Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant, Jr. et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10147
)
Debtors. 	)
______________________________________ )
Eastwood Construction Partners, 	)
LLC dba Eastwood Homes, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________ )
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND DEFERRING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFERRING DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DIRECTING BOTH PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH
LOCAL RULE 7056-1
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	the 	motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	and 	supporting 	brief 	filed 	by 	Eastwood
Construction Partners, LLC d/b/a Eastwood Homes (“Plaintiff”), ECF
Nos. 	31 	& 	32, 	and 	the 	cross-motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	and
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 17th day of February, 2026.
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supporting 	brief 	filed 	by 	James 	Lawrence 	Bryant, 	Jr. 	and 	Sharon
Renea 	Bryant 	(“Defendants”). 	ECF 	Nos. 	87 	& 	88. 	Defendants 	are
proceeding pro se.1 	For the reasons stated herein, the Court will
deny 	in 	part 	and 	defer 	in 	part 	Plaintiff’s 	motion, 	defer
Defendants’ 	cross-motion, 	require 	Plaintiff 	to 	refile 	its
Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Material 	Facts 	filed 	in 	support 	of 	its
motion in separately numbered paragraphs as required by Local Rule
7056-1(b)2 	within 	seven 	(7) 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	this 	order, 	and
allow 	Defendants 	fourteen 	(14) 	days 	from 	the 	close 	of 	discovery3
to 	file 	a 	Statement 	of 	Disputed 	Material 	Facts 	in 	response 	to
Plaintiff’s 	statement 	in 	correspondingly 	numbered 	paragraphs 	in
accordance with Local Rule 7056-1(c).4
1 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
2 Local Rule 7056-1(b) provides in relevant part:
Each motion for summary judgment must be accompanied by . . . a
separate and concise “Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.” 	Each
fact in a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts must be set forth
in 	a 	separately 	numbered 	paragraph 	and 	must 	be 	supported 	by
reference to the particular portions of the record relied upon to
establish that fact.
3 Under the scheduling order in this proceeding, discovery ends April 2, 2026.
ECF No. 39, ¶ 3. 	Defendants must file a Statement of Disputed Material Facts
on or before April 16, 2026, unless the scheduling order is modified by the
Court.
4 Local Rule 7056-1(c) provides in relevant part:
[A] party opposing such motion must file and serve . . . a separate
and concise “Statement of Disputed Material Facts.” 	Each fact in
a 	Statement 	of 	Disputed 	Material 	Facts 	must 	be 	set 	forth 	in 	a
separately 	numbered 	paragraph 	that 	corresponds 	to 	the 	numbered
paragraph in the movant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
and must be supported by reference to the place in the record that
supports the existence of a genuine dispute of such fact. 	Pertinent
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Under Local Rule 7056-1(c), all facts set forth in Plaintiff’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts will be deemed admitted by Defendants
for 	purposes 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	unless
specifically controverted by Defendants in a Statement of Disputed
Material 	Facts 	supported 	by 	reference 	to 	the 	record 	or 	proper
affidavit 	that 	establishes 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of
material fact. 	If Plaintiff fails to timely submit a Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts as required by Local Rule 7056-1(b) and
this order, the Court will deny the motion without further hearing.
If Defendants fail to timely file a Statement of Disputed Material
Facts 	in 	the 	form 	required 	by 	Local 	Rule 	7056-1(c) 	or 	otherwise
fail 	to 	identify 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact, 	the 	Court 	may
grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and enter judgement
against 	Defendants 	in 	favor 	of 	Plaintiff 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	the
undisputed facts are sufficient to support judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of title
11 	on 	March 	13, 	2025. 	Case 	No. 	25-10147, 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Plaintiff
initiated 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	on 	June 	5, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	1.
excerpts 	of 	evidentiary 	documents 	cited 	must 	be 	filed
contemporaneously 	with 	the 	response. 	All 	facts 	set 	forth 	in 	a
movant’s 	Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Material 	Facts 	will 	be 	deemed
admitted for the purpose of a motion for summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party in a Statement of
Disputed Material Facts.
(emphasis added).
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On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint as of
right 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	15(a)(1)(B), 	made
applicable 	to 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	by 	Federal 	Rule 	of
Bankruptcy 	Procedure 	7015. 	ECF 	No. 	3. 	On 	November 	14, 	2025,
Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	and 	supporting
brief. 	ECF Nos. 31 & 32. 	Thereafter, Defendants filed a document
titled 	“Motion 	to 	Defer 	or 	Deny 	Plaintiff’s 	Premature 	Motion 	for
Summary Judgment,” ECF No. 44, as well as an answer to the amended
complaint. 	ECF No. 45. 	Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’
motion 	to 	defer 	or 	deny 	summary 	judgment, 	ECF 	No. 	55, 	and
Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion. 	ECF No. 57.
On 	January 	22, 	2026, 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	cross-motion 	for 	summary
judgment and supporting brief. 	ECF Nos. 87 & 88. 	On February 12,
2026, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s cross-motion. 	ECF
No. 	93. 	Finally, 	on 	February 	17, 	2026, 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	reply
in support of their motion for summary judgment. 	ECF No. 97.
FACTS5
On December 28 and 29, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants entered
into a settlement agreement. 	ECF No. 28, at 29-39. 	The settlement
agreement 	required, 	inter 	alia, 	that 	Defendants 	execute 	a
confession of judgment in the amount of $150,000.00, but provided
that the judgment would remain confidential and not be filed unless
5 	The 	Court 	has 	reviewed 	the 	record, 	and 	the 	following 	facts 	appear 	to 	be
undisputed for purposes of this order.
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Defendants 	defaulted 	under 	the 	settlement 	agreement. 	Id. 	at 	31.
In 	exchange, 	Plaintiff 	was 	required 	to 	pay 	Defendants
$7,500.00. 	Id. 	On 	March 	22, 	2024, 	the 	North 	Carolina 	Superior
Court of Randolph County directed Plaintiff to file the confession
of 	judgment. 	ECF 	No. 	3-2, at 	2. 	On 	March 	25, 	2024, 	Plaintiff
filed the confession of judgment. 	ECF No. 3-3. 	The confession of
judgment states, in relevant part, that:
In 	April 	2023, 	[Defendants] 	began 	a 	campaign 	to 	damage
[Plaintiff]’s 	business 	and 	reputation 	in 	the
neighborhood 	and 	on 	social 	media. 	[Defendants]
approached 	[Plaintiff]’s 	customers 	and 	made 	negative
comments 	about 	Plaintiff, 	placed 	defamatory 	signs 	on
their 	yards, 	and 	made 	defamatory 	social 	media 	posts.
[Defendants]’ 	conduct 	caused 	[Plaintiff] 	to 	lose 	at
least one contract for the purchase of a lot and home in
Piper 	Village. 	[Plaintiff] 	suffered 	damages 	in 	the
amount of at least $74,400 in profit on the sale of the
lot 	and 	home. 	. 	. 	. 	[Defendants] 	acknowledge 	that
[Plaintiff]’s 	damages 	are 	at 	least 	$74,400, 	and 	that
under Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
[Plaintiff]’s 	damages 	may 	be 	trebled 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$223,200. 	[Defendants] 	acknowledge 	that 	they 	are
confessing to a lower amount of damages in the amount of
[$150,000].
Id. 	¶¶ 	6-7, 	13. 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	voluntary 	petition 	under
chapter 	7 	on 	March 	13, 	2025, 	and 	on 	June 	5, 	2025, 	Plaintiff
initiated 	this 	adversary 	proceeding, 	seeking 	a 	declaration 	of
exception to discharge for the debt represented by the confession
of judgment under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	ECF No. 1.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	when 	the 	moving 	party
“show[s] 	that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R.
Civ. 	P. 	56(a); 	Fed. 	R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	7056. 	“A 	fact 	is 	‘material’ 	if
proof 	of 	its 	existence 	or 	non-existence 	would 	affect 	disposition
of 	the 	case 	under 	applicable 	law. 	An 	issue 	of 	fact 	is 	‘genuine’
if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return
a verdict for the non-movant.” 	Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC,
980 	F.3d 	1027, 	1037 	(4th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Anderson 	v. 	Liberty
Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S. 	242, 	248 	(1986)). 	The 	nonmoving 	party 	may
not 	rely 	solely 	on 	allegations 	or 	denials 	in 	its 	pleadings 	but
must 	set 	forth 	specific 	facts 	demonstrating 	a 	genuine 	issue 	for
trial. 	U.S. 	Commodity 	Futures 	Trading 	Comm'n 	v. 	PMC 	Strategy,
LLC, No. 3:11CV73, 2013 WL 1349177, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2013).
“To create a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party
must 	cite 	competent, 	admissible 	evidence, 	and 	there 	must 	be
sufficient evidence for the jury to return a verdict for the non-
moving party.” 	Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
construe 	the 	“facts 	and 	inferences 	drawn 	therefrom 	in 	the 	light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 	Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v.
Am. 	Home 	Assur. 	Co., 	377 	F.3d 	408, 	418 	(4th 	Cir. 	2004). 	Where
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there 	are 	cross 	motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	as 	in 	this 	case,
“the 	court 	must 	review 	each 	motion 	separately 	on 	its 	own 	merits
‘to 	determine 	whether 	either 	of 	the 	parties 	deserves 	judgment 	as
a matter of law.’” 	Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th
Cir. 	2003) 	(quoting 	Philip 	Morris 	Inc. 	v. 	Harshbarger, 	122 	F.3d
58, 	62 	n.4 	(1st 	Cir. 	1997)). 	“As 	to 	those 	elements 	on 	which 	it
bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	at 	trial, 	a 	movant 	is 	only 	entitled 	to
summary judgment ‘if the proffered evidence is such that a rational
factfinder could only find for [the movant].’” 	In re Caceres, No.
18-80776, 	2023 	WL 	2543713, 	at 	*3 	(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	Feb. 	27, 	2023)
(quoting Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2009)). 	If
there 	is 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact, 	the 	court 	must 	deny
both motions, “[b]ut if there is no genuine dispute and one or the
other 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	prevail 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law, 	the 	court
will render judgment.” 	10A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (4th ed. 2021).
Rule 	56(d) 	“requires 	a 	court 	to defer ruling 	on 	a summary-
judgment motion until the 	nonmovant 	has 	had 	a 	reasonable
opportunity 	to 	discover 	information 	that 	is 	essential 	to 	its
response.” 	Hodgin 	v. 	UTC 	Fire 	& 	Sec. 	Americas 	Corp., 	885 	F.3d
243, 	250 	(4th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(citing 	Pisano 	v. 	Strach, 	743 	F.3d 	927,
931 	(4th 	Cir. 	2014)); 	see 	also 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(d) 	(“If 	a
nonmovant 	shows 	by 	affidavit 	or 	declaration 	that, 	for 	specified
reasons, 	it 	cannot 	present 	facts 	essential 	to 	justify 	its
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opposition, 	the 	court 	may: 	defer 	considering 	the 	motion 	or 	deny
it”). 	Although a motion for summary judgment may be filed before
the completion of discovery, the Fourth Circuit strongly disfavors
a court’s grant of summary judgment pre-discovery against a pro se
party. 	Laber 	v. 	Austin, 	No. 	3:23CV498, 	2024 	WL 	4789132, 	at 	*3
(E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2024), reconsideration denied sub nom. Laber v.
Hegseth, 	No. 	CV 	3:23CV498, 	2025 	WL 	2977523 	(E.D. 	Va. 	Mar. 	10,
2025), aff'd, No. 	25-1547, 	2025 	WL 	2952598 	(4th 	Cir. 	Oct. 	20,
2025).
DISCUSSION
Section 	523(a)(6) 	excepts 	from 	discharge 	any 	debt 	“for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity.” 	11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	The term
“debt” means liability on a claim. 	11 U.S.C. § 101(12). 	“‘Claim’
means—right 	to 	payment, 	whether 	or 	not 	such 	right 	is 	reduced 	to
judgment 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	101(5)(A). 	The 	Court 	previously
has ruled in this case that the confession of judgment is a “debt”
as 	contemplated 	by 	§§ 	101(12) 	and 	523(a). 	ECF 	Nos. 	36, 	41 	& 	82.
Therefore, 	in 	order 	for 	the 	obligation 	represented 	by 	the
confession 	of 	judgment 	to 	be 	excepted 	from 	discharge, 	Plaintiff
must establish that the confession of judgment is: (1) a debt for
(2) willful and (3) malicious (4) injury.
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	it 	is 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	in
its 	favor 	because 	(1) 	issue 	preclusion 	prohibits 	Defendants 	from
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relitigating the issue of willfulness; (2) Defendants are bound by
their 	admissions 	in 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment; 	(3) 	under 	the
doctrine 	of 	quasi-estoppel, 	Defendants 	cannot 	take 	a 	position
inconsistent 	with 	the 	settlement 	agreement 	and 	confession 	of
judgment; 	and 	(4) 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material 	fact
that 	the 	debt 	represented 	by 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment 	is 	for 	a
willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff by Defendants. 	ECF No.
32.
I. 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	is 	denied 	in
part.
a. The 	confession 	of 	judgment 	is 	entitled 	to 	claim
preclusion but not issue preclusion.
“The 	Full 	Faith 	and 	Credit 	Act, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1738, 	requires
federal courts . . . to give state judicial proceedings ‘the same
full 	faith 	and 	credit 	. 	. 	. 	as 	they 	have 	by 	law 	or 	usage 	in 	the
courts 	of 	such 	State 	. 	. 	. 	from 	which 	they 	are 	taken.’” 	Parsons
Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1738). 	Federal courts apply the preclusion principles
of 	the 	state 	where 	the 	judgment 	was 	entered. 	Id. 	at 	523; 	see 	In
re 	Caswell, 	605 	B.R. 	401, 	410 	(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	2019) 	(quoting 	In
re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Issue preclusion, applies under North Carolina law where “the
determination 	of 	an 	issue 	in 	a 	prior 	judicial 	. 	. 	. 	proceeding
precludes 	the 	relitigation 	of 	that 	issue 	in 	a 	later 	action,
provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a
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full 	and 	fair 	opportunity 	to 	litigate 	that 	issue 	in 	the 	earlier
proceeding.” 	Gray v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 264 N.C. App. 642,
648-49 (2019) (quoting Whitacre P'ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C.
1, 	15 	(2004)). 	The 	following 	requirements 	must 	be 	met: 	(1) 	the
issue is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessary to
the judgment in the prior action; (2) the prior action resulted in
a 	final 	judgment 	on 	the 	merits; 	and 	(3) 	the 	current 	parties 	are
the same as, or in privity with, the parties to the earlier action.
See 	Sartin 	v. 	Macik, 	535 	F.3d 	284, 	288 	(4th 	Cir. 	2008) 	(citing
Thomas 	M. 	McInnis 	& 	Assocs., 	Inc. 	v. Hall, 	318 	N.C. 	421, 	428-29
(1986)).
Claim preclusion applies when a party attempts to relitigate
the 	same 	cause of 	action. 	ACC 	Const., 	Inc. 	v. 	SunTrust 	Mortg.,
Inc., 239 N.C. App. 252, 261-62 (2015). 	The elements include: (1)
a 	final 	judgment 	on 	the 	merits 	in 	a 	prior 	suit; (2) 	identity 	of
the cause of action in the prior suit and the later suit; and (3)
identity of or privity with the parties in both suits. 	Id. at 262.
Claim preclusion bars relitigating claims previously presented or
claims 	that 	could 	have 	been 	presented. 	King 	v. 	Grindstaff, 	284
N.C. 348, 356 (1973) (quoting Cromwell v. Sac Cnty., 94 U.S. 351,
353 (1876)).
Issue preclusion does not apply to the confession of judgment
because North Carolina law provides that “no judgment by confession
shall be held to be res judicata as to any fact in any civil action
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except 	in 	an 	action 	on 	the 	judgment 	confessed.” 	N.C. 	Gen. 	Stat.
§ 1A-1, Rule 68.1(e);6 see also Sartin, 535 F.3d at 288-89 (finding
that the North Carolina Supreme Court “has indicated both that it
follows 	the 	traditional 	rule 	for 	collateral 	estoppel 	[issue
preclusion] 	and 	that 	it 	views 	the 	Restatement 	as 	presenting 	this
rule,” 	and 	citing 	the 	Restatement 	(Second) 	of 	Judgments 	§ 	27
(1982), 	for 	the 	proposition 	that, 	when 	a 	judgment 	is 	entered 	by
confession, 	none 	of 	the 	issues 	are 	actually 	litigated 	and 	issue
preclusion does not apply). 	Therefore, issue preclusion does not
apply to the facts stated in the confession of judgment.
Although 	issue 	preclusion 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	a 	judgment 	by
confession, 	claim 	preclusion 	does. 	Simpson 	v. 	Plyler, 	258 	N.C.
390, 397 (1963) (a consent judgment “is as much a judgment on the
merits 	as 	if 	it 	had 	been 	entered 	on 	a 	jury 	verdict. 	A 	consent
judgment, 	as 	well 	as 	a 	judgment 	on 	trial 	of 	issues, 	is 	[claim
preclusive] 	as 	between 	the 	parties 	upon 	all 	matters 	embraced
therein”) 	(quotations 	omitted); 	see 	also 	N.C. 	Gen. 	Stat. 	§ 	1A-1,
Rule 	68.1(e) 	(providing 	that 	confessions 	of 	judgment 	“shall 	have
the 	same 	effect 	as 	other 	judgments 	. 	. 	. 	.”). 	Because 	claim
preclusion 	applies 	to 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment, 	Defendants
6 “The Restatement of Judgments now speaks of res judicata as ‘claim preclusion’
and collateral estoppel as ‘issue preclusion.’ 	Some courts and commentators
use ‘res judicata’ as generally meaning both forms of preclusion.” 	Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 n.5 (1980) (internal citations omitted). 	Here, the
Court understands “res judicata as to any fact” to mean issue preclusion.
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cannot dispute the validity and amount of the judgment. 	See In re
Heckert, 272 F.3d 253, 257-58 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claim
preclusion applies when a bankruptcy court considers the validity
of a claim upon which debt is based); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)
(the term “claim” means a right to payment, including a judgment).
Thus, claim preclusion applies to the confession of judgment.
b. Defendants 	are 	not 	bound 	by 	statements 	in 	the
confession of judgment.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 68.1(b) provides that a confession of judgment
must “concisely show why the defendant is or may become liable to
the 	plaintiff.” 	The 	rule 	further 	provides 	that, 	although 	a
judgment 	by 	confession 	has 	the 	same 	effect 	of 	other 	judgments,
they are not preclusive “as to any fact in any civil action except
in an action on the judgment confessed.” 	N.C. R. Civ. P. 68.1(e).
Therefore, 	factual 	statements 	contained 	within 	a 	confession 	of
judgment do not constitute admissions that a defendant is estopped
from disputing in a subsequent civil action.
Plaintiff 	attempts 	to 	circumvent 	the 	prohibition 	against
granting 	facts 	contained 	in 	the 	confession 	preclusive 	effect 	by
arguing 	that 	the 	facts 	nevertheless 	constitute 	admissions. 	In
support of this theory, Plaintiff cites cases in which a defendant
was 	precluded 	by 	estoppel 	from 	disputing 	the 	validity 	of 	a
confessed 	judgment 	itself 	by 	challenging 	the 	underlying 	facts
giving 	rise 	to 	the 	liability. 	See 	Peace 	v. 	Mangum, 	28 	N.C. 	369
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(1846); J.S. Martin & Son v. Briscoe, 143 N.C. 353 (1906); Pulley
v. 	Pulley, 	255 	N.C. 	423 	(1961). 	Plaintiff 	cites 	the 	following
portion of Pulley:
In Johnson v. Alvis, 159 Va. 229, 165 S.E. 489, 490, the
Court 	said: 	‘A 	defendant 	confessing 	judgment 	is
estopped, 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	fraud, 	to 	question 	its
validity 	on 	account 	of 	irregularities 	to 	which 	he 	did
not 	object, 	or 	to 	dispute 	any 	facts 	set 	forth 	in 	the
confession, and if, after the entry of the judgment, he
ratifies 	or 	accepts 	it, 	or 	acquiesces 	in 	it, 	he 	is
estopped to deny the authority on which it was confessed
or otherwise to impeach its validity.
255 	N.C. 	at 	430.7 	Plaintiff 	misconstrues 	this 	statement 	in
Johnson. 	The defendant in Johnson was challenging the validity of
the 	judgment 	itself 	by 	contesting 	its 	underlying 	facts. 	159 	Va.
229. 	Johnson 	and 	the 	other 	cases 	cited 	by 	Plaintiff 	align 	with
N.C. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	68.1 	and 	prohibit 	a 	judgment 	debtor 	from
challenging 	the 	debt 	by 	disputing 	the 	underlying 	facts 	contained
in 	the 	judgment.8 	The 	statement 	in 	Johnson 	and 	the 	holdings 	in
the 	other 	cases 	cannot 	be 	interpreted 	as 	suggested 	by 	Plaintiff,
which 	would 	directly 	contradict 	the 	restrictions 	in 	the 	rule
7 In Johnson, the plaintiffs executed a note and authorized their attorney in
fact to confess judgment for them in the amount due on the note in the event of
default in payments. 	159 Va. at 230. 	The note was not paid, the attorney in
fact 	confessed 	judgment, 	execution 	was 	issued 	on 	the 	judgment, 	and 	the
plaintiffs filed a motion to quash the judgment. 	Id. 	The trial court overruled
the motion and held the judgment valid and binding. 	Id. 	The appellate court
noted that the plaintiffs contested the validity of the judgment for the first
time on appeal. 	Id. at 233.
8 Plaintiff also points to In re Burress, 245 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
This case is distinguishable because in Colorado, “[c]onfessions of judgment
have been recognized as forming a basis for [issue preclusion] as to the facts
stipulated to.” 	Id. at 877.
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itself. 	As 	has 	been 	explained 	to 	Defendants, 	and 	which 	precept
applies equally to Plaintiff, this proceeding is not an action on
the judgment confessed. 	See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003).
Therefore, Defendants are not bound by statements in the confession
of judgment.
c. Quasi-estoppel does not apply.
The 	North 	Carolina 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	a 	doctrine
known 	as 	quasi-estoppel 	or 	estoppel 	by 	benefit. 	Whitacre, 	358
N.C. 	at 	18. 	“Under 	a 	quasi-estoppel 	theory, 	a 	party 	who 	accepts
a transaction or instrument and then accepts benefits under it may
be 	estopped 	to 	take 	a 	later 	position 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	prior
acceptance 	of 	that 	same 	transaction 	or 	instrument.” 	Id. 	(citing
Brooks 	v. 	Hackney, 	329 	N.C. 	166, 	173 	(1991)). 	“[Q]uasi-estoppel
is 	inherently 	flexible 	and 	cannot 	be 	reduced 	to 	any 	rigid
formulation.” 	Id. (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 321 N.C. 244, 249 n.1
(1987)).
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendants 	are 	estopped 	from 	denying
the statements in the confession of judgment because they accepted
the 	benefits 	under 	the 	settlement 	agreement 	and 	cannot 	now 	deny
its obligations. 	The settlement agreement required Defendants to
execute 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment, 	which 	they 	did. 	As 	has 	been
explained 	to 	Defendants 	in 	their 	attempts 	to 	attack 	the 	validity
of 	the 	judgment 	itself, 	that 	matter 	is 	precluded. 	But 	extending
quasi-estoppel 	to 	give 	preclusive 	effect 	to 	facts 	stated 	in 	a
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confession 	of 	judgment 	would 	render 	the 	limitations 	in 	N.C. 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	68.1(e) 	meaningless 	and 	would 	go 	beyond 	the 	obligations
imposed by the settlement agreement.
The settlement agreement does not require Defendants to admit
to 	the 	facts 	contained 	in 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment. 	Instead,
the 	settlement 	agreement 	explicitly 	states 	that 	Defendants 	deny
Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	and 	that 	the 	parties 	entered 	the
settlement agreement without any admission of liability. 	ECF No.
28, 	at 	30. 	The 	settlement 	agreement 	further 	states 	that 	“[n]o
provision 	of 	this 	Agreement 	shall 	be 	considered 	as 	admissions 	by
any Party of any liability or wrongdoing.” 	Id. at 35-36. 	Instead,
the 	settlement 	agreement 	merely 	required 	the 	execution 	of 	the
confession 	of 	judgment. 	Defendants 	complied 	with 	that 	term, 	and
Plaintiff 	fully 	received 	the 	benefit 	of 	that 	bargain. 	Quasi-
estoppel does not contemplate the Court giving the Plaintiff more
than 	that 	to 	which 	it 	was 	entitled 	by 	the 	agreement. 	Therefore,
quasi-estoppel does not apply.
II. 	The 	parties 	must 	comply 	with 	the 	Local 	Rules 	in
formatting, 	particularly 	important 	in 	this 	case 	with
unrepresented parties.
Neither 	party 	has 	complied 	with 	Local 	Rule 	7056-1.
Defendants’ 	initial 	response 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment 	asked 	the 	Court 	to 	defer 	ruling 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	motion
until 	the 	completion 	of 	discovery 	because 	Defendants 	could 	not
present 	facts 	essential 	to 	justify 	their 	opposition 	absent
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discovery. 	ECF 	No. 	44, 	at 	4-6. 	Discovery 	has 	not 	yet 	been
concluded. 	Therefore, the Court will defer ruling on the remaining
arguments 	raised 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	and 	Defendant’s 	cross-
motion and will direct the parties to comply with Local Rule 7056-
1.
NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	is 	denied 	with
respect 	to 	the 	applicability 	of 	issue 	preclusion 	and 	quasi-
estoppel.
2. 	Plaintiff 	shall 	have 	seven 	(7) 	days 	from 	entry 	of 	this
order 	to 	refile 	its 	Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Material 	Facts 	in
separately numbered paragraphs and with citations to the record as
required by Local Rule 7056-1(b).
3. 	Defendants shall have fourteen (14) days from the close
of 	discovery 	to 	file 	a 	Statement 	of 	Disputed 	Material 	Facts 	in
correspondingly 	numbered 	paragraphs 	and 	with 	citations 	to 	the
record as required by Local Rule 7056-1(c).
4. 	Under 	Local 	Rule 	7056-1(c), 	all 	facts 	set 	forth 	in 	a
timely filed and conforming Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
by Plaintiff are deemed admitted for purposes of Plaintiff’s motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	unless 	specifically 	controverted 	by
Defendants in a Statement of Disputed Material Facts supported by
references to the record or proper affidavit that establishes the
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existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
5. 	If 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	timely 	submit 	a 	Statement 	of
Undisputed 	Facts 	as 	required 	by 	Local 	Rule 	7056-1(b) 	and 	this
order, the Court will deny the motion without further hearing.
6. 	If Defendants fail to timely file a Statement of Disputed
Material 	Facts 	in 	the 	form 	required 	by 	Local 	Rule 	7056-1(c) 	or
otherwise 	fail 	to 	identify 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact, 	the
Court may grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and enter
judgement 	against 	Defendants 	in 	favor 	of 	Plaintiff 	to 	the 	extent
that the undisputed facts are sufficient to support judgment.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-02009
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator 	Via CM/ECF
Jamey M. Lowdermilk
Katarina Kyung Oak Wong
Counsel for Plaintiff/Third Party Defendants 	Via CM/ECF
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr.
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Sharon Renea Bryant
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
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