USA v. Galaviz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
United States of America, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	ORDER
)
vs. 	)
)
Amos Ryker Galaviz, 	) 	Case No. 1:25-cr-127
)
Defendant. 	)
Finding that Defendant qualified for representation under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court
issued an order on July 8, 2025, appointing the Federal Public Defender’s Office to represent him.
(Doc. No. 13). AFPD Max Rudy subsequently filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Defendant.
(Doc. No. 19).
On June 15, 2026, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting that the court appoint
substitute counsel to represent him in this matter. (Doc. No. 40). He asserts that he has substantial
and irreconcilable differences of opinion with his current counsel that have let to an irreparable
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
A criminal defendant as the right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend VI; see also Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution
guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the
assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.”). “The
right to counsel, however, is not absolute, and a court must beware that a demand for counsel may
be utilized as a way to delay proceedings or trifle with the court.” United States v. Williams, No.
2:21-CR-00027-1-JRG-CRW, 2024 WL 2145806, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2024) (internal
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quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Green, 388 F.3d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 2004)); see e.g.,
Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 839 (“An accused does not have an absolute right to counsel of his own
choosing . . . and a district court “may properly require the defendant to choose either to proceed pro
se, with or without the help of standby counsel, or to utilize the full assistance of counsel, who
would present the defendant's defense.” (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Davidson, 195 F.3d 402, 407 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Nor is an accused guaranteed perfect representation
or even a meaningful relationship’ with counsel . . . . (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[A]
‘persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the
functional equivalent of a valid waiver of counsel.’” Williams, No. 2:21-CR-00027-1-JRG-CRW,
2024 WL 2145806, at *3 (quoting Green, 388 F.3d at 921); United States v. Coles, 695 F.3d 559,
562 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant may engage in conduct which constitutes a waiver of his right
to counsel.” (citations omitted)); Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding the
“functional equivalent” of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's right to counsel where
the defendant continued “to seek the removal of his appointed counsel, after being cautioned that
no replacement counsel would be appointed.”); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.
1983) (“[A] persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new
counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. In such an
instance, the trial court may proceed to trial with the defendant representing himself.”); United
States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that a defendant's refusal to cooperate
with, verbal altercations with, and unreasonable demands of multiple court-appointed attorneys
constituted valid waiver of right to counsel)).
Whether to accede to Defendant’s request to appoint substitute counsel to represent him is
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a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court. United States v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456, 460
(8th Cir. 2003). 	Defendant must show a justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel in order to be
granted a substitute. Justifiable dissatisfaction sufficient to warrant that new counsel be appointed
includes 	a 	conflict 	of 	interest, 	an 	irreconcilable 	conflict, 	or 	a 	complete 	breakdown 	in
communications between Defendant and his counsel. 	Id. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d
1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991)). The proper focus in evaluating claims of dissatisfaction with counsel
is on the quality of the advocacy. Defendant does not have the absolute right to counsel of her own
choosing. The primary aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each
criminal defendant, rather than to ensure that each defendant will be represented by the lawyer he
prefers. United States v. Johnson, 121 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997).
On June 24, 2026, the court convened an ex parte hearing on Defendant’s motion with
Defendant and AFPD Rudy. For the reasons articulated on the record at the close of the hearing, the
court GRANTS Defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 40). AFPD Rudy is authorized to withdraw. The
court shall appoint substitute counsel in a separate order to represent Defendant in this matter
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of June, 2026.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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