USA v. Chappell et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
United States of America, )
)
Plaintiff, ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE
vs. )
)
Jack Albert Chappell, ) Case No. 1:16-cr-052
)
Defendant. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before the Court is the Defendant’s pro se motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A), filed on May 30, 2024. See Doc. No. 821. The Government filed a response in
opposition to the motion on June 12, 2024. See Doc. No. 823 The Defendant filed a reply on
September 3, 2024. See Doc. No. 829. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2016, the Defendant was charged by way of superseding indictment with three (3)
counts: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(a) and 2. See Doc. No. 74. On February 26, 2019, a jury trial commenced.
See Doc. No. 564. On March 1, 2019, the jury found the Defendant guilty on the drug and money
laundering conspiracy charges (Counts One and Ten) but acquitted him on the firearms charge (Count
Twelve). See Doc. No. 563. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) established a total
offense level of 40 and criminal history category of VI with an advisory Sentencing Guideline range
of 360 months to life. See Doc. No. , ¶¶ 20, 143. On September 6, 2019, the Court adopted the PSR
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without change and sentenced the Defendant to a 360-month term of imprisonment on the drug
conspiracy charge and a concurrent 240-month term of imprisonment on the money laundering
conspiracy charge. See Doc. No. 625. The Defendant appealed. See Doc. No. 628. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court on March 10, 2021. See Doc.
No. 718. The Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion on October 3, 2022, which the Court denied on
May 23, 2023. See Doc Nos. 774 and 814.
On May 30, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) citing his health problems as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons justifying the
requested sentence reduction. See Doc. No. 821. The Government filed a response in opposition to
the motion contending the Defendant had failed to provide an appropriate basis for a sentence
reduction. See Doc. No. 823. The Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion. See Doc. No.
829. The Defendant is serving his sentence at Victorville Medium I FCI in Victorville, California.
He has a presumptive release date of May 6, 2042.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allows the Court to modify a term of imprisonment under two
circumstances: by motion of the Director of the BOP or upon motion of the Defendant “after the
defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to
bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by
the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” In this case, the Government maintains
the Defendant has not exhausted his administrative remedies. However, the record reveals he did
make a request for compassionate release on September 17, 2020, that was denied by the Warden on
October 23, 2020. See Doc No. 823-3. While remote in time from the current motion, the Court
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notes the Warden’s response was outside the 30-day window prescribed by the First Step Act. The
Court concludes the Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies. See United States v.
Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining the exhaustion requirement is a mandatory
claims processing rule).
In considering a motion to reduce sentence, the Court must assess whether, after considering
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist which warrant a
sentence reduction, and if a sentence reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s
applicable policy statement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). There is no right to counsel in Section
3582(c) proceedings. United States v. Brown, 565 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2009). Nor is there a
right to a hearing. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827-28 (2010) (observing that, under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b)(4), a defendant need not be present at a proceeding under
Section 3582(c)(2) regarding the imposition of a sentencing modification).
Prior to the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, district courts could only grant
compassionate release sentence reductions based upon a motion filed by the director of the BOP.
Such motions were rarely filed. This all changed when the First Step Act was signed into law on
December 21, 2018. The relevant portion of the new law now reads as follows:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.--The court may not modify
a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that–
(1) in any case–
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier,
may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or
supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the
unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the
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factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
finds that–
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction;
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;
18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
The First Step Act does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The applicable
Sentencing Commission policy statement can be found at Section 1B1.13 of the 2023 Sentencing
Guidelines Manual. Section 1B1.13 provides as follows:
(a) In General.--Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the
defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of
imprisonment (and may impose a term of supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of
imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the
extent that they are applicable, the court determines that–
(1) (A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or
(B) The defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least
30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. §
3559(c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is
imprisoned;
(2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the
community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and
(3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.
(b) Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.--Extraordinary and compelling reasons
exist under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof:
(1) Medical Circumstances of the Defendant.--
(A) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious
and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific
prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a
specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic
solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage
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organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(B) The defendant is–
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive
impairment, or
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health
because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment
of a correctional facility and from which he or she is
not expected to recover.
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires
long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and
without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health
or death.
(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances–
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or
at imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak
of infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health
emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local
authority;
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the
defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical
complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing
outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health
emergency described in clause (i); and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely
manner.
(2) Age of the Defendant.--The defendant (A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the
aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her
term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(3) Family Circumstances of the Defendant.--
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(A) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's
minor child or the defendant's child who is 18 years of age or older and
incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a
medical condition.
(B) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner
when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the
spouse or registered partner.
(C) The incapacitation of the defendant's parent when the defendant
would be the only available caregiver for the parent.
(D) The defendant establishes that circumstances similar to those listed
in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) exist involving any other
immediate family member or an individual whose relationship with the
defendant is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member,
when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for such
family member or individual. For purposes of this provision,
‘immediate family member’ refers to any of the individuals listed in
paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) as well as a grandchild, grandparent,
or sibling of the defendant.
(4) Victim of Abuse.--The defendant, while in custody serving the term of
imprisonment sought to be reduced, was a victim of:
(A) sexual abuse involving a “sexual act,” as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2246(2) (including the conduct described in 18 U.S.C. 2246(2)(D)
regardless of the age of the victim); or
(B) physical abuse resulting in “serious bodily injury,” as defined in
the Commentary to § 1B1.1 (Application Instructions);
that was committed by, or at the direction of, a correctional officer, an
employee or contractor of the Bureau of Prisons, or any other individual who
had custody or control over the defendant.
For purposes of this provision, the misconduct must be established by a
conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case,
or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are
unduly delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger.
(5) Other Reasons.--The defendant presents any other circumstance or
combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together
with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in
gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
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(6) Unusually Long Sentence.--If a defendant received an unusually long
sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a
change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has
not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the
defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where
such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being
served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed,
and after full consideration of the defendant's individualized circumstances.
(c) Limitation on Changes in Law.--Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a
change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not
been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether
an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy statement. However,
if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law (including an
amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be
considered for purposes of determining the extent of any such reduction.
(d) Rehabilitation of the Defendant.--Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(t), rehabilitation of
the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of
this policy statement. However, rehabilitation of the defendant while serving the
sentence may be considered in combination with other circumstances in determining
whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is
warranted.
(e) Foreseeability of Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.--For purposes of this
policy statement, an extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been
unforeseen at the time of sentencing in order to warrant a reduction in the term of
imprisonment. Therefore, the fact that an extraordinary and compelling reason
reasonably could have been known or anticipated by the sentencing court does not
preclude consideration for a reduction under this policy statement.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Even when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, a court should only grant a motion for
release if it determines that the defendant is not a danger to the public. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).
A court should also consider whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of release. See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Whether to grant relief under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)
is vested in the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Vangh, 990 F.3d 1138, 1140
(8th Cir. 2021).
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The Defendant’s primary contention is that his health problems qualify as extraordinary and
compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction. The Defendant maintains he has terminal
cancer. The Defendant, who was 59, at the time of sentencing, is 64 years of age and has
approximately 18 years left on his 360-month sentence. His presumptive release date is May 6, 2042.
At sentencing, the Defendant was found to have a criminal history category VI (22 criminal history
points).
The medical records indicate the defendant has a number of health issues but he does not have
a terminal illness or an end of life trajectory. The Defendant states his health problems include
chronic neck pain related to a broken neck he suffered in a 1992 car accident, hepatitis C, COPD, and
right knee pain. The PSR noted all these health problems except the COPD. See Doc. No. 623, ¶ 84.
The medical records generally support the Defendant’s complaints but do not reveal any conditions
that cannot be managed with appropriate medical care while incarcerated. See Doc. No. 822-1.
The Defendant has not demonstrated that his medical conditions have significantly impacted
his day-to-day living or his ability to provide self-care. The Court was aware of his health problems
at the time of sentencing. Since the Defendant does not have an end of life trajectory and the
Defendant is able to provide himself with self-care, he has not established that his medical problems
warrant a sentence reduction.
In addition, the Court concludes the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh against any
sentence reduction. The Defendant has an extensive prior criminal history beginning in 1979. The
PSR noted he has spent a substantial part of his adult life in prison. See Doc No. 623, ¶ 65. The
offense in this case is a serious drug trafficking crime. The Defendant fell within criminal history
category of VI. His advisory Guideline Sentencing range was 360- months to life. The Court
sentenced him to 360-months of imprisonment. He has served approximately 7 years of his 30-year
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sentence. The need for the sentence imposed under Section 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C) still remains given
nature of the offense (distribution of approximately 20 pounds of methamphetamine). Granting
Defendant’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) would undermine the Section 3553(a) factors.
The Court has carefully reviewed the entire record and concludes the Defendant has failed to
demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that would warrant a sentence reduction. See
United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016) (the burden is on the defendant to establish
a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s motion to reduce sentence (Doc. No. 821) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of September, 2024.
/s/ Daniel L. Hovland
Daniel L. Hovland, District Judge
United States District Court
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