USA v. Villarreal et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 5:18-CR-00048-KDB-DSC-13
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Martin Vidal Santillan’s pro se Motion for
Reduction in Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. No. 400). Having carefully
reviewed the Defendant’s motion, exhibits, and all other relevant portions of the record, the Court
will deny the motion without prejudice to a renewed motion properly supported by evidence and
after exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2019, Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine and marijuana. (Doc. No. 226). He was sentenced
to 156 months plus five years of supervised release and upon release is to surrender to a duly
authorized immigration official for deportation. (Doc. No. 349).
Defendant is a 55-year-old male confined at FCI Schuykill, a medium-security federal
corrections institution in Pennsylvania, with a projected release date of October 10, 2029. He
claims his Type II diabetes puts him at a heightened risk of death from complications of a COVID-
19 infection. According to his Presentence Report, he has been diagnosed with Type II diabetes
and high blood pressure and incurred a stroke in October 2017. (Doc. No. 219, ¶¶ 69, 70). The
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. ORDER
MARTIN VIDAL SANTILLAN,
Defendant.
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Defendant also claims he suffers from vitreous hemorrhage, macular edema, traction detachment,
vertigo, complications from the earlier stroke, and is confined to a wheelchair for the majority of
the day. (Doc. No. 400, Pg. 10). The Defendant does not attach any medical records to his motion.
II. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A prisoner may bring a motion for compassionate release before the court only if he “has fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure” of the BOP to bring a motion on his behalf
or if 30 days have passed since the warden received his request, “whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Courts are split over whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional or is a
“case processing” rule that can be waived. Compare United States v. Brown, No. CR 12-20066-
37-KHV, 2020 WL 1935053, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 22, 2020) (“The requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies or wait 30 days after the warden receives a request is jurisdictional.”) with
United States v. Alam, -- F.3d --, No. 20-1298, 2020 WL 2845694, at *2 (6th Cir. June 2, 2020)
(holding that the administrative exhaustion requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is non-
jurisdictional). The majority view is that the exhaustion requirement is a case processing rule. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 12 Cr. 133 (JFK), 2020 WL 1849748, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,
2020) (collecting cases).
If the rule is not jurisdictional, then it can be waived, forfeited, or abandoned, and is otherwise
subject to exceptions. See United States v. Zukerman, 16 Cr. 194 (AT), 2020 WL 1659880, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020); United States v. Russo, No. 16-cr-441 (LJL), 2020 WL 1862294, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020). These exceptions include “where it would be futile, either because the
agency decisionmakers are biased or because the agency has already determined the issue, . . .
where the administrative process would be incapable of granting adequate relief, . . . [or] where
pursuing agency review would subject plaintiffs to undue prejudice.” Zukerman, 2020 WL
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1659880, at *3 (citing Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2019). It is Defendant’s
burden to show that he has exhausted his remedies or that exhaustion would be futile or result in
undue prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Bolino, No. 06-cr-0806(BMC), 2020 WL 32461, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020) (requiring defendant to prove that the exhaustion requirement has been
met).
Here, Defendant has not exhausted his remedies as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A).
While he attaches his request, dated February 2, 2020, for compassionate release to the warden,
Defendant has not attached a copy of the warden’s denial (which Defendant states was on March
5, 2020). Defendant filed a request for reconsideration by the warden on April 28, 2020, which
was rejected on May 4, 2020, as not being complete nor timely. (Doc. No. 400, Pgs. 16-19). The
rejection on May 4 gave Defendant five days to refile, yet Defendant fails to provide such a timely
refiling. Defendant has not exhausted all administrative appeals of the warden’s adverse decision
that are available to him within the BOP. Defendant submits no evidence of appealing the
warden’s decision to the Regional Office.
Inmates are in federal custody for a reason, and each inmate’s sentencing judge considered
many factors, including danger to the community and medical conditions when initially imposing
these sentences. The law considers the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment as a final
judgment on the matter and “closely guards the finality of criminal sentences against judicial
‘change of heart.’” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b); United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir.
2010). Moreover, when Congress fashioned the compassionate release statute—an exception to
the general rule that terms of imprisonment may not be modified once imposed—it gave the BOP
an important statutory role. Allowing the BOP to first address Defendant’s compassionate release
request makes sense, as the BOP stands in the best position to assess all of the factors which must
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be considered in granting a motion for compassionate release, including the number of COVID-
19 cases within the particular facility; the defendant’s medical conditions and his or her resulting
susceptibility to COVID-19 complications; the ability of the facility to treat the defendant’s
medical conditions; the defendant’s conduct during the period of incarceration; and the defendant’s
proposed release plans, among other factors. See United States v. Wroten, No. 1:06-cr-00250-MR-
WCM-21, 2020 WL 3960825 n. 4 (July 13, 2020). Given the BOP’s shared desire for a safe and
healthy prison environment, the Court concludes that strict compliance with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement takes on added—and critical—importance. See United States v. Raia, 954
F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).
The Court does not mean to minimize the risks that COVID-19 poses in the federal prison
system, particularly for inmates like Defendant. However, the BOP is taking proactive measures
to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among inmates at Schuykill and other facilities. In addition,
the BOP is reviewing all inmates who have COVID-19 risk factors, as described by the CDC, to
determine which inmates are suitable for home confinement. Since March 26, 2020, the BOP has
placed 6,997 inmates on home confinement. Further, if an inmate does not meet the BOP’s internal
criteria for home confinement, the BOP may petition a court for compassionate release on an
inmate’s behalf pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
According to the BOP’s website, FCI Schuykill has completed 77 inmate tests with 4 inmate
tests pending and just one confirmed active case of COVID-19. Given this information, the Court
finds that Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the exhaustion requirement in 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) should be excused. With no confirmed COVID-19 case at FCI Schuykill
amongst the staff and only one confirmed case amongst the inmate population, requiring
Defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies within the BOP before petitioning this Court
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would not result in any “catastrophic health consequences” or unduly prejudice Defendant. See
United States v. Fraction, No. 3:14-CR-305, 2020 WL 3432670, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2020)
(finding the defendant did “not demonstrate any ‘catastrophic health consequences’ to make
exhaustion futile or show that he could be unduly prejudiced if he had to wait to exhaust his
administrative remedies with the BOP”); see also United States v. Albertson, No. 1:16-cr-00250-
TWP-MJD, 2020 WL 1815853, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr.8, 2020) (“The Court will not grant
compassionate release on medical grounds without documentation ….”); United States v. Clark,
No. 3:13-cr-163-FDW-1, 2019 WL 1052020, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2019) (denying motion for
compassionate release, in part, because inmate failed to provide medical records to substantiate
medical claims). Generalized concerns regarding the possible spread of COVID-19 to the inmate
population at FCI Schuykill are not enough for this Court to excuse the exhaustion requirement,
especially considering the BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail
the virus’s spread at FCI Schuykill. See United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).
III. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Reduction in Sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (Doc. No. 400), is DENIED without prejudice to a renewed
motion properly supported by evidence and after exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 21, 2020
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