Butler v. Jeffers et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
STEVEN BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER MICHAEL JEFFERS, OFFICER
DAVID BLYTHE, OFFICER RONALD
BODEN, and OFFICER STEWART
DANBURG, in their individual capacities,1
Defendants.
4:24CV3002
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
This 	matter 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s2 	Findings 	and
Recommendation (Filing No. 57) recommending the Court deny Butler’s Petition for a
Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1651 (Filing
No. 51) and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2) (Filing No. 52). 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (authorizing the Court to
refer certain matters to a magistrate judge). Starting with the petition, the magistrate judge
concluded Butler failed to show his circumstances warrant the “drastic and extraordinary”
1 In his Amended Complaint (Filing No. 9), plaintiff Steven Butler (“Butler”) names
Deputies Jeffers, Blythe, Bolden, Danburg, and Ullman as defendants. He apparently did
not have their first names. 	On initial review (Filing No. 21), the Court dismissed Deputy
Ullman from this matter and narrowed the claims against the remaining defendants. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	On March 27, 2025, Officers Michael Jeffers, Ronald Boden,
and Stewart Danburg answered (Filing No. 19) the Amended Complaint and reported their
“correct names,” which includes their first names and the clarification that the person
Butler identified as “Bolden” should be “Boden.” A few weeks later, Officer David Blythe
likewise answered and gave his full name (Filing No. 31). To date, Butler’s pleading has
not been updated to reflect the defendants’ full names or to correct the misnomer. 	For
purposes of this Memorandum and Order, the Court will use the correct names and order
Butler to amend the complaint to reflect the correct information going forward.
2 The Honorable Ryan C. Carson, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Nebraska.
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remedy of mandamus. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting
Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-260 (1947) (explaining such an extraordinary remedy
is “reserved for really extraordinary causes”)).
Turning to the motion for leave to amend, the magistrate judge found Butler’s
proposed amendments were “not entirely clear.” 	The magistrate judge also articulated
several reasons to conclude Butler’s “request to amend is futile” and found he failed to
include sufficient allegations to nudge his “claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Butler objects to the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation on multiple
grounds (Filing No. 61). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	He also asks
the Court to stay or defer summary-judgment proceedings in this case and expedite the
ruling on his amended complaint (Filing No. 58).
In his first objection, 	Butler argues 	his circumstances 	are in fact drastic and
extraordinary because “critical, court-ordered evidence was withheld for months despite
prior requests.” 	According to Butler, “mandamus is proper to preserve evidence and
vindicate due process.” 	He also asserts the magistrate judge failed to consider the Court’s
affirmative duty to reexamine unconstitutional applications of the law under Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 264 (2022). 	In particular, he “urges this
Court to recognize its constitutional and statutory authority to reexamine the doctrines of
qualified and absolute immunity.”
With respect to his request for leave to amend, Butler contends the denial of his
request “was an abuse of discretion.” 	Reiterating that he is proceeding pro se, he notes
leave should be freely granted under Rule 15(a)(2) and argues his proposed “limited
amendment to add Lancaster County” as a defendant is not futile. 	He also faults the
magistrate judge for prematurely finding “state law claims time-barred and defamation
claims insufficient, without considering [his] ability to plead tolling or additional facts.”
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Butler last objects that “the Magistrate Judge failed to address [his] arguments
concerning Nebraska’s judicial selection system, known as the Missouri Plan, and its
implications 	for judicial independence and constitutional structure.” 	He also discusses
“[t]he judiciary’s refusal to confront systemic abuses” and again “requests that this Court
stay all further proceedings in this matter until such time as counsel or an [Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”)] advocate is appointed or otherwise made available.” 	As he sees
it, “Such a stay would not prejudice Defendants but would safeguard the integrity of the
process and uphold the Court’s responsibility 	to ensure justice is not compromised 	by
disability or lack of representation.” 	To that end, he asks the Court to “[r]econsider the
denial of appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) or, alternatively, order ADA
accommodations 	(extended 	deadlines; 	telephonic/video 	appearances; 	plain-language
directives) consistent with Title II of the ADA and Section 504.”
None of the defendants has weighed in on Butler’s objections or his other pending
motions. 	See NECivR 7.1(b)(1)(B); 72.2(a).
As Butler points out, § 636(b)(1) requires the Court to “make a de novo review of
. . . specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (“The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report
enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at
the heart of the parties’ dispute.” The Court “may accept, reject, or modify,” the Findings
and Recommendation 	“in 	whole or in part” and 	can receive 	additional evidence if
necessary. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Having carefully completed that review, the Court finds no compelling reason to
reject or modify the Findings and Recommendation. 	See id. 	The magistrate 	judge
thoroughly considered Butler’s sundry arguments and explained his sound reasons for
recommending the Court reject them. 	Put simply, the Court agrees with the magistrate
judge that Butler has not shown that he is entitled to the extraordinary relief of a writ of
mandamus, see Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380, or that justice requires that he be granted leave to
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amend his pleading a second time. Butler also inaptly attempts to reassert matters, like his
claim about the preservation of evidence and request for the appointment of counsel,
already duly considered and rejected by this Court (Filing No. 21) and the magistrate judge
(Filing No. 47).3
In light of the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	Plaintiff Steven Butler’s objections (Filing No. 61) are overruled, and his
ancillary requests for relief are denied.
2. 	The magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation (Filing No. 57) is
accepted.
3. 	Butler’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Relief under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1651 (Filing No. 51) and Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) 	(Filing
No. 52) are both denied.
4. 	Butler’s 	Motion 	to Stay/Defer 	Summary-Judgment 	Proceedings 	and to
Expedite Ruling on Amended Complaint (Filing No. 58) is denied as moot.
Butler must respond to the pending motion for summary judgment (Filing
No. 53) on or before December 18, 2025.
5. 	Butler shall amend his complaint on or before December 1, 2025, to update
the full names 	of 	the defendants and correct 	the misnomer 	regarding
defendant Ronald Boden’s last name. No other amendments are permitted.
6. 	Failure to comply with this Memorandum and Order could result in the
dismissal of this case without further notice.
3 The Court notes Butler did not timely object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that the discretionary appointment of counsel in this civil case was unnecessary because
his “Amended Complaint is relatively straightforward, and the issues are not factually or
legally complex.” 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (giving fourteen days to object to a findings
and recommendation); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); NECivR 72.2(a).
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Dated this 18th day of November 2025.
BY THE COURT:
Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
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