Yoda v. FCI Berlin, Warden

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mashud Yoda
v. Case No. 21-cv-556-JL
FCI Berlin, Warden
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The respondent, the Warden of the Federal Correctional
Institution in Berlin, New Hampshire (“FCI Berlin”), moves for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 8) on Mashud Yoda’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Pet., Doc. No. 1;
Pet. Suppl., Doc. No. 6). Mr. Yoda, who is incarcerated at FCI
Berlin, Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 1), challenges a Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) disciplinary proceeding and decision that resulted in
the loss of good conduct time, as violative of his Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Specifically, Mr. Yoda challenges
that proceeding and decision on the following grounds: he did
not receive notice of what constituted prohibited behavior under
the relevant disciplinary code; he was innocent of the charged
offense, and so the discipline hearing officer (“DHO”) lacked
sufficient evidence to find him guilty; and the DHO demonstrated
partiality against him. See id. at 2–3; accord Pet’r’s Rebuttal
to His 2241 Pet. (hereinafter “Yoda Obj. I”) (Doc. No. 9 at 1).1
1 The court construes Mr. Yoda’s “Rebuttal to His 2241
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 1 of 17

2
The Warden disagrees, arguing that sufficient evidence
supported the DHO’s decision finding Mr. Yoda guilty of the
charged disciplinary offense, Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc.
No. 8 at 2–3), and Mr. Yoda failed to administratively exhaust
his claim on the DHO’s impartiality, id. at 4. Mr. Yoda filed
objections to the Warden’s motion. See Yoda Obj. I (Doc. No.
9); Yoda Obj. II (Doc. No. 11).
Because the Warden failed to address Mr. Yoda’s notice
claim, the district judge should direct the Warden to file a
motion for summary judgment on this issue. The DHO’s decision
was supported with sufficient evidence, however, and Mr. Yoda
failed to administratively exhaust his claim on the DHO’s
partiality, so the district judge should grant the Warden’s
motion for summary judgment, which addresses those two claims.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party
shows that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the mov[ing party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
Petition” (Doc. No. 9) and “Response to Motion for Summary for
Summary Judgement” (Doc. No. 11) as Objections to the Motion for
Summary Judgment and identifies those documents as “Yoda Obj. I”
and “Yoda Obj. II,” respectively. Cf. Foley v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 75–76 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)) (construing
liberally a pro se petitioner’s pleadings).
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 2 of 17

3
law.’” Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Mgmt., LLC, 964 F.3d 77,
87 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). “A genuine
dispute is ‘one that must be decided at trial because the
evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the [party
opposing summary judgment], would permit a rational factfinder
to resolve the issue in favor of either party.’” Id. (quoting
Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st
Cir. 1990)). The party opposing summary judgment “must adduce
specific facts showing that a trier of fact could reasonably
find in his favor,” Johnson v. Johnson, 23 F.4th 136, 141 (1st
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brader v.
Biogen Inc., 983 F.3d 39, 53 (1st Cir. 2020)), and “cannot rely
on ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation’” when doing so, id. (quoting Brader,
983 F.3d at 53; Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8).
When considering summary judgment motions, to “determin[e]
if a genuine dispute of material facts exists,” Taite v.
Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir.
2021), the court “‘look[s] to all of the record materials on
file, including the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits’
without evaluating ‘the credibility of the witnesses or weighing
the evidence,’” id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Ahmed v.
Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 495 (1st Cir. 2014)). When reviewing
these materials, the court “read[s] the facts in the light most
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 3 of 17

4
favorable to the [party opposing summary judgment] and grant[s]
all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Lachance v. Town of
Charlton, 990 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2021).
II. Background
Mr. Yoda challenges a DHO decision finding him guilty of
improperly using a security device, in violation of BOP
Prohibited Act Code (“Code”) 208, after he rang the duress alarm
in his cell to obtain a cup for water to take his anti-anxiety
medication. See Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2); see also Resp’t’s Mot.
for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8 at 1). Code 208 forbids “destroying,
altering, interfering with, improperly using, or damaging any
security device, mechanism, or procedure.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.3
tbl.1. Mr. Yoda’s version of events giving rise to this
disciplinary action differs from that presented by the BOP; at
this stage, the court “read[s] the facts in the light most
favorable to” Mr. Yoda. See Lachance, 990 F.3d at 20.
On January 1, 2021, at approximately 4:36 p.m., BOP Officer
Chadderton “was escorting medical staff” through FCI Berlin when
he responded to a duress alarm coming from Mr. Yoda’s cell.
Incident Report, Jan. 1, 2021, Attach. to Ex. E to Resp’t’s Mot.
for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 ¶ 11). Officer Chadderton did
not bring any medical staff member with him while responding to
the duress alarm. Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2); cf. Incident Report
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 4 of 17

5
(Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 ¶ 11) (omitting any mention of medical staff
accompanying the officer to Mr. Yoda’s cell). Mr. Yoda
explained to Officer Chadderton that he needed a cup for water
to take his medication, of which he was “in dire need” because
he was suffering from “suicidal thoughts.” Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at
2); Pet. Suppl. (Doc. No. 6 at 1). But see Incident Report
(Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 ¶ 11) (omitting from the officer’s report any
mention by Mr. Yoda of suicidal ideation or medication).
Officer Chadderton indicated to Mr. Yoda that needing a cup
did not qualify as a medical emergency and “any further improper
use of his duress alarm would lead to further similar incident
reports.” Incident Report (Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 ¶ 11); accord Pet.
(Doc. No. 1 at 1). Mr. Yoda countered, “[T]his is an
emergency.” Incident Report (Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 ¶ 11). In the
Incident Report that followed, Officer Chadderton wrote that he
“verif[ied] that inmate Yoda was not under any legitimate duress
and was not having a legitimate medical emergency that posed a
risk to his safety or that of his cellmate . . . .” Id.
Officer Chadderton issued an Incident Report on January 1,
2021 at 5:15 p.m., id. at ¶ 13, and staff delivered it to Mr.
Yoda by 6:20 p.m., id. at ¶ 16. Two days later, on January 3,
2021, Mr. Yoda went before the Unit Disciplinary Committee
(“UDC”). Id. at ¶¶ 17, 21. Mr. Yoda told the UDC that he
pulled the duress alarm because he “didn’t have a cup to take
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 5 of 17

6
[his] meds for anxiety.” Id. at ¶ 17. Given the severity of
the charge, the UDC automatically referred Mr. Yoda’s
disciplinary matter to the DHO, id. at ¶¶ 18(B), 19; Decl. of
Nichole Hayden, DHO (hereinafter DHO Decl.) (Doc. No. 8-1 at 3
¶ 9), and recommended loss of good conduct time and email
privileges as a sanction, if the DHO found that Mr. Yoda
committed the charged offense, Incident Report (Doc. No. 8–6 at
1 ¶ 20).
On January 12, 2021, DHO Nichole Hayden conducted a hearing
on the charge against Mr. Yoda. DHO Report, Jan. 15, 2021,
Attach. to Ex. I to Resp’t’s Mot. to Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8-10 at
1 ¶ I(B)); DHO Decl. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 1 ¶ 1). At that hearing,
Mr. Yoda verbally denied the charge, explaining that he “wasn’t
thinking straight” when he rang the alarm to ask for a cup. DHO
Report (Doc. No. 8-10 at 1 ¶ III(A)–(B)); accord DHO Decl. (Doc.
No. 8-1 at 3 ¶ 12). In a written statement to DHO Hayden, Mr.
Yoda elaborated on his state of mind at the time he hit his
duress alarm. See Pet’r’s Statement to DHO, Jan. 1, 2021,
Attach. to Ex. K to Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8-12).
He said that, earlier on the day of the incident, BOP staff
changed his cell, and, in the process, someone disposed of his
cup. Id. at 1. Within a few hours, he needed to take his
medication but no longer had the cup that he usually used. Id.
He felt like harming himself and rang the duress alarm when he
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 6 of 17

7
saw medical staff walk by his cell, seeking the attention of a
medical professional for what he perceived as a medical
emergency. See id. Mr. Yoda believed that, when he rang the
duress alarm under these circumstances, he was obeying
directions from his psychologist regarding his mental health
concerns and the prison rules. Id. at 2.
Mr. Yoda requested a witness, prisoner Hector Velez, for
his disciplinary hearing. DHO Report (Doc. No. 8-10 at
¶ III(C)(4)). Mr. Velez submitted a written statement, saying
that Mr. Yoda “was asking [the] officer for [a] cup so he could
take his meds promply (sic),” Velez Statement, Attach. to Ex. J
to Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8-11); accord DHO Report
(Doc. No. 8-10 at 2 ¶ V). When DHO Hayden considered this
statement, she noted in her written report that Mr. Velez was
not Mr. Yoda’s cellmate, and that Mr. Yoda did not call his
cellmate as a witness. DHO Report (Doc. No. 8-10 at 2 ¶ V).
In addition to evaluating Mr. Yoda’s and Mr. Velez’s
written statements, DHO Hayden took into account Officer
Chadderton’s Incident Report, statements Mr. Yoda made during
the hearing, and a “supporting memorandum” submitted by another
BOP staff member, Officer Couture. Id. Officer Couture
corroborated that Officer Chadderton “verif[ied]” whether Mr.
Yoda “was having an emergency” before explaining “that [the]
duress alarm was for emergencies only.” Id.; accord Couture
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 7 of 17

8
Memo, Jan. 1, 2021, Attach. to Ex. F to Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ.
J. (Doc. No. 8-7). Officer Couture next heard Mr. Yoda say that
he was having “an emergency” and “need[ed] a cup.” DHO Report
(Doc. No. 8-10 at 2 ¶ V). At the hearing, DHO Hayden explained
to Mr. Yoda that, rather than ring the duress alarm for a cup,
he could have drunk water directly from the sink in his cell to
take his medication. See id.
DHO Hayden found, “based on the greater weight of the
evidence, that being the written account of the incident and
evidence provided,” id. at 3 ¶ V, that Mr. Yoda “committed
prohibited act 208” by misusing a security device, id. at ¶ VII.
As a sanction for this behavior, Mr. Yoda lost seven days of
good conduct time and email privileges for one month. Id. at
¶ VI. Mr. Yoda received a copy of the DHO Report on January 15,
2021 at 9:20 a.m. Id. at ¶ IX.
Thereafter, Mr. Yoda filed administrative appeals
unsuccessfully challenging the DHO’s decision and resulting
sanctions. See Admin. Remedy Resp., May 6, 2021, Attach. to Ex.
L to Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 8-13 at 3) (denying
Regional Office appeal); Admin. Remedy Resp., May 11, 2021 (Doc.
No. 1 at 7) (denying Central Office appeal). In both appeals,
Mr. Yoda argued that DHO Hayden lacked sufficient evidence to
find him guilty of the charged Code violation as he presented
evidence at the hearing that supported his innocence based on
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 8 of 17

9
his belief that he pulled the alarm during a bona fide medical
emergency. See Reg’l Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-13 at 1–
2); Central Off. Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8–9).2 Mr.
Yoda also argued that he lacked notice as to what conduct
qualified as a medical emergency to avoid punishment under Code
208. See Reg’l Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-13 at 1);
Central Off. Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8).
III. Discussion
Mr. Yoda contends that the DHO’s findings against him
violated his due process rights on three grounds: (A) he did not
have notice of what constituted prohibited conduct, (B) he did
not commit the infraction with which he was charged and so the
DHO lacked sufficient evidence to find him guilty, and (C) the
DHO lacked impartiality. E.g., Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2–3); Yoda
Obj. I (Doc. No. 9 at 1).
A. Due Process for Disciplinary Proceedings
“[D]ue process requires procedural protections before a
prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in
2 The Warden also filed a copy of Mr. Yoda’s Central Office
Administrative Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-14), labeled “Third
Copy: Warden’s Administrative Remedy File.” Mr. Yoda attached a
copy of the appeal to his petition (Doc. No. 1), and his copy is
labeled “Original: Return to Inmate.” See Central Off. Admin.
Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8). The handwritten appeals are
slightly different, but because Mr. Yoda’s copy is date stamped
as received by the Administrative Remedy Section of the Federal
BOP, the court relies upon the copy he filed.
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 9 of 17

10
good time credits.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453
(1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). For a
BOP disciplinary hearing, these due process procedural
protections include “written notice of the charges at least
twenty-four hours in advance of the hearing,” Surprenant v.
Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at
564); “the ability to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence,” id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566); “an impartial
decisionmaker,” id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570–71); and “a
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on
and the reasons for the disciplinary action,” Hill, 472 U.S. at
454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67).
After a hearing, when a DHO disallows good time credits as
a penalty for a disciplinary violation, due process requires the
support of that decision by “some evidence in the record.” Id.
The DHO’s decision satisfies this standard when “any evidence in
the record” exists “that could support the conclusion reached
. . . .” Id. at 455–56. “The evidentiary requirement in
reviewing prison disciplinary actions is met even when the
evidence ‘might be characterized as meager’; it simply must not
be ‘so devoid of evidence as to make the findings of the
institution without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Brown v.
Kallis, No. 21-cv-920 (PJS/ECW), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92674, at
*27–28, 2022 WL 1652933, at *8 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2022) (quoting
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 10 of 17

11
Hill, 472 U.S. at 457; Flowers v. Anderson, 661 F.3d 977, 980
(8th Cir. 2011))), R&R adopted, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92665, at
*1, 2022 WL 1645666, at *1 (D. Minn. May 24, 2022).
“Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment
of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”
Hill, 472 U.S. at 456.
B. Mr. Yoda’s Due Process Claims
1. Notice of Violative Conduct
Mr. Yoda has argued in his administrative appeals and in
his filings before this court that he lacked notice of what
constituted a medical emergency that qualified him to ring his
duress alarm. See Reg’l Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-13 at
2); Central Off. Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8–9); Pet.
(Doc. No. 1 at 3); Yoda Obj. I (Doc. No. 9 at 1); Yoda Obj. II
(Doc. No. 11 at 2 ¶ 2). Because the Warden did not address this
argument in his motion for summary judgment, the district judge
should direct the Warden to file a motion for summary judgment
on this issue.
2. Sufficient Evidence
Throughout his disciplinary proceedings, administrative
challenges, and pleadings before this court, Mr. Yoda has argued
that he did not commit a Code 208 violation because he was
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 11 of 17

12
having a genuine medical emergency, see Pet’r’s Statement to DHO
(Doc. No. 8-12 at 1); Reg’l Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-13
at 1–2); Central Office Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8);
Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2, 3); Pet. Suppl. (Doc. No. 6 at 1); Yoda
Obj. I (Doc. No. 9 at 1); Yoda Obj. II (Doc. No. 11 at 1–2 ¶ 1,
2 ¶ 3, 2–4 ¶ 4), and, therefore, the DHO lacked sufficient
evidence to find Mr. Yoda guilty of the charged violation. The
DHO found Mr. Yoda guilty of “destroying, altering, interfering
with, improperly using, or damaging any security device,
mechanism, or procedure,” § 541.3 tbl.1, when he activated his
duress alarm to obtain a cup, rather than to notify FCI Berlin
staff that he was experiencing a bona fide medical emergency.
See DHO Report (Doc. No. 8-10 at 2–3 ¶ V); DHO Decl. (Doc. No.
8-1 at 3-4 ¶ 13).
To comport with Mr. Yoda’s due process rights, DHO Hayden
must have supported her decision with a “written statement . . .
of the evidence relied on” in reaching that decision. See Hill,
472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67). The
“evidence relied on” must amount to “some evidence,” id., a
standard met by pointing to “any evidence in the record” in
“support [of] the conclusion reached,” id. at 455–56. “Even
when there is substantial evidence to the contrary,” the DHO
“may find [an incident] report to be credible and therefore take
disciplinary action.” Brown, 2022 WL 1652933 at *8 (internal
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 12 of 17

13
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hrbek v. Nix, 12 F.3d 777, 781
(8th Cir. 1993)); Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (“The Federal
Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes
any conclusion but the one reached . . . .”).
DHO Hayden’s decision met this standard when she issued her
written report indicating the evidence upon which she relied to
support her conclusion that Mr. Yoda violated Code 208. See DHO
Report (Doc. No. 8-10 at 2–3 ¶ V). She noted that she
considered Officer Chadderton’s “written account of the
incident;” Officer “Couture’s supporting memorandum” on the
incident; Mr. Yoda’s “witness’[s] statement”; and statements
made by Mr. Yoda “to the investigating official,” “during [his]
UDC hearing,” and “during the DHO hearing,” as well as the
“handwritten statement” he submitted to the DHO. DHO Report
(Doc. No. 8-10 at 2 ¶ V); accord DHO Decl. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 3
¶ 13). Ultimately, she “found [Mr. Yoda’s] version of events —
specifically the allegation that he told Officer Chadderton that
he felt like harming himself or someone — was not credible when
weighed against the other evidence,” DHO Decl. (Doc. No. 8-1 at
4 ¶ 13), especially given that Mr. Yoda did not mention those
feelings during his UDC review and that those statements were
not supported by Officer Chadderton’s, Officer Couture’s, or Mr.
Velez’s statements. Id. DHO Hayden’s decision, therefore, was
supported by “some evidence in the record,” Hill, 472 U.S. at
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 13 of 17

14
454, in satisfaction of Mr. Yoda’s due process rights, even if
Mr. Yoda testified to the contrary, see id. at 457; Brown, 2022
WL 1652933 at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hrbek, 12 F.3d at 781).
Because “a trier of fact could [not] reasonably find” that
no evidence supported the DHO’s decision, see Johnson, 23 F.4th
at 141, a genuine dispute of material fact does not remain as to
whether sufficient evidence supported DHO Hayden’s determination
that Mr. Yoda misused his duress alarm, see Baum-Holland, 964
F.3d at 87. The district judge should, therefore, grant the
Warden’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
3. DHO’s Partiality
Mr. Yoda suggests that DHO Hayden failed to act as “an
impartial decisionmaker,” Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 16 (citing
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570–71), because of her preexisting
relationships with staff at FCI Berlin in her prior role as a
lieutenant, see Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2); see also DHO Decl. (Doc.
No. 8-1 at 1 ¶ 1). The Warden argues that Mr. Yoda failed to
administratively exhaust this claim. Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J.
(Doc. No. 8 at 4). Based on the record provided by both
parties, the Warden is entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
“In general, a § 2241 petitioner must exhaust available
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 14 of 17

15
administrative remedies before [he] can obtain relief in federal
court.” Shorter v. Warden, 803 F. App’x 332, 336 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474–75
(11th Cir. 2015)); accord Millhouse v. Lewisburg, 666 Fed. App’x
98, 100 (3rd Cir. 2016) (citing Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3rd Cir. 1996)). “Proper exhaustion
requires that a petitioner assert an issue or claim at every
administrative level.” Millhouse, 666 Fed. App’x at 100 (citing
Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761). When challenging the outcome of a BOP
disciplinary proceeding, a federal prisoner must raise his
claims in regional and central office appeals. Id.; accord 28
C.F.R. §§ 542.14(d)(2), 542.15.
Mr. Yoda first alleged that DHO Hayden lacked impartiality
in his petition before this court. See Pet. (Doc. No. 1 at 2–
3). This claim does not appear in either of his administrative
appeals. See Reg’l Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 8-13 at 1–2);
Central Off. Admin. Remedy Appeal (Doc. No. 1 at 8–9). Mr.
Yoda, therefore, failed to administratively exhaust his claim
that DHO Hayden was biased against him. See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 542.14(d)(2), 542.15; Millhouse, 666 Fed. App’x at 100. For
this reason, the district judge should grant the Warden’s motion
for summary judgment on this claim.
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 15 of 17

16
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should grant
the Warden’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 8) on Mr.
Yoda’s claims that the DHO lacked sufficient evidence to find
him guilty of a Code 208 violation and that the DHO was biased
against him. The district judge should also issue the following
order:
The respondent is granted leave to file a
properly supported motion for summary judgment
addressing Mr. Yoda’s claim alleging that he did not
have adequate notice of what constituted prohibited
conduct under Code 208 and, therefore, that the guilty
finding by the DHO and resulting loss of good conduct
time violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.
The summary judgment motion is due thirty days after
the issuance of the Order approving this Report and
Recommendation.
Mr. Yoda is granted thirty days to respond to the
Warden’s motion for summary judgment regarding his
notice claim.
If this Report and Recommendation is not
approved, the Court will issue a separate procedural
order at that time.
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 16 of 17

17
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016). “Only
those issues fairly raised by the objections to” this Report and
Recommendation “are subject to review in the district court and
those not preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.”
Id. (citations omitted).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
July 14, 2022
cc: Mashud Yoda, pro se
Seth R. Aframe, Esq., U.S. Attorney’s Office
Case 1:21-cv-00556-JL Document 14 Filed 07/14/22 Page 17 of 17