 	which 	suggests 	a 	potential 	malignancy, 	warranting 	further
investigation to see if the cancer has returned and whether surgery would
be appropriate. Radiologic Report (“Attachment B”), received via email;
ECF No. 135-3 (sealed), PageID.1215. On February 6, 2025, after a
review 	of 	“abnormal 	labs,” 	the 	oncologist 	“cleared 	for 	Stage 	IV
Esophageal Cancer treatment.” ECF No. 135-3 (sealed), PageID.1248. At
the same time, Vinton was taken off of Nivolumab on February 24, 2025
because of concerns that it was causing dermatitis and pneumonitis. ECF
No. 135-3 (sealed), PageID.1240. On February 24, 2025, the stated plan
for treatment was to consult for cardiothoracic (“CT”) surgery to discuss
surgical options, such as esophagectomy, regarding Vinton’s esophageal
cancer. ECF No. 135-3 (sealed), PageID.1240-41.
Based on the parties’ brief, as corroborating medical records have
not 	been 	submitted 	to 	the 	Court, 	the 	BOP 	transported 	Vinton 	to
specialists at Duke Cancer Center, Durham, North Carolina, in April
2025, where Duke proposed to surgically remove his esophagus and half
his 	stomach 	to 	reduce 	the 	chances 	of 	recurrence. 	Defendant’s
Supplemental 	Motion, 	ECF 	No. 	130, 	PageID.1160; 	ECF 	No. 	134,
PageID.1180.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Generally speaking, once a court has imposed a sentence, it does
not have the authority to change or modify that sentence unless such
authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. Curry, 606
F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2010). One such statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c),
which provides for compassionate release of a defendant based on “post-
sentencing factual developments.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555,
569 (6th Cir. 2021).
Under 	§ 	3582(c)(1)(A), 	a 	district 	court 	may 	grant 	a 	sentence
reduction “only if it finds that the defendant satisfies three requirements:
(1) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; (2)
the ‘reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the 	Sentencing 	Commission’; 	and 	(3) 	the 	relevant 	§ 3553(a) 	factors
support 	the 	reduction.” 	Hunter, 	12 	F.4th 	at 	561 	(quoting 	§
3582(c)(1)(A)(i); then United States v Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir.
2021)). Furthermore, before a defendant can seek compassionate release,
he must exhaust administrative remedies or wait 30 days from the
Warden’s receipt of his request. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831,
833–34 (6th Cir. 2020).
The policy statement applicable to compassionate release motions,
18 U.S.C. § 1B1.13, was amended (effective November 1, 2023) to describe
six categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons that individually,
or in combination, may support a request for compassionate release. As
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relevant here, the medical circumstances of a defendant may constitute
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	under 	the 	Sentencing
Commissioner’s policy if:
(1)(A) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e.,
a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory).
A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of
death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples
include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis 	(ALS), 	end-stage 	organ 	disease, 	and 	advanced
dementia.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). The defendant bears the burden of proving that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist to justify release under the
statute. United States v. Marrell, 2024 WL 3251272, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
July 1, 2024)(Parker, J.) (citing to United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d
1031, 1033 (6th Cir. 1990)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) contains an exhaustion requirement: prior to
filing 	a 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release, 	a 	defendant 	must 	“fully
exhaust[ ] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of
Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf” or 30 days must lapse
“from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s
facility, whichever is earlier.” See Alam, 960 F.3d at 832 (dismissing
without prejudice motion for compassionate release filed only “10 days
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after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion in federal court,
not 	the 	required 	30 	days”). 	While 	this 	administrative 	exhaustion
requirement 	is 	“not 	jurisdictional, 	it 	is 	a 	mandatory 	claim-
processing rule by 	which 	this 	Court 	must 	abide.” 	United 	States 	v.
McAfee, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113677, *2-3 (S.D. Ohio June 29, 2020)
(citing Alam, 960 F.3d at 833).
Vinton has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The
Warden denied Vinton’s latest request for administrative remedy on
December 9, 2024, and told Vinton he could appeal to the Regional
Director within 20 days. ECF No. 135-2 (sealed), PageID.1206-07. On
December 18, 2024, Vinton asked the BOP Social Work Department for
help 	regarding 	his 	request, 	and 	was 	told 	he 	could 	utilize 	the
administrative remedy process to appeal the determination. ECF No.
125, PageID.1110. Appeal to the Regional Office and to the Office of
General Counsel are required to fully exhaust the administrative remedy
process. Declaration of S. Allison-Love, ECF No. 134-2, PageID.1191. But
Vinton did not appeal the decision. Id. at PageID.1192. Therefore, he did
not fully exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the instant
Motion for Compassionate Release.
Furthermore, because the Warden responded to Vinton’s requests
within 30 days, both on October 24 (6 days later) and on December 9 (6
days later), Vinton cannot rely on the “30-days” rule. See McAfee, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113677, *2-3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (“A
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defendant may only file a motion for compassionate release after having
‘fully 	exhausted 	all 	administrative 	rights 	to 	appeal’ 	. 	. 	. 	or 	after
receiving no response from the warden within thirty days, whichever is
earlier.”); United States v. Vaughan, No. 2:13-CR-36, 2025 WL 2298369,
at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2025) (“At the time the motion was filed, . . .
thirty days had passed with no response from the warden. Therefore, Mr.
Vaughan has exhausted his administrative remedies, and this Court may
consider his motion.”). In any event, Vinton did not wait 30 days from the
Warden’s receipt of his latest request on December 3, 2024 to send the
instant Motion on December 31, 2024, even though it was received by the
Court on January 13, 2025. ECF No. 135-2 (sealed), PageID.1206; see
Alam, 960 F.3d at 832 (“Alam has not exhausted his administrative
appeals because he waited just 10 days after the warden's receipt of his
request to file his motion in federal court, not the required 30 days.”).
Therefore, Vinton has not exhausted his remedies, and the Court
may deny the Motion on this basis alone. See McAfee, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 113677, *2-3.
B. Terminal Illness
Furthermore, the medical records provided to the Court do not, at
this time, show that Vinton’s medical condition rises to the level of
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release.
Vinton argues “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A),
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because Vinton allegedly suffers from terminal cancer with an end-of-life
trajectory. However, that argument fails for two reasons.
First, a review of Vinton’s medical records suggests it is premature
to conclude that his esophageal cancer is terminal with an end-of-life
trajectory. Vinton’s counsel argues that the recurrence of Stage IV cancer
is terminal with an end-of-life trajectory, because “up to 50% of patients
treated with curative esophagectomy for esophageal cancer will develop
recurrence, contributing to the dismal survival associated with this
disease.”3 ECF No. 130, PageID.1160. He states that life expectancy of
Stage IV esophageal cancer patients, following recurrence, is 16.6 months
to 33.4 months, depending on the type of treatment. Id.
The records do show that Vinton is being treated for esophageal
cancer and has a history of such cancer.4 However, the records do not
conclusively indicate that Vinton’s Stage IV cancer has returned or that
he is on an end-of-life trajectory. Vinton’s counsel admitted the same,
stating 	Vinton 	“suffers 	from 	a 	suspected 	recurrence 	of 	Stage 	IV
Esophageal Cancer” and that “recent developments show Vinton’s cancer
may be returning.” ECF No. 130, PageID.1157, 1159 (emphasis added).
3 Boerner T. et al., Incidence and Management of Esophageal Cancer
Recurrence to Regional Lymph Nodes After Curative Esophagectomy, 152
I NT’ L J. CANCER 2109, 2109 (2023).
4 	As 	Vinton’s 	counsel 	acknowledged, 	the 	Court 	already 	considered
Vinton’s cancer and remission status when it sentenced him in March
2024. 	See Hunter, 12 F.4th at 569 (noting that “extraordinary and
compelling” focuses “on post-sentencing factual developments”).
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The Court understands Vinton’s concerns that his cancer might be “in
recurrence,” especially since he has been unable to take Nivolumab, his
preventive medication, since February 2025.
It is true that a “specific prognosis of life expectancy . . . is not
required” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). But what is required is evidence
that Vinton suffers from a “from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory),” such as metastatic solid-
tumor (or Stage IV) cancer or end-stage organ disease. See United States
v. 	Karr, 	611 	F. 	Supp 	395, 	400 (E.D. 	Ky. 	Feb. 	18, 	2020) (granting
compassionate release based on “well-documented diagnosis of ‘terminal
metastatic’ Stage IV cancer”); United States v. Smallwood, No. 5:08-CR-
00038-TBR, 2020 WL 5486729, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2020) (granting
compassionate release where defendant faced a recurrence of her tumor,
which put her at risk of complications if contracting COVID-19, and the
“side 	effect 	from her 	cancer treatment—the 	need for a 	wheelchair,
feeding tube, no teeth, and the difficulty speaking” were “permanent
disabilities”).
Here, doctors who evaluated Vinton suspect some change in the
status of his cancer requiring additional evaluation and treatment to
determine whether the cancer has returned or what treatment might be
needed to prevent recurrence, including esophagectomy. While Vinton’s
counsel pointed to studies showing that there is a 50% likelihood Vinton
would develop recurrence after surgery, there would likewise be a 50%
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chance 	he 	does 	not 	develop 	recurrence 	after 	surgery. 	A 	suspected
recurrence 	does 	not 	satisfy 	defendant’s 	burden 	of 	proving 	that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist to justify release under the
statute.
Vinton’s 	counsel 	cited 	to 	a 	case 	in 	which 	this 	Court 	granted
compassionate release even though the parties agreed the defendant
“ha[d] not been formally diagnosed with cancer, or with any other
terminal illness.” United States v. English, No. 2:19-CR-20164-TGB-
EAS-1, 2022 WL 17853361, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2022). However,
the Court did so based on medical records which presented a “history of
BOP’s 	gross 	mismanagement 	of 	[the 	defendant]’s 	serious 	health
conditions.” Id. Here, there is no indication the BOP is failing to respond
to Vinton’s health needs, and on the contrary, records show that he has
been seen by BOP doctors monthly and that the BOP scheduled him for
surgery in a large outside hospital to limit the risk of recurrence. To the
extent Vinton requires specialized medical care, that medical care is
being provided to him. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)–(C).
Therefore, based on the records available to the Court, Vinton has
failed to demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
compassionate 	release 	at 	this 	time.5 	If 	Vinton’s 	health 	conditions
5 The Court need not explore the § 3553 factors since there are no
compelling reasons for compassionate release at this time. See United
States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting that a district
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materially 	decline 	and 	such 	conditions 	are 	supported 	by additional
medical 	records 	that 	can 	support 	a 	finding 	of 	extraordinary 	and
compelling reasons, Vinton may renew his motion for compassionate
release after fully exhausting the administrative remedy process or if the
warden does not act on his request for release within thirty days, as
explained above.
C. Appointment of Counsel
On August 21, 2025, Vinton requested that the Court appoint
counsel because “[d]ue to his imprisonment, he does not have the ability
nor the resources to obtain counsel.” ECF No. 141. The appointment of
counsel 	in 	§ 	3582(c) 	proceedings 	is 	discretionary. 	United 	States 	v.
Cleveland, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30608, *9 (6th Cir. 2025). This Court
has already denied Vinton’s first request to appoint substitute counsel on
July 17, 2025 after his paid counsel withdrew, because “there is no
constitutional (or statutory) right to appointed counsel in § 3582(c)
proceedings.” ECF No. 139, PageID.1390 (citing United States v. Manso-
Zamora, 991 F.3d 694, 696 (6th Cir. 2021)). Vinton did not present
exceptional circumstances that warrant the appointment of counsel at
this 	time. 	Therefore, 	Vinton’s 	Motion 	to 	Appoint 	Counsel 	will 	be
DENIED without prejudice to renewing the request if Vinton chooses to
court need not address § 3553 factors if it finds no extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release).
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renew his motion for compassionate release based on further medical
developments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For 	the 	aforementioned 	reasons, 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Compassionate Release (ECF No. 125) is DENIED without prejudice.
This means that Defendant may re-file this motion if circumstances have
changed, he exhausts his administrative remedies, and supplements his
motion 	with 	updated 	medical 	records 	that 	support 	his 	request.
Furthermore, Defendant’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 141) is
also DENIED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2025 	/s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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