Salinger v. Lawler

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:25-CV-293-WCM
ROD SALINGER, )
)
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OF
v. ) DECISION AND
) ORDER
ANDREW LAWLER, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________ )
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss,” Doc. 29); Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions
(the “Motion for Sanctions,” Doc. 44); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint and for Transfer (the “Motion for Leave to Amend,” Doc.
48).
I. Relevant Procedural History
On November 4, 2024, Rod Salinger (“Plaintiff”), appearing
pro se, filed
a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, in case number 2:24-cv-01417-SCD, against Andrew Lawler
(“Defendant”). He also named “Doubleday,” “Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group,” and “Penguin Randon House LLC” (collectively, the “Publisher
Defendants”) as defendants.
On August 27, 2025, the Hon. Stephen C. Dries, United States
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Magistrate Judge,1 found that personal jurisdiction over Defendant was
lacking and transferred the case to this district (the “Transfer Order,” Doc.
22).2
On September 24, 2025, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff
responded, and Defendant replied.3 Docs. 35, 36.
A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was noticed for December 1, 2025,
along with a status conference. However, as described in the Court’s previous
order, Plaintiff did not appear, and the Court rescheduled the proceedings for
January 6, 2026. The undersigned also set a briefing schedule with respect to
any motion seeking an award of costs or other appropriate relief in relation to
Plaintiff’s nonappearance and advised that the Court intended to hear any
such motion on January 6, 2026. Doc. 42.
Defendant filed the Motion for Sanctions on December 8, 2025. Docs. 44,
45. Plaintiff did not file any response.
On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant appeared before
1 The parties consented for a United States Magistrate Judge to preside over the
matter.
2 The Wisconsin court read Plaintiff’s filings as indicating that Plaintiff wished to
dismiss his claims against the Publisher Defendants and dismissed those parties.
Plaintiff now states that he did not wish to dismiss them.
3 Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the Motion to Dismiss was extended through and
including October 22, 2025. Plaintiff did not meet that deadline and filed his
opposition on October 29, 2025. Doc. 35. Defendant, however, does not object to the
Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s late-filed response. Doc. 34.
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the Court and were heard on the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for
Sanctions. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the undersigned took both
Motions under advisement.4
On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Leave to Amend. The
next day he filed an affidavit (Doc. 49), which appears to pertain to all pending
motions.
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges as follows:
Plaintiff is a director of a not-for-profit organization called Peace
Strategies Foundation (“Peace Strategies”) “which is involved in a proactive
peace-making effort in the Middle East.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.
Plaintiff and Defendant met in 2019 in Jerusalem, Israel. Doc. 1 at ¶ 11.
During that meeting, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, Defendant
introduced himself as a writer who was preparing an article on archaeology in
Jerusalem for National Geographic. Id. at ¶ 11-12. Defendant did not mention
that he was writing a book. Id. at ¶ 12.
On November 2, 2021, Defendant’s book, entitled Under Jerusalem, was
4 At the beginning of the hearing, and in light of uncertainty in the record, the Court
inquired as to whether there was unanimous consent regarding the disposition of this
matter by a United States Magistrate Judge and gave the parties an opportunity to
confer outside of the Court’s presence. Thereafter, the parties advised that there was
unanimous consent and submitted an executed Joint Stipulation confirming their
consent. Doc. 46.
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published. Id. at ¶ 16, 14. Plaintiff contends that Under Jerusalem included
seven allegedly defamatory statements about him. Id. at ¶ 17.
III. Discussion
A. The Motion for Leave to Amend
By this Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to file an Amended Complaint as
well as an order transferring this case back to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks leave to file
his Amended Complaint and requests that Wisconsin’s three-year statute of
limitations be applied to his claims in this Court.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion is untimely; it was filed after the
Motion to Dismiss had been pending for more than three months and
subsequent to a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss (which hearing itself had to
be rescheduled because Plaintiff failed to appear at the initial setting).
More substantively, the Motion for Leave to Amend is futile. As noted
above, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
transferred this matter to this Court after concluding that it did not have
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiff has identified no legal basis
upon which the undersigned could now transfer the case back to Wisconsin.
Further, while the Motion for Leave to Amend makes clear that Plaintiff wants
his defamation claim to be considered under Wisconsin’s three-year statute of
limitations – whether in this district or back in Wisconsin – for the reasons
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discussed below, Wisconsin law does not apply.
Accordingly, the Motion for Leave to Amend will be denied.
B. The Motion to Dismiss
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. In addition, he
argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation because Plaintiff
has not alleged that Defendant acted with actual malice.5
1. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Claim
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Under Jerusalem was first
published on November 2, 2021. Plaintiff filed suit in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin on November 4, 2024.
Defendant argues that the law of North Carolina governs this case and
that, because North Carolina law imposes a one-year statute of limitations for
defamation claims, Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
54(3).
Plaintiff concedes that if North Carolina law applies, his claim is
untimely. He argues, though, that Wisconsin law controls and that under
Wisconsin’s three-year statute of limitations, his claim is not time-barred. See
5 Defendant also requests that to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed as
asserting a claim under “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” see Doc. 1 at ¶ 9,
that such a claim be dismissed. However, Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that he
has attempted to bring only a claim for defamation and the undersigned does not read
Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting any other type of claim.
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Wis. Stat. § 893.57.
a. Governing Law
In the Transfer Order, the Eastern District of Wisconsin determined that
it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Doc. 22 at 9. Rather
than dismissing the case, the court transferred it to this district pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1631. Id. at 9-10.
Section 1631 provides that:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in
section 610 of this title or an appeal, including a
petition for review of administrative action, is noticed
for or filed with such a court and that court finds that
there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in
the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to
any other such court (or, for cases within the
jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court, to that
court) in which the action or appeal could have been
brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the
action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in
or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the
date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for
the court from which it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631.
The Transfer Order noted that, in the event Plaintiff’s Complaint were
to be dismissed (in Wisconsin) for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff could
not re-file his suit in North Carolina in light of North Carolina’s one-year
statute of limitations Doc. 22 at 10. The Transfer Order also indicated that
Plaintiff’s suit was timely under Wisconsin’s three-year statute of limitations.
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Id. at 10.
Now, Plaintiff appears to argue that the Transfer Order requires this
Court to determine the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claim using Wisconsin law.
The Court, however, does not agree with this interpretation of the
language, or effect, of the Transfer Order. That is, the undersigned does not
read the Transfer Order as attempting to require the application of Wisconsin
law to Plaintiff’s defamation claim and otherwise concludes that North
Carolina should be applied.
In that regard, Section 1631 provides that when an action is transferred,
it “shall proceed as if it had been filed in…the court to which it is transferred
on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from
which it is transferred.” Emphasis added. In other words, the transferee court
will view the case as having been filed on the date it was originally filed in the
transferor court. What that means here is that the transfer pursuant to Section
1631 had the effect of retaining Plaintiff’s original filing date of November 4,
2024.
But whether Plaintiff’s claim is timely is a separate question, and one
that must be answered “as if” this matter had been filed originally in this
district.
On that point, courts have held that Section 1631 requires a transferee
court to apply the substantive and choice of law rules of the transferee’s
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jurisdiction. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 793 (10th Cir.
1998) (“in cases where the transferor court determines that it lacks personal
jurisdiction…the transferee jurisdiction's substantive and choice of law rules
apply so long as the transfer did in fact cure a jurisdictional defect…the proper
course of action since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 is to transfer pursuant
to that statute, which requires that the transferee court apply that
jurisdiction's law.”) (internal citations omitted); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Lab'ys, No. 1:15CV360, 2016 WL 922792, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 10,
2016) (“While the Fourth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, other courts have
held that…when a case is transferred to cure jurisdiction, the law of the
transferee forum must apply.”); see also LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 830 F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that courts “avoid
forum shopping” by applying the law of the transferee court, not the law of the
transferor court, when the plaintiff improperly filed in the transferor court);
Kuennen v. Stryker Corp., 1:13-CV-00039, 2013 WL 5873277, at *2 (W.D. Va.
Oct. 30, 2013) ( “where the transferor court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant . . . the transferee court must apply the law of the state in
which it is held, rather than that of the transferor state”) (citing Gimer v.
Jervey, 751 F. Supp. 570, 576 (W.D. Va. 1990), aff’d, 948 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir.
1991))).
Consistent with these authorities, the undersigned finds that North
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Carolina law, including North Carolina’s statute of limitations, governs
Plaintiff’s claim.
b. Application of North Carolina Law
Under North Carolina law, the one-year limitations period applicable to
a defamation claim begins to run from the date the subject statement is
published. See Horne v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 228 N.C. App. 142,
150 (2013) (“[A] defamation action must be commenced within one year from
the date the action accrues, which is the date of the publication of the
defamatory words—irrespective of the date of discovery by the plaintiff.”).
Here, Under Jerusalem was published on November 2, 2021. Id. at ¶ 16,
14. Plaintiff filed suit approximately three years later, on November 4, 2024.6
In his response to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35-1) and during the
January 6, 2026 hearing, Plaintiff asserted that a second publication of Under
Jerusalem occurred on September 26, 2023 and that this date should be
6 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to argue that additional shipments of the
edition of the book that was published on November 2, 2021 extended the statute of
limitations, this argument is foreclosed by the single publication rule. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 577A (1977) (“[a]ny one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one
radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate
communication is a single publication.”); Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 142 (4th
Cir. 2021) (the “great majority of states … now follow the single publication rule.”)
(quoting Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co., 739 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1984)).
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considered for purposes of determining the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claim.7
Defendant appears to acknowledge that a paperback edition of the book was
published in September of 2023. See Doc. 36 at 5 (referring to the November 2,
2021 publication as the original hardcover edition and the September 26, 2023
publication as a paperback edition).
This information, though, does not change the result. Allegations
regarding a September 2023 publication do not appear in Plaintiff’s Complaint,
but even if Plaintiff had pled (or was now given leave to plead) a September
2023 publication date, Plaintiff’s claim would still be untimely, since Plaintiff
filed his case in Wisconsin more than one year later.
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is time-
barred and will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
2. Defendant’s Remaining Arguments
In light of the Court’s ruling with respect to the statute of limitations,
the Court does not reach Defendant’s additional arguments for dismissal.
C. The Motion for Sanctions
Rule 16(f) authorizes courts to sanction parties for “fail[ing] to appear at
a scheduling or other pretrial conference” or “fail[ing] to obey a scheduling or
7 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend references a different date—September 23,
2023—as the date Under Jerusalem was “republished in paperback.” Docs. 48 at 2;
48-1 at 1 & 2.
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other pretrial order.” Rule 16(f) further provides that “[i]nstead of or in
addition to any other sanction, the court must order the party, its attorney, or
both to pay the reasonable expenses—including attorney’s fees— incurred
because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the noncompliance was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.”
Here, Defendant seeks expenses and attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$2,832.88 in connection with his attorneys’ appearance at the December 1,
2025 hearing.
Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to appear that day as a result of
adverse weather conditions at his location in Alaska.
Defendant questions the accuracy of Plaintiff’s representations.
In view of Plaintiff’s
pro se status, the information provided by him both
during the January 6, 2026 hearing and subsequently in his affidavit, as well
as the Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed
with prejudice, the Court will deny the Motion for Sanctions.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 29) is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. Defendant Andrew Lawler’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 44) is DENIED.
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3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and for Transfer
(Doc. 48) is DENIED.
4. The Clerk is RESPECTFULLY DIRECTED to enter a judgment
consistent with this Memorandum of Decision and Order.
Signed: January 22, 2026
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