Reliant Life Sciences, LLC v. AGC Biologics et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Reliant Life Sciences, LLC
v. 	Case No. 1:22-cv-137-SE
AGC Biologics, Inc. and
Daigle Computer Systems, Inc.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Reliant Life Sciences, LLC (“Reliant”), a staffing services
company, filed suit against its former client, AGC Biologics,
Inc. (“AGC”), and its former consultant, Daigle Computer
Systems, Inc. (“Daigle”). 	After facilitating a working
relationship between AGC and Daigle, Reliant claims that AGC and
Daigle violated the terms of their respective agreements with
Reliant and made related misrepresentations to continue a
working relationship without Reliant. 	On October 25, 2022, AGC
was dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 	(Doc. No. 17).
Daigle, however, failed to respond to Reliant’s complaint, and
on November 7, 2022, the Clerk of Court entered default against
it. 	(Doc. No. 18). 	Before the court for recommendation as to
disposition is Reliant’s motion for default judgment against
Daigle (Doc. No. 19) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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55(b)(2).1 	For reasons explained below, the court recommends
that Reliant’s motion be granted and that damages be awarded in
the amount of $109,404.80.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party moves for a default judgment under Rule
55(b)(2), the court “may examine a plaintiff's complaint, taking
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, to determine
whether it alleges a cause of action.” 	Ramos-Falcon v.
Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 301 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002).
The defaulting party is “taken to have conceded the truth of the
factual allegations in the complaint.” 	Ortiz-Gonzalez v.
Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2002). 	Admitting the truth
of the factual allegations, however, “does not admit the legal
sufficiency of [the] claims.” 	10 James W. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice § 55.32[1][b] (3d ed. 2013). 	For that reason,
1 Reliant moves for default judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 55(b)(1) and claims its damages are for a sum
certain, but as explained below, because Reliant seeks
attorneys’ fees and treble damages under the New Hampshire
Consumer Protection Act, RSA 358-A, the court must analyze its
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). 	See,
e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins.
Fund v. Phils HVAC, Inc., No. 21-cv-10680-ADB, 2021 WL 4594925,
at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 6, 2021) (noting Plaintiffs must
utilize Rule 55(b)(2) because the reasonableness of their
request for attorneys' fees requires judicial review); Merullo
v. Greer, No. 11–cv–116–SM, 2012 WL 832832, at *3, 5 (D.N.H.
Feb. 10, 2012) (applying Rule 55(b)(2) and requiring proof of
damages under RSA 358-A).
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the court reviews the admitted facts in light of the elements of
the claims pleaded before entering a default judgment. 	Sampson
v. Lambert, 903 F.3d 798, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2018); Neff v.
Mediation Processing Servs., LLC, No. 21-CV-310-JL, 2021 WL
7082838, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 27, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-310-JL, 2021 WL 7082833
(D.N.H. Oct. 14, 2021).
BACKGROUND
By virtue of its default, Daigle concedes the following
facts alleged in Reliant’s complaint. 	Reliant, a New Hampshire
limited liability company, provides staffing services to client
companies in the biotechnology, medical device, and
pharmaceutical industries. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1, ¶ 7).
These client companies enter into service agreements with
Reliant in order to utilize Reliant’s consultants to fill
temporary vacancies on discrete projects. 	Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 	Reliant
separately enters into independent subcontractor agreements with
consultants, in which the consultants agree to provide services
to a particular client company, on behalf of Reliant, for a
specified period of time. 	Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
On September 28, 2021, Reliant entered into an Independent
Subcontractor Agreement (the “Agreement”) with Daigle, in which
Daigle agreed to perform certain services for Reliant’s client,
AGC, in exchange for payment. 	Id. ¶¶ 20-21; see also Agreement,
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Ex. 1 to Aff. Of James P. Harris (“Harris Aff.”) (Doc. No. 19-
3). 	Reliant and Daigle estimated that Daigle’s work for AGC
would commence in October 2021 and likely conclude one year
later. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1, ¶ 22). 	The Agreement required
Reliant to pay Daigle according to terms and rates set forth in
the parties’ related Statement of Work and based upon Daigle’s
hours submitted in a weekly timesheet, subject to approval by
AGC. 	Id. ¶ 23.
The Agreement also prohibited Daigle from: soliciting,
attempting to solicit, or accepting employment directly from
AGC; doing business with AGC, or persuading AGC to curtail or
limit its dealings with Reliant; or advising AGC of an
opportunity to obtain Daigle’s services from anyone other than
Reliant. 	Id. ¶ 24; see also Agreement, Ex. 1 to Harris Aff.
(Doc. No. 19-3, §3). 	The restrictive covenant remained in
effect during the term of the Agreement and for a period of one
year thereafter. 	Agreement, Ex. 1 to Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-
3, §3). 	In the event Daigle violated the restrictive covenant
provision, the terms of the Agreement required Daigle to pay
Reliant liquidated damages in the amount of $35,000.00 per
violation. 	Id.
On October 17, 2021, AGC separately accepted the terms of a
Master Service Agreement with Reliant and directed Daigle to
commence work for AGC. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1, ¶¶ 19, 26).
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Daigle began work for AGC on November 1, 2021 and submitted two
timesheets for work completed through November 15, 2021. 	Id. ¶¶
26-28. 	Reliant ultimately accepted both timesheets, without
rejection from AGC, and issued invoices to AGC for work
completed. 	Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. 	During Daigle’s second week of work,
however, AGC requested that Daigle stop work. 	Id. ¶ 30.
Reliant complied with AGC’s request and instructed Daigle to
stop work. 	Id.
Yet, shortly thereafter, Daigle recommenced its work with
AGC through a different staffing company. 	Id. ¶ 33. 	Daigle’s
solicitation of AGC and acceptance of an opportunity to provide
services to AGC through another staffing company violated the
terms of Daigle’s Agreement with Reliant. 	Id. ¶ 35. 	Further,
Daigle misled Reliant to believe that Daigle was no longer
providing services to AGC on the project, when in fact, it
continued to perform services for AGC through another company.
Id. ¶¶ 70-71.
On March 15, 2022, Reliant initiated this action against
both AGC and Daigle in New Hampshire Superior Court, and AGC
removed the case to this court. 	(Doc. No. 1). 	Daigle was
served with a copy of the summons and complaint on April 4,
2022, and Reliant filed an affidavit of service on June 22,
2022. 	(Doc. No. 16). 	When Daigle did not file a response
within the time allowed, the Clerk of Court entered default
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against it. 	(Doc. No. 18). 	Reliant now moves for default
judgment as to Daigle. 	(Doc. No. 19).
DISCUSSION
Reliant brings four claims against Daigle: breach of
contract (Count II), interference with contract (Count IV),
civil conspiracy (Count V), and violation of RSA 358-A (Count
VI). 	All of Reliant’s claims seek damages based upon Daigle’s
breach of the parties’ Agreement and its related
misrepresentations. 	Reliant moves for default judgment on
Counts II and VI and seeks damages in the amount of $109,404.80,
reflecting liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees under the
parties’ Agreement, as well as treble damages pursuant to the
New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, RSA 358-A (the “CPA”).
I. 	Jurisdiction
“[W]hen judgment is sought against a party who has failed
to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an
affirmative duty to assure itself that it has jurisdiction over
both the subject matter and the parties.” 	Sun Life Assur. Co.
of Canada, (U.S.) v. Conroy, 431 F. Supp. 2d 220, 224 (D.R.I.
2006). 	Thus, the court must consider whether it has both
subject matter jurisdiction over this case and personal
jurisdiction over Daigle. 	Id.
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A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A federal court has original jurisdiction over a civil
state law claim when there is diversity of citizenship between
the parties and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 	28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). 	Here, both requirements are satisfied. 	Specifically,
Reliant is a citizen of New Hampshire, AGC is a citizen of
Washington, and Daigle is a citizen of Texas. 	See (Doc. No. 7-
1, ¶¶ 1-3); see also Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1, at 2-3). 	In
addition, Reliant sought monetary damages against Daigle and AGC
in the amount of at least $100,500.00, which does not include
Reliant’s request for treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 	See
Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1, at 5). 	Thus, based on this
court’s diversity jurisdiction, the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
“This court’s personal jurisdiction in state-law claims is
generally coextensive with New Hampshire state courts’ personal
jurisdiction.” 	Gagnon v. Gagnon, 621 F. Supp. 3d 229, 229
(D.N.H. Aug. 10, 2022) (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir.
2002)). 	“Personal jurisdiction usually is obtained over a
defendant by service of process.” 	Id. (quoting Farm Credit Bank
of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.
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2003)). 	Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, defendants may
waive personal jurisdiction by either failing to raise it or
through actions indicating that they acquiesce to the court's
jurisdiction. 	Vazquez-Robles v. CommoLoCo, Inc., 757 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 2014).
Reliant provided adequate proof of service as to Daigle.
(Doc. No. 16). 	Further, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement
between Reliant and Daigle, Daigle expressly consented to the
personal jurisdiction of New Hampshire state courts. 	See
Agreement, Ex. 1 to Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-3, §12). 	Thus, the
court concludes it has personal jurisdiction over Daigle.
II. 	Liability
A. Breach of Contract (Count II)
Under New Hampshire law, “a breach of contract occurs when
there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise
which forms the whole or part of a contract.” 	BAE Sys. Info.
and Elecs. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. SpaceKey Components, Inc.,
941 F. Supp. 2d 197, 213 (D.N.H. 2013) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 164 N.H. 659, 668
(2013)), aff'd, 752 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2014). 	Contracts
involving restrictive covenants, however, are disfavored under
New Hampshire law and construed narrowly. 	See Syncom Indus.,
Inc. v. Wood, 155 N.H. 73, 78 (2007). 	Nevertheless, a
restrictive covenant remains valid and enforceable “if the
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restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of
the case.” 	Id.
The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant “is a matter
of law for the court to decide.” 	Id. 	In determining the
reasonableness of the restrictive covenant, the court must
consider: “(1) whether the restraint is narrowly tailored to
protect the employer's legitimate interests; (2) whether its
restrictions impose an undue hardship on the employee; and (3)
whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest.”
PC Connection, Inc. v. Sillich, No. 22-cv-524-LM, 2023 WL
3393449, at *2 (D.N.H. May 11, 2023) (citing 	ACAS Acquisitions
(Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 155 N.H. 381, 388-89 (2007)).2
Based on the admitted allegations, Reliant sufficiently
demonstrates that Daigle breached the terms of its Agreement
with Reliant. 	Specifically, the terms of the Agreement between
Reliant and Daigle prohibited Daigle from: soliciting or
attempting to solicit employment from AGC; doing business with
AGC; persuading AGC to curtail or limit its dealings with
Reliant; or advising AGC of an opportunity to obtain Daigle’s
2 Although Daigle appears to be a subcontractor of Reliant,
as opposed to an employee, the court finds that the factors for
consideration are applicable in both instances. 	See TLS Mgmt.
and Mktg. Servs., LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo, 966 F.3d 46, 49, 57-
58 (1st Cir. 2020) (applying similar employer and employee
restrictive covenant considerations to the parties’
subcontractor agreement).
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services from anyone other than Reliant. 	Agreement, Ex. 1 to
Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-3, §3). 	In exchange, Reliant connected
Daigle to AGC and enabled Daigle to provide consulting services
to AGC on a project estimated to last for one year. 	Id.
Although Daigle initially performed under the terms of the
Agreement, it stopped work for AGC after two weeks, and then
shortly thereafter recommenced its work for AGC through another
staffing company. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1, ¶¶ 30, 33). 	Where
Daigle solicited AGC and continued a working relationship with
AGC without Reliant, Daigle’s conduct breached the terms of the
parties’ Agreement without legal excuse.
Because Daigle’s breach involves a restrictive covenant,
the court must also consider the reasonableness of the
restrictive covenant. 	First, the court finds the restraint is
necessary to protect Reliant’s legitimate business interests,
including confidential information and “contacts developed
during the employment.” 	See Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n
v. Forbes, 142 N.H. 440, 443 (1997). 	Second, the restrictive
covenant is reasonably limited in time and space, where the
period of enforceability is the term of the Agreement and one
year thereafter and the restriction concerns only Daigle’s
working relationship with AGC. 	See ACAS Acquisitions, 155 N.H.
at 38 (noting that the restrictive covenant must be limited to
the scope of the employee’s customer contacts); Concord
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Orthopaedics, 142 N.H. at 444 (holding that a two-year duration
for a restrictive covenant is reasonable). 	Third, the
restrictive covenant comports with the public interest “in the
enforcement of legally enforceable contracts . . . .” 	PC
Connection, Inc., 2023 WL 3393449, at *4. 	Similarly, the
limited scope of the restrictive covenant does not unduly
interfere with any public interest in consumer choice. 	Id. 	For
these reasons, the court finds the restrictive covenant is
reasonable and enforceable. 	Accordingly, where Reliant
demonstrated that Daigle breached the provision without legal
excuse, the district judge should enter default judgment against
Daigle on Reliant’s breach of contract claim.
B. Violation of RSA 358-A (Count VI)
The CPA prohibits “any unfair method of competition or any
unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade
or commerce within this state.” 	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 358–A:2.
When a party complains of commercial conduct that is not
specifically delineated under the CPA, the court applies the
“rascality test” to determine whether the conduct is “covered by
the CPA.” 	Beer v. Bennett, 160 N.H. 166, 171 (2010) (quotation
and brackets omitted). 	“The test requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant’s acts attained a level of rascality that
would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble
of the world of commerce.” 	Id. (quotation omitted).
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While a breach of contract, on its own, fails to state a
claim under the CPA, “a defendant who induces the plaintiff to
enter a contract based on a knowing misrepresentation of the
promisor's intent to perform under the contract violates the
Consumer Protection Act.” 	Campbell v. CGM, LLC, No. 15–cv–088–
JD, 2017 WL 78474, at *12 (D.N.H. Jan. 9, 2017) (quoting Moulton
v. Bane, No. 14-cv-265-JD, 2016 WL 1091093, at *12 (D.N.H. Mar.
21, 2016)). 	In addition, “misrepresentations made by a
defendant in an ongoing effort to avoid performing under an
agreement, when the defendant did not intend to perform, also
violate the CPA.” 	Id. (quoting Moulton, 2016 WL 1091093, at
*12).
In HCC Specialty Underwriters, Inc. v. Woodbury, No. 16–cv–
501–LM, 2017 WL 2389522 (D.N.H. June 1, 2017), the court denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s CPA claim based on
allegations similar to those of Reliant. 	Id. at *3.
Specifically, the court held that to the extent one defendant
never intended to honor the non-competition provisions in the
parties’ agreement or made misrepresentations to avoid
performing under the agreement, plaintiff could have a viable
CPA claim. 	Id. 	As to the other defendant, the court held that
allegations concerning interference with plaintiff’s business
relationships and good will with clients were also sufficient to
avoid dismissal of plaintiff’s CPA claim. 	Id.
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Reliant asserts that Daigle misled Reliant to believe that
the AGC project was terminated and that Daigle was no longer
performing consulting services for AGC. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1,
¶¶ 30, 33). 	Contrary to these representations, Daigle resumed
its work with AGC but through another staffing company. 	Id. ¶¶
33, 70-71. 	Thus, Daigle made misrepresentations to avoid
performing its obligations under the terms of the Agreement and
interfered with Reliant’s business relationships. 	See Woodbury,
2017 WL 2389522, at *3. 	Accordingly, the court finds that
Reliant has sufficiently demonstrated that Daigle’s conduct
violated the CPA, and therefore, it recommends that the district
judge enter default judgment against Daigle on Reliant’s CPA
claim.
III. 	Damages3
In the case of defaulting defendants, “the amount of
damages are not necessarily established as a result of the
default.” 	Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 4 v. Stanley
Excavation, 243 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Me. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Rather, allegations of damages “must be established by proof
unless the damages involve a sum certain or are for
3 The court did not hold a hearing on damages. 	Rule
55(b)(2) “makes an evidentiary hearing an available tool, not a
prerequisite, to the determination of a damage award.”
AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 429, 436 (1st Cir.
2015).
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liquidated damages.” 	Id. (quotation omitted). 	Where a party
seeks to recover both a sum certain and damages that require
judicial determination under Rule 55(b)(2), “the entire matter,
including the sum certain, must be determined under Rule
55(b)(2).” 	Id. at 27 n.5 (citing Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care
Ctrs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 262, 268 (D.R.I.1999) (“A case is either
for a ‘sum certain’ or not. A party must choose one of the two
procedures offered by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) . . . .”),
aff'd, 236 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.2001)). 	The reasonableness of
attorneys’ fees and treble damages under the CPA require
judicial review. 	Id.; see also Phils HVAC, 2021 WL 4594925, at
*2; Merullo, 2012 WL 832832, at *3 (applying Rule 55(b)(2) and
requiring proof of damages under RSA 358-A).
Reliant seeks to recover: (1) liquidated damages under the
Agreement; (2) treble damages under RSA 358-A; and (3)
attorneys’ fees and costs under the Agreement and/or RSA 358-A.
Accordingly, the court must analyze Reliant’s request for
damages under Rule 55(b)(2).
A. Contractual Liquidated Damages
A liquidated damages clause is valid when: “(1) the damages
anticipated as a result of the breach are uncertain in amount or
difficult to prove; (2) the parties intended to liquidate
damages in advance; and (3) the amount agreed upon is reasonable
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and not greatly disproportionate to the presumable loss or
injury.” 	Holloway Auto. Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 9-10
(2011). 	To determine whether the amount is reasonable, the
court considers “whether the amount was a reasonable estimate of
difficult-to-ascertain damages at the time the parties agreed to
it.” 	Id. (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). 	In
addition, the court asks whether “actual damages are easily
ascertainable after a breach.” 	Id. (quotation omitted). 	If the
damages are easily ascertainable, the court must then determine
whether the stipulated amount is “unreasonable and grossly
disproportionate to the actual damages from a breach.” 	Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, the Agreement provides that if Daigle violates any
part of the restrictive covenant provision, Daigle “will pay to
Reliant, for each occurrence, the sum of $35,000.00 as
liquidated damages.” 	Agreement, 	Ex. 1 to Aff. of James P.
Harris, (Doc. No. 19-3, § 3). 	The record demonstrates that the
parties intended to liquidate damages in advance, and even
assuming damages would be ascertainable, the court finds that
the amount of $35,000 is reasonable given Daigle’s hourly rate
of $100.00 and the fact that Daigle performed only two weeks of
work, when the contract contemplated at least one year of work.
See also Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1, at 5) (estimating 2,000
hours of work by Daigle and gross revenue between $333,000.00
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and $400,000.00). 	Accordingly, the court finds that the
liquidated damages provision is valid and enforceable. 	Based on
Daigle’s violation of the restrictive covenant provision, the
court recommends that Reliant be awarded liquidated damages in
the amount of $35,000.00.
B. Treble Damages Under the RSA 358-A
Any person injured by a CPA violation “may bring an action
for damages . . . .” 	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10. 	A
prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover “the amount of
actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater.” 	Id. 	If the
court finds that the violation was a “willful or knowing
violation of [the CPA], it shall award as much as 3 times, but
not less than 2 times, such amount.” 	Id.
Reliant submits that Daigle’s conduct was a willful and
knowing violation of the CPA because Daigle misled Reliant to
believe that Daigle was no longer providing services to AGC on
the project. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 7-1, ¶¶ 70-71). 	Yet, shortly
after being directed to stop work for AGC, Daigle recommenced
its work for AGC through another staffing company, performing
the same work on the same project. 	Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-2,
¶¶ 10-11). 	The court is persuaded that the admitted conduct of
Daigle supports a willful violation of the CPA. 	Accordingly,
the court recommends that the district judge award Reliant
treble damages in the total amount of $105,000.00.
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C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Reliant is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs under the express terms of the parties’ Agreement. 	See
Agreement, Ex. 1 to Aff. Of James P. Harris (“Harris Aff.”)
(Doc. No. 19-3, § 12) (“[Daigle] agrees to pay all costs and
expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) incurred by
Reliant in connection with any dispute between the parties in
connection with Timesheets, Invoices, Services, or this
Agreement.”); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10
(permitting the court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees).
“The lodestar approach is the method of choice for
calculating fee awards.” 	Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 638
(1st Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 	Under this approach, a
district court first “calculate[s] the number of hours
reasonably expended by the attorneys for the prevailing party,
excluding those hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary.’” 	Cent. Pension Fund of the Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs v. Ray Haluch Gravel
Co., 745 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 	The court then determines
“a reasonable hourly rate or rates — a determination that is
often benchmarked to the prevailing rates in the community for
lawyers of like qualifications, experience, and competence.”
Id. (citation omitted). 	Multiplying the results of these two
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inquiries yields the lodestar amount. 	Id. 	The court may then
adjust the potential award based on factors not captured in the
lodestar calculation. 	See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 ; Coutin v.
Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1997).
“The party seeking the [fee] award has the burden of producing
materials that support the request.” 	Hutchinson ex rel. Julien
v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433).
In support of its request for fees, Reliant’s counsel
submitted a copy of its invoices for the matter. 	See Ex. 3 to
the Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-5). 	The court reviewed these
invoices and is satisfied that the time expended by Reliant’s
counsel in preparing the complaint and the motion for default
judgment was reasonable. 	The time entries appear to relate to
necessary work and do not appear duplicative. 	In addition,
these tasks were primarily performed by an associate at a
prevailing rate. 	Harris Aff. (Doc. No. 19-2, ¶ 13). 	To ensure
that the fee award concerns only work product related to Daigle,
Reliant’s counsel proposes an award of 50% of time and fees
expended on the complaint and an award for all time and fees
expended in connection with the default judgment motion.
Finally, as to costs, Reliant seeks reimbursement of 50% of the
filing fee of the complaint and all costs associated with
serving Daigle. 	In sum, the court finds Reliant’s proposal for
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fees and costs to be reasonable and recommends that the district
judge award Reliant fees and costs in the amount of $4,223.50.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that the
district judge: (1) grant Reliant’s motion for default judgment
(Doc. No. 19) as to its claims for breach of contract (Count II)
and violation of RSA 358-A (Count VI); (2) award Reliant damages
in the amount of $109,404.80; and (3) dismiss the remaining
claims against Daigle (Counts IV and V) as moot.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Only those issues raised in the objection to this
Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the district
court. 	See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Natl Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). 	Any issues not preserved by such
objection(s) are precluded on appeal. 	See id. 	Failure to file
any objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court's order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
May 23, 2023
cc: 	Counsel of record
Case 1:22-cv-00137-SE Document 20 Filed 05/23/23 Page 19 of 19