Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant, Jr. et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10147
)
Debtors. 	)
___________________________________)
)
Eastwood Construction Partners, 	)
LLC dba Eastwood Homes, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	the
Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Adversary Proceeding filed by James L. Bryant, Jr.
and 	Sharon 	R. 	Bryant 	(collectively 	“Defendants”). 	ECF 	No. 	37.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 21st day of November, 2025.
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Defendants are proceeding pro se.1 	For the reasons stated herein,
the Court will deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
Eastwood 	Construction, 	LLC 	d/b/a 	Eastwood 	Homes
(“Plaintiff”), 	commenced 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	on 	June 	5,
2025; 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	Amended 	Complaint 	June 	9, 	2025, 	seeking
to 	have 	the 	Court 	determine 	that 	debt 	owed 	to 	Plaintiff 	from
Defendants 	is 	exempt 	from 	discharge 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	523(a)(6).
ECF 	No. 	3 	(the 	“Amended 	Complaint”). 	On 	August 	29, 	2025,
Defendants 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	adversary 	proceeding 	for 	failure
to 	state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted, 	among 	other
things. 	ECF Nos. 16, 28. 	Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion
on September 22, 2025. 	ECF No. 27. 	The Court conducted a hearing
on 	Defendants’ 	motion 	on 	October 	28, 	2025, 	and 	took 	the 	matter
under 	advisement. 	ECF 	No. 	30. 	On 	November 	18, 	2025, 	after
considering 	Defendants’ 	motion, 	the 	Court 	entered 	an 	Order 	and
Opinion 	Denying 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss2 	holding: 	(1) 	that
the 	bankruptcy 	court 	must 	determine 	dischargeability 	of 	the
underlying 	debt 	under 	binding 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	Fourth 	Circuit
1 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
2 This Court incorporates by reference the factual background outlined in the
Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 	ECF No. 36, at 3-10. 	Defined
terms 	shall 	have 	the 	meanings 	assigned 	in 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	order 	unless
specifically defined otherwise herein.
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precedent, 	notwithstanding 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement 	and 	broad
release, ECF No. 36, 11-15; (2) that neither the “Eastwood Release”
Clause nor the “No Admission of Liability” Clause prohibited such
an inquiry under the same precedent, id.; (3) that the action was
not 	barred 	by 	Res 	Judicata, 	Collateral 	Estoppel, 	or 	Judicial
Estoppel, id. at 15-17; (4) that the Amended Complaint sufficiently
stated 	a 	claim 	for 	the 	underlying 	debt 	represented 	by 	the
Confession 	of 	Judgment 	entered 	in 	state 	court; 	id. 	at 	p. 	17-19;
and (5) that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint stated a plausible claim
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), id. at 20-26.
On 	November 	19, 	2025, 	Defendants 	filed 	the 	current 	Motion
asking 	this 	Court 	to 	reconsider 	and 	vacate 	its 	Order 	and 	Opinion
Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 	59(e) 	and 	60(b), 	made 	applicable 	by 	Federal 	Rules 	of
Bankruptcy 	Procedure 	9023 	and 	9024, 	to 	dismiss 	the 	adversary
proceeding entirely, or, in the alternative, to require Plaintiff
to 	appear 	and 	show 	cause 	why 	they 	should 	not 	be 	sanctioned 	for
their lack of candor to the Court.
DISCUSSION
The appropriate standard for reconsideration is determined by
whether the order proposed to be reconsidered is interlocutory or
final. 	Am. 	Canoe 	Ass'n 	v. 	Murphy 	Farms, 	Inc., 	326 	F.3d 	505, 	514
(4th 	Cir. 	2003). 	An 	order 	denying 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is
interlocutory. 	See, e.g., In re TMG Liquidation Co., No. Adv. 11-
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80212-HB, 	2012 	WL 	4467553, 	at 	*1 	(Bankr. 	D.S.C. 	Sept. 	26, 	2012)
(“Denial 	of 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b) 	‘is 	not 	a
final 	order 	because 	it 	does 	not 	end 	the 	litigation 	on 	the 	merits
and 	leave 	nothing 	for 	the 	court 	to 	do 	but 	execute 	the 	judgment’”
(quoting 	Rux 	v. 	Republic 	of 	Sudan, 	461 	F.3d 	461, 	474 	(4th 	Cir.
2006) (citation modified))). 	Therefore, a motion to reconsider an
interlocutory 	judgment 	does 	not 	trigger 	the 	standards 	for
reconsideration that apply when a judgment is final. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. 	P. 	59(e); 	Murphy 	Farms, 	Inc., 	326 	F.3d 	at 	514 	(“Rule 	60(b)
does not govern relief from interlocutory orders . . . .” (citing
12 	Moore's 	Federal 	Practice 	§ 	60.23(2025))). 	As 	such, 	neither
Rule 	59(e), 	nor 	60(b) 	provide 	the 	appropriate 	standard 	at 	the
motion 	to 	dismiss 	stage. 	See, 	e.g., 	Fayetteville 	Investors 	v.
Commercial 	Builders, 	Inc., 	936 	F.2d 	1462, 	1472 	(4th 	Cir. 	1991).
Reconsideration 	of 	an 	interlocutory 	order 	is 	governed 	by 	Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	54(b), 	made 	applicable 	to 	this 	adversary
proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7054. 	The Court
has liberally construed the motion of Defendants as a request for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	54(b), 	a 	court 	“retains 	the 	power 	to
reconsider 	and 	modify 	its 	interlocutory 	judgments 	. 	. 	. 	at 	any
time 	prior 	to 	final 	judgment 	when 	such 	is 	warranted.” 	Murphy
Farms, 	Inc., 	326 	F.3d 	at 	514-15. 	A 	court 	may 	revise 	an
interlocutory 	order 	in 	three 	circumstances: 	“(1) 	a 	subsequent
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trial 	produces 	substantially 	different 	evidence, 	(2) 	controlling
authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to
the 	issue, 	or 	(3) 	the 	prior 	decision 	was 	clearly 	erroneous 	and
would work manifest injustice.” 	Id. at 515. 	A motion under Rule
54(b) may not be used to raise new arguments that could have been
raised 	previously. 	Hatch 	v. 	DeMayo, 	No. 	1:16CV925, 	2018 	WL
6003548, 	at 	*1 	(M.D.N.C. 	Nov. 	15, 	2018) 	(Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	54(b)
motions 	“should 	not 	be 	used 	to 	rehash 	arguments 	the 	court 	has
already considered or to raise new arguments or evidence that could
have 	been 	raised 	previously.”(citing 	South 	Carolina 	v. 	United
States, 232 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (D.S.C. 2017))).
While 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	generally 	restates 	previous
arguments, 	Defendants 	raise 	an 	additional 	argument 	that 	was 	not
raised previously, although it could have been. 	Defendants contend
that 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	is 	invalid 	because 	after 	it 	was
entered, Plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal of all claims with
prejudice in the State Lawsuit. 	ECF No. 37, Ex. A. 	The voluntary
dismissal 	was 	not 	attached 	or 	integral 	to 	the 	Amended 	Complaint.
Nevertheless, if Defendants had timely requested the Court to take
judicial 	notice 	of 	the 	dismissal,3 	it 	is 	a 	matter 	that 	properly
could be considered if its existence is not subject to reasonable
3 Debtors have requested that the Court take judicial notice of the voluntary
dismissal in connection with the motion to reconsider. 	ECF No. 38 (“Debtors
Judicial 	Notice 	of 	Eastwood’s 	Voluntarily 	Dismissal 	with 	Prejudice 	of 	State
Claims”).
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dispute 	and 	its 	accuracy 	can 	be 	readily 	determined 	from 	a 	source
whose 	accuracy 	cannot 	be 	reasonably 	questioned. 	Fed. 	R. 	Bankr.
P. 	9017; 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid. 	201(b); 	see 	also 	Witthohn 	v. 	Federal 	Ins.
Co., 164 Fed. Appx 395, 397 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) (holding that
a 	district 	court 	could 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	public 	records 	in
connection 	with 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	including 	a 	state 	court
complaint); 	In 	re 	Phillips, 	573 	B.R. 	626, 	631 	(Bankr. 	E.D.N.C.
2017) (taking judicial notice of a state court action on a motion
to dismiss).
As 	a 	result 	of 	the 	voluntary 	dismissal 	with 	prejudice,
Defendants contend that the Court failed to properly consider that
the “underlying state-court claims” were “eliminat[ed].” 	ECF No.
37 at, 4. 	Defendants explain that this failure was the result of
the 	Court’s 	faulty 	assumption 	that 	the 	“state-court 	claims”
survived dismissal of the underlying lawsuit after the Confession
of 	Judgment 	had 	been 	entered. 	Id. 	at 	4, 	5. 	As 	explained 	by 	the
Supreme 	Court 	in 	Archer 	v. 	Warner, 	the 	remaining 	efficacy 	of 	the
underlying 	state 	court 	claims 	does 	not 	affect 	the 	bankruptcy
court’s 	obligation 	to 	assess 	the 	dischargeability 	of 	the 	debt 	by
examining the nature of the circumstances giving rise to the debt.
538 	U.S. 	314 	(2003). 	Nevertheless, 	even 	if 	the 	Court 	were 	to
consider 	the 	voluntary 	dismissal, 	there 	was 	no 	manifest 	error 	of
law 	that 	would 	require 	reconsideration 	and 	the 	dismissal 	did 	not
affect the efficacy of the Confession of Judgment.
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Defendants attribute the failure to consider the dismissal to
the 	Plaintiff 	because 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	include 	the 	voluntary
dismissal with their Amended Complaint. 	Defendants argue that if
the 	Court 	had 	considered 	the 	voluntary 	dismissal, 	it 	would 	have
granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 	On this basis, Defendants
argue 	that 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	decision 	was 	clearly 	erroneous 	and
that 	maintaining 	it 	would 	work 	manifest 	injustice, 	demanding
reconsideration.
Under North Carolina law, a dismissal with prejudice usually
operates 	as 	an 	adjudication 	on 	the 	merits 	and 	has 	res 	judicata
implications. 	Caswell Realty Assocs. I, L.P. v. Andrews Co., Inc.,
496 	S.E.2d 	607, 	610 	(N.C. 	Ct. 	App. 	1998). 	But 	in 	this 	case, 	the
voluntary 	dismissal 	itself 	preserved 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	under 	the
Confession 	of 	Judgment. 	Cf. 	In 	re 	Fowler, 	312 	B.R. 	287, 	294
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2004) (where all but one claim was dismissed with
prejudice in the prior state court action, the dischargeability of
the remaining claim could be considered in a later dischargeability
action; finding “the plaintiff's . . . abandonment of unspecified
state 	court 	claims 	as 	possible 	separate 	and 	additional 	bases 	for
recovery 	against 	the 	defendant 	by 	dismissing 	them 	with 	prejudice
does not support application of collateral estoppel or res judicata
in 	this 	proceeding”). 	In 	Archer, 	as 	in 	the 	present 	case, 	after
the 	parties 	reached 	a 	settlement 	agreement 	to 	resolve 	their
litigation and before the bankruptcy proceedings, “the [plaintiff]
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voluntarily 	dismissed 	the 	state-court 	lawsuit 	with 	prejudice.”
538 	U.S. 	at 	317. 	As 	in 	Archer, 	the 	voluntary 	dismissal 	of 	all
remaining claims did not vitiate the obligations evidenced by the
Settlement Agreement or Confession of Judgment in this case.
The 	State 	Court’s 	orders, 	including 	the 	Confession 	of
Judgment, 	are 	not 	reviewable 	by 	this 	Court 	and 	sufficiently
establish the continuing efficacy of the judgment. 	See ECF No. 3,
Ex. 	B. 	The 	State 	Court’s 	Order 	Granting 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to
Enforce 	Settlement 	Agreement 	provided 	both: 	(1) 	that 	the
“[Plaintiff] shall file the Confession of Judgment,” and (2) that
“Plaintiff 	shall 	dismiss 	its 	claim 	in 	this 	action 	pursuant 	to
Paragraph 	4(c) 	of 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement.” 	Id. 	Paragraph
4(c)(ii) of the Settlement Agreement provides that “[u]pon filing
of the Dismissal by Defendants, [Plaintiff] shall execute and file
a 	Stipulation 	of 	Voluntary 	Dismissal 	with 	Prejudice 	of 	the 	State
[Court] Lawsuit with the Randolph County Clerk of Superior Court,
dismissing all claims without prejudice.” ECF No. 28, at 32.
As required by that Order, Plaintiff filed the Confession of
Judgment and thereafter voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims
with 	prejudice. 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	Ex. 	C. 	Significantly, 	the 	voluntary
dismissal 	by 	its 	own 	terms 	preserves 	the 	obligations 	in 	the
Confession 	of 	Judgment: 	“This 	dismissal 	of 	pending 	claims 	has 	no
effect 	on 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	filed 	and 	recorded 	on 	March
25, 2024[,] pursuant to an Order of the Court dated March 22, 2024,
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nor 	does 	Plaintiff 	waive 	any 	of 	its 	rights 	to 	collect 	on 	the
Confession of Judgment.” ECF No. 37, Ex. A. 	The plain language of
both 	the 	State 	Court 	order 	and 	voluntary 	dismissal 	eliminate 	any
argument that dismissal precluded the Confession of Judgment. 	If
Defendants believed the State Court erred, the appropriate remedy
was 	to 	appeal 	the 	judgement 	in 	state 	court, 	as 	this 	Court 	cannot
sit 	in 	appellate 	jurisdiction 	over 	state 	court 	judgements. 	See
Rooker 	v. 	Fidelity 	Trust 	Co., 	263 	U.S. 	413, 	(1923); 	D.C. 	Ct. 	of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
As 	explained 	in 	the 	Order 	and 	Opinion 	Denying 	Defendants’
Motion 	to 	Dismiss, 	it 	is 	the 	facts 	and 	circumstances 	giving 	rise
to 	the 	liability 	in 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	which 	the 	Court
must consider in this adversary proceeding under Archer and In re
Hilgartner, 	91 	F.4th 	186 	(4th 	Cir. 	2024).4 	Id. 	For 	the 	reasons
set 	forth 	in 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	order, 	Plaintiff 	has 	sufficiently
stated 	a 	claim 	for 	nondischargeability 	of 	that 	debt, 	and 	because
none of the basis for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
are present in this case, the Court will deny the Motion.
4 Defendants also request that this Court Order Plaintiff to appear and show
cause why they should not be sanctioned for their lack of candor to the Court.
Defendants’ request is premised on the fact that Plaintiff’s failure to include
the 	voluntary 	dismissal 	was 	intentional 	and 	caused 	the 	Court 	to 	rule 	on 	an
incomplete, 	misleading 	record. 	Nothing 	in 	Defendants 	filings 	contains
allegations 	of 	malfeasance 	by 	Plaintiff 	in 	failing 	to 	attach 	the 	dismissal.
Therefore, the Court will not direct Plaintiff to show cause why it should be
sanctioned.
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NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
that the Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, is denied.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-02009
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr.
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Sharon Renea Bryant
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator 	VIA CM/ECF
Jamey M. Lowdermilk
Katarina Kyung Oak Wong 	VIA CM/ECF
Counsel for Plaintiff
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