Lewis v. FCI Berlin, Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Darnell L. Lewis
v. 	Case No. 16-cv-188-LM
Warden, Federal Correctional
Institution, Berlin, New
Hampshire
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Darnell Lewis, who appears pro se, petitioned this court
for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, while
he was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Berlin, New Hampshire (“FCI-Berlin”). 	In his petition, Lewis
claims that the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly
calculated the term of his incarceration. 	Specifically, he
contends that the BOP erred by failing to give him credit
against his federal sentence for time he spent in the custody of
the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) between April 14,
2009, and January 1, 2010. 	Before this magistrate judge for a
report and recommendation is respondent’s second motion for
summary judgment. 	Petitioner objects. 	For the reasons that
follow, respondent’s motion should be denied.
Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record, read
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, presents no
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 1 of 18

2
genuine issue as to any material fact and reflects the movant's
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Morse v. Cloutier,
869 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Schiffmann v. United States, 811 F.3d 519, 512 (1st Cir. 2016)).
Background
On April 14, 2009, Lewis was arrested in Michigan on drug
charges by officers of the Kalamazoo Police Department on drug
charges. 	At the time, he was on parole from a sentence for a
prior state conviction. 	Two days after Lewis was arrested, on
April 16, 2009, an assistant county prosecutor sent a fax to the
county jail, directing the jail to release Lewis “to the custody
of the U.S. Marshall's Office . . . as the [state] charges
against [him] . . . will be dismissed to due to [his] Federal
indictment[].” 	Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A., Attach. A (Doc.
No. 18-1), at 2. 	“There was no writ of habeas corpus
prosequendum issued by the federal court ordering Michigan to
produce Lewis to answer the federal charge.” 	Resp’t’s Mot.
Summ. J. (Doc. No. 14), at 1. 	On the same day that the
assistant prosecutor sent the fax quoted above, Lewis was: (1)
released by the county jail to the USMS; and (2) arrested by the
federal Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).
An Individual Custody/Detention Report (“ICDR”) prepared by
the USMS shows that Lewis was in the custody of the USMS from
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 2 of 18

3
April 16 to December 29, 2009. 	See Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
A, Attach. B (Doc. No. 18-2), at 3. 	“On December 29, 2009,
[Lewis] was returned to state custody with the federal judgment
lodged as a detainer.” 	Id., Ex. A, Woods-Coleman Decl. (Doc.
No. 18) at ¶ 8. 	“On May 11, 2010, [Lewis] paroled from his
Michigan state sentence into the custody of the USMS for service
of his federal sentence.” 	Id. at ¶ 9. 	At some point, the BOP
performed a sentence calculation using May 11, 2010, as the
starting date for Lewis’s federal incarceration. 	Thus, the time
between Lewis’s arrest by the DEA on April 16, 2009, and his
return to state custody on December 29 was not credited toward
his federal sentence.
The summary judgment record includes an April 26, 2011,
email exchange between a BOP inmate classification and
computation technician and a specialist in the Central Records
Section at the MDOC. 	In the first e-mail, the BOP technician
made the following request for information:
This inmate paroled from MDOC on 04/03/2007. 	He
violated his parole on 4/14/2009. 	Was he given credit
from 04/14/2009-05/11/2010 when he [was] discharged
from his MDOC parole violation or was there a break in
his credit during that time. 	He believes he is
entitled to credit from us [i.e., BOP] for some of
that time. 	Please verify his MDOC credit.
Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Attach. C (Doc. No. 14-1), at 2.
The MDOC records specialist responded:
There has been no break in service on his Michigan
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 3 of 18

4
sentence. 	He has received credit since July 17, 1998
and continues to be credited with service toward his
maximum term while in your custody.
Id. 	The content of that e-mail was confirmed two days later, in
a letter from another MDOC employee. 	See id., Attach. H (Doc.
No. 18-8), at 2.
In September 2015, Lewis asked the BOP for credit against
his federal sentence for the time he spent in the custody of the
USMS between April 14, 2009, and January 1, 2010. 1 	His request
generated this response:
On 04-14-09 you were arrested by state PD and taken to
jail for Delivery of Controlled Substance. 	The DEA
interviewed you inside the jail the same day. 	You
were released to USM[S] custody on 04-16-2009. 	On 04-
14-2009 your parole violation was entered into the
data system and you were sent back to continue your
state prison term until you paroled on 5-11-2010,
which is the same day your computation began with the
Bureau of Prisons. 	You were primary state custody
until the date of parole.
Pet. (Doc. No. 1) at 9.
Dissatisfied with that response, Lewis began the process of
seeking an administrative remedy from the BOP. 	In his initial
inmate request, he stated, in pertinent part:
This petitioner asserts that he was initially arrested
by the federal authorities and was then taken to the
local jail for processing and holding purposes. 	This
movant is relying on Barden v. [K]eohane, [according]
to which the BOP has the discretion to retroactively
designate a state prison as the place of a prisoners
confinement to serve a federal sentence under 18
1 Lewis’s actual request does not appear to be included in
the summary judgment record.
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 4 of 18

5
U.S.C. § 3621(b).
Pet. at 10. 	The BOP responded as follows:
A review was conducted and found that on April 14,
2009, you were arrested by Michigan State Police and
taken to Kalamazoo County Jail, for the Delivery of
Control Substance. 	The same day you were questioned
by the Drug Enforcement Administration. 	On April 14,
2009, your Parole Violation was entered into Michigan
Department of Corrections data system. 	On April 16,
2009, you were released, inadvertently, to United
States Marshal Service. 	The Kalamazoo County Jail had
no information pertaining to your Parole Violation
that had been entered on April 14, 2009. 	You were
considered primarily state custody and you were sent
back to the state to complete your probation violation
until you were paroled on May 11, 2015 [sic]. 	The
credit for the time you are requesting has been
credited towards your Michigan parole violation and is
precluded under Title 18 U.S.C[.] 3585(b).
Pet. at 26. 2
Lewis appealed, and his appeal was granted to the extent
that the BOP agreed to consider whether to make a “nunc pro
tunc” designation of the MDOC as a facility in which Lewis was
serving his federal prison sentence between April 14, 2009 and
January 1, 2010. 	To collect the information necessary to
determine whether to make a nunc pro tunc designation, Jose
Santana of the BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center
wrote to Western District of Michigan Judge Robert Jonker, the
2 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides that “[a] defendant shall be
given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date
the sentence commences . . . as a result of the offense for
which the sentence was imposed . . . that has not been credited
against another sentence.”
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 5 of 18

6
sentencing judge in Lewis’s federal criminal case, to ask
whether he had intended for Lewis’s federal sentence to run
consecutively to or concurrently with his state sentence. 	In
the letter, Santana explained:
On November 19, 2009, Darnell Lewis, was sentenced by
the Court to a 121-month term of imprisonment for
Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams of More
of Cocaine Base. 	At the time the federal sentence was
imposed, Mr. Lewis was under the primary jurisdiction
of state authorities in Michigan. 	. . . 	Following
sentencing, Mr. Lewis was appropriately returned to
state authorities and the U.S. District Court Judgment
was filed as a detainer.
On January 14, 2010, the State of Michigan revoked Mr.
Lewis' parole and he was ordered to serve the remainder of
the previously imposed 22-year term of imprisonment.
. . . .
Mr. Lewis has requested that his federal sentence be
served concurrently with the state term, which would
be accomplished by the Bureau of Prisons designating
the state institution for service of his federal
sentence.
Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Attach. I (Doc. No. 18-9), at 2.
Judge Jonker responded:
[Y]ou ask whether the Court has any position on whether the BOP
should retroactively designate a state institution where
Defendant served time on a state conviction as a location for
concurrent service of the federal sentence Defendant is now
serving. 	I have reviewed the public record of the federal
sentencing and find that the Court did not express any intention
on this issue [i.e., concurrent service of Lewis's state and
federal sentences] at the time of sentencing. 	Under these
circumstances, I doubt whether the Court has any power now to
affect the designation decision of the BOP. 	In any event, I
believe the BOP should calculate the time of Defendant's federal
sentence in this case, including any potential impact of the
state custodial time, under the rules and policies the BOP
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 6 of 18

7
normally applies.
Id., Attach. J. (Doc. No. 18-10), at 2.
Based in part on Judge Jonker’s response, Lewis’s final
appeal was denied as follows:
A review of your record reveals [that] on April 14,
2009, you were arrested by law enforcement officials
from the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety in
Kalamazoo, Michigan, on local drug charges. 	At the
time of your arrest, you were on parole with the
Michigan Department of Corrections . . . and a parole
violation warrant was issued.
On April 16, 2009, you were temporarily removed from
state custody by federal agents from the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and charged with
Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams of More
of Cocaine Base. 	The local charges for drug
possession were not pursued by Kalamazoo County in
lieu of federal prosecution; however, you were still
in the primary custody of the state of Michigan,
pending your parole violation case.
Records reflect that on November 19, 2009, you were
sentenced in the United States District Court, Western
District of Michigan, to a 121-month term of
imprisonment for Possession with Intent to Distribute
50 Grams or More of Cocaine Base. 	On December 29,
2009, you were returned to state custody to complete
your Michigan state sentence for violating your
parole.
Pet. at 15.
This action followed. 	In his petition, Lewis claims that
he is entitled to credit against his federal sentence for the
time he spent in USMS custody between April 14, 2009, and
January 1, 2010, for two reasons: (1) from April 14 onward, he
was under the primary jurisdiction of the United States; and (2)
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 7 of 18

8
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP should have designated
the facilities in which he was held between April 14, 2009, and
January 1, 2010, as places where he served his federal sentence.
Discussion
Respondent moves for summary judgment, arguing that: (1)
the State of Michigan obtained primary jurisdiction over Lewis
on April 14, 2009, and did not relinquish that jurisdiction when
it released Lewis to the USMS on April 16; and (2) even if the
State of Michigan did relinquish primary jurisdiction, Lewis is
only entitled to 40 days of credit toward his federal sentence,
based upon the time he served from November 19 to December 29,
2009, because he could not have started serving his federal
sentence any earlier than the date on which it was imposed,
i.e., November 19.
I. 	Primary Jurisdiction
Under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, “[t]he first
sovereign to take physical custody of a defendant retains
‘primary jurisdiction' until releasing that jurisdiction.”
Elwell v. Fisher, 716 F.3d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). 	“Generally, a sovereign can only relinquish primary
jurisdiction in one of four ways: 1) release on bail, 2)
dismissal of charges, 3) parole, or 4) expiration of sentence.”
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 8 of 18

9
Id. 	Finally, “[a] defendant sentenced by both a state and
federal sovereign will first serve the sentence of the sovereign
with primary jurisdiction.” 	Thomas v. Warden, Fed. Corr. Inst.,
No. 13-cv-259-LM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13868, at *10, 2015 WL
502144, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 5, 2015) (citing United States v.
Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1980)), appeal filed sub
nom., Thomas v. Schult, No. 15-1186 (1st Cir. filed Feb. 18,
2015).
In respondent’s view, the State of Michigan obtained
primary jurisdiction over Lewis when he was arrested by local
police on April 14, 2009, and never gave up primary jurisdiction
over him, despite the fact that state officials erroneously
released Lewis to the USMS without requiring the presentation of
a writ of habeas corpus prosequendum, a device that allows a
sovereign to give up physical custody of a person without
relinquishing primary jurisdiction. 3 	Petitioner, on the other
3 With regard to the mechanics of the writ:
The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is issued by
a requesting jurisdiction seeking to have a prisoner
in another jurisdiction produced to the requesting
jurisdiction to stand trial. 	United States v. Lewis,
732 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2013). 	The requesting
jurisdiction does not take the prisoner into custody,
because he is already in custody; rather, it is
directed to the individual's custodian. 	Id. 	The
custodian does not relinquish primary jurisdiction
over the prisoner — instead, he is, in effect,
“borrowed” by the requesting jurisdiction. 	Smart v.
Warden, No. 13–cv–375–SM, [2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 9 of 18

10
hand, claims that the United States had primary jurisdiction
over him ever since April 14, 2009.
The State of Michigan had primary jurisdiction over Lewis
when he was arrested for the offense that resulted in the state
sentence from which he had paroled on April 3, 2007, and with
regard to which he remained on parole at the time of his April
14, 2009 arrest. 	Despite the statement of the MDOC that Lewis
was continuously serving his Michigan sentence during the period
relevant to this action, under federal law, Michigan
relinquished its primary jurisdiction by paroling Lewis in April
of 2007. 	See Elwell, 716 F.3d at 481 (identifying parole as an
event that results in the relinquishment of primary
jurisdiction). 	Michigan again obtained primary jurisdiction on
April 14, 2009, when Lewis was arrested on new state drug
charges. 	However, Michigan explicitly relinquished primary
jurisdiction when it dismissed those charges in conjunction with
releasing him to the custody of the USMS on April 16, 2009. 	See
id. (identifying dismissal of charges as an event that results
in the relinquishment of primary jurisdiction). 	Upon Lewis’s
88730, at *7,] 2014 WL 2940871, at *3 (D.N.H. June 30,
2014).
Murphy v. Cent. Falls Det. Facility Corp., No. C.A. 14–203 S,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183690, at *4 n.4, 2015 WL 1969178, at *4
n.4 (D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2014), R&R adopted, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
56723, at *6, 2015 WL 1969178, at *2 (D.R.I. Apr. 30, 2015).
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 10 of 18

11
release from state custody, he was arrested by the federal DEA,
which established the primary jurisdiction of the United States.
Accordingly, when Lewis was sentenced in federal court, in
November of 2009, he was under the primary jurisdiction of the
United States.
To be sure, the record includes multiple representations to
the contrary. 	Specifically, BOP officials have characterized
Lewis’s custody as of April 16, 2009 as follows: (1) “BER/Supv
Corr Systems Spec” told Lewis that he was in “primary state
custody until the date of parole [i.e., May 11, 2010],” Pet. at
9; (2) Warden Tatum told Lewis that as of April 14, 2009, he was
“considered primarily state custody,” id. at 26; (3) Jose
Santana told Judge Jonker that when Lewis was sentenced for his
federal crime, he “was under the primary jurisdiction of state
authorities in Michigan,” Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Attach.
I, at 2; and (4) the BOP’s Administrator of National Inmate
Appeals, Ian Connors, told Lewis that as of April 14, he was
“still in the primary custody of the state of Michigan, pending
[his] parole violation case,” Pet. at 15. 	But all of those
statements either: (1) ignore the effect of Lewis’s April 2007
parole, which terminated the State of Michigan’s primary
jurisdiction over him; or (2) assume that the presumed April 14,
2009 filing of a parole violation, in and of itself, established
the State of Michigan’s primary jurisdiction.
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 11 of 18

12
Respondent has produced evidence that various BOP officials
believed that on April 14, 2009, Lewis’s “parole violation was
entered into the [MDOC] data system,” Pet. at 9, 26, or that “a
parole violation warrant was issued,” id. at 15. 	But respondent
has produced no evidence that, at any point before Lewis was
arrested by the DEA on April 16, any state or local law-
enforcement officer ever: (1) took Lewis into custody on the
parole violation as a result of the entry into the MDOC data
system; or (2) arrested him pursuant to a parole violation
warrant on him. 	In other words, while the record shows that
Lewis was arrested by local law-enforcement officers on a drug
charge, and that various state or local officials determined
that the conduct underlying that charge also constituted a
violation of the terms of Lewis’s parole, respondent has
produced no evidence that Lewis was ever taken into custody by
state law-enforcement officers for violating his parole. 	To the
contrary, the Michigan prosecutor explicitly released him from
state custody to federal custody on April 16, 2009. 	That
matters because primary jurisdiction is not established by a
criminal defendant’s conduct. 	A sovereign obtains primary
jurisdiction by taking a defendant into physical custody. 	See
Elwell, 716 F.3d at 481.
There is no evidence in the record before the court
demonstrating that Lewis was taken into custody for a parole
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 12 of 18

13
violation before he was released to the USMS and arrested by the
DEA. 	The State of Michigan could have taken Lewis into custody
for a parole violation before April 16, 2009, but primary
jurisdiction is established when a sovereign takes a person into
physical custody, see id., not when a defendant engages in
conduct that would permit a sovereign to take him into custody. 4
Instead, respondent has produced evidence that does show
that: (1) the jail that released Lewis to the USMS on April 16
did not know about the notice of a parole violation that had
been entered into Lewis’s MDOC record two days earlier; (2)
Lewis was handed over to state officials on December 29, 2009,
not to serve a sentence that had been imposed as a result of his
parole violation, but to face charges that he had violated his
parole; and (3) his parole was not actually revoked until
January 14, 2010. 	Thus, there is no evidence to support the
proposition that Lewis was in the custody of the State of
Michigan for a parole violation at any time before he was
released to the USMS and arrested by the DEA on April 16, 2009.
Respondent attempts to bolster the court of his position
concerning primary jurisdiction by asserting that Michigan state
authorities “inadvertently” transferred Lewis to the USMS
4 Respondent has produced evidence that Lewis’s parole was
revoked, but according to the letter from Jose Santana to Judge
Jonker, Lewis’s parole was revoked on January 14, 2010, long
after he had been released to the USMS.
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 13 of 18

14
without a writ of habeas corpus prosequendum, in error, and that
the State’s error did not cause the State to lose primary
jurisdiction. 	He supports that argument by citing several cases
in which erroneous releases by state officials did not result in
the relinquishment of primary jurisdiction. 	The problem with
respondent’s argument is that it rests upon the faulty premise
that, at the time of Lewis’s release to the USMS, Michigan had
primary custody of Lewis which, as discussed above, it did not.
An erroneous failure to obtain primary jurisdiction is very
different from an erroneous relinquishment of primary
jurisdiction, which was the issue in the cases respondent cites
in his brief.
For the reasons discussed herein, the undisputed factual
record does not establish that respondent is entitled to
judgment, as a matter of law, on the basis that the State of
Michigan retained primary jurisdiction over Lewis at any time
after April 16, 2009.
II. 	April 16, 2009 through January 1, 2010
Respondent’s fallback argument is that even if the United
States obtained primary jurisdiction over Lewis on April 16,
2009, his federal sentence could not have started running any
earlier than November 19, 2009, the date on which that sentence
was imposed. 	Lewis claims that he should receive credit against
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 14 of 18

15
his federal sentence for all the time he served in the custody
of the USMS from April 14, 2009, onward.
Citing Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir.
2011), respondent argues that “[t]he earliest date on which a
federal sentence can commence is the date on which the district
court imposes the sentence,” Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no.
14) 3, and that “a federal sentence can never begin before the
federal court imposes it,” id. at 8. 	Schleining, however, is
inapposite. 	In that case, “[t]he sole question for review [was]
whether a federal prisoner may receive [Good Conduct Time]
credit for time he served in state prison – discharging a state
sentence – before he was sentenced in federal court.” 	642 F.3d
at 1246-47 (emphasis in the original). 	Here, Lewis is not
seeking credit for time he served in state prison; as discussed
above, he is seeking credit for time he served in the custody of
the USMS, while he was under the primary jurisdiction of the
United States.
More importantly, respondent’s assertion that a federal
sentence can never begin before it is imposed is refuted by the
applicable federal statute which provides that:
[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on
the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence
service of sentence at, the official detention
facility at which the sentence is to be served.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). 	The statute then goes on to provide for
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 15 of 18

16
credit for prior custody. 	See § 3585(b). 	Section 3585(b)’s
provision for credit for prior custody is broad enough that,
under the proper circumstances, credit may be given for time
served prior to the imposition of a sentence. 	See, e.g.,
McClain v. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (“We hold that petitioner should be given credit on
the federal sentence for the time that he was on state parole,
from July 1, 1991, until the date of his sentence, October 11,
1991.”). 	Thus, Lewis is not precluded, as a matter of law, from
receiving credit against his federal sentence for time served in
the custody of the USMS before he was sentenced.
In short, the summary judgment record establishes that
Lewis was in primary state custody on April 14 and 15, 2009,
before he was arrested by the DEA and taken into USMS custody.
The summary judgment record, however, does not establish that
Lewis is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for
the time he served in the custody of the USMS between April 16,
2009 and January 1, 2010.
Additionally, while the parties have addressed Lewis’s
asserted entitlement to sentence credit for the period between
April 14, 2009 and December 29, 2009, they have not addressed
whether, if the court denies summary judgment and finds that
Lewis was in federal custody on and after April 16, 2009,
whether he remained in federal custody after December 29, 2009.
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 16 of 18

17
Accordingly, respondent cannot be said to have met his burden to
demonstrate that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law to the extent Lewis seeks credit against his federal
sentence for time he spent in custody between December 30, 2009
and January 1, 2010.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons above, respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, (Doc. No. 14) should be granted in part, to
the extent Lewis seeks credit against his federal sentence for
time spent in state custody on April 14 and 15, 2009, and
otherwise denied. 	Further, the district judge should grant the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and direct the BOP to
credit Lewis’s sentence for the time spent in custody between
April 16, 2009 and January 1, 2010, unless respondent can show
cause why the petition should not be granted or Lewis not be
credited as recommended, within fourteen days of the date of
this Report and Recommendation.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 17 of 18

18
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
January 30, 2018
cc: 	Darnell L. Lewis, pro se
Seth R. Aframe, Esq.
Case 1:16-cv-00188-LM Document 25 Filed 01/30/18 Page 18 of 18