HENDERSON v. SHANLEY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JEREMY LAMOND HENDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV308
)
ASHLIE SHANLEY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim (Docket Entry 10) as well as submissions that the Court construes as a
motion to compel service (Docket Entry 14) and a request for removal (Docket Entry 1-2).
These matters are ripe for disposition. For the below reasons, the Court denies the motion to
compel service. Further, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the request for
removal and grant the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Jeremy Lamond Henderson (“Henderson”) filed a complaint that named
as defendants Ashlie Shanley (“Shanley”), the Cabarrus County District Attorney; Nathaniel
Knust, a Cabarrus County District Court Judge; Van Worth Shaw, the Cabarrus County
Sheriff; and Wayne Goodwin, the Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles. (Docket Entry 1 at 2, Complaint.) However, Henderson ultimately served the
complaint on Shanley only. (See generally Text Order dated 04/14/2025; Docket Entries 6, 8.)
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Shanley filed a motion to dismiss on June 9, 2025, which included a certificate from
her attorney certifying that the motion was served on Henderson by mail. (Docket Entry 10.)
The Court then sent Henderson a Roseboro letter informing him of his right to file a response,
and the potential consequences—including dismissal—of not doing so. (Docket Entry 12.)
Henderson’s response was due on June 30, 2025.
On June 30, 2025, Henderson submitted a statement alleging that he had never received
Shanley’s motion to dismiss, requesting that the Court order Shanley to “properly inform me
with her motions addressing the true party in interest,” and stating that he would “respond
within the 21-day time frame upon proper service of due process.” (Docket Entry 14 at 1–2.)
The Court construes this submission as a motion to compel service. (See infra Section IV.)
On July 28, 2025, Henderson filed a document titled both “Complaint” and “Plaintiff’s
Opposition for Motion to Dismiss.” (Docket Entry 15 at 1.) Despite Henderson’s earlier
statement that he never received Shanley’s motion to dismiss, the motion and briefing were
attached to Henderson’s July 28 submission. (See id. at 24–36.)
It is not clear whether Henderson intended his July 28 submission to serve as an
amended complaint or as his response to Shanley’s motion. On one hand, the document
clearly takes the form of a complaint; for example, it includes numbered paragraphs and a
prayer for relief. (See Docket Entry 15.) It also includes multiple causes of action not found
in the original complaint, including securities fraud, human trafficking, negligence, and
“violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584 – Sale into involuntary servitude.” (Id. at 9–11, 14, 17–19.) On
the other hand, certain portions of the document contain argumentation and extensive quotes
from judicial opinions. (See id. 15 at 3–5.) It also omits some of the causes of action found in
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the original complaint, including copyright infringement and Henderson’s request to remove
a state proceeding to federal court. (Compare Docket Entry 15 with Docket Entry 1 at 7; Docket
Entry 1-2 at 1–2.)
The undersigned recommends that the Court construe the original complaint (Docket
Entry 1) as the operative complaint in this matter and Henderson’s July 28 submission (Docket
Entry 15) as an untimely response to the motion to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prohibit amendment as a matter of course at this stage in the proceedings, and
Henderson has not sought leave to amend.1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)–(2). Further, were
the Court to adopt the new submission as the operative complaint, it would be determining
that Henderson had abandoned his claims not carried over from the original complaint despite
no clear indication that Henderson wished to do so. And the Court cannot consider both
documents to be operative complaints. This Court has previously ruled that
[w]hile courts should and do construe pro se complaints liberally,
it is unfair to defendants to require them to sort through
numerous briefs and other paper writings to figure out whether
and what federal causes of action a plaintiff is asserting and
whether the plaintiff might have scattered sufficient allegations
1 While pro se, Henderson is not unfamiliar with federal courts: He has filed at least
three other lawsuits, all of which appear facially similar to this one. See Jeremy Lamond Henderson
Tr. v. Haynes, No. 3:23-CV-730-FDW, 2024 WL 460263 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2024); Henderson v.
Haynes, No. 3:23-CV-583-FDW, 2024 WL 1184724, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2024); Henderson
v. Cabarrus Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 3:23-CV-367-RJC-DCK, 2024 WL 5397196 (W.D.N.C. Aug.
14, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-00367-RJC-DCK, 2025 WL 33468
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2025). The undersigned does not consider whether any claims or issues in
this case are precluded by those cases, first, because the defendants have not raised the issue,
and second, because the only claims that survive Henderson’s failure to properly serve most
of the defendants in this case are those against Shanley, see infra Section III, who was not a
defendant in any of Henderson’s other cases. “Preclusion is not a jurisdictional matter,” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 282 (2005), and therefore need not be raised
sua sponte.
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of the necessary facts supporting such a claim in all the various
paper writings. A complaint is supposed to be one document.
Rice-Rashawn v. Rice, No. 1:17-CV-56, 2017 WL 11017515, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2017).
Accordingly, the undersigned discusses only the allegations included in the original complaint
from this point on.
Henderson’s complaint is difficult to understand, but it includes, in relevant part, the
following allegations:
• The Cabarrus County magistrate’s office & district attorney’s office issued an Order
for Arrest against Henderson in retaliation for a lawsuit he had filed against the sheriff’s
office. (Compl. at 5.)
• The Cabarrus County sheriff, district attorney, magistrate judge, and DMV conspired
to:
o Create “Orders and Warrants for Arrest with allegations containing
constitutional rights violations.” (Id.)
o Use Henderson’s “copyrighted tradename and material on their documents for
profit and gain.” (Id.)
o “Fraudulently maintain[n] [Henderson’s] copyrighted material in their databases
to gain and maintain contractual jurisdiction over [Henderson].” (Id.)
o “Seiz[e] and refus[e] to release property belonging to me and my organization.”
(Id.)
o “Violat[e] [Henderson’s] constitutionally protected second, fourth, and fifth
amendment right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness to generate profit
revenue and gain.” (Id.)
• Shanley “authorized the agencies and corporations operating under her leadership to
consistently violate my constitutionally protected right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness by denying my first amendment right to travel in an automobile and to
bear arms in exchange for her benefits and privileges known as Concealed Carry
Weapons Permits and Driver’s Licenses. I was not using the automobile that I was
traveling in for profit and gain on the roadways.” (Id. at 6.)
• Shanley “authorized her courthouse to assign and reschedule court dates on their
dockets without my knowledge in their attempts to default me. This is also a retaliatory
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action as a result of a previously filed lawsuit [and] a direct violation of the second
amendment[.]” (Id.)
• Shanley “authorizes her security guards on patrol to violate the second, fourth, and
fifth amendment constitutionally protected rights for the men and women living in and
traveling through Cabarrus county, North Carolina without consequences as well.” (Id.)
Henderson additionally alleges, with reference to no specific defendant, “1. Copyright
Infringement 2. Violation of constitutionally protected civil rights. 3. Larceny of a Firearm. 4.
False Arrest and Imprisonment.” (Id. at 7.) He cites federal criminal statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 241–
42 as his basis for federal question jurisdiction and requests “a $500,000.00 judgment and
injunctive relief.” (Id. at 3, 7.)
In summary, the undersigned interprets Henderson’s complaint as containing the
following collections of attempted claims against Shanley:
(1) Constitutional rights violations resulting from various charges brought against
Henderson (concealed weapon, driving with a revoked license, etc.).
(2) Retaliatory prosecution and rescheduling of court dates.
(3) Copyright infringement resulting from the use of Henderson’s name and
information for profit.
(4) False arrest and imprisonment, presumably from Henderson’s detainment in
connection with the above charges.
(5) Larceny, apparently from the confiscation of Henderson’s concealed weapon.
(6) Conspiracy to commit all the above actions.
Finally, Henderson requests “an order for removal” of his North Carolina Superior
Court case, No. 23CR221205-120, to federal court. (Docket Entry 1-2 at 1–2.) The
undersigned takes judicial notice of the fact that the case Henderson seeks to remove is a state
criminal case in which Henderson faces multiple charges, including carrying a concealed
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weapon, driving with a revoked license, and resisting a public officer. See Cabarrus Superior
Court Case No. 23CR221205-120, https://perma.cc/S3T6-HRD7 (last visited January 14,
2026).
II. REMOVAL REQUEST
The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Henderson’s request for removal.
The general removal statute only applies to civil actions, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, and “there
exist few circumstances under which a state criminal prosecution may be removed to federal
district court,” as specified by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443, Ali v. N. Carolina Sheriff’s
Ass’n, No. 5:13-CV-546-BO, 2013 WL 5863744, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2013). “Section
1442 applies to prosecutions proceeding in state court against federal officers or agents,
section 1442a to members of the armed forces, and section 1443 to claims of racial inequality.”
Id. Henderson has alleged no such bases for removing his state criminal proceeding here, so
removal would not be proper.
III. CLAIMS AGAINST UNSERVED DEFENDANTS
The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Henderson’s claims against
Defendants Knust, Shaw, and Goodwin. The Court previously warned Henderson that his
claims would be dismissed if he did not serve Defendants before May 12, 2025. (See Text
Order dated 04/14/2025.) However, Henderson has only served Shanley. (See Docket Entries
6, 8.) Accordingly, dismissal without prejudice of the remaining defendants is appropriate. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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IV. MOTION TO COMPEL SERVICE
The Court construes Henderson’s June 30, 2025 submission (Docket Entry 14) as (1)
a motion to compel Shanley to serve Henderson in the way Henderson argues is proper, and
(2) a motion for an extension of time to file a response to Shanley’s motion to dismiss. The
Court denies both requests.
Henderson claims that he has
not received a Motion to Dismiss or any correspondences from
District Attorney ASHLEY SHANLEY regarding this case. I did
receive a letter from the State of North Carolina Department of
Justice on June 20, 2025, but returned the letter due to unsolicited
mail listed in a fictious name. . . . District Attorney ASHLEY
SHANLEY has done this on multiple occasions in order to deter,
delay, trick, and deceive her opponent. I am asking the court to
order District Attorney ASHLEY SHANLEY to properly inform
me with her motions addressing the true party in interest
regarding this case at the above listed address. She has failed to
follow the federal and state rules of procedure. I will respond
within the 21-day time frame upon proper service of due process.
(Docket Entry 14 at 1–2.) Henderson then writes his name in all capital letters—“JEREMY
LAMOND HENDERSON”—and writes that “[t]his is the true party in interest in this case.”
(Id. at 8.) Henderson also attached a copy of an envelope addressed to “Jeremy Lamond
Henderson” with a return address to the “State of North Carolina,” “Department of Justice.”
(Id. at 5.) Henderson writes below the return address that “Asheley Shanley is not listed on
this document” and that he does
not know or have any business dealings with the State of North
Carolina Department of Justice. They are a third party intervenor
if they are attempting to contact me in regards to the ongoing
case between the Plaintiff (JEREMY LAMOND
HENDERSON) and the Defendant (ASHLEY SHANLEY).
Doing so constitutes a violation of Federal Rule 17. Plaintiff and
Defendant; Capacity; Public Officers and 18 U.S.C. 1342 –
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Fictious name or address, along with the Federal Style Manual.
The real party in interest was not listed on the above listed
envelope and they are also a third party intervenor and prohibited
from partaking in this case.
(Id. at 4.)
In summary, the Court reads Henderson to argue that he should not have to respond
to Shanley’s motion to dismiss until she delivers it to him with his name written in all capital
letters and her name (presumably, in all capital letters as well) in the return address.
This is a frivolous argument. Rule 17 does not require a party’s name to be written in
any particular way; it merely requires that a case not involve an uninterested party. See, e.g.,
Addax Energy SA v. M/V Yasa H. Mulla, 987 F.3d 80, 84–85 (4th Cir. 2021). Similarly, 18
U.S.C. § 1342 criminalizes use of a false name to commit the various types of mail fraud listed
in § 1341; it is wholly irrelevant here.
Further, even if the correct spelling of Henderson’s name involved all capital letters,
Shanley’s use of lowercase letters would not make her service improper. Misnaming a party
“in some insignificant way” does not make service defective. See Miller v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Schs., No. 3:24-CV-00511-FDW-DCK, 2024 WL 4354716, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2024)
(citation modified). And Henderson’s argument that the North Carolina Department of
Justice—which employs Shanley’s attorney—is an improper third-party intervenor is similarly
frivolous. A party’s attorney is entitled to act for them throughout a case. See, e.g., Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Devers, 389 F.2d 44, 45–46 (4th Cir. 1968).
For the above reasons, the Court denies Henderson’s motion to compel service.
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V. CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT SHANLEY
The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss all of Henderson’s claims against
Shanley. Henderson did not file a timely response to Shanley’s motion to dismiss, meaning
Shanley’s motion may be “considered and decided as an uncontested motion, [which]
ordinarily will be granted without further notice.” Local Rule 7.3(k); see also Kinetic Concepts, Inc.
v. ConvaTec Inc., No. 1:08CV918, 2010 WL 1667285, at *6-8 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2010) (Auld,
M.J.) (analyzing this Court’s Local Rules 7.3(f), 7.2(a), and 7.3(k) and discussing authority
supporting proposition that failure to respond to argument amounts to concession).
Alternatively, Henderson’s claims against Shanley are either outside the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, barred by prosecutorial immunity, or insufficiently stated by Henderson’s
complaint. The undersigned discusses each of these reasons for dismissal below.
A. Conspiracy Claims
To the extent that Henderson is attempting to sue Shanley under 28 U.S.C. §§ 241 and
242 (see Compl. at 5–6)——which are federal statutes criminalizing conspiracy and certain
willful deprivations of rights—this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Henderson’s claims.
“Criminal laws generally do not provide private causes of action.” Nelson v. Credit Acceptance
Corp., No. 1:21CV909, 2022 WL 17832129, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (Auld, M.J.) (citing
Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000)), report and recommendation adopted, (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 15, 2023). Courts have analyzed the statutes Henderson attempts to sue under here, and
have found that they, specifically, do not provide a private cause of action. See, e.g., Rankin v.
Sykes, No. 1:18CV353, 2019 WL 203184, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2019). Indeed, Henderson
has tried suing under these statutes at least twice before and has been given the same answer.
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See Henderson v. Cabarrus Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 3:23-CV-367-RJC-DCK, 2024 WL 5397196, at
*2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-00367-RJC-DCK,
2025 WL 33468 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2025); Henderson v. Haynes, No. 3:23-CV-583-FDW, 2024
WL 1184724, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2024). Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction over
Henderson’s conspiracy claims.
B. Constitutional Rights Violations and Retaliatory Prosecution Claims
To the extent that Henderson is instead relying on the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to create a federal question jurisdiction for him to seek money damages for Shanley’s
prosecution of state criminal charges against him, his suit is barred by prosecutorial immunity.
“Absolute immunity applies with full force to a prosecutor’s activities that remain intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Williams v. North Carolina, No.
1:23CV325, 2023 WL 6879203, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2023). Thus, “in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
Here, though Henderson’s complaint is sparse on factual details, it appears to center
on the state criminal charges Shanley brought against him, as well as conduct “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as the scheduling of court
dates. (See Compl. at 5–6.) Shanley is immune from such claims.
C. Copyright Infringement
Henderson has failed to state a claim for copyright infringement. A motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) prompts a court to consider whether allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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The “court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, but does not consider legal conclusions, elements of a cause of
action, and bare assertions devoid of factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591
F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
Here, Henderson’s copyright infringement claim requires two elements “(1) ownership
of a valid copyright by the party complaining of infringement, and (2) unauthorized copying
of the protected work by the infringing party.” Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa
USA, Inc., 196 F. App’x 166, 172 (4th Cir. 2006); accord. Banilla Games, Inc. v. Fuel Smart 6 Inc.,
No. 1:24-CV-358, 2025 WL 1371557, at *2 (M.D.N.C. May 12, 2025). But Henderson has
not alleged facts to support either one. It is not even entirely clear what copyrighted
information he alleges Shanley infringed or how doing so yielded “profit and gain.” (Compl.
at 5.) Thus, Henderson has not stated a claim for copyright infringement.
D. Remaining Claims
The Court does not have jurisdiction over Henderson’s remaining claims. Those
claims are based on state tort and criminal law; they include claims of false arrest,
imprisonment, and larceny. (See Compl. at 5–6.) But federal courts only have jurisdiction over
claims rooted in state law when those claims arise from “the same common nucleus of
operative fact as a federal law claim.” See, e.g., Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 116 (4th Cir.
2001). For the reasons described above, none of Henderson’s federal law claims survive.
Thus, even if Henderson has properly stated the remaining state law claims, the Court does
not have jurisdiction to hear them.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Henderson’s motion
to compel service (Docket Entry 14) is DENIED without prejudice. Furthermore, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Henderson’s request for removal (Docket Entry 1-2)
be DENIED, that Shanley’s motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 10) be GRANTED, and that
Henderson’s complaint be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice.
/s/ Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge
January 16, 2026
Durham, North Carolina
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