USA v. Morillo et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. 	Case No. 15-cr-174-SM-AJ-1
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 052
Mara Morillo,
Defendant
O R D E R
Invoking the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, the
defendant, Mara Morillo, moves the court to reconsider its order
dated March 25, 2026, denying her motion to dismiss the pending
criminal charge against her for lack of timely prosecution.
That motion for reconsideration is denied.
The court’s orders vacating Morillo’s conviction (documents
no. 279 and 280) are the subject of the government’s pending
appeal. 	The Speedy Trial Act clock (governing any potential
retrial of Morillo) is automatically tolled during that appeal
and does not begin to run until the Court of Appeals has
rendered a final decision resolving that appeal and issued its
mandate.
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If the defendant is to be tried again following a
declaration by the trial judge of a mistrial or
following an order of such judge for a new trial, the
trial shall commence within seventy days from the date
the action occasioning the retrial becomes final.
If the defendant is to be tried again following an
appeal or a collateral attack, the trial shall
commence within seventy days from the date the action
occasioning the retrial becomes final.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (emphasis supplied). 	See also United States
v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 509 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Courts which have
considered the question of when an appeal ends and the clock
begins to run again for speedy trial purposes have generally
held that the applicable date is the date on which the appellate
court issues its mandate.”) (collecting cases); United States v.
Mack, 669 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1982) (“For computing speedy
trial time limits, the date the ‘action occasioning retrial
becomes final’ has been construed to mean the date on which the
mandate of the court of appeals becomes final.”); United States
v. Russo, 550 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (D.N.J. 1982) (“The
finality referred to in § 3161(e) logically means finality of
the Court of Appeals’ action that occasioned the retrial. 	The
Court of Appeals’ action is final on the issuance of its
mandate. . . . 	[T]he Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction over
an appeal until it has issued its mandate, and the district
court does not reacquire jurisdiction over a case until the
mandate is issued.”).
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So, upon the government’s appeal, the application (if any)
of the Speedy Trial Act’s seventy-day time limit was
automatically stayed, by operation of law. 	See 18 U.S.C. §§
3161(e) and (h). 	At the moment, however, it is unclear whether
Morillo will actually be retried on the charge against her or if
the Speedy Trial Act even has any application to this case. 	If
the Court of Appeals affirms this court’s decision vacating
Morillo’s conviction, the Speedy Trial Act clock will begin
running (upon issuance of the mandate), and the government will
have to decide whether it wishes to pursue a retrial. 	See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(e). 	If, however, the Court of Appeals reverses or
vacates this court’s order, Morillo’s conviction will be
reinstated, there will be no retrial, and the Speedy Trial Act
has no application.
Conclusion
In short, it is entirely unclear whether there will be any
retrial in this matter. 	That uncertainty will not be resolved
until the Court of Appeals disposes of the government’s pending
appeal and issues its mandate. 	Until that time: (1) this court
lacks jurisdiction over Morillo’s criminal proceeding; and (2)
the Speedy Trial Act clock is tolled.
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Morillo’s Motion for Reconsideration (document no. 287) is,
then, necessarily denied.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
May 5, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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