Tucker v. Skinner et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
RICKEY TUCKER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00163-CMS
)
ANDREW SKINNER, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION, MEMORANDUM, AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Deputy Andrew Skinner,
Lieutenant Robyn Merideth, Seargeant Michael Yaworksi, Deputy Hunter Juden,
and Correctional Officers Zack Stevens and Ryan Skinner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Doc. 70).1 This Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff brings this action on a court-provided prisoner civil rights
complaint form pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names as Defendants the Scott
1 These same defendants also filed a Motion to Compel and to Determine the Sufficiency of
Request for Admissions Responses. (Doc. 61). Because the Court grants summary judgment to
these defendants on all claims, this motion is DENIED as moot.
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County Sheriff’s Department,2 Deputy Andrew Skinner, Lieutenant Robyn
Merideth, Sergeant Michael Yaworski, Deputy Hunter Juden, and Correctional
Officers Zack Stevens and Ryan Skinner. He sues all remaining Defendants in both
their individual and official capacities.
The Allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 2, 2022, while he was being held in a holding
cell at the Scott County Detention Center, Defendants A. Skinner, Yaworski,
Juden, Stevens, R. Skinner,3 and Merideth physically assaulted him. (Doc. 6 at 6).
These Defendants woke Plaintiff and dragged him off the top bunk and onto the
bottom bunk. (Doc. 6 at 6). They then began punching Plaintiff and electrocuting
him with their tasers. (Doc. 6 at 6).
Defendants then dragged Plaintiff from the pod into the rotunda. (Doc. 6 at
6). They continued punching him in his head, face, and back, began kicking him,
and “brutally smashed” his front teeth out of his mouth. (Doc. 6 at 6). Plaintiff was
then dragged down the hallway toward the booking room, where the assault
continued. (Doc. 6 at 6). One deputy twisted Plaintiff’s arm behind his back so
2 On November 5, 2024, Senior District Judge Catherine D. Perry entered an order dismissing all
of Plaintiff’s claims against the Scott County Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 47).
3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint refers to “R. Skinner” as “C. Skinner.” (Doc. 6). On November
5, 2024, Judge Perry directed the Clerk of Court to “change the docket sheet to replace the name
Christoper Skinner with Ryan Skinner”, as Plaintiff incorrectly identified Ryan Skinner as
Christopher Skinner. (Doc. 46). For clarity, this opinion will refer to that named defendant as “R.
Skinner” throughout.
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hard while he was placing Plaintiff into a restraint chair that it dislocated his
shoulder. (Doc. 6 at 6). While Plaintiff was in the restraint chair, Defendants
continued to tase him, causing him to defecate and urinate on himself. (Doc. 6 at
7). Plaintiff was then forced to sit in his feces and urine for many hours. (Doc. 6 at
7).
At some point, EMS was dispatched to the jail to remove the taser prongs.
(Doc. 6 at 7). EMS personnel were unable to remove the prongs, so Plaintiff was
transported to the Missouri Delta Medical Center. (Doc. 6 at 7). Missouri Delta
doctors performed an MRI of Plaintiff’s head and another MRI of his shoulder.
(Doc. 6 at 7). After Plaintiff’s release from Missouri Delta, he was transported
back to the Scott County Jail without any medication for pain relief. (Doc. 6 at 7).
Plaintiff alleges that A. Skinner tased him more than twenty times, punched
him repeatedly in the face, and knocked his teeth out. (Doc. 6 at 7-8). He also
kicked Plaintiff and hit him with his police baton and pulled Plaintiff’s handcuffs
up to the back of his head, tearing Plaintiff’s chest muscle, rotary cup, and arm
ligaments. (Doc. 6 at 7-8). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Juden tased him while he
was in the pod, then strapped him into the restraint chair and continued to tase him.
(Doc. 6 at 8). Juden also assaulted Plaintiff in his pod, in the hallway, rotunda, and
booking area. (Doc. 6 at 8).
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As to Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff states that he tased him and beat,
punched, and kicked him in the pod, rotunda, hallway, and booking area. (Doc. 6 at
8). Stevens initially wore a body camera, but Defendant Juden told Stevens to stop
filming. (Doc. 6 at 8). Plaintiff also claims that R. Skinner punched and kicked
Plaintiff and forced his handcuffs up causing Plaintiff’s shoulder injuries. (Doc. 6
at 8). Finally, Defendants Yaworski and Merideth allegedly tased, punched, and
kicked Plaintiff while he was handcuffed. (Doc. 6 at 8).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
After discovery was completed, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
(Doc. 70). Defendants asserted that summary judgment on all remaining claims
was proper because (1) Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative
remedies under PLRA; and (2) the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
on Plaintiff’s excessive force claims. (Doc. 70-71). Along with its motion and
memorandum in support, Defendants filed a Statement of Uncontroverted Material
Facts. (Doc. 72).
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
76) did not specifically identify any fact contested by Plaintiff. Nor did Plaintiff
cite any materials in the record to support the factual allegations in his response.
Uncontroverted material facts not properly contested are accepted as true for
purposes of summary judgment. See Jones v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 461
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F.3d 982, 991 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that district court “properly deemed
defendants’ statements admitted” when the “plaintiffs failed to provide a pleading
in accordance with the rules that controverted any of the movants’ facts”)
The Uncontroverted Material Facts
On March 2, 2022, an inmate informed jail personnel that Plaintiff “broke a
metal piece off in shower and has threatened to use it to stab people.” (Doc. 72 at
3). When defendants Juden, Stevens, A. Skinner, and R. Skinner approached
Plaintiff in his pod, Plaintiff was holding a metal shank over four inches in length,
which appeared to have sharp edges. (Doc. 72 at 3). Plaintiff was instructed at least
five times to put the shank down over a span of four seconds. (Doc. 72 at 3-4).
Because Plaintiff refused to drop the shank, Plaintiff was tased four times over the
next minute. (Doc. 72 at 4). The officers then handcuffed Plaintiff, but Plaintiff
“used [his] body to push them off of [him] and tensed [his] arm and hands up.”
(Doc. 72 at 4).
After moving Plaintiff to the hallway, Defendant Juden ordered Plaintiff to
sit and “stay down”. (Doc. 72 at 5). Instead, Plaintiff attempted to stand up and
kick Defendant Skinner. (Doc. 72 at 5). Plaintiff then tried to move away from the
officers. (Doc. 72 at 5). Plaintiff was tased once more in the hallway. (Doc. 72 at
5). The officers were unable to remove the final two taser prongs from Plaintiff’s
body. (Doc. 72 at 5). After Defendant Juden was unable to remove the remaining
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two prongs, Juden contacted EMS. (Doc. 72 at 5). The entire incident involving
Plaintiff and Defendants was captured on video. (Doc. 72 at 2-3). Defendants
Merideth and Yaworski were not present during the incident. (Doc. 72 at 2).
Effective October 1, 2021, and at all relevant times regarding the subject
incident on March 2, 2022, the Scott County Jail had a Detainee/Offender
Handbook. (Doc. 72 at 1). Plaintiff had access to the handbook until he was
transferred to Mississippi County jail in June 2022. (Doc. 72 at 1-2). The Scott
County Jail had a portable kiosk available to inmates requesting to file grievances.
(Doc. 72 at 2). Plaintiff did not request access to a kiosk to submit a grievance
during the time he was in isolation. (Doc. 72 at 2). Plaintiff first filed a grievance
regarding alleged excessive force on May 31, 2022, nearly three months after the
incident. (Doc. 72 at 1). Plaintiff did not file an appeal regarding any answer or
lack thereof to his grievance. (Doc. 72 at 2).
ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
“[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A party moving for summary judgment
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bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material
fact. Id. at 323. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is material if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The moving party can satisfy its burden in
either of two ways: it can produce evidence negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case, or it can show that the nonmoving party does not have
enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial.” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)).
When the moving party meets this burden, “the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The “party opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or
denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The evidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970)).
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In addition to the requirements of Rule 56, this Court’s Local Rule 4.01(E)
addresses a non-moving party’s duties in opposing a moving party’s Statement of
Material Facts:
Every memorandum in opposition must be accompanied by a
document titled Response to Statement of Material Facts, which must
be separately filed using the filing event “Response to Statement of
Material Facts.” The Response must set forth each relevant fact as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. The facts in dispute
shall be set forth with specific citation(s) to the record, where
available, upon which the opposing party relies. The opposing party
also shall note for all disputed facts the paragraph number from the
moving party's Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts. All
matters set forth in the moving party's Statement of Uncontroverted
Material Facts shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.
E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E).
Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 56(e) and Local Rule 4.01(E) means
that all of PRA’s uncontroverted material facts supported by the record are deemed
admitted. See United Parcel Services, Inc., 461 F.3d at 991. This Court has
independently verified that all of Defendants’ factual assertions are supported by
the attached exhibits and the record.
The Remaining Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s Claims Because Plaintiff Failed to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies under PLRA.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner cannot
bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without first exhausting available
administrative remedies through the prison grievance process. See 42 U.S.C. §
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1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA contains, ‘its own, textual exception’: ‘[A]n inmate is
required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are [available,
i.e.,] “capable of use” to obtain “some relief for the action complained of.”’” Smith
v. Andrews, 75 F.4th 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 642 (2016)). Moreover, the exhaustion requirement requires proper
exhaustion, which entails completion of the administrative review process in prison
in accordance with applicable procedural rules, including deadlines. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–103 (2006).
“[T]he prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, . . . define the boundaries
of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The Scott County
Jail’s handbook provides the following grievance process. An inmate is first
required to submit “on the proper form to the Shift Supervisor or the Assistant Jail
Administrator within 24 hours of the incident which [he is] filing a grievance
regarding.” (Doc. 72 Ex. A, p. 8). The Shift Supervisor or the Assistant Jail
Administrator then has 10 working days upon receipt of the grievance to respond
to the inmate with a decision. (Doc. 72 Ex. A., p. 8). After the Shift Supervisor or
the Assistant Jail Administrator makes a decision, the following appeals process
applies:
If the inmate is not satisfied with the decision, the inmate may make
an appeal to the Jail Administrator within 24 hours who shall have ten
(10) working days upon receipt of the grievance to respond to the
inmate with a decision.
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If the inmate is not satisfied with the decision, the inmate may make
an appeal to the Chief Deputy within 24 hours who shall have ten (10)
working days upon receipt of the grievance to respond to the inmate
with a decision.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the decision, the inmate may make
an appeal to the Sheriff or his designee within 24 hours who shall
have ten (10) working days upon receipt of the grievance to respond
to the inmate with a decision. This is the final level of complaint[.]
(Doc. 72 Ex. A, p. 8).
Plaintiff failed to timely file a grievance. An inmate is required to submit a
grievance “on the proper form to the Shift Supervisor or the Assistant Jail
Administrator within 24 hours of the incident which [he is] filing a grievance
regarding.” (Doc. 72 Ex. A, p. 8). The relevant incident took place on March 2,
2022. (Doc. 72 at 3). Plaintiff did not file his grievance until May 31, 2022. (Doc.
72 at 1). Moreover, Plaintiff did not file an appeal regarding any answer or lack
thereof to his grievance. (Doc. 72 at 2). Because Plaintiff did not exhaust the
grievance procedures set forth in the Scott County Jail’s handbook, Plaintiff failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies under PLRA. The Court grants summary
judgment in favor of all remaining Defendants on this ground.
Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment
on the Ground of Qualified Immunity.
In the alternative, Defendants also argue they are entitled to summary
judgment because of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity is ‘an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
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223, 237 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), which
should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). “An officer is entitled to qualified
immunity unless: ‘(1) he violated a constitutional right, and (2) that constitutional
right was clearly established so that a reasonable officer would know of the right at
the time of the alleged violation.’” Klum v. City of Davenport, 145 F.4th 907, 912
(8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 925 F.3d 979, 982 (8th
Cir. 2019)). A court has discretion to resolve either prong of the analysis first.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
“Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79, (2017) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Because the focus is on whether the officer
had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the
backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
198 (2004) (per curiam). Although there does not need to be a case “directly on
point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U.S. at 79
(alterations omitted). “Use of excessive force is an area of the law ‘in which the
result depends very much on the facts of each case,’ and thus police officers are
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entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the
specific facts at issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104-105 (2018) (per
curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)). Thus, a
plaintiff must identify controlling authority or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of
persuasive authority’” placing the constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
(1999)).
Plaintiff does not identify any cases that would support his apparent
argument that his tasing violated any clearly established constitutional right to be
free from excessive force. And there are “numerous [Eighth Circuit] cases
permitting officers to use tasers on noncompliant, violent suspects.” Franklin v.
Franklin County, Ark., 956 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 2020). See Brossart v. Janke,
859 F.3d 616, 625 (8th Cir. 2017); Zubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 572, 580 (8th Cir.
2018). In fact, the Eighth Circuit has found it reasonable “for officers to use tasers
and their own body weight to subdue combative jail detainees, apparently under
the influence of drugs, who resist officer efforts to move them.” Franklin, 956 F.3d
at 625 (citing Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 422–24, 427 (8th Cir. 2017)).
Here, defendants Juden, Stevens, A. Skinner, and R. Skinner approached
Plaintiff while he was holding a metal shank over four inches in length, which
appeared to have sharp edges. (Doc. 72 at 3). Plaintiff was instructed at least five
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times to put the shank down over a span of four seconds. (Doc. 72 at 3-4). Because
Plaintiff refused to drop the shank, Plaintiff was tased four times over the next
minute. (Doc. 72 at 4). The officers could have reasonably believed that Plaintiff
posed a threat to them, himself, or others, and therefore reasonably believed that
the use of a taser was necessary to subdue Plaintiff. See Carpenter v. Gage, 686
F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that it was not unreasonable for an officer to
use his taser on an individual lying on the ground who had refused officers’ orders
to present his hands for cuffing). As in the cases previously cited, the scene here
“was a tumultuous one involving seemingly aggressive and noncompliant
behavior, circumstances which [the Eighth Circuit has] previously held rendered
officers' uses of tasers reasonable.” Rudley v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 935 F.3d
651, 654 (8th Cir. 2019).
The same goes for Plaintiff’s tasing when he attempted to kick Defendant
Skinner. (Doc. 72 at 5). The Eighth Circuit has “allowed the use of tasers on
detainees in handcuffs in appropriate circumstances.” Franklin, 956 F.3d at 1062.
In short, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his
tasing violated any clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive
force. Rudley, 935 F.3d at 655 (affirming grant of qualified immunity to officers
because plaintiffs “cite[d] no case holding that the use of a similar degree of force
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was unreasonable in circumstances similar to those here”). Summary judgment is
proper for the remaining Defendants on this ground.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70) is GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion to Compel and Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of
Request for Admissions Responses (Doc. 61) is DENIED as moot. An appropriate
Judgment shall accompany this Opinion, Memorandum, and Order.
Dated this 11th day of February 2025.
________________________________
CRISTIAN M. STEVENS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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