Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00109-KDB
CHRISTINE W. AKERS,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
FRANK BISIGNANO,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Christine Akers’ Motion to Alter
Judgment (Doc. No. 14) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) after the Court denied
her Social Security disability appeal and affirmed the Commissioner’s opinion. In support of her
motion, she alleges that the Court committed two clear errors of law in denying her appeal.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a motion to alter or amend may only be
granted: “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to make arguments that could
have been made before the judgment was entered.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir.
2002). Further, a party’s disagreement with the Court’s decision is not a basis for granting a Rule
59(e) motion. Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir.1993). Indeed, “[w]here a
motion does not raise new arguments, but merely urges the court to change its mind, relief is not
authorized.” Medlock v. Rumsfeld, 336 F. Supp. 2d 452, 470 (D. Md. 2002), aff’d, 86 F. App’x.
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665 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir.1982)) (internal
quotations omitted).
In part, Akers reiterates the arguments raised in her appellate briefing—namely, that (1)
the ALJ failed to reconcile internal inconsistencies within the Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) regarding her assessed functional limitations and the Vocational Expert’s testimony that
she contends confine her to sedentary rather than light work, and (2) the ALJ did not conduct the
symptom evaluation required by SSR 16-3P because his analysis relied exclusively on objective
medical evidence. These arguments do not satisfy the standard for reconsideration under Rule
59(e), and the Court declines to revisit them.1
The Court notes, however, that a material inconsistency exists between its interpretation of
the RFC and the ALJ’s explanation of it. See Doc. No. 14 at 2 (“This Court acknowledged that the
ALJ limited Plaintiff to standing and walking for a combined total of five hours in an eight-hour
workday.”). After finding the medical examiner Dr. Eyassu’s opinion that Akers could “stand/walk
1 Akers correctly notes that a footnote in the Court’s prior Order contained two erroneous
citations, however, those citations were offered merely as additional support and were not material
to the Court’s reasoning or its ultimate conclusion. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity and
completeness, the Court provides a corrected footnote (in relevant part):
Although Akers is restricted from performing the full range of light work, the RFC
fits squarely within SSA regulations, and many ALJs have determined that
plaintiffs can do light work when they can stand or walk for less than six hours per
workday. See Darris B. v. Saul, No. 2:19CV577, 2020 WL 7268577, at *12 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 17, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19CV577, 2020
WL 7265849 (E.D. Va. Dec. 10, 2020) (ALJ determined the plaintiff could perform
light work where he could stand and walk for four hours per day); Pack v. Berryhill,
No. 1:18CV191, 2019 WL 1099707, at *4–6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2019) (affirming
ALJ’s determination that the plaintiff could perform light work despite a restriction
in the RFC that she could stand and walk for only four hours per day); Jackson v.
Astrue, No. 5:11-CV-185, 2012 WL 6599597, at *8 (N.D.W. Va. May 22,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:11CV185, 2012 WL 6599340
(N.D.W. Va. Dec. 18, 2012) (ALJ found plaintiff capable of light work where he
could stand or walk for no more than five hours in an eight-hour workday).
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for five hours total in an 8-hour workday,” to be moderately persuasive and supported by his
“thorough evaluation of the record,” the ALJ adopted an RFC that is, without explanation, both
more and less restrictive than this limitation. Doc. No. 4-2 at 21–22, 26. The RFC permits Akers
to stand for up to three hours at a time and up to five hours total in an eight-hour workday and to
walk for up to two hours at a time and up to five hours total in an eight-hour workday. Id. at 21,
25. The ALJ may well have intended to align the RFC with Dr. Eyassu’s opinion—which identified
Akers to have limitations in prolonged standing and walking. See Doc. Nos. 4-2; 4-8 at 274. But
as written, the RFC would allow Akers to alternate between standing and walking for the full 8-
hour workday because it does not restrict her to 5 hours of combined standing and walking.
Accordingly, because the ALJ’s decision does not otherwise address or resolve this
inconsistency, the Court concludes upon reconsideration that the RFC is not supported by
substantial evidence.2 To prevent manifest injustice, and pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Court will
therefore GRANT Akers’ Motion to Alter Judgment and remand the matter for a new hearing.
2 To be clear, the Court does not hold that an RFC limiting Akers to 5 hours of combined
standing and walking in an 8-hour workday would be unsupported by substantial evidence, nor
does it hold that such a limitation necessarily confines a claimant to sedentary work. Rather, the
Court remands so that the ALJ may more fully articulate his basis for concluding that Akers could
stand and walk for up to an entire 8-hour workday or to otherwise clarify or modify the RFC.
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I. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED;
2. The Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability and
other benefits is REVERSED; and
3. The matter is REMANDED to the ALJ for a new hearing pursuant to Sentence
Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: March 19, 2026
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