MACK v. HACKETT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JAMES DAMION MACK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV605
)
MR. HACKETT, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (the “Summary Judgment Motion”) of Defendant Mr. Hackett
(“Defendant Hackett”). (Docket Entry 17; see also Docket Entry 18
(Memorandum in Support).) For the reasons that follow, the
undersigned will recommend that the Court grant the Summary
Judgment Motion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, a former state inmate proceeding pro se, filed an
unverified Complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”) of religious discrimination in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
that allegedly occurred while Plaintiff served a sentence in state
prison. (See Docket Entry 2.) Plaintiff brought those claims
against Defendant Hackett, the Chaplain at Piedmont Correctional
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Institution (“PCI”), in his individual capacity. (See id. at 2.)1
After Defendant Hackett filed his Answer (Docket Entry 12), the
Court permitted the parties a period of discovery (see, e.g.,
Docket Entry dated Jan. 28, 2025). At the end of discovery,
Defendant Hackett filed the Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum
in Support, arguing that (1) “[Plaintiff] cannot show that
[Defendant] Hackett treated other inmates differently than
[Plaintiff]” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause (Docket Entry 18 at 5), (2) “[Defendant] Hackett’s actions
did not present a substantial burden upon Plaintiff’s ability to
freely exercise his religion” under the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause (id.), and (3) “[Defendant] Hackett is [] entitled
to qualified immunity” (id.).
Along with the Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum in
Support, Defendant Hackett filed the Declaration of Dr. Jason
Hackett (Docket Entry 18-1) which, in turn, relies upon the
following documents: (1) North Carolina Department of Adult
Correction (“DAC”), Division of Institutions (“DOI”) Religious
Services Policy and Procedure (Docket Entry 18-2), (2) PCI
Chaplaincy Service Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) (Docket
Entry 18-3), (3) DAC/DOI Diagnostic Centers Policy and Procedure
1 Pin cites to Docket Entries refer to the page numbers that
appear in the footer appended thereto upon docketing in the CM/ECF
system (not any original pagination).
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(Docket Entry 18-4), (4) DAC/DOI Offender Custody Classification
Policy and Procedure (Docket Entry 18-5), (5) DAC Offender Public
Information regarding Plaintiff (Docket Entry 18-6), and (6) print-
out reflecting Plaintiff’s custody actions during incarceration
(Docket Entry 18-7). The Clerk sent Plaintiff a letter in
accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975),
advising Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the
Summary Judgment Motion. (Docket Entry 19.) Despite that notice,
Plaintiff failed to respond to the Summary Judgment Motion. (See
Docket Entries dated June 26, 2025, to present.)
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that “[Defendant] Hackett
was allowing the Christian processer’s [sic] to attend their
religious services (Bible Study) while at the same time denying the
Muslim processer’s [sic] attendance to their religious services
(Talim, Jumu’ah), which happens to be obligatory in [Plaintiff’s]
religion.” (Docket Entry 2 at 5; see also id. at 11 (notarizing
allegations of Complaint as sworn by Plaintiff).) The Complaint
further maintains that the alleged discrimination “involved
[him]self and several other Muslims . . . and the entire facility
was aware of the situation.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff’s
allegations in the Complaint, “[he] asked [O]fficer Fuller and
[O]fficer Taylor to check and see if [Plaintiff and other, unnamed
individuals] could attend Jumu’ah services Friday 3/25/22 and
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[Officers Fuller and Taylor] asked their sergant [sic] on duty” and
then “told [Plaintiff] that their sergant [sic] called the chaplain
and . . . the chaplain said that [Plaintiff and unnamed others]
couldn’t attend because [they] were processer’s [sic].” (Id.) The
Complaint therefore asserts that Defendant Hackett “continuously
and knowingly discriminated against [Plaintiff’s] religion, while
denying [him] the right to exercise [his] religious freedom” (id.)
in violation of the “First and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 3),
entitling him to “$450,000” in “punitive damages” (id. at 5).
Plaintiff attached to his Complaint a sign-up sheet for “Life
Recovery Bible Study [i]n the Chapel” on April 12 and 13, 2022,
reflecting the names “Mark Wonderly,” “Michael Cole,” and “Joseph
Carson” (id. at 15), as well as a list of “Attendees for Life
Recovery Bible Study in the Chapel” on April 12, 2022, which
contains 18 names, including “Mark Wonderly” but neither “Michael
Cole” nor “Joseph Carson” (id. at 16). Lastly, Plaintiff attached
to his Complaint a handwritten list of dates from November 1, 2021
to April 15, 2022, without accompanying explanation of the
relevance of those dates. (See id. at 18.)2
2 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
by filing a grievance and “appeal[ing] the grievance to step three and
complet[ing] the process.” (Docket Entry 2 at 7; see also id. at 12-14, 17
(grievance and responses).) Defendant Hackett, in his Answer, “admit[ted] that
Plaintiff ha[d] submitted grievances with the facility related to an alleged
event that transpired at [PCI] on March 25, 2022, and that Plaintiff appealed
th[at] grievance to the ‘third step’ with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Board”
(continued...)
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In his Declaration, Defendant Hackett averred that, during the
time relevant to this action, he served as “a clinical chaplain at
[PCI]” and “provide[d] compassionate, individualized spiritual care
to [] people in the custody of the [DAC].” (Docket Entry 18-1,
¶ 3.) In that capacity, he “provide[d] teaching and counseling
that prepare[d] individuals both spiritually and emotionally for
life beyond the facility walls” and “coordinate[d] and le[d]
religious services for diverse faith groups.” (Id.) Defendant
Hackett further averred that he had “familiar[ty] with the
religious policies of the [DAC] and the [SOPs] related to religious
services at [PCI].” (Id.)
Defendant Hackett thereafter explained that “[t]he [DAC]
Policy on Religious Services . . . provides that religious services
may be provided for regular population offenders” (id., ¶ 5), and
that “the policy allows for all offenders to ‘privately pray,
meditate, and study scriptures or religious literature in their
cell’” (id. (quoting Docket Entry 18-2 at 6)). According to
Defendant Hackett, “[t]he [PCI SOP] on Chaplaincy Services provides
that religious programs may be made available to offenders in the
regular prison population who are in medium or minimum custody”
(id., ¶ 6), and “include activities such as Bible studies, Islamic
2(...continued)
(Docket Entry 12 at 2-3), and did not plead failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as an affirmative defense (see id. at 3-5).
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education, Jumah, Mass, and American Indian prayer circle, among
others” (id. (citing Docket Entry 18-3 at 7-9)).
Additionally, Defendant Hackett averred that “[PCI] is one of
several diagnostic centers operated by the [DAC]” (id., ¶ 7), that
“[n]ew and returning offenders in the custody of the [DAC],”
“colloquially called ‘processors,’” must “complete several
processes upon their admission to the facility” (id.), which
“broadly include a reception period, offender orientation, and
several diagnostic evaluations . . . ‘to assist the individual in
adjusting to incarceration and to provide evaluative information
for management and treatment of the offender’” (id. (quoting Docket
Entry 18-4 at 1)). Defendant Hackett further explained that
“[p]rocessors are not yet part of the regular prison population
until they have completed their processing” and that, “[f]or safety
and management reasons, processors are not permitted to take part
in the regularly scheduled religious activities [at PCI] until they
have fully processed into the facility and received a custody
designation” (id., ¶ 8 (citing Docket Entry 18-5)), but “may submit
a request to observe religious practices to [PCI’s] warden, in
consultation with the chaplain” (id., ¶ 9 (citing Docket Entry 18-2
at 2-3)).
With regard to Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint,
Defendant Hackett noted that Plaintiff “was most recently
incarcerated on March 10, 2022, after convictions for interfering
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with a monitoring device and being a habitual felon[ and ] was
released on probation on December 2, 2024.” (Id., ¶ 10 (citing
Docket Entry 18-5 at 1).) Defendant Hackett pointed out that,
“[a]s with other newly admitted offenders, [Plaintiff] was required
to complete processing before he could be admitted into the regular
prison population” (id., ¶ 11), as well as that “[Plaintiff]
completed processing and received his initial custody
classification on March 30, 2022[, and thus] was a processor for
twenty days” (id. (citing Docket Entry 18-7 at 1)). Defendant
Hackett averred that, “[d]uring the time in which [Plaintiff] was
processing into [PCI], he was not permitted to attend corporate
worship services per policy[, which] held true for those of all
faiths, Christian and Muslim alike” (id., ¶ 12), and that, “[a]fter
he had completed processing, [he] was permitted to attend[] and did
attend Islamic services” (id., ¶ 14). Defendant Hackett lastly
observed that, “[w]hile processing, [Plaintiff] did not submit a
special request to the warden to observe a particular religious
practice” (id., ¶ 13), and “never discussed any issues related to
accessing religious services with [Defendant Hackett]” (id., ¶ 15).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court should grant a motion for summary judgment when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, . . . the evidence [must be viewed] in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. However, a nonmovant cannot
defeat summary judgment with merely a scintilla of evidence.”
American Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)
(citations omitted). The party seeking summary judgment has the
initial burden to show “an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986). Additionally, even for unopposed summary judgment
motions, the moving party must establish “that it is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12
F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff failed to respond to the Summary
Judgment Motion (see Docket Entries dated June 26, 2025, to
present), despite notice to do so (see Docket Entry 19). However,
Plaintiff’s “verified [C]omplaint is the equivalent of an opposing
affidavit for summary judgment purposes, when the allegations
contained therein are based on personal knowledge.” Williams v.
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Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted).3
The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge will therefore
consider the verified allegations in the Complaint in resolving the
Summary Judgment Motion.
B. The Qualified Immunity Defense
“Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges a right
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). However,
“[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to
stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” Brown v.
Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “The Supreme Court has
directed that ‘qualified immunity questions should be resolved at
the earliest possible stage of a litigation.’” Smith v. Reddy, 101
F.3d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
3 Even for unopposed summary judgment motions, the moving party must
establish “that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Custer v. Pan
Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987)). In analyzing qualified immunity, the
Court must consider (1) “whether a constitutional violation
occurred,” and (2) “whether the right violated was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.” Williams v.
Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013). The Court possesses
discretion to address either prong first. See Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). For the reasons that
follow, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, fails to support a finding that Defendant Hackett
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and, thus, qualified
immunity bars both of Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims
against Defendant Hackett.
1. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion],” U.S. Const. amend. I, and “[i]nmates clearly retain
protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its
directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of
religion,” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)
(citation omitted).4 To establish a “violation of rights secured
by the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate . . . must demonstrate that:
(1) he holds a sincere religious belief; and (2) a prison practice
4 The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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or policy places a substantial burden on his ability to practice
his religion.” Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir.
2018). Moreover, even if an inmate can show that a prison policy
substantially burdens his religious exercise, the policy will not
violate the First Amendment if the defendant can demonstrate that
the policy “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also id.
at 89-90 (setting forth four-factor reasonableness inquiry,
including (1) whether penological objective justifying prison
policy qualifies as “legitimate and neutral,” and whether “a valid,
rational connection [exists] between the prison [policy] and the
legitimate [penologic]al interest,” (2) “whether . . . alternative
means of exercising the right [exist] that remain open to prison
inmates,” (3) what “impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources,” and (4) whether “ready
alternatives” exist to prison’s policy).
Here, Defendant Hackett declined to question the “sincerity of
Plaintiff’s beliefs,” but did contend that the prison policy that
prohibited Plaintiff, during the brief, 20-day period during which
he underwent processing, from attending scheduled religious
services with the regular prison population did not place “a
substantial burden . . . on his ability to practice his religion.”
(Docket Entry 18 at 7.) In that regard, Defendant Hackett notes
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that “[o]ther courts have held that a prison’s action which may
temporarily cause inmates to miss religious services does not
substantially burden an inmate’s rights under the First Amendment.”
(Id. at 8 (citing Craig v. Sevier, No. 1:24CV1329, 2025 WL 1222461,
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2025) (unpublished), Beebe v. Birkett,
749 F. Supp. 2d 580, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2010), and Boomer v. Irvin,
963 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)).) Defendant Hackett further
argues that “[he] had a legitimate penological interest in
promoting safety and effective prison management that was
rationally related to keeping Plaintiff from attending religious
services with other inmates until he had fully processed into the
facility.” (Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted).)
Assuming the sincerity of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, his
First Amendment claim fails because he cannot show that missing one
Jumu’ah service on March 25, 2022, while he remained a processor
substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion.
“[S]ingle or isolated incidents do not place a substantial burden
on an inmate’s exercise of religion.” Davis v. Doe, No. 1:14CV373,
2014 WL 1835853, at *2 (M.D.N.C. May 8, 2014) (unpublished)
(rejecting inmate’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim where
prison policy “caused him to miss part of a single religious
service”); see also Bynum v. Poole, No. 1:15CV960, 2017 WL 3578698,
at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2017) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.)
(declining relief on inmate’s Free Exercise claim based on
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cancellation of Jumah service on one occasion, and holding that
“the Court w[ould] not view a single or isolated incident as
placing a substantial burden upon [the p]laintiff’s exercise of
religion” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2017) (Biggs,
J.). Indeed, federal district courts across the country
consistently have found singular or brief incidents did not
substantially burden an inmate’s free exercise of his religion.
See Craig, 2025 WL 1222461, at *2 (“[W]ithout more, an allegation
that a prison official prevented participation in a religious
service on one occasion is not sufficient to allege a substantial
burden.”); Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1111 (D. Wyo.
2014) (rejecting contention that single missed visit with minister
constituted substantial burden); Mubashshir v. Moore, No.
3:10CV2802, 2011 WL 1496670, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2011)
(unpublished) (concluding that inmates’ “First Amendment rights
were not violated,” because denying them “services in the chapel on
two occasions” qualified as “isolated instances,” and collecting
cases to support proposition that “[i]solated acts or
omissions . . . do not constitute a substantial burden on religious
freedom”); Gunn v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:07CVP103, 2010 WL
2555756, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 18, 2010) (“[T]he isolated incident
[the p]laintiff describes [of missing one religious service due to
prison policy] is not sufficient to implicate the Constitution.”);
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Gill v. Defrank, No. 98 CIV. 7851, 2000 WL 897152, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2000) (“[M]issing one religious service does not constitute
a substantial burden on an inmate’s right to the free exercise of
his religion.”), aff’d, 8 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2001).
Alternatively, even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant
Hackett’s denial of permission for Plaintiff to attend one group
religious service on March 25, 2022, substantially burdened his
right to free exercise of his religion, Defendant Hackett has
convincingly shown that he acted pursuant to a prison policy which
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest in
maintaining safety and order in the prison. Under the first Turner
factor, i.e., “legitma[cy] and neutral[ity],” Turner, 482 U.S. at
89, Defendant Hackett’s proffered penological objective of
“promoting safety and effective prison management” (Docket Entry 18
at 9) certainly qualifies as legitimate and neutral, see In re Long
Term Administrative Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five
Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (“In the difficult
and dangerous business of running a prison, frontline officials are
best positioned to foresee threats to order and to fashion
responses to those threats. Hence, the evaluation of penological
objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison
administrators, who are actually charged with and trained in the
running of the particular institution under examination. When a
state correctional institution is involved, the deference of a
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federal court is even more appropriate. Prison officials should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”), abrog’n on other grounds recog’d, Latson
v. Clarke, 794 F. App’x 266, 270 (4th Cir. 2019).5
Moreover, “a valid, rational connection,” Turner, 482 U.S. at
89 (internal quotation marks omitted), exists between the
legitimate and neutral penological objective of prison safety and
effective prison management and the prison policy in question. The
DAC/DOI Diagnostic Center Policy and Procedure details that
processing an inmate involves, among other things, collecting
social, mental health, and criminal history information, conducting
a psychological evaluation, administering psychometric tests,
identifying Security Risk Group, i.e., gang, affiliations and other
crime-related problems, and administering a Risk Needs Assessment.
(See Docket Entry 18-4 at 2.) Thus, the policy of prohibiting all
processors from participating in group religious services with the
regular prison population until prison officials complete these
critical assessments that determine an offender’s custody
classification rationally serves the legitimate penological
5 Similarly, the “prison [policy] restricting inmates’ First Amendment
rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the
expression,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, as it applied to processors “of all faiths,
Christian and Muslim alike” (Docket Entry 18-1, ¶ 12).
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objective of maintaining prison safety and effective prison
management. The first Turner factor therefore strongly weighs in
Defendant Hackett’s favor.
Next, the Court must consider “whether . . . alternative means
of exercising the right [exist] that remain open to prison
inmates,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. As detailed above,
notwithstanding the policy in question temporarily prohibiting
Plaintiff during processing from attending group religious services
with the regular prison population, he retained the rights to 1)
“‘privately pray, meditate, and study scriptures or religious
literature in [his] cell’” (Docket Entry 18-1, ¶ 5 (quoting Docket
Entry 18-2 at 6)), and 2) “submit a request to observe religious
practices to [PCI’s] warden, in consultation with the chaplain”
(id., ¶ 9 (citing Docket Entry 18-2 at 2-3)), the latter of which
Plaintiff did not do (see id., ¶ 13). Thus, the second Turner
factor clearly supports Defendant Hackett.
Under the third Turner factor, the Court evaluates the “impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. In this case, allowing inmates
who lack a custody classification because they remain in processing
to attend group religious services with the regular prison
population would pose an obvious threat to both the prison guards
and to other inmates. The guards and regular prison population
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would face potential exposure at group religious services to
inmates with gang (or other risk group) affiliation, serious mental
health issues, or a history of (or propensity towards) retaliatory
or violent behavior. As such, this factor demonstrably favors
Defendant Hackett.
The fourth Turner factor tasks the Court with assessing the
existence of “ready alternatives” to the prison’s processing
policy, Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Here, both the sheer importance of
the processing period to prison security and its brevity do not
suggest that other such “ready alternatives” exist, and Plaintiff
has proffered no evidence of such alternatives. Accordingly, this
factor definitively disfavors Plaintiff.
In totality, consideration of the Turner factors demonstrates
that, even if the processing policy substantially burdened
Plaintiff’s right to practice his religion (which it did not, for
the reasons explained above), Defendant Hackett has shown that he
followed a policy that rationally related to the legitimate and
neutral penological objective of maintaining prison safety and
effective prison management.
Put simply, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
claim fails as a matter of law.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws[.]’” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Thus, “[t]he Equal
Protection Clause . . . requires Plaintiff to show that Defendant
Hackett “treated [Plaintiff] differently than [Defendant Hackett]
treated similarly situated prisoners and that such unequal
treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful discrimination.”
Miles v. Guice, 688 F. App’x 177, 179 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Veney
v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 2002)). In this case,
Plaintiff has not established an Equal Protection violation,
because he has shown neither that Defendant Hackett treated other
similarly situated inmates differently from Plaintiff, nor that
such unequal treatment resulted from intentional religious
discrimination.
With regards to different treatment from similarly situated
inmates, as Defendant Hackett argues, the record does not support
a reasonable inference “that the suspected Christian inmates whose
names appear on the Bible study sign-up sheet provided in [the]
Complaint were processors at the time of their inclusion [on the
sheet] and not inmates who were part of the regular prison
population.” (Docket Entry 18 at 6.) Indeed, Defendant Hackett
deemed it “telling that two names appearing on the hand-written
sign-up sheet, Michael Cole and Joseph Carson, do not appear on the
typed version of the list containing more names.” (Id.
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(referencing Docket Entry 2 at 15-16).) As discussed above,
Plaintiff failed to respond to the Summary Judgment Motion and thus
did not refute any of Defendant Hackett’s arguments and averments.
As such, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Hackett treated
Plaintiff differently from similarly situated inmates.
Concerning intentional religious discrimination, Defendant
Hackett averred that “[he] respects all offenders, regardless of
their beliefs or religious affiliations, and treat[s] all offenders
with dignity and fairness” (Docket Entry 18-1, ¶ 4), as well as
that the processing policy “held true for those of all faiths,
Christian and Muslim alike” (id., ¶ 12). Plaintiff did not refute
those averments and thus has not raised any inference of
intentional religious discrimination by Defendant Hackett.
In short, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Claim also fails as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant
Hackett violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Defendant
Hackett has demonstrated entitlement to qualified immunity
regarding both of Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 in this
action.
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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Summary Judgment Motion
(Docket Entry 17) be granted.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 18, 2026
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