Mohlman v. Salem, Township of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARON MOHLMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF SALEM and
MILAN TOWING &
RECOVERY, INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-11033
District Judge F. Kay Behm
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SALEM TOWNSHIP’S
MOTION (ECF No. 25) TO SET ASIDE CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
(ECF No. 20)
I. 	OPINION
A. 	State Court Cases
It appears Aaron Mohlman received a citation from Salem Township in July
2023 for failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance near Stonegate Drive
(see ECF No. 25-2), which resulted in Salem Township v. Mohlman, Case No.
2023-23l23003-ON (14A District Court).
On September 5, 2023, the court found Mohlman responsible for the
violation of Salem Township Zoning Ordinance § 67.03. (ECF No. 25-3.) (See
also ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 8-9.) Mohlman filed an appeal to the Washtenaw County
Circuit Court on September 19, 2023. See Case No. 23-001182-AV. (See also
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ECF No. 1, ¶ 11.) The court heard oral argument on June 28, 2024, and, on July 1,
2024, the Circuit Court affirmed. (ECF No. 25-4.) (See also ECF No. 1, ¶ 12.)
On July 11, 2024, Mohlman filed an appeal to the Michigan Court of
Appeals, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on July 16, 2024. (ECF No.
1, ¶¶ 13-14.) See Case No. 371611 (ECF No. 25-5). Mohlman alleges he had 21
days within which (i.e., until August 6, 2024) to file an application for leave to
appeal (ECF No. 1, ¶ 15); yet, on or about August 4, 2024, Defendants entered
onto his property at 8413 Stonegate, Salem Township, MI 48168 and “removed all
of [Mohlman]’s property stored at that location, including vehicles, equipment,
trailers, etc.” (id., ¶ 16).
Mohlman alleges that neither he nor his counsel received notice that the
property would be removed (id., ¶ 23), he did not consent to the entry upon his
property or the removal of his property (id., ¶ 17), “the property unlawfully
removed from Mohlman’s property is now being held by Defendant Milan/Budget
at the direction of Defendant Salem Township[,]” (id., ¶ 18), and “Defendants have
refused to release or return [Mohlman]’s property[,]” (id., ¶ 19). He does not
allege that the Washtenaw County Circuit Court (Case No. 23-001182-AV) or the
Michigan Court of Appeals (Case No. 371611) stayed the removal of his property
pending appeal.
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B. 	Instant Lawsuit
On April 10, 2025, Mohlman filed this lawsuit in pro per against Defendants
Salem Township and Milan Towing & Recovery, Inc. (d/b/a Budget Stadium
Towing). Mohlman’s causes of action include trespass, conversion, injunctive
relief, illegal search and seizure, and violation of a bankruptcy stay. (ECF No. 1,
¶¶ 24-42.)1
1. 	Service
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 2, 5.) He submitted
service documents to the Clerk (see ECF No. 6), summons have been issued (ECF
1 Meanwhile, on October 9, 2023, Mohlman (and Charlotte S. Dobessi-Bossombo)
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. See Case No. 23-48841-mlo (E.D. Mich.
Bankr.). It appears an 11 U.S.C. § 362 stay was in place at least until September
20, 2024, perhaps up until the case was closed on January 14, 2025. (See ECF No.
43, therein.) Thus, Plaintiff alleges here that the bankruptcy case “remained open
and pending” at the time his property was improperly removed (i.e., allegedly
August 4, 2024), and he further alleges “Defendants did not seek any authorization
from the bankruptcy court prior to removal of Plaintiff’s property.” (See ECF No.
1, ¶¶ 20-22.) An action for violation of the bankruptcy stay would, of course, be a
matter for the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance. See Heghmann v. Town of
Rye, 326 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D.N.H. 2004); In re Reserves Dev. Corp., 64 B.R. 694
(W.D. Mo. 1986). See also Zimmerman v. Bellows, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035
(D. Minn. 2013) (a claim under § 362(k) “must be brought in the bankruptcy court,
rather than in the district court, which only has appellate jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases”) (emphasis in original) (citing E. Equip. & Servs. Corp. v.
Factory Point Nat’l Bank, 236 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam)).
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Nos. 7, 8), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) attempted service by
mail on May 14, 2025 (ECF No. 9).
Milan Towing appeared on June 28, 2025, filing an answer, affirmative
defenses, and crossclaim. (ECF No. 10.) (See also ECF Nos. 11, 12, 17.)
2. 	Entry of Default
On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for Clerk’s entry of default as to
Defendant Salem Township, alleging the summons and complaint were served on
May 14, 2025 at 9600 Six Mile, Salem Township, MI 48175 by the USMS. (ECF
No. 14.) On July 9, 2025, the request was denied, explaining that the Clerk was
unable to verify service executed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, because
“[n]o proof of service [was] filed.” (ECF No. 15.)
On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed documents purportedly related to service
upon Defendant Salem Township (ECF No. 18), as well as a request for Clerk’s
entry of default (ECF No. 19). On July 15, 2025, the Clerk entered default as to
Salem Township “for failure to plead or otherwise defend . . . .” (ECF No. 20.) At
the same time Plaintiff filed his request for Clerk’s entry of default (ECF No. 19),
he also filed a request for Clerk’s entry of default judgment as to Salem Township
(ECF No. 21); however, on July 15, 2025, the Clerk denied the request for default
judgment, because “[t]he requested amount [could not] be verified in accordance
with [E.D. Mich.] LR 55.2[,]” (ECF No. 22).
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C. 	Instant Motion
Judge McMillion has referred this case to me for pretrial matters. (ECF No.
13.) Currently before the Court is the Township’s September 5, 2025 motion,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), to set aside the Clerk’s July 15, 2025 entry of
default, contending, inter alia, that “Salem Township never received the Summons
and Complaint, nor was service ever effected on the Township’s Supervisor, Clerk,
or office staff.” (ECF No. 25, PageID.68.) Concurrent with the filing of this
motion, counsel entered appearances on the Township’s behalf. (ECF Nos. 23,
24.)
“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(c). See also Roper v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 07-10002,
2008 WL 275689, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2008) (Steeh, J.) (“In this case, the
default was not willful, the set-aside will not prejudice plaintiffs, and defendant St.
Francis has raised a meritorious defense.”); Golden v. Nat’l Fin. Adjusters, 555 F.
Supp. 42, 44 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (Freeman, J.).
Upon consideration of the motion papers and exhibits, the Court concludes
that the Clerk’s entry of default (ECF No. 20) should be set aside, because good
cause, as contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), exists.
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1. 	Willful
Defendant Salem Township argues that its default was not willful. (ECF
No. 25, PageID.66-68; see also ECF No. 28, PageID.110-111.) As the Sixth
Circuit has observed: “‘To be treated as culpable, the conduct of a defendant must
display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the
effect of its conduct on those proceedings.’” Dassault Systemes, SA v. Childress,
663 F.3d 832, 841 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William
Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Here, Defendant Salem Township contends its default was “the result of
Plaintiff’s defective service of process.” (ECF No. 25, PageID.67.) “A state, a
municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization that is
subject to suit must be served by: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner
prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a
defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). “Service of process on a public, municipal,
quasi-municipal, or governmental corporation, unincorporated board, or public
body may be made by serving a summons and a copy of the complaint on: . . . the
supervisor or the township clerk of a township[.]” M.C.R. 2.105(G)(4).
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To support its position that “the Complaint was never served upon
Defendant Salem Township[,]” the Township points to the documents Plaintiff
filed related to service upon Salem Township, which include:
• 	A Process Receipt and Return form, which lists a service
address of 9600 Six Mile Road, Salem Township, MI 48175,
asks to serve either the Township Supervisor or the Township
Clerk, is signed by Plaintiff on April 23, 2025, is also signed by
an authorized USMS Deputy or Clerk on May 14, 2025, and
lists “Tracking Number # 9589-0710-5270-2150-8952-98”
(ECF No. 18, PageID.45; see also ECF No. 9, PageID.18);
• 	A document indicating that USPS Tracking Number
9589071052702150895298 was delivered on June 10, 2025
(ECF No. 18, PageID.44); and,
• 	A July 11, 2025 “tracking status” for
9589071052702150895298, indicating that the item was
“delivered, left with individual” on June 10, 2025 in Detroit, MI
48226 (id., PageID.46).
(ECF No. 18, PageID.44-46). Yet, the Undersigned is somewhat perplexed,
because the online USPS Tracking information indicates the package was
delivered on May 28, 2025 to Detroit.2 Whatever the delivery date may have been,
these documents do not constitute proof that either the Township Supervisor or
Clerk was served at the location of Township Hall (9600 Six Mile Road, Salem,
MI 48175) or the Township’s mailing address (P.O. Box 75002, Salem, MI
2 See
https://tools.usps.com/go/TrackConfirmAction?qtc_tLabels1=95890710527021508
95298 (last visited Oct. 20, 2025).
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48175). See https://www.salem-mi.org/how_do_i/contact_us.php (last visited Oct.
20, 2025). Instead, it seems that “the certified mail containing the Summons and
Complaint was misdirected to Detroit, Michigan, not to the Township’s offices.”
(ECF No. 25, PageID.67.)
In his response, Plaintiff points out that the USMS attempted service upon
both Defendants. (ECF No. 27, PageID.105.) Moreover, Plaintiff suggests that
Defendant Milan Towing’s service of its June 28, 2025 answer, affirmative
defenses, and cross-claim as to Salem Township (ECF No. 10) upon Defendant
Salem Township “minimally provided Salem with knowledge of the pendency of
the claim in this Court.” (ECF No. 27, PageID.106.) Indeed, on July 5, 2025,
Milan’s counsel certified that it served a copy of the answer, affirmative defenses
and cross-claim “on both Aaron Mohlman and Salem Township at the addresses as
specified in the case caption . . . [,]” which, in the case of Salem Township, was
seemingly PO Box 75002 Salem, MI 48175. (See ECF No. 12.)
So, while there is no evidence indicating Defendant Salem Township was
served with summons and a complaint in May 2025, there seems to be a dispute
over when Salem Township became aware of this lawsuit – July 2025 or
September 2025. Defendant Salem Township contends that, “[o]nly after learning
from the Township prosecutor’s colleague that a default had been entered, did the
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Township become aware of the case.” (Id.) In fact, Salem Township Supervisor
Gary Whittaker attests, in a sworn affidavit, inter alia:
• 	It is my understanding that attorney Rodney Glusac, a colleague
of the Township’s contracted prosecutor, Mr. James Fink, sent
Mr. Fink a copy of the Notice of Entry of Default in this matter.
• 	On September 1, 2025, Mr. Fink forwarded the Notice of Entry
of Default to the Township, which alerted the Township of its
need to appear in this action to seek to set aside the default and
challenge the original service of the Complaint.
• 	The Township Prosecutor is not an authorized recipient of
service on behalf of the Township.
• 	At no time did I or the Township Clerk receive service of the
Complaint from Plaintiff, nor was a copy served on any person
in charge of the offices of the Township Supervisor or
Township Clerk by personal service or certified mail.
(ECF No. 25-8 ¶¶ 3-6). (ECF No. 25, PageID.64; see also id., PageID.67-68.)
Plaintiff has not shown otherwise.
Upon consideration, the Court is not convinced that the Township’s “failure
to plead was minimally gamesmanship and more likely willful[,]” as argued by
Plaintiff. (ECF No. 27, PageID.106.) Preliminarily, it is possible that the May
2025 misdirected attempt at service was the fault of the Court, its Clerk, or the
USMS, in other words a fault that cannot be attributed to Defendant Salem
Township (see ECF Nos. 9, 18). Also, even if Salem Township had some
knowledge of this lawsuit in July 2025 by having received a copy of co-Defendant
Milan Towing’s answer, affirmative defenses, and cross-claim (see ECF Nos. 10,
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12), it would not change the fact that Salem Township had – at that point – yet to
be served with a summons and complaint. Unless a Court authorizes alternate
service, Defendants are summoned to court by actual service, not by mere
constructive knowledge. Finally, although approximately two months passed
between co-Defendant Milan Towing’s July 5, 2025 certificate of service (ECF
No. 12) and Defendant Salem Township’s September 5, 2025 appearances in this
matter (see ECF Nos. 23, 24), Defendant Salem Township’s same-day motion
maintains, with the support of an affidavit from its Township Supervisor, that the
Township was “alerted . . . of its need to appear in this action” on September 1,
2025, when its contracted prosecutor “forwarded the Notice of Entry of Default to
the Township,” (ECF No. 25-8 ¶ 4) and that neither the Township Supervisor nor
the Township Clerk had received service of the complaint from Plaintiff (id., ¶ 6).
This factor favors Defendant Salem Township.
2. 	Prejudice
Defendant Salem Township argues that Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice.
(ECF No. 25, PageID.68-69.) As the Sixth Circuit has stated:
“[D]elay alone is not a sufficient basis for establishing prejudice.”
INVST Fin. Grp., [Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 398
(6th Cir. 1987)] (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does
increased litigation cost generally support entry of default. [United
States v. $22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d 318, 325 (6th Cir.
2010)]. Instead, “it must be shown that delay will result in the loss of
evidence, create increased difficulties of discovery, or provide greater
opportunity for fraud and collusion.” INVST Fin. Group, 815 F.2d at
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398 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the relevant
inquiry concerns the future prejudice that will result from reopening
the judgment, not prejudice that has already resulted from the
defendant's conduct. Berthelsen [v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 620-621 (6th
Cir. 1990)].
Dassault Systemes, 663 F.3d at 842.
In his response, Plaintiff generally contends he “would be prejudiced in the
event of a set aside.” (ECF No. 27, PageID.106.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends
he “has been without valuable equipment for months, which has interfered with
[his] ability to make a living[,]” and he further contends that “Milan is now
apparently selling off the equipment.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the “substantial
delay” or “additional time” caused by setting aside the default “would represent
undue prejudice as it would directly interfere with [his] ability to make a living.”
(Id.)
However, Defendant Salem Township correctly notes that “[t]his case
remains at its earliest stages,” i.e., “there has been no discovery, no scheduling
order, and no substantive motion practice.” (ECF No. 25, PageID.68.) Moreover,
this Court has no reason to doubt Salem Township’s representation that it
“promptly moved to set aside the default after first learning of it[.]” (Id.)
Likewise, this Court has no reason to doubt Salem Township’s representation that
“[t]here has been no loss of evidence, . . . no strategic delay, and no change in
posture that would disadvantage Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 28, PageID.111.)
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This factor favors Defendant Salem Township.
3. 	Meritorious defense(s)
Contending it has “multiple meritorious defenses,” Defendant Salem
mentions defenses pertaining to, inter alia, “lack of jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s
failure to properly serve the Complaint,” as well as “a collateral attack” on the state
court proceedings, res judicata, governmental immunity and viability (as to the
trespass and conversion claims), etc. (ECF No. 25, PageID.69-78.) (See also ECF
No. 28, PageID.111-112.) As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
A defense is “meritorious” if it is “good at law.” $22,050, 595 F.3d at
326 (quoting Williams v. Meyer, 346 F.3d 607, 614 (6th Cir.2003)). . .
. [T]he test is not whether a defense is likely to succeed on the merits;
rather, the criterion is merely whether “there is some possibility that
the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result
achieved by the default.” Id. (quoting Burrell v. Henderson, 434 F.3d
826, 834 (6th Cir.2006)). Thus, even conclusory assertions may be
sufficient to establish the “hint of a suggestion” needed to present a
meritorious defense. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dassault Systemes, 663 F.3d at 843.
In his response, Plaintiff contends “there is no meritorious defense,”
pointing to the bankruptcy stay and addressing the merits of Defendant Salem
Township’s collateral attack, res judicata, and governmental immunity defenses.
(ECF No. 27, PageID.106-107.) However, even if, arguendo, Plaintiff’s case is
about “the subsequent seizure and sale of [his] personal[] and business
equipment[,]” (id., PageID.107), the nature of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant
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Salem Township’s defenses thereto are more appropriately tested by way of a Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), not by way of briefing related to a motion to set aside default.
This factor favors Defendant Salem Township.
II. 	ORDER
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Salem Township has shown its
default was not willful, the set aside will not prejudice Plaintiff, and its motion
raises meritorious defenses. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Township’s
September 5, 2025 motion (ECF No. 25) to set aside entry of default (ECF No. 20).
Defendant Salem Township has up to and including Friday, December 5, 2025 by
which to file an answer or Rule 12 motion in response to the complaint and any
affirmative defenses thereto.
It is SO ORDERED.3
Dated: November 3, 2025 	_______________________
ANTHONY P. PATTI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 The attention of the parties is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which provides a
period of fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this order within
which to file objections for consideration by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
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