Shannon v. Michigan Department of Corrections

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARKEIA SHANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
2:23-CV-10995-TGB-APP
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S PRO SE
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
SETTLEMENT AND MOTION
TO APPEAL
(ECF NO. 21)
Charkeia 	Shannon, 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	brought 	this
employment 	discrimination 	case 	against 	her 	former 	employer, 	the
Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). In January 2025, the
parties reached a mediated settlement, executed a binding Settlement
Agreement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Approximately
two months later, Shannon, now proceeding pro se, now moves for
reconsideration of the parties’ settlement and to appeal. ECF No. 21. The
MDOC filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 22. Upon review of the
parties’ filings, the Court concludes oral argument will not aid in the
resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the present
motion on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated
below, Shannon’s Motion to Reconsider Settlement and Motion to Appeal
will be DENIED.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Charkeia Shannon, then represented by attorney Eric Stempien,
brought 	this 	employment 	discrimination 	case 	against 	Defendant
Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), alleging discrimination
and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
ECF 	No. 	1. 	The 	parties 	eventually 	reached 	a 	settlement 	with 	the
assistance of mediator Kathy Bogas, executed a binding Settlement
Agreement on January 8, 2025, and on January 16, 2025, the Court
entered a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, dismissing the case with
prejudice and without costs. ECF No. 20. That Order stated that “[t]he
Parties further stipulate and agree that the Court will retain jurisdiction
over this matter through April 8, 2025 in order to enforce the terms of
the parties’ settlement.” Id. PageID.98.
The Settlement Agreement released and discharged all claims
Shannon had or may have against the MDOC and the State of Michigan
through the date of signing the Agreement in exchange for monetary
consideration in the amount of $19,500.00. Settlement Agreement and
Release, ECF No. 22-1. The Agreement provided that payment in the
amount of $8,750.00 will be paid to Shannon, $5,750.00 will be paid to
“Stempien Law, PLLC,” and $5,000.00 will be assigned to the redemption
of Shannon’s worker’s compensation claim, if any. Id. PageID.119–20,
¶¶ 2.1.1–2.1.3. 	To 	receive 	payment, 	the 	Agreement 	required 	both
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Shannon and her attorney to first register as a vendor on the Michigan
Statewide Integrated Government Management Application (“SIGMA”)
System, after which payment would be issued. Id. The Agreement also
required Shannon to file and redeem any workers compensation claim
she has or may have arising out of her employment with the State of
Michigan. Id. PageID.116–17, ¶ 1.10. In addition, under the Agreement,
Shannon agrees that she will not seek or accept employment with the
State of Michigan, id. PageID.117, ¶ 1.11, and the State of Michigan and
the United States Department of Treasury are empowered to exercise
any right of set-off to which they are entitled by law. Id. PageID.122,
¶ 6.1. Finally, Shannon affirmatively represented that she “has read this
Agreement 	carefully 	and 	understands 	all 	terms, 	conditions, 	and
responsibilities,” that she “enters into this Agreement voluntarily and
with the advice of counsel,” and that she “has the capacity to execute this
Agreement and its releases.” Id. PageID.122–23, ¶¶7.1–7.4.
About 	two 	months 	after 	executing 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement,
Shannon, 	now 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	brought 	the 	instant 	motion 	for
reconsideration 	of 	the 	settlement 	and 	to 	appeal. 	ECF 	No. 	21. 	She
questions why the Settlement Agreement requires her to complete a
redemption 	for 	a 	worker’s 	compensation 	claim 	when 	she 	was 	not
physically 	injured 	on 	the 	job. 	Id. 	PageID.100–01. 	Shannon 	further
complains that deductions were made from the settlement proceeds by
the Department of Treasury, and about the provision in the Agreement
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that she would not apply for or accept employment with the State of
Michigan. Id. PageID.101–02. She also generally complains about her
attorney’s representation of her in this litigation and contends that she
experienced “undue pressure and coercion” by her attorney to sign the
Settlement Agreement. Id.
Defendant 	MDOC filed a response in opposition to Shannon’s
motion. ECF No. 22. The MDOC explained that because Shannon alleges
she suffered emotional distress damages from her employment, the State
of Michigan’s standard procedure is to allocate a portion of a monetary
settlement 	proceeds 	towards 	a 	worker’s 	compensation 	redemption.
However, 	upon 	filing 	the 	redemption 	paperwork 	with 	the 	Worker’s
Compensation Bureau, and there being no claim, Shannon will receive
the $5,000.00. Id. PageID.106–07. The MDOC further stated that it is
standard practice to pay legal settlements handled by the state Attorney
General’s Office through the Michigan Department of Treasury, and the
Treasury Department has an obligation to collect any outstanding debts
or obligations owed by the payee when making these payments. Id.
PageID.107. In addition, the MDOC states that it is common practice to
require as a condition of payment that the payee agree not to seek or
accept future employment with the State. Id. PageID.108.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has long recognized the
broad, inherent authority and equitable power of a district court to
enforce 	an 	agreement 	in 	settlement 	of 	litigation 	pending 	before 	it.
RE/MAX Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2001);
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2000).
Courts may enforce a settlement agreement “even where the agreement
has not been arrived at in the presence of the court nor reduced to
writing.” Kukla v. Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir.
1973); see also Henley v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation &
Developmental 	Disabilities, 	141 	F. 	App’x 	437, 	442 	(6th 	Cir. 	2005).
Nevertheless, “[b]efore enforcing settlement, the district court must
conclude that agreement has been reached on all material terms. The
court must enforce the settlement as agreed to by the parties and is not
permitted to alter the terms of the agreement.” Brock v Scheuner Corp.,
841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). “Whether
the parties actually reached an agreement is a question of fact for the
district court,” Moore v. U.S. Postal Serv., 369 F. App’x 712, 717 (6th Cir.
2010), which is governed by state contract law, Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co.
v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 515 F. App’x 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“Because settlement agreements are a type of contract, the formation
and enforceability of a purported settlement agreement are governed by
state contract law.”).
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Under Michigan law, “[b]efore a contract can be completed, there
must be an offer and acceptance. Unless an acceptance is unambiguous
and in strict conformance with the offer, no contract is formed. Further,
a contract requires mutual assent or a meeting of the minds on all the
essential terms.” Kloian v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 733 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (citation modified). Determining whether there was
mutual assent between the parties “is judged by an objective standard,
looking to the express words of the parties and their visible acts, not their
subjective states of mind,” Tillman v. Macy’s Inc., 735 F.3d 453, 459 (6th
Cir. 2013), which requires consideration of the “relevant circumstances
surrounding the transaction, including all writings, oral statements, and
other conduct by which the parties manifested their intent.” Innotext, Inc.
v. Petra’Lex USA Inc., 694 F.3d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 2012); 	see also
Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Daniel J. Aronoff Living Trust, 853 N.W.2d
481, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (“Courts judge whether there was a
meeting of the minds from objective evidence.”).
“As a general rule, settlement agreements are ‘final and cannot be
modified.’” Clark v. Al-Amin, 872 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Smith v. Smith, 823 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011)).
Thus, “a party cannot void a settlement agreement merely because he
has 	had 	a 	change 	of 	heart, 	nor 	can 	he 	do 	so 	merely 	because 	his
assessment of the consequences of the settlement was incorrect.” Id.
(citation modified).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
First, the Court finds that the parties have reached a valid, binding
Settlement Agreement based on “the expressed words of the parties and
their visible acts.” Huntington Nat’l Bank, 853 N.W.2d at 488 (citation
omitted). Under Michigan’s substantive law, a contract exists in this case
because the parties reached an agreement on material terms of the
settlement and Shannon unequivocally accepted the offer when she
signed the Settlement Agreement. See id. The Settlement Agreement
comprehensively 	sets 	forth 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	agreement 	in 	easy-to-
understand language, and Shannon expressly agreed that she “has read
this Agreement carefully and understands all terms, conditions, and
responsibilities,” that she “had the opportunity to consult with legal
counsel for the purpose of reviewing the terms of this Agreement,” and
that she “has the capacity to execute this Agreement and its releases.”
ECF No. 22-1, PageID.122–23, ¶¶ 7.1–7.4.
Having found that Shannon entered into a valid contract, Michigan
law is clear that a settlement agreement between parties is “final and
cannot be modified.” Smith, 823 N.W.2d at 116. Most importantly to this
case, it cannot be avoided merely because one party “has had a ‘change of
heart,’” Vittiglio v. Vittiglio, 824 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012),
or “did not understand” the Agreement. Thomas v. Holy Cross Servs.,
Inc., No. 2:23-CV-12843, 2024 WL 4794502, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14,
2024) (DeClercq, J.).
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Shannon principally complains that the Settlement Agreement
required 	that 	$5,000 	of 	the 	settlement 	proceeds 	be 	allocated 	to 	a
redemption of a potential worker’s compensation claim, stating she does
not understand why she would file such a claim when she was not
physically injured and has not been employed with the MDOC since 2021.
ECF No. 21, PageID.100–01. This complaint does not bar enforcement of
the Settlement Agreement. Under the parties’ Settlement Agreement,
which Shannon expressly agreed she read and understood, Shannon
“agrees to file and redeem any workers compensation claim which she
has, or may have in the future, arising out of her employment as an
employee of the State of Michigan,” and that $5,000 of the total $19,500
settlement amount will be assigned to the redemption of Shannon’s
worker’s compensation claim and “shall be paid after the payment of the
statutory redemption period.” ECF No. 22-1, PageID.116, 118, ¶¶ 1.10,
2.1.3.
The MDOC explains the reasoning for this provision in its Response
brief. Because Shannon alleged she suffered emotional distress damages
from her employment, 	the 	State of Michigan’s standard settlement
procedure is to allocate a small portion of the settlement proceeds–here,
$5,000—towards a worker’s compensation redemption, as such damages
could be considered a workplace injury. ECF No. 22, PageID.106–07. If
Shannon received workers’ compensation benefits, then she would need
to reimburse the State of Michigan for those benefits from the $5,000
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assigned from the settlement proceeds, so that she does not receive a
double recovery for that claimed injury. However, if the redemption order
confirms 	that 	Shannon 	did 	not 	receive 	any 	workers’ 	compensation
benefits, she will receive the full $5,000. The MDOC further explains that
this is a simple process involving minimal documentation to be filed with
the Worker’s Compensation Bureau, and that the Attorney General’s
office can provide the name and contact information of an Assistant
Attorney General who specializes in worker’s compensation matters to
help 	facilitate 	the 	process. 	Id. 	Shannon 	may 	contact 	the 	Assistant
Attorneys 	General 	in 	this 	case 	to 	obtain 	that 	name 	and 	contact
information.
Accordingly, 	Shannon 	is 	required, 	as 	part 	of 	the 	Settlement
Agreement, to file redemption paperwork with the Michigan Worker’s
Compensation 	Bureau, 	and 	the 	Court 	may 	not 	modify 	the 	final
Settlement Agreement to alter or eliminate that requirement. See Clark,
872 N.W.2d at 736. Shannon’s claimed confusion over this provision does
not bar its enforcement. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. v.
Buckallew, 690 N.W.2d 93, 93 (Mich. 2004) (mem.) (ignorance of or a
mistake in understanding an agreed-upon contract is not a basis for relief
from the same, and a party is not “excused by its own carelessness or lack
of due diligence”).
Shannon also complains that the Department of Treasury made a
deduction from her settlement payment. As explained above, the terms
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of the Settlement Agreement required Shannon to register as a vendor
on Michigan’s SIGMA System to receive the $8,750 settlement payment.
ECF 	No. 	22-1, 	PageID.119, 	¶ 2.1.1. 	Shannon 	states 	that 	after 	she
registered with SIGMA, the Michigan Department of Treasury deducted
$2,944.60 of the $8,750 settlement payment as a set-off for a debt
Shannon owed the State of Michigan. ECF No. 21, PageID.102. While
Shannon contends that “one of [her] debts” in an unspecified amount was
for 	some 	reason 	exempt 	from 	offset, 	that 	contention 	does 	not 	bar
enforcement 	of 	the 	parties’ 	Settlement 	Agreement. 	The 	Settlement
Agreement expressly provides that “[t]he State of Michigan and the
United States Department of Treasury are empowered to exercise any
right 	of 	set-off to 	which 	they 	are 	entitled 	by 	law.” 	ECF 	No. 	22-1,
PageID.122, ¶ 6.1. The Court may not modify this final Settlement
Agreement to alter or eliminate that unambiguous requirement. See
Clark, 872 N.W.2d at 736.
Similarly, Shannon’s apparent disagreement the provision in the
parties’ 	Settlement 	Agreement 	that 	she 	is 	not 	permitted 	to 	seek
employment with the State of Michigan does not bar enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement expressly provides
that “Shannon agrees that she will not seek or accept employment with
the 	State 	of 	Michigan.” 	ECF 	No. 	22-1, 	PageID.117, 	¶ 	1.11. 	That
negotiated provision is not “retaliatory” as Shannon contends, and she
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cannot 	seek 	to 	renegotiate 	that 	provision 	out 	of 	the 	Settlement
Agreement now. See Clark, N.W.2d at 736.
Finally, 	Shannon 	generally 	contends 	that 	there 	was 	“undue
pressure and coercion” by her attorney to sign the Settlement Agreement,
and that her consent was “not freely given as [she] was at work during a
lunch break at the time of the [settlement] negotiations.” ECF No. 21,
PageID.101. She states that she was initially unwilling to sign the
Settlement Agreement because she disagreed with it, but her attorney
said that he would no longer represent her if she did not sign. Id.
PageID.103.1 Shannon’s general complaints fail to satisfy the exacting
standard 	of 	duress 	necessary 	to 	set 	aside 	a 	binding 	settlement
agreement. Duress involves an “unlawful or wrongful act or threat that
overcomes the free will of the victim.” Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F.
App’x 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Harvard Drug Group, LLC v.
Linehan, 	684 F. Supp. 2d 921, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (Roberts, J.)
(“Duress requires compulsion or coercion by which one is illegally forced
to act by fear of serious injury to person, reputation or fortune.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511,
1 	Shannon also generally complains about her attorney’s pretrial and
pre-settlement 	conduct 	and 	strategy, 	such 	as 	the 	scheduling 	of
depositions and the stipulated dismissal of her Family and Medical Leave
Act 	(“FMLA”) 	claims. 	ECF 	No. 	21, 	PageID.101–02. 	However, 	these
allegations in no way demonstrate duress or coercion in entering the
Settlement Agreement.
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512–13 (Mich. 1881) (“Duress exists when one by the unlawful act of
another is induced to make a contract or perform some 	act under
circumstances which deprive [her] of the exercise of free will.”).
Here, Shannon has not proffered any argument that she was ever
threatened in such a way that overcame the exercise of her free will to
execute the Settlement Agreement. Shannon was represented by counsel
and the parties settled the case with the assistance of a neutral mediator.
McCormack v. City of Westland, Mich., No. 18-2135, 2019 WL 4757905,
at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2019) (“Given that McCormack was represented
by counsel and the parties settled the case with the district court’s
participation 	and guidance, 	her 	argument 	that 	the 	agreements are
unenforceable due to duress, coercion, fraud, and mistake is not only
unconvincing, but refuted by the record.”) (citing Clement v. Buckley
Mercantile Co., 137 N.W. 657, 660 (Mich. 1912) (“The law does not
recognize duress by mere suggestion, advice, or persuasion, especially
where 	the 	parties 	are 	at 	arm’s 	length 	and 	represent 	opposing
interests.”)). That Shannon was at work during a lunch break at the time
of the settlement negotiation in no way establishes duress or coercion to
sign the Settlement Agreement when it was presented to her.
And her claim that her attorney told her he would no longer
represent her if she did not sign the Settlement Agreement also fails to
establish duress or coercion under Michigan law. See Rusiecki v. City of
Marquette, 64 F. App’x 936, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that Rusiecki
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may have changed his mind about the settlement is insufficient to justify
reopening, 	as 	is 	a 	threat 	from 	Rusiecki’s 	attorney 	to 	withdraw
representation.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Murdock v. Trinity
Servs. Grp., No. 17-11803, 2020 WL 5596158, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18,
2020) (Levy, J.) (plaintiff’s contention that “he ‘never was comfortable
with any settlement agreement that has been forced on [him] by [his]
attorney[]s,’ that he ‘told my attorney[]s on the recorded phone calls that
[he] want[s] to go to trial in this matter,’ and that he ‘truly believe[s] that
[he] ha[s] been misle[]d, and lied to just in order to push this case on’” is
insufficient to establish duress or coercion to set aside a stipulated
dismissal and settlement agreement). Rather, under Michigan law, “the
requirements for setting aside a settlement agreement … require[e] a
showing of bad faith on the part of Defendants’ attorneys in addition to
Plaintiff’s[.]” Murdock, 2020 WL 5596158, at *1; see also Kimball v.
Crowley, No. 320139, 2014 WL 3928807, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 12,
2014) (“When a party to an agreement argues that consent was achieved
‘through duress or coercion practiced by her attorney, the judgment will
not be set aside absent a showing that the other party participated in the
duress 	or 	coercion.’”) 	(quoting 	Vittiglio, 	824 	N.W.2d 	at 	596–97). 	In
Kimball, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the “plaintiff argues
only that her attorney induced her agreement to the stipulation; she
offers no evidence, and makes no argument, to suggest that defendant
played any role in her purported duress,” and held that “[o]n these facts,
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plaintiff has not made a showing of duress which would warrant the
setting aside of her stipulation.” Kimball, 2014 WL 3928807, at *2.
Shannon here makes no contention that counsel for the MDOC played
any role in her alleged duress, and in fact asserts that she “did NOT
speak to, nor see [via Zoom] the Attorney General at any time during the
mediation conference meeting.” ECF No. 21, PageID.101 (capitalization
in original).
“[P]ublic 	policy 	favors 	settling 	cases 	without 	litigation, 	and
settlement agreements should be upheld whenever it is equitable to do
so.” Rusiecki, 64 F. App’x at 938. Here, the MDOC states that all “funds
have been disbursed, and Shannon need only go through the worker’s
compensation redemption process to access the remaining portion of [the]
settlement 	proceeds 	as 	she 	previously 	agreed 	to 	do.” 	ECF 	No. 	22,
PageID.108. In reading Shannon’s motion, the Court can see that, in
looking back, she feels that the settlement itself and the process that led
to it was not fair to her. While this is unfortunate, the law must enforce
agreements and contracts such as this even when parties who have
agreed to them later change their minds or upon reflection wish they had
not made such agreements. Such agreements are legally binding. The
Court therefore finds that it is equitable to uphold the parties’ negotiated
settlement 	in 	this 	case. 	Accordingly, 	Shannon’s 	motion 	for
reconsideration of the parties’ Settlement Agreement will be DENIED.
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And finally, Shannon’s motion to extend time to appeal will be
denied. A notice of appeal was required to be filed within 30 days after
the entry of the Court’s order dismissing this case, Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A), or by February 15, 2025, and it was not. Federal Rule of
Appellate 	Procedure 	4(a)(5)(A) 	states 	that 	“[t]he 	district 	court 	may
extend the time to file a notice of appeal if [ ] a party so moves no later
than 30 days after [the time to appeal] expires” and if the “party shows
excusable neglect or good cause.”2 “Good cause will be found where forces
beyond the control of the [petitioner] prevented her from filing a timely
notice of appeal.” Nicholson v. City of Warren, 467 F.3d 525, 526 (6th Cir.
2006) (citation omitted). “Excusable neglect [is] a strict standard which
is met only in extraordinary cases.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover,
“[i]gnorance of the rules or mistakes in construing the rules do not
usually constitute excusable neglect.” Id. at 527 (“Furthermore, mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel are not necessarily excusable”)
(citation omitted). If either good cause or excusable neglect are satisfied,
a district court “may” extend the time to file a notice of appeal by a
2 	The Court notes that under Rule 4(a)(6), “a district court [may]
reopen the time to appeal for a maximum of 14 days if the moving party
did not receive notice of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 77(d) within 21 days of the entry of that judgment.” Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(6). However, this rule is inapplicable here as Shannon does
not contend that she did not timely receive notice of the entry of dismissal
in this case.
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maximum of “[thirty] days after the prescribed time or [fourteen] days
after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever
is later.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A), (C).
While Shannon’s motion to appeal was filed within 30 days after
the time to appeal expired, the Court finds that she has not shown
excusable neglect or good cause for failing to timely appeal. The filing of
a notice of appeal is a “modest task.” Isert v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d
756, 758 (6th Cir.2006). Shannon’s pro se status is not, by itself sufficient
good cause to justify an extension, and her general assertions in her
motion that she has endured “unstable housing” since her termination,
does not currently have a vehicle, has had to rely on family members and
friends for financial support, and has not had stable employment are also
insufficient to establish good cause or excusable neglect for missing the
appeal deadline. Shannon stated that she was in fact at work at the time
of the settlement negotiations and she otherwise does not explain how
she was “prevented” by forces beyond her control from filing a timely
notice 	of 	appeal. 	Without 	such 	a 	demonstration, 	Shannon 	cannot
establish good cause or excusable neglect for extending the appellate
filing deadline. Accordingly, her request to extend the appeal deadline
will be DENIED.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Charkeia Shannon’s
motion for reconsideration of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and
motion to appeal, ECF No. 21, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 10, 2025 	/s/Terrence G. Berg
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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