Williamson v. State of North Dakota et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Robert Williamson, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	ORDER GRANTING MOTION
) 	FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v. 	)
)
Chad Pringle, JRCC Warden et al., 	) 	Case No.: 1:24-cv-00069
)
Defendants. 	)
Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 106) made by
Defendants James River Correctional Center (“JRCC”) Warden Chad Pringle, Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) Warden Joseph Joyce, Chief of Security Jeff Lorenz,
JRCC Lieutenant Logan Onstad, JRCC Correction Officers Robert Dickenson, Lyle Mee, James
Taylor, Zach Bell, JRCC Corrections Officers A, B, C, D, E, JRCC Administration Vickie Steckler,
JRCC Investigation Captain Byran Dreher, DOCR Unit Manager Lacey Fisher, Corrections
Officer FNU Living-Good, DOCR Warden James Sayler, DOCR Mail Clerk Tammy Homan, Steve
Foster, and Ed LNU. For the reasons articulated below, the motion (Doc. No. 106) is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Williamson (“Plaintiff”) initiated the above-captioned action on April 29,
2024, through the filing of a Prisoner Litigation Packet pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. No. 1). The initial packet was received incomplete, with Plaintiff submitting
a completed packet on May 20, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3).
On July 9, 2024, the court issued a screening order directing Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint or to show cause by August 9, 2024. (Doc. No. 9). On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
second PLRA packet with his Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10).
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 1 of 22

2
The court reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and on November 25, 2024, directed
the Clerk’s Office to serve the Amended Complaint.1 (Doc. No. 13). Defendants filed an Answer
to the Amended Complaint on February 18, 2025. (Doc. No. 60).
On March 16, 2026, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No.
106). Plaintiff filed a response on March 30, 2026, and Defendants replied on April 9, 2026. (Doc.
Nos. 115, 116). The final pretrial conference and jury trial were subsequently canceled and trial
preparation deadlines stayed pending a ruling on the motion. (Doc. No. 119). This matter is now
ripe for the court’s review.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is dictated by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56. Pursuant to Rule
56, “a party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the part of
each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court
must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. As to whether facts are
material, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” if the evidence is enough that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
1 The court dismissed the State of North Dakota and claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official
capacities. Plaintiff was permitted to proceed with ten claims as outlined in the Order. All other claims and Defendants
JRCC Case Manager Frank Holdburg, DOCR Sergeant FNU Volk, Correctional Officer FNU Steckler, DOCR Case
Manager Steve Bement, DOCR Investigation Captain Marc Schwehr, and DOCR Chief of Security Todd Flanagan
were dismissed without prejudice. (See generally Doc. No. 13). The court also dismissed individual capacity claims
against Director Dave Krabbenhoft, Director Colby Braun, and Brandi Netolicky. (See Doc. No. 9).
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 2 of 22

3
Once the moving party has demonstrated a sufficient showing, the burden rests on the
nonmoving party to provide specific facts, whether through affidavits or other evidence, that there
is a genuine issue of material facts. Hill v. Payne, No. 621CV06029SOHBAB, 2023 WL 2192961,
at *4 (W.D. Ark Jan. 30, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:21-CV-06029, 2023
WL 2192247 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 23, 2023); see National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co.,
165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The nonmoving party may not rely only on allegations or denials
but must provide specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Twardowski v. Bismarck
Police Dep’t, No. 1:17-CV-110, 2017 WL 8791103, at *2 (D.N.D. Dec. 22, 2017), aff’d, 754 F.
App’x 492 (8th Cir. 2019).
While unrepresented litigants are entitled to liberal construction of the pleadings, they are
required to comply with substantive and procedural law, including the requirements of Rule 56.
Glaum v. Braun, No. 1:24-CV-146, 2026 WL 883451, at *2 (D.N.D. Mar. 31, 2026) (collecting
cases).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants’ arguments are two-fold. Defendants first argue they are entitled to summary
judgment on Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies as required by the PLRA. Defendants next argue they are entitled to summary judgment
on the merits of the remaining claims. In response, Plaintiff argues he is excused from exhausting
administrative remedies because prison officials refused to respond to or lost his grievances, and
there are genuine issues of material fact.
A. Failure to Exhaust Available Administrative Remedies as to Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5
The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 3 of 22

4
remedies is a mandatory requirement; however, while a prisoner must exhaust available remedies,
they need not exhaust those that are unavailable. Muhammad v. Mayfield, 933 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th
Cir. 2019); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016) (identifying the circumstances in
which an administrative remedy is unavailable). All that is required to properly exhaust one’s
administrative remedies is compliance with a prison’s grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 910, 922-23 (2007). Section 1997e(c) also dictates when a court may dismiss an action.
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined on any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first
requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)-(2).
The North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations Resident Grievance
Policy (“Grievance Policy”) outlines the procedures required during the grievance 2 process.
Pursuant to the Grievance Policy, an inmate may only pursue a grievance about a matter subject to
the grievance procedure that affected them personally and directly within the last fifteen days.
Matters subject to the grievance procedure include:
1. Policies, rules, and procedures enforced within the facility that directly and
negatively affect the adult in custody.
2. A policy, regulation, rule, or procedure, or the lack of a policy, regulation, rule,
or procedure that negatively affects the conditions of confinement within the
facility. Examples of conditions of confinement include the exercise of religious
beliefs; recreation; access to medical, dental, vision care and treatment; access to
education programs; resident accounts; commissary; case management; food
2 The Grievance Policy defines a grievance as “[a] written complaint submitted through the grievance procedure by a
juvenile or adult in custody about a Department policy, condition of confinement, circumstances, action or failure to
act that the juvenile or adult in custody claims to be unjust, unfair, or unlawful.” (Doc. No. 108-1 at 4).
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 4 of 22

5
service; housing conditions; hygiene; jobs; laundry; legal access; mail and
mailroom; 	privileges; 	programs; 	property 	publications; 	recreation; 	safety;
sanitation; searches; staff conduct (such as failure to protect or excessive use of
force); and visitation.
3. Although the department allows allegations of sexual abuse to be submitted on a
grievance 	form 	for 	investigation, 	the 	department 	does 	not 	have 	grievance
procedures to address allegations of adult in custody sexual abuse, If an allegation
of sexual abuse is submitted on a grievance form, it must be removed from the
grievance process and processed under the Policy 3C-04, Prison Rape Elimination
Act of 2003 (PREA) as though it were submitted using another permitted method.
If there are another claims included in the grievance (besides the allegation of
sexual abuse or harassment), then the portion of the grievance related to those
claims must be refiled under a new grievance, and the original grievance will be
maintained to be processed under Policy 3C-04, Prison Rape Elimination Act of
2003 (PREA) as though it were submitted using another permitted method. [PREA
115.52]
4. Retaliatory actions against adults in custody for submission of a grievance
procedure, participation in a grievance proceeding, or the exercise of a legal right.
(Doc. No. 108-1 at 4-5) (emphasis in original).3
To successfully complete the grievance procedure, the inmate must have documentation of
the grievance, a documented attempt at informal resolution, two levels of documented internal
resolution, and an appeal to the department director. (Id. at 6). The process allows only one issue
per grievance form. Abuse of the grievance procedure occurs when grievances contain profanity,
threats, or abusive and demeaning behavior, issues that have been previously addressed through
the grievance procedure or not subject to the grievance procedure, or involve the submission of
multiple frivolous grievances that are abusive, harassing, or made in bad faith about DOCR
employees. (Id. at 6, 9).
3 The Grievance Policy further identifies issues not subject to the grievance procedure. Those include processes with
an established, formalized appeal or review process, actions of persons outside the jurisdiction of the facility, medical
decisions by a doctor, nurse practitioner, physician’s assistant, dentist, or psychologist, and housing, programs, and
work assignments. (Id. at 5).
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 5 of 22

6
1. 	Exclusion from Exhausting Administrative Remedies
The court first turns to whether Plaintiff was excused from exhausting his administrative
remedies due to prison officials refusing to respond or losing grievances. Plaintiff appears to cite
Porter v. Sturm in support of his argument that inmates are excused from exhausting remedies.
Inmates are excused from exhausting remedies when officials have prevented
prisoners from utilizing the procedures, or when officials themselves have failed to
comply with the grievance procedures. A remedy that prison officials prevent a
prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy under § 1997e(a).
Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations, citations, and alterations
omitted). However, Plaintiff does not show that he was excused from exhausting his administrative
remedies beyond a vague assertion that “Defendants Motion for summary judgment claiming
Plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies when DOCR OFFICIALS FAILED TO RESPOND, LOST
GRIEVANCES AND OR DESTORED IS GOOD CAUSE FOR EXHAUSTING REMEDIES
should be DENIED[.]” (Doc. No. 115 at 11) (errors and emphasis in original). Plaintiff provides
no support for this assertion. In fact, Defendants provide evidence that Plaintiff not only knew
about the grievance procedure, but used it often, with numerous responses from prison officials.
See Morris v. Allen, No. 2:12CV00146 JLH-JJV, 2013 WL 3422893, at *3 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2013),
aff’d (Oct. 29, 2013) (“The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense
that the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving.”).
2. 	Claim 1
Plaintiff’s Claim 1 asserts a lack of access to the courts pursuant to the First Amendment
by DOCR Warden James Sayler (“Sayler”) and DOCR Unit Manager Lacey Fisher (“Fisher”), in
due their alleged refusal to fix the Wi-Fi or provide any research to Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff’s
inability to timely file an appeal from his criminal judgment.
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 6 of 22

7
As argued by Defendants, no grievance was submitted relating to Plaintiff’s concerns with
access to legal materials or to the internet that impacted his ability to appeal his criminal judgment.
In reviewing Plaintiff’s grievances, the court is inclined to agree. Plaintiff alleges this incident
occurred on or about February 18, 2022. (See Doc. No. 10 at 21). However, Plaintiff did not file
any grievances until August of the same year. (See Doc. No. 108-3 at 2). There is no record of a
grievance documenting these concerns until March 7, 2024, when Plaintiff submitted loose-leaf
documents that he considered “Appeal Step 2,” wherein he claimed to be giving the DOCR an
opportunity to respond to alleged non-answered grievances. (Doc. No. 108-37 at 3, 30). This
“Appeal Step 2” does not document either Sayler or Fisher as the individuals allegedly involved
in the incident beyond a general assertion that Plaintiff wrote to the unit manager and warden. (Id.
at 30). The DOCR responded to Plaintiff on April 18, 2024, advising that not only had the facility
just responded to several other grievance appeals, but Plaintiff did not follow the correct process
or use the correct form to appeal, and to the extent Plaintiff meant to file the documents as sensitive
in nature,4 they did not meet the criteria. (Id. at 2).
Because Plaintiff did not file a grievance pertaining to the lack of access to legal materials
or access to the internet that impacted his ability to appeal, did not tie Sayler and/or Fisher to the
allegations in Claim 1, and failed to file a grievance within the required fifteen day window,
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Thus, summary
judgment is required as to Claim 1.
4 The Grievance Policy defines when a grievance is sensitive in nature. “If an adult in custody has a sensitive complaint
and reasonably fears possible adverse effects if the adult in custody’s complaints are known at the facility, the adult in
custody may file a grievance directly with the department director through the mail. The adult in custody is required
to clearly explain the reason for not submitting the grievance through the facility’s grievance process. If the DOCR
director determines the grievance is not of a sensitive nature, the grievance will be returned to the adult in custody to
file through the usual grievance procedures.” (Doc. No. 108-1 at 8-9).
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 7 of 22

8
3. 	Claim 2
Plaintiff alleges lack of access to the courts under the First Amendment against JRCC
Administration Vickie Steckler (“Stecker”), Ed LNU, and DOCR Mail Clerk Tammy Homan
(“Homan”) on the basis that in approximately May 2023, he sent out a Rule 24 letter to the State
Attorney’s Office and the letter was returned to him on July 27, 2023. (Doc. No. 10 at 27). He
further alleges that he did not receive the Rule 24 letter back until April 7, 2024, and was therefore
unable to have his claims reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel which in turn impacted
his release date. (Id.).
Defendants again argue Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the
filing of the complaint as no grievance was filed.
A review of the grievances submitted by Plaintiff during his term of incarceration
establish that of the 50 grievances filed, Plaintiff filed five grievances related to his
issues with mail and staff handling of mail procedures …. A review of each of the
five grievances submitted that address mail or staff handling of mail irrefutably
demonstrates that Plaintiff did not file a grievance alleging any of the underlying
facts that are now claimed and were allowed to proceed after screening by this
Court.
(Doc. No. 107 at 13). The court agrees that none of the grievances pertaining to mail or staff
handling of mail relates to the instant claim. Each of the five grievances either do not name
Steckler, Homan, or Ed LNU, do not fall within the fifteen-day window, or are factually unrelated
to the instant claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to
Claim 2.
4. 	Claims 4 and 5
Claims 4 and 5 address substantially similar facts. Both claims allege JRCC Correction
Officer Zach Bell (“Bell”) violated Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment rights by labeling him
as a snitch to other inmates, and that JRCC Warden Chad Pringle (“Pringle”), Chief of Security
Jeff 	Lorenz 	(“Lorenz”), 	and 	JRCC 	Investigation 	Captain 	Bryan 	Dreher 	(“Dreher”) 	were
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 8 of 22

9
deliberately indifferent to Bell’s actions and failed to intervene or protect Plaintiff. (Doc No. 10 at
21, 23).
Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances pertaining to Bell, but the grievances did not pertain
to him being labeled as a snitch. In May 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting he be given
additional good time because Bell deprived him of his rights, while also threatening an eye for an
eye action. (Doc. No. 108-9 at 2). Another grievance was filed in August 2023, pertaining to an
alleged write-up by Bell. (Doc. No. 108-10 at 2-3).
Although Plaintiff did not specifically file any grievances pertaining to Bell calling him a
snitch, he did submit snitch-related grievances. However, he only mentioned DOCR staff as a
whole. (Doc. No. 108-34 at 3; Doc. No. 108-38 at 2-5). In response, even though Plaintiff alleged
fears for his safety, DOCR reported that Plaintiff refused to participate in the separation process,
in other words, to request administrative segregation. (Doc. No. 108-38 at 2).
The 	only 	mention 	of 	Bell 	purportedly 	calling 	Plaintiff 	a 	snitch 	is 	on 	loose-leaf
documentation submitted to Director Colby Braun, wherein Plaintiff asserted, “Officer Zach Bell
is telling inmates that I am snitching on them, this needs to stop…. Officer Bell is putting me in
danger, also putting my family in danger. I’m getting strong armed over this.” (Doc. No. 108-37
at 20). The documents were subsequently returned due to failure to follow the correct process and
failure to use the correct appeal form. (Id. at 2).
Similar issues arise as to Plaintiff’s claim against Pringle, Lorenz, and Dreher for their
alleged deliberate indifference and failure to intervene or protect Plaintiff from Bell. There are no
grievances alleging that these individuals were deliberately indifferent to Bell’s actions or that they
knew the alleged conduct was occurring and failed to intervene. The only mention of potential
deliberate indifference as to Plaintiff being labeled a snitch is in a November 2024 grievance,
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 9 of 22

10
where Plaintiff asserted the DOCR in general was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety.
(Doc. No. 108-38 at 3).
Even if the court were to construe Plaintiff’s grievances as having been against Bell,
Pringle, Lorenz, and Dreher, Plaintiff still would not have complied with the Grievance Policy.
The alleged conduct occurred in July 2022, and Plaintiff’s grievances and loose-leaf documents
were not submitted until 2024. This is well over the 15-day deadline required by the Grievance
Policy. 	The claims against Bell, Pringle, Lorenz, and Dreher are therefore subject to summary
judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
B. Summary Judgment as to Claims 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
Defendants also argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to the merits of Claims 3,
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
1. 	Claim 3
Plaintiff alleges in Claim 3 that between December 2023 and July 2024, Homan, Warden
Joseph Joyce (“Joyce”), Fisher, and DOCR Mail Clerk Steve Foster (“Foster”) ignored his requests
to improve the filing system by adopting Odyssey, requiring him to submit documents by mail.
“Because of the delay, motions are not accepted and I’m also not notified until after I’ve had a
hearing. If I’m not notified in time for a hearing, I can’t address the issues on record for a review
of abuse of discretion and I lose that right.” (Doc. No. 10 at 27).
Plaintiff filed a grievance in August 2024, pertaining to issues with the legal mail process.
(See Doc. No. 108-35). In his first grievance, Plaintiff “demanded” a no contact order due to fear
of staff and not wanting to either be in contact with or see staff. (Doc. No. 108-33 at 5). His
proposed remedy was for facility staff to bring him his legal mail and to be provided with a tablet
for his court hearings. (Id.). In a second grievance, Plaintiff alleged that his legal mail was
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 10 of 22

11
interfered with and requested to open mail with another shift. (Doc. No. 108-51 at 2). This request
was accommodated. (Id.). In a third grievance, Plaintiff voiced continued concern with the mail
system, alleging that the facility “use’s our legal mail process to violate our 1st Amendment by
putting refused on the mail when request to do it with another shift.” (Doc. No. 108-35 at 5).
Plaintiff also requested the facility adopt the Odyssey system or come up with a new system. (Id.
at 3-5). Plaintiff received accommodation to receive his legal mail from a different shift, but
appealed, again requesting the Odyssey system be implemented. (Id. at 2).
A prisoner retains the right to send and receive mail under the First Amendment, but this
right may be restricted by prison regulations that are reasonably related to legitimate interests.
Glaum v. Braun, No. 1:24-CV-146, 2026 WL 883451, at *2 (D.N.D. Mar. 31, 2026). Greater
protections have been afforded to legal mail and outgoing mail than to non-legal mail and incoming
mail. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). An isolated incident of mail tampering is
not enough to establish a violation, rather, the inmate must make a showing that prison officials
engaged in regular and unjustifiable interference with incoming legal mail. Id.
Even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, a reasonable jury could not conclude a violation
of his First Amendment occurred. First, Plaintiff cannot show there was regular and unjustifiable
interference with his mail. Due to an alleged fear for his safety, Plaintiff did not want contact with
the staff who open and copy legal mail for the inmates, and instead wanted his legal mail brought
to him and to attend court hearings by tablet. However, pursuant to policy, staff will not deliver
legal mail, and inmates are required to sign for mail and be present when the documents are copied.
Even when accommodation was made for Plaintiff to have another shift handle his legal mail,
Plaintiff continued to try to waive his rights to be present for the opening of legal mail and
continued advocating for the adoption of Odyssey. (See Doc. No. 108-33 at 3; Doc. No. 108-35 at
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 11 of 22

12
2). To the extent Plaintiff may argue that “putting refused” on the mail violates his First
Amendment rights, Plaintiff was advised that staff were following the correct procedure by
documenting his refusals to engage in the legal mail process. (Doc. No. 108-35 at 5).
At most, the closest Plaintiff comes to arguing that prison officials engaged in regular and
unjustifiable interference with incoming legal mail is his statement that due to mail delays his
motions were not accepted by the court and he did not receive notice of this until after court
hearings. (See Doc. No. 10 at 27). Here again, even construing this information in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the facts do not demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find a First
Amendment violation occurred. While Plaintiff alleged an injury, he does not show how prison
officials engaged in regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail beyond this single incident.
See Sanderson v. Lopez, No. 4:17CV00174 JLH/PSH, 2017 WL 4020428, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
21, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17CV00174 JLH-PSH, 2017 WL 4012963
(E.D. Ark. Sept. 12, 2017) (“Neither an isolated incidence of mail tampering nor short delays in
receiving mail violate a prisoner’s First Amendment right to free speech to send and receive
mail.”).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff argues Homan, Joyce, Fisher, and Foster are liable under
Section 1983 for violating his constitutional right to access the mail, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for which relief can be granted. Section 1983 requires defendants to be held liable for their
own specific conduct which must rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff is required
to allege facts showing each defendant was involved in the alleged violation, and the facts must
explain how each defendant was involved or responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional
right. Glaum v. Braun, No. 1:24-CV-146, 2025 WL 1067441, at *11 (D.N.D. Apr. 9, 2025), on
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 12 of 22

13
reconsideration in part, No. 1:24-CV-146, 2025 WL 1864884 (D.N.D. June 2, 2025). “General
references to defendants collectively are insufficient to allege individual liability.” Id.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he does not specifically allege how each listed Defendant violated
his First Amendment right to access the mail. Instead, Plaintiff generally claims the free flow of
his mail was interrupted and the failure to adopt Odyssey is grossly negligent. (See Doc. No. 10 at
55). This is not remedied in Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment. In his responsive brief,
Plaintiff continues to group the Defendants together generally. (See Doc. No. 115 at 11 (“Because
the defendants in this action refused Williamson access to the courts in order to file and follow
proper rules of procedure that would have produced a different result.”) (emphasis added)). To the
extent Plaintiff does address each Defendant individually, he still does not point to how each
individual Defendant was involved in the deprivation of his rights, beyond his vague statement
that the free flow of his mail has been interrupted by the NDSP mail process, resulting in missed
hearings, rejected and denied motions, undelivered subpoenas, and missed scheduling notices.
(Doc. No. 115 at 13). Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of Section 1983 entitle
the Defendants to qualified immunity and dismissal. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132
(8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility
for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants [Plaintiff]
must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of
his constitutional rights.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
2. 	Claim 6
The sixth claim alleges that on approximately August 15, 2023, Pringle and Lorenz
retaliated against Plaintiff for filing three grievances by making a false conduct report, which
resulted in him being transferred to a maximum-security prison.
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 13 of 22

14
The Eighth Circuit has outlined the applicable law required to succeed on a retaliatory
transfer claim.
In general, a prisoner enjoys no constitutionally protected right against transfer to
another prison. And ‘[j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will
be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable
expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.” Prison authorities
have a great deal of discretion in running their institutions, and such discretion
normally outweighs any interest that any individual prisoner may have in remaining
housed in a particular prison. Nevertheless, a prisoner cannot be transferred in
retaliation for his exercise of constitutionally protected rights, either between
prisons in a single state, or between state and federal prison systems under the
interstate Corrections Compact.
To successfully argue retaliatory transfer in violation of his constitutional rights
pursuant to § 1983, [Plaintiff] “must prove that a desire to retaliate was the actual
motivating factor behind the transfer.” In other words, [Plaintiff] must prove that
but for his protected First Amendment activity, he would not have been transferred.
Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). As such, Plaintiff
is required to prove that but for his First Amendment conduct, he would not have been transferred.
The record shows Plaintiff made numerous threats during his incarceration, not only to
Bell, but to other staff as well. Plaintiff’s grievances are jam-packed with threats to facility staff.
(See Doc. No. 108-9 at 2 (“Give me good-time for CIT since your staff member deprived me of
the rights thats under law, and the kindness of my heart I will forget eye for an eye for the good-
time I’ve lost for CIT. Or I got plan B, get write ups and loose good-time or plan C eye for any
eye, that a possible trip back to prison or jail.” (errors in original)); Doc. No. 108-12 at 4 (“God
made it simple, eye for an eye love a brother threw the treatment given to you, repay.” (error in
original)); Doc. No. 108-24 at 4 (“She’s lucky I didn’t throw something at her for trying to trip me
‘cutting me off, stepping in front of me.’ She’s got an attitude, she keeps it up I’ll keep rolling the
dice back. Respect for respect.” (error in original))). Moreover, the declarations and emails
provided by Defendants show that the transfer was not due to grievances, but rather to ensure the
safety and security of Bell and the staff because of Plaintiff’s threats. At no time during the email
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 14 of 22

15
correspondence were the grievances discussed. Conversations instead focused on a memorandum
submitted by Bell in regard to fears for his safety, and whether Plaintiff should be moved. Also
notable is Defendants’ concern as to whether and to what extent any potential opportunity for
treatment may be impacted if he were to be transferred. Taken in totality, Defendants had
justification for transferring Plaintiff due to his behaviors and threats toward facility staff.5
Based on the information available in the record, no reasonable jury could conclude that
the filing of grievances was the but for cause of Plaintiff’s transfer. For these reasons, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the retaliatory transfer claim.
3. 	Claims 7, 8, and 9
Plaintiff contends that in mid-2023, JRCC Lieutenant Logan Onstad (“Onstad”), JRCC
Correction 	Officers 	Robert 	Dickenson 	(“Dickenson”), 	Lyle 	Mee 	(“Mee”), 	James 	Taylor
(“Taylor”), and multiple unnamed officers violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by using excessive force against him. (Doc. No. 10 at 23-24). Plaintiff further alleged claims
against Onstad, Lorenz, Taylor, Mee, and unnamed officers for failure to intervene or protect
Plaintiff from Dickenson’s use of force.
Plaintiff’s grievances from this incident allege that while investigating his black eye, staff
members assaulted him.
I feared for my safety, they kneed, kicked, bashed my head, twisted my knees.
When I was in a cell I continued to get kicked. The COS was bashing his knee in
my back, I have a bad back, while they was striping me while pulling my underwear
off somebody’s finger went in my asshole. Staff had no reason to pull me off the
floor. They had no reason to use force.
5 Of note, while Lorenz is listed as a Defendant in this claim, Lorenz had no role in the decision to transfer Plaintiff.
Email correspondence suggests the JRCC Warden and Deputy Warden made the decision to transfer Plaintiff after a
memorandum was submitted by Bell detailing concerns for his safety.
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 15 of 22

16
(Doc. No. 108-11 at 5) (error in original). After reviewing video footage of the incident, staff
concluded Plaintiff was restrained due to noncompliance with officer commands, at no time did
an officer knee or harm him in any way outside the “force continuum,” and no officer was seen
putting a finger in his anus. (Id.). Plaintiff disagreed with the findings filed a step two grievance.
(Id. at 4). Plaintiff appealed the step two grievance and on review, the grievance appeal was denied.
(Id. at 2-3). The denial concluded: “The video footage of the incident was reviewed and showed
that staff followed policy and training guidelines…. A review of the Use of Force report shows the
staff followed all appropriate amount of force in this situation when you failed to comply with staff
directives.” (Id. at 2).
The standard for reviewing an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment is well
established in this circuit.
The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause governs a convicted
prisoner’s right to be free from the use of excessive force. After incarceration, only
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. When confronted with a claim of
excessive force alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial
inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Factors that inform this
inquire are: (1) whether there was an objective need for force, (2) the relationship
between any such need and the amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably
perceived by the correctional officers, (4) any efforts by the officers to temper the
severity of their forceful response, and (5) the extent of the inmate’s injury.
Ashton v. Moire, No. 1:24-CV-193, 2024 WL 5248000, at *2 (D.N.D. Dec. 11, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-00193, 2024 WL 5245882 (D.N.D. Dec. 30, 2024)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). While the Eighth Amendment protects a prisoner
against excessive use of force, it does not protect a prisoner against objectively de minimis use of
force. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d. Cir. 2002).
Here, the material facts included in the video footage, grievances, and other relevant
evidence demonstrate that Defendants applied reasonable force to maintain or restore discipline.
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 16 of 22

17
During the investigation into Plaintiff’s black eye, Plaintiff refused to turn around for hand
restraints to be applied. Only after his continued non-compliance with verbal commands and
attempts to pull away was force used. This force included taking Plaintiff to the ground and
securing his hands and feet while waiting for a drag blanket to be brought by staff to transport
Plaintiff based on his refusal to walk. Based on the available evidence, a reasonable jury could not
conclude that the force used constituted excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff continues to argue excessive force was used, the Eighth
Amendment does not protect against the use of de minimis force, as is the case here.
Plaintiff also cannot establish personal liability under Section 1983. While Dickenson and
Mees used force to bring Plaintiff to the ground, there is no evidence that the use of this de minimis
force was intended for anything other than to secure Plaintiff after his continued disregard of verbal
commands and attempts to resist staff. Further, there is no evidence that Onstad, Lorenz, or Taylor
engaged in personal acts violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Evidence of such de minimis
use of force is not sufficient to overcome Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity.
Dickenson is also entitled to summary judgment as no reasonable jury could find that the
video footage demonstrates he kicked Plaintiff in the head three times while he was in a drag
blanket as Plaintiff alleged. The footage further shows that at no time during the incident was
Plaintiff either purposefully kicked or kicked at all.
Similarly, because the video footage shows that at no time did Dickenson, or any other
officer, kick Plaintiff in the head, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his failure to intervene or to protect
claim against Onstad, Lorenz, Taylor, Mee, and the unknown officers. “A prison official may be
liable for failure to protect an inmate from a use of excessive force if he is deliberately indifferent
to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Ashton, 2024 WL 5248000, at *3 (quoting
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 17 of 22

18
Estate of Davis Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1395 (8th Cir. 1997)). “A prison official acts
with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety when the official is present at the time of an
assault and fails to intervene or otherwise act to end the assault.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Mueller,
13 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1994)). Because the video evidence shows that at no time was Plaintiff
kicked, Defendants cannot be said to have failed to intervene or to protect Plaintiff as there was no
use of excessive force for the Defendants to respond to. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 650-51 (“[A]
corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis of liability for an Eighth
Amendment violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to
intervene and simply refused to do so.” However, “an officer is only liable if there is a realistic
and reasonable opportunity to intervene.”).
Finally, Lorenz is entitled to summary judgment. To overcome qualified immunity and to
hold Lorenz personally liable under Section 1983, the alleged conduct must be specific and
supported by evidence allowing a reasonable jury to find that Lorenz violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See Evans as Tr. for Evans v. Krook, 680 F. Supp.3d 1080, 1093 (D. Minn.
2023) (“[W]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the
plaintiff bears the burden to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the
defendant officer has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”). In his complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that during the incident, Lorenz assaulted him by placing his finger in Plaintiff’s anus.
However, in his original grievance, Plaintiff only commented that “somebody” placed their finger
in his anus. (Doc. No. 108-11 at 5). Approximately two months later and only after an officer
indicated they saw no one place their finger in his anus did Plaintiff name Lorenz as the individual
who allegedly assaulted him at step two of the grievance process. (See Id. at 4). On appeal of the
step two grievance, Director Dave Krabbenhoft reiterated that at no time did anyone see an officer
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 18 of 22

19
place a finger in Plaintiff’s anus, and review of the relevant video footage showed that staff
followed policy and training guidelines. (Id. at 2). Because there is nothing to support Plaintiff’s
allegations beyond his vague and albeit self-serving assertion that Lorenz assaulted him, there is
no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff’s claim is supported to establish
personal liability under Section 1983 or overcome Lorenz’s qualified immunity. As such, Lorenz
is entitled to summary judgment.
4. 	Claim 10
Finally, Plaintiff claims Corrections Officer FNU Living-Good (“Living-Good”) violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment for using excessive force by placing pressure on and
twisting Plaintiff’s wrists when placing him in handcuffs. (Doc. No. 10 at 26). As previously
explained, the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive use of force against convicted prisoners,
with unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constituting cruel and unusual punishment. See
Ashton, 2024 WL 5248000, at *2.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Living-Good in October 2023. Plaintiff alleged that after
telling Living-Good he was going to sue his colleagues, Living-Good began twisting his wrists in
the handcuffs. (Doc. No. 108-16 at 5). Plaintiff proceeded to inform Living-Good that if he
continued to twist his wrists, he was going to sue for cruel and unusual punishment and excessive
force. (Id.). At that point, Living-Good allegedly cranked Plaintiff’s wrists harder. (Id.). Living-
Good responded in the informal resolution portion of the grievance:
Resident Williamson, at that time of the ICS, I did slightly add pressure to your
wrist because you were pulling away from your escorting officers and yelling at the
surrounding staff. You were acting in a threatening way. I gave you commands to
stay near. This is a technique taught in training if a resident is being disorderly and
you need to gain control. I meant no disrespect or harm.
(Doc. No. 108-16 at 5). Plaintiff disagreed with the assessment of step one submitted a step two
grievance on January 5, 2024. (Id. at 4). In step two, Plaintiff again asserted Living-Good cranked
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 19 of 22

20
his wrist harder after Plaintiff stated he was going to sue for violations of his Eighth Amendment
rights if Living-Good continued to use excessive force. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff appealed the step two
decision and after review, Director Colby Braun (“Braun”), denied the appeal, advising:
The grievances and appeal were reviewed. Officer LivingGood did not use
excessive force, he applied pressure when you did not follow directives, were
pulling away from officers, and yelling at the surrounding team members. Once
you complied with the directives given, the pressure was discontinued. Your actions
during an emergency required the NDSP team to address your behavior, which
resulted in you being escorted to BIU and receiving an incident report. You created
an unsafe situation not only for the team members, but also the residents in that
unit. Your appeal is denied.
(Id. at 2).
In his reply, Plaintiff argues that Living-Good’s actions were not warranted because there
was no yelling, threat of harm, and no one was placed in fear of being harmed. (See Doc. No. 115
at 24). As a result of Living-Good “cranking” his wrists while handcuffed, Plaintiff claimed he
sustained a “painful permanent bubble” on his wrist that causes it to hurt or go numb. (Id. at 23-
24). Even taking these facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot establish there is
a genuine issue of material fact that may result in a reasonable jury weighing in his favor.
In determining whether there is an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the
court must consider five factors. See Ashton, 2024 WL 5248000, at *2 (The five factors include
whether there was an objective need for force, relationship between such need and amount of force
used, threat reasonably perceived by the officers, any efforts to temper the severity of the forceful
response, and the extent of the inmate’s injury). A review of the factors, the parties’ briefs, and the
grievances, demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot show the force was applied for any reason other than
to maintain or restore discipline.
As to the first factor, Plaintiff cannot show there was not an objective need for force. It is
undisputed that at or about the time Living-Good handcuffed Plaintiff, there was an ICS event that
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 20 of 22

21
required the participation of numerous staff members to resolve. While this event was occurring,
Plaintiff engaged in disorderly behavior, which resulted in staff members being taken away from
the emergency to address him. (Doc. No. 108-16 at 4; see also Doc. No. 111-1 at 3 (“Resident
Robert Williamson…was standing in the entrance of the library yelling at Capt. Erickson and Lt.
Jung as they were escorting the residents involved with the fight.”); Doc. No. 111-1 at 11 (“When
escorting inmates that had been fighting, inmate Williamson was standing in the library still yelling
at staff, calling them super cops and other names. I stopped at the library and informed inmate
Williamson that when he is asked to clear the area that is what he needs to do. He started to say
something about his right[s] are being violated.”)).
As to the second factor, there was a relationship between the need for force and the force
actually used by Living-Good. Living-Good applied restraints as a result of Plaintiff’s disorderly
and non-compliant behavior, and disengaged pressure when Plaintiff complied with directives.
(Doc. No. 108-16 at 4.). The third factor considers the threat reasonably perceived by the
correctional officers. Here, Plaintiff cannot show the force used was disproportionate to the
circumstances. As opined by Braun, “Officer Living[-]Good did not use excessive force, he applied
pressure when you did not follow directives, were pulling away from officers, and yelling at the
surrounding team members.” (Id. at 2).
As to the fourth factor, which considers efforts made by the officers to temper the severity of
their forceful response, Living-Good discontinued pressure as soon as Plaintiff complied. (Id.).
Finally, the fifth factor considers Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff alleges that because of his wrists being
“yanked” or “cranked,” he acquired a permanent bubble on his wrist that caused pain or numbness.
There is no information to corroborate this injury beyond Plaintiff’s own statements. “Mere
allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party’s own
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 21 of 22

22
conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Corwin,
483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). At most, Plaintiff can show that he disagrees with the finding
that no excessive force was used; however, such a disagreement is not enough to show that Living-
Good engaged in malicious or sadistic actions to cause Plaintiff harm. Living-Good is therefore
entitled to summary judgment.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
106) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of June, 2026.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
Case 1:24-cv-00069-CRH Document 120 Filed 06/03/26 Page 22 of 22