Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION
Mohammad Hussain Ahmadi, 	)
) 	ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
Petitioner, 	) 	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
)
v. 	)
) 	Case No. 3:26-cv-74
Markwayne Mullin, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
Petitioner Mohammad Hussain Ahmadi petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Docs. 1; 8.
Respondents oppose the Petition. Docs. 5; 9. For the reasons below, the Court grants the Petition
and orders Respondents to grant Petitioner a bond hearing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Afghanistan and resident of West Fargo, North Dakota. Doc. 1 at
5-7. In early 2024, he presented himself at the border and was paroled into the United States after
using the CBP-One application. Id. His parole was granted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) and
was “valid for one year” beginning on May 17, 2024, and would “automatically terminate . . . at
the end of the one-year period.” Doc. 5 at 2; Doc. 1 at 6. He was placed in removal proceedings
and charged under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an applicant for
admission without valid entry documents. Id.
After being paroled into the United States, Petitioner filed a timely application for asylum.
Id. at 7. His asylum application remains pending. Id. at 8. On March 2, 2026, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Petitioner in connection with a scheduled
appearance at the Fourt Snelling Immigration Court in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Id. Petitioner was
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transferred to the Grand Forks County Correctional Center in Grand Forks, North Dakota, where
he remains in custody. Id.
Petitioner filed this Petition on March 18, 2026. Doc. 1. He asserts his detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 9. He requests immediate release from detention
or a bond hearing. Id. at 14-15. Respondents oppose the Petition. Docs. 5; 9.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That authority includes
jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). Petitioner’s arguments raise two
questions: whether he is entitled to a bond hearing on either statutory or constitutional grounds.
Regarding the statutory argument, Petitioner argues he is being improperly held under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) instead of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Doc. 1 at 12-14. But the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Avila v. Bondi forecloses this argument. 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). Avila
concerned the “Government’s power to detain aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.” Id. at 1132. Section
1225(a)(1) indicates the statute applies to an alien who is an “applicant for admission.” Id. at 1133
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). An applicant for admission is “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1)). “Being ‘admitted’ does not merely mean being present in the United States; under
immigration law, it signifies having made a lawful entry into the country.” Id. Section
1225(b)(2)(A) states that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
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examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for [removal proceedings.]” Id.
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The question in Avila was “whether an alien who is an
‘applicant for admission’ is also ‘seeking admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. If the answer is
yes, “then, generally, any ‘alien present in the United States who has not been admitted’ ‘shall be
detained.’” Id.
The Eighth Circuit held the terms are equivalent.1 Id. at 1138. While a noncitizen remains
an “applicant for admission” so long as they are “present in the United States” and have “not been
admitted,” they are also “presently seeking admission,” regardless of whether they take “any
further affirmative steps to gain admittance.” Id. Avila dictates that § 1225 applies to Petitioner.
He is an “applicant for admission” as the term is defined by the statue: “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). Petitioner has been “physically present and continuously residing in the United States”
for over two years. Doc. 1 at 13. He “has not been admitted” because, although he was paroled
into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), the statute dictates that “parole . . . shall not be
regarded as an admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Petitioner argues that his parole weighs in his favor because “[p]arole expiration does not
reset a person’s status to that of someone newly presenting at the border.” Doc. 1 at 13. But as
indicated above, parole—or the expiration of parole—does not change Petitioner’s status as an
“applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). And under Avila, someone who is an
1 The Eighth Circuit’s holding aligns with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026).
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“applicant for admission” is also “seeking admission.” Avila, 170 F.4th at 1138. Thus, Petitioner’s
statutory argument fails.
But Avila does not foreclose Petitioner’s procedural due process claim. The Eighth
Circuit’s decision was based on its construction of § 1225(b)(2), not the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
1140-41. (Erickson, J., dissenting). The Due Process clause applies to aliens within the United
States “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply
the test in Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Courts consider the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
At the outset, Respondents argue a Mathews analysis is not necessary because precedent
dictates that Petitioner’s detention does not violate his due process rights. Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (analyzing the detention of an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) with a criminal
record involving theft and first-degree burglary); Baynee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 930 (8th Cir.
2024) (analyzing the detention of an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) who was convicted of “theft,
lying to the police . . . possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia . . . [and] robbery with a
dangerous weapon”). The Court finds these cases are easily distinguishable. Besides the detention
being based on a different statutory section, the respondents in those cases demonstrated the
petitioners were a danger or flight risk based on their criminal convictions. As the following
Mathews analysis will reveal, that is not the case here.
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The first Mathews factor requires consideration of the private interest affected by the
official action. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “Freedom of imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty clause that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). During the more than two years in
which Petitioner has resided in the United States, he has built a life here. He has appeared for all
scheduled immigration hearings and complied with the law. Doc. 1 at 7. The Court finds that
Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in his freedom from detention. See Lopez Miranda v. Flores,
No. 25-cv-584, 2025 WL 3901908, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025) (“[N]oncitizens acquire a
protectable liberty interest when they spend years establishing a life in the interior of the United
States, regardless of their citizenship status.”). Petitioner’s liberty interest is further strengthened
by the fact that Respondents paroled him from civil immigration custody in 2024. Doc. 1 at 2.
Numerous courts have found that individuals paroled from civil immigration custody have a
protectable liberty interest in remaining so. See e.g., Zapata v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-7492, 2025 WL
2578207, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (collecting cases). The first Mathews factor weighs in
Petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor asks whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of
erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures
could ameliorate these risks. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Civil immigration detention must be
“nonpunitive in purpose” and bear a “reasonable relation” to the authorized statutory purposes of
preventing flight and danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Respondents
previously determined that Petitioner did not pose a threat, paroling him into the United States
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which allows the Department of Homeland Security to parole
noncitizens “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Because Respondents “[have] ‘communicated no basis under those
statutory purposes’ for re-detaining him now, there is a high risk that [Petitioner] has been and will
continue to be erroneously deprived of his liberty.” Ramirez-Mendez v. Olson, No. 26-17, 2026
WL 907576, at *4 (E.D. Ky. April 2, 2026) (holding the second Mathews factor weighed in
petitioner’s favor where he was paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and respondents alleged
no basis for re-detaining under the statutory purposes of preventing flight and danger to the
community).
Petitioner has not been afforded a custody redetermination hearing. To counter the risk of
erroneous deprivation, such hearing is appropriate. See e.g., Azalyar v. Raycraft, 814 F. Supp. 3d
926, 934 (S.D. Ohio 2026) (“Respondents must provide a custody redetermination hearing at
which the government bears the burden of justifying [petitioner’s] continued detention[.]”);
Ramirez-Mendez, 2026 WL 907576, at *4 (holding that a custody redetermination hearing
countered the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s rights); Alvarez-Rico v. Noem, No. 4:26-
cv-729, 2026 WL 522322, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026) (“Absent some sort of pre-detention
hearing to determine whether his circumstances have changed such that he now presents a danger
or a flight risk when the government previously determined that he presented neither, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of [the petitioner’s] liberty interest is obvious.”).
Third, the Court recognizes that Respondents have a legitimate interest in ensuring that
noncitizens appear for removal hearings and do not pose a danger to the community. But here,
Respondents’ interest in detaining Petitioner is low because they have not established that he is
unlikely to appear or that he is a threat to the community. See Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp.
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3d 1134, 1153-54 (D. Minn. 2025) (granting habeas petition in part because there was no showing
that public safety or attendance concerns required detention). Respondents previously determined
Petitioner was not a danger when they granted him parole. They fail to allege that this is no longer
the case. Further, because a bond hearing allows Respondents to plead their case, there is no risk
that requiring one will impede their interests. Azalyar, 814 F. Supp. at 935 (holding that a bond
hearing does not impede respondents’ interests). Nor is there a risk that requiring a bond hearing
will impose more than a minimal cost. Id. (citing Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801, 2025 WL
1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). The Court concludes that Respondents’ interest in
protecting the public or avoiding additional administrative burdens do not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest, especially when a mechanism exists to safeguard due process.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the record, the parties’ filings, and the relevant case law.
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Docs. 1; 8) is GRANTED. Respondents are
ENJOINED from detaining Petitioner unless he is provided with a bond hearing within seven
calendar days of the filing date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of June, 2026.
/s/ Peter D. Welte
Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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