MONROE v. ADAMS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DEVONTA J. MONROE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24cv770
)
JAMIE ADAMS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss”
(Docket Entry 17) (the “Motion”) filed by Detective Jeffrey R.
Cooke (“Detective Cooke”) and Lieutenant Jeremy White (“Lieutenant
White”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). For the reasons that
follow, the Court will extend the deadline for proper service upon
Defendants, which should result in the denial of the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Following his arrest in 2022 (see Docket Entry 2 (the
“Complaint”) at 7), Devonta J. Monroe (the “Plaintiff”), acting	1
pro se, sued Defendants (among others) for wrongfully releasing
footage of his police interrogation (see id. at 7-20; see also
Docket Entry 3 at 3-5 (summarizing Complaint’s allegations)). The
Court (per the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge) granted
Plaintiff pauper status (see Docket Entry 3 at 11), ordered the
1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
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Clerk to “send Plaintiff summonses for Defendants” (id.), and
directed “Plaintiff [to] fill out the summonses, including
addresses suitable for service, and then return them to the Clerk”
(id.).
Plaintiff returned blank summonses (see Docket Entry 6 at 1-6)
and, later, incomplete summonses (see Docket Entry 7-1 at 3, 5),
after which the Court (again, per the undersigned) “g[a]ve
Plaintiff one final chance to promptly return properly completed
summons forms” (Text Order dated Feb. 3, 2025 (all-cap font
omitted)), “including with an address suitable for service of
process on [] Defendant[s]” (id.). That Text Order required the
Clerk, upon Plaintiff’s “timely return[ of the] properly completed
summons forms, . . . [to] issue the summonses and [ ] forward them
(along with any other necessary documents) to the United States
Marshals Service . . . [for] service of process.” (Id.)2
Thereafter, Plaintiff returned summons forms and the Clerk
issued summonses to Defendants, both of which list 303 West Church
Street, Laurinburg, NC 28352, the Laurinburg Police Department’s
address, see https://www.laurinburg.org/public-safety/police (last
visited Feb. 4, 2026), as the service address. (See Docket Entry
2 “When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the
district court must order the U[nited] S[tates] M[arshals]
S[ervice] to effect service.” Scott v. Maryland State Dep’t of
Lab., 673 F. App’x 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(c)(3)); see also 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) (“The officers of the court
shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such
cases.”).
2
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8 at 3, 5.) The Marshals Service hand-delivered the summonses and
Complaint to a supervisor at Defendants’ place of employment (see
Docket Entry 10-1 at 1; Docket Entry 10-1 at 1) and remarked on
both receipts: “Delivered to Supervisor, Asst. Chief Christopher
Young, who will deliver to [Defendants] and also notify [the]
city[’s] attorney” (Docket Entry 10-1 at 1; accord Docket Entry 10-
2 at 1).
Asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process,
and insufficient service of process (see Docket Entry 17 at 1),
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules
12(b)(2), (4), and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”) (see id.).
DISCUSSION
Defendants maintain that “the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over [them] because Plaintiff failed to comply with
the requirements for serving individuals under Rule 4.” (Docket
Entry 18 at 2 (the “Supporting Brief”).) According to the
Supporting Brief:
The [] Rules . . . allow service of process by following
the rules for service of process in the state in which
the suit is filed or process is served or
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of
the complaint to the individual personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s
dwelling or usual place of abode with someone
of suitable age and discretion who resides
there; or (C) delivering a copy of each [to an
agent] authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
3
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)[(2)]. “Service of process cannot be
effected upon [a d]efendant by serving at his place of
employment individuals who are not authorized to accept
service of process” on [his] behalf . . . . Elkins v.
Broome, 213 F.R.D. 273, 276 (M.D.N.C. 2003). “Likewise,
service on a coworker[ ] is not proper service for suits
a g a i n s t o f f i c e r s i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l
capacities.” Tholley v. AAA Pediatrics, No. 1:25cv370,
2025 WL 1559154, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2025)
(unpublished). Moreover, “a plaintiff may not serve a
defendant in his individual capacity by leaving process
at an individual defendant’s place of business.” Kennedy
v. Rowe, No. 5:23cv264, 2024 WL 2703016, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
May 24, 2024) [(internal quotation marks omitted)]
(unpublished). In the absence of service [of] process,
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the named
defendants. Murphy Bros v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999).
. . . Plaintiff must comply with the rules for serving
individuals. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). . . . [Lieutenant]
White and [Detective] Cooke were not personally served
with the summons and [C]omplaint. Copies of the summons
and [C]omplaint were delivered at Defendants’ place of
employment and to a coworker, albeit a supervisor, not
authorized by [ ] Defendant[s] to accept service of
process on their behalf. Elkins, 213 F.R.D. at
276. Moreover, the remarks on the return of service for
both [Lieutenant] White and [Detective] Cooke do not
support an inference that [the supervisor] was authorized
to accept service on behalf of [Defendants] in their
individual capacities. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed
to effectuate service of process on Defendants . . ., and
his Complaint should be dismissed for insufficient
service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction
under Rules 12(b)(2) and (b)(5). . . .
(Id. at 2-4 (internal brackets and docket citations
omitted).) Additionally, the Supporting Brief urges the Court to
dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(4), contending that
“Plaintiff’s summonses are facially deficient because both are
addressed to [Lieutenant] White and [Detective] Cooke individually
at their place of business” (id. at 5), where, according to
4
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Defendants, Plaintiff can effect service “[only] by personally
delivering process to them” (id.).3
Because the Court will order Plaintiff (via the Marshals
Service) to properly effect service, none of Defendants’
contentions warrant dismissal, as explained below.
A. Rule 12(b)(4) Challenge
“Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(4) and Rule 12(b)(5)
serve different purposes.” Kernea v. City of Charlotte, No.
3:22cv659, 2023 WL 6410702, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2023). “[A]
Rule 12(b)(5) motion ‘challenges the mode of delivery or the lack
of delivery of the summons and complaint,’” id. (brackets omitted)
(quoting Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1353 (3d
ed. Apr. 2023 update)), whereas “a Rule 12(b)(4) motion to dismiss
objects to a defect in the content of the documents served,”
Kennedy, 2024 WL 2703016, at *2; see also Connell v. Adams, No.
1:22cv935, 2023 WL 2914856, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2023) (“[A]
3 For those same reasons, the Supporting Brief also seeks
dismissal for Plaintiff’s alleged “failure to comply with the
Court’s February 3, 2025, Text Order[, which] ‘g[ave] Plaintiff one
final chance to promptly return properly completed summons forms.’”
(Docket Entry 18 at 4-5 (all-cap font omitted) (quoting Text Order
dated Feb. 3, 2025); see id. at 5 (reasoning that including
Defendants’ employer’s address on the summons forms “was improper”
and therefore noncompliant with the Text Order “because Defendants
could not properly be served [there] . . . except by personal[]
deliver[y]”).) That argument, however, “challeng[es] the manner or
sufficiency of service of process,” Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v.
Ciba Seeds, 933 F. Supp. 519, 526 (M.D.N.C. 1996), rather than
Plaintiff’s compliance with the Text Order and, as such, is better
considered under Rule 12(b)(5), see id., as detailed herein.
5
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typical Rule 12(b)(4) challenge alleges that the entity named in
the summons is different from the entity named in the complaint.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, in objecting to the inclusion of their employer’s
address in the summonses on the theory that “[they] could not
properly be served [there] . . . except by personal[] deliver[y]”
(Docket Entry 18 at 5), Defendants “confuse[ ] . . . the form of
the process . . . [with] the manner or method by which it is
served,” Stewart v. Virginia Commw. Univ., No. 3:09cv738, 2011 WL
1827735, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As such, Defendants’ true objection lies not in the	4
“content of the summons[es but] . . . the mode of delivery,” Wright
& Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1353 (4th ed. Sept. 2025
update) (footnote omitted), and thus “Rule 12(b)(5) [remains] the
proper vehicle for [Defendants’] challeng[e],” id.
B. Rule 12(b)(5) & (2) Challenges
Rather than challenge the substance of process, “[a] motion
under Rule 12(b)(5) . . . challeng[es] the manner or sufficiency of
service of process.” Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933
F. Supp. 519, 526 (M.D.N.C. 1996). Rule 12(b)(2) and (5)
challenges often go hand-in-hand because, “[b]efore a federal court
4 Moreover, Plaintiff’s options for effecting service at
Defendants’ place of employment extend beyond “personal[]
deliver[y]” (Docket Entry 18 at 5) and include, pursuant to Rule
4(e)(1), “registered or certified mail,” N.C. R. Civ. P.
4(j)(1)(c), as explained herein.
6
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may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural
requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Cap.
Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); see
also Hawkins v. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211, 228
(4th Cir. 2019) (identifying “fundamental[]” dictate that
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction requires valid service of process that
comports with due process”).5
Defendants’ Supporting Brief seeks dismissal due to allegedly
improper service of process. (See Docket Entry 18 at 2-4.) In
that regard, the Supporting Brief details that, rather than serve
Defendants through one of the methods prescribed by Rule 4(e),
Plaintiff attempted to effect service (through the Marshals
Service) by leaving a copy of the summonses and Complaint with
Defendants’ supervisor, who Defendants maintain was “not authorized
. . . to accept service of process on their behalf.” (Id. at
4.) That circumstance, in Defendants’ view, warrants dismissal
under Rules 12(b)(2) and (5). (Id.)6
5 The Supporting Brief’s Rule 12(b)(2) argument rests
entirely on Defendants’ alleged failure to receive proper service
of process. (See Docket Entry 18 at 4.)
6 Although the Supporting Brief does not address whether
Plaintiff’s method of service “follow[ed] state law,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(e)(1), “North Carolina does not allow for service on an
employee’s supervisor to constitute proper service in the absence
of that supervisor being an authorized agent,” Warren v. McGeough,
No. 1:13cv1144, 2015 WL 1795000 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2015); see also
N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j) (providing for service by delivery of summons
and complaint to the defendant (A) personally or at his dwelling;
(continued...)
7
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“[T]he technical requirements of service should be construed
liberally as long as the defendant had actual notice of the pending
suit.” Elkins, 213 F.R.D. at 275. But “the [R]ules are there to
be followed, and plain requirements for the means of effecting
service of process may not be ignored.” Armco Inc. v. Penrod
Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984)
(footnote omitted). To that end, although “[s]ervice of process is
not freestyle, and courts are directed not to overlook procedural
deficiencies just because actual notice occurred,” Shaver v.
Cooleemee Volunteer Fire Dep’t, No. 1:07cv175, 2008 WL 942560, at
*2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2008), “[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(5) is not
justified where it appears that service can be properly made,”
Plant Genetic, 933 F. Supp. at 527 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Gregory v. U.S./U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of
Colo., 942 F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting “general rule
[ ] that when a court finds that service is insufficient but
curable, it generally should quash the service and give the
plaintiff an opportunity to re-serve the defendant” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
“[D]ismissal of a civil action for [inadequate service of
process] is inappropriate unless otherwise a party’s rights would
6(...continued)
(B) via authorized agent; (C) via registered or certified mail;
(D) via authorized delivery service; or (E) via signature-confirmed
mail).
8
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be seriously prejudiced or no reasonably conceivable means of
acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant remains.” Miree v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 768, 776 (N.D. Ga.
1980). Here, Defendants do not maintain that delivery of the
summonses and Complaint to their supervisor prejudiced them or
deprived them of notice, or that no means exist for obtaining
jurisdiction over them. (See Docket Entry 18 at 2-5.) Therefore,
Plaintiff’s technically inadequate attempt at service does not
warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) or (5), particularly because
(I) Plaintiff proceeds pro se and relies on the Marshals Service
for service of process and (ii) Defendants suffered no apparent	7
prejudice. Instead, the Court (per the undersigned) will exercise
its “discretion [under Rule 4(m)] to grant [ P]laintiff an
extension of time to serve [ D]efendant[s] with the [C]omplaint and
summons[es]. . . .” Gelin v. Shuman, 35 F.4th 212, 220 (4th Cir.
2022); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served
within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the Court . . . must
dismiss the action . . . or order that service be made within a
specified time.”).
7 The Fourth Circuit has “suggested that where an in forma
pauperis plaintiff, like [Plaintiff], has no control over the delay
in service of process by the Marshals Service, that delay
constitutes good cause requiring a Rule 4(m) extension.” McGraw v.
Gore, 31 F.4th 844, 852 (4th Cir. 2022) (italics and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev.,
994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Pro se litigants are allowed
more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct
defects in service of process and pleadings.”).
9
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CONCLUSION
The technical non-compliance with the method of service
warrants correction, not dismissal.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 17)
be denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff shall have until March 6, 2026, to effect proper
service of process on Defendants;
(2) The Clerk of Court shall promptly re-issue and forward the
summonses (see Docket Entry 8 at 3-6) and any other necessary
documents to the Marshals Service for service of process on
Defendants; and
(3) The Marshals Service shall promptly mail copies of the
summonses and Complaint via certified mail, return receipt
requested, to Lieutenant White and Detective Cooke at their place
of employment.8
This 4 day of February, 2026.	th
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
8 As noted above, North Carolina allows for service of
process by certified mail, see N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(c),
rendering that method (including when addressed to Defendants’
workplace) appropriate under Rule 4(e)(1), see Moore v. Cox, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 570, 573 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“[M]ail[ing] . . . the suit
papers to a defendant’s place of employment is within the [state
law] rule.”).
10
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