Snow v. BeyondTrust Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Kyle Snow,
Plaintiff
v. 	Case No. 25-cv-548-SM-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 114
BeyondTrust Corporation,
Defendant
O R D E R
Kyle Snow brings this action against his former employer,
BeyondTrust. 	In his original complaint, Snow advanced two
claims: first, that BeyondTrust interfered with his right to
take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
(count one); and, second, that BeyondTrust then terminated his
employment in retaliation for having taken FMLA leave (count
two). 	By prior order (document no. 14), the court dismissed
count one for failure to state a viable claim (since Snow
concedes that BeyondTrust afforded him full FMLA leave).
Although count two similarly failed to set forth the essential
elements of a viable claim, the court allowed Snow the
opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the
shortcomings noted by the court and to properly articulate a
viable retaliation claim.
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Snow has filed an Amended Complaint (document no. 15) and
BeyondTrust has again moved to dismiss, asserting that the
amended complaint, like its predecessor, fails to state the
essential elements of a viable claim. 	For the reasons
discussed, that motion is granted.
Standard of Review
As noted in the court’s prior order, to survive defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the amended complaint must include well-pled
(i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) factual allegations as
to each of the essential elements of a viable claim that, if
assumed to be true, allow the court to draw the reasonable and
plausible inference that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
sought. 	See Tasker v. DHL Retirement Savings Plan, 621 F.3d 34,
38-39 (1st Cir. 2010).
Background
Accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true - as
the court must at this juncture - the relevant background is as
follows. 	Snow worked for BeyondTrust for approximately seven
years as a technical support engineer. 	He performed his job
well and each year he received a merit-based salary increase.
In 2023, he suffered from serious mental health issues and
required medical leave. 	In September of that year, he applied
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for leave under defendant’s FMLA and short term disability
policies. 	That request was processed through Symetra,
BeyondTrust’s leave administrator, and Snow was approved for
FMLA leave for the twelve-week period extending from September
14 through December 6, 2023. 	Amended Complaint (document no.
15) at para. 32. 	On November 2, 2023, Snow was reminded that
his FMLA leave would expire in about four weeks and unless he
was approved for additional leave or on an excused absence, he
would likely be expected to return to work on that date. 	See
Email entitled “Exhaustion of Leave” from Symetra to Kyle Snow
(document no. 9-3).
On December 7, 2023, after Snow’s FMLA leave had expired,
BeyondTrust’s leave of absence administrator, Rakeyla Young,
contacted Snow about his return to work. 	She noted that Snow’s
medical providers had not yet released him to work and she asked
about Snow’s anticipated return. 	She also requested additional
medical information from his healthcare providers. 	Amended
Complaint at paras. 37-39. 	See also Email from Rakeyla Young to
Snow (Dec. 7, 2023) (document no. 1-3). 	Ms. Young also
recommended that Snow explore the availability of long-term
disability since “your healthcare provider hasn’t released you
to return and is extending your leave past the supported time of
short-term disability.” 	Id. 	Finally, she told Snow that she
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would inform BeyondTrust’s human resources administrator of
their conversation to “figure out the next steps as a company.”
Id.
According to Snow, later that day (December 7), he
contacted Ms. Young and informed her that:
after meeting with his primary care provider, the
provider believed Plaintiff should be reassessed in
approximately six weeks following an adjusted
treatment plan, while also allowing for updates if an
earlier time could work.
Plaintiff stated that he had provided the return-to-
work paperwork to his provider and that the provider
expected to have it completed by the end of the next
business day.
Plaintiff also stated, “In terms of the next steps of
advice within the company I will await your updates.”
Amended Complaint at paras. 45-47. 	Thus, says Snow, he “did not
simply remain absent on his own initiative, refuse to return, or
ignore work.” 	Id. at para. 48.
The following day (December 8, 2023), Snow’s healthcare
provider completed a work release form, stating that Snow was
not yet able to return to work and would need an additional six
weeks of leave beyond the expiration of his FMLA leave - that
is, through January 15, 2024. 	Amended Complaint at paras. 52-
53. 	See also Work Release Form (document no. 1-3) at 5.
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According to Snow, BeyondTrust “therefore knew, while deciding
what to do, that Plaintiff remained under active medical care
and had submitted updated medical documentation during a
temporary treatment and reassessment period.” 	Amended Complaint
at para. 56. 	There is, however, no suggestion anywhere in the
amended complaint that BeyondTrust approved (or that Snow even
sought) any additional medical leave beyond the expiration of
his FMLA leave on December 7, 2023. 	Nor is there any indication
that Snow inquired about the company’s long-term disability
policy, or that he sought any sort of accommodation. 	He simply
represented (through his medical provider) that he could not
return to work for another six weeks.
On December 19, 2023 - twelve days after Snow’s FMLA leave
had expired and while he remained unable to return to work -
BeyondTrust’s human resources representative contacted Snow and
told him that the company had decided to terminate his
employment. 	Amended Complaint at para. 57. 	Snow was told that
the decision to fire him was a “business decision only” and not
related to his performance. 	Id. at para. 58. 	He was also told
that BeyondTrust had “already waited long enough” for him to
return to work, the technical support team needed to hire
someone who could perform his duties immediately, and the
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company could not “work him back into the budget.” 	Id at para.
59.
The Family and Medical Leave Act
As discussed more fully in the court’s prior order, the
FMLA prohibits an employer from: (a) interfering with an
employee’s exercise of the statute’s substantive rights, and (b)
discriminating against an employee for having exercised those
rights. 	See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). 	See generally Pierce v. Alice
Peck Day Mem’l Hosp., No. CIV. 00-318-M, 2002 WL 467125, at *5
(D.N.H. Mar. 11, 2002) (“An employer may not interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise by employees of the rights
conferred by the FMLA, and may not discriminate against an
employee for having exercised those rights. 	Nor may employers
use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment
actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.”)
(citations and internal punctuation omitted). 	Importantly,
however, “although an employee who properly takes FMLA leave
cannot be discharged for exercising a right provided by the
statute, she nevertheless can be discharged for independent
reasons.” 	Henry v. United Bank, 686 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
2012). 	See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c) (“If the employee is
unable to perform an essential function of the position because
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of a physical or mental condition . . . the employee has no
right to restoration to another position under the FMLA.”).
Discussion
As noted above, Snow claims BeyondTrust retaliated against
him for having exercised his FMLA rights and used his invocation
of those rights as a factor in its decision to terminate his
employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). 	To prevail
upon an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that:
“(1) he availed himself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2)
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a
causal connection between that adverse action and his protected
conduct.” 	McMillen v. Concord Hosp., No. 12-CV-077-SM, 2014 WL
4715733, at *5 (D.N.H. Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Orta–Castro v.
Merck, Sharp & Dohme Quimica P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 113–14
(1st Cir. 2006)) (emphasis supplied).
As the court noted in its earlier order, the elements
listed above are those necessary to establish a prima facie
claim of FMLA retaliation. 	See, e.g., Carrero-Ojeda v.
Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755 F.3d 711, 719 (1st Cir.
2014). 	But, the court of appeals has made clear that a
“plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case at the pleading stage.” 	Id. 	Rather, “the elements
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of a prima facie case are useful as a prism to shed light upon
the plausibility of a plaintiff’s claim.” 	Id. (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). 	That is, to be sure, a subtle,
if not confusing, point. 	It is, however, sufficient to note
that to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging FMLA
retaliation must plausibly allege some causal connection between
an adverse employment action and their FMLA-protected conduct.
See, e.g., Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir.
2017); Haglund v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 3d
292, 298 (D. Mass. 2020).
Distilled to their essence, the facts alleged in the
Amended Complaint reveal that Snow asked for and was granted the
full 12 weeks of leave authorized under the FMLA; as the end of
his leave approached, BeyondTrust reminded him that he was
expected to return to work at the conclusion of that leave
(December 7); once that leave had expired, BeyondTrust noted
that his medical provider had not yet released him to return to
work and suggested he explore long-term disability; the
following day, Snow provided BeyondTrust with a letter from his
medical provider saying that he could not yet return to work and
needed an additional six weeks of leave; and, finally, roughly
10 days later after receiving that letter, BeyondTrust
terminated Snow’s employment.
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In support of the claim that his amended complaint
plausibly supports the inference that there was a causal
connection between his use of 12 weeks of FMLA leave and
BeyondTrust’s decision to fire him roughly two weeks after that
leave ended and he had still not returned to work, Snow says:
During the termination call, Defendant’s HR
representative, Cassie Wortendyke, told Plaintiff that
the decision was a “business decision only” and was
not based on performance.
During the same call, Defendant also told Plaintiff
that it had already “waited long enough” for him, that
the support team needed someone who could perform
support duties immediately, and that the company could
not “work [him] back into the budget.”
Those statements expressly referenced the amount of
time Plaintiff had been out and Defendant’s view that
it needed immediate coverage.
Defendant’s statement that it had already “waited long
enough” directly referenced Plaintiff’s leave-related
absence and supports a reasonable inference that
Plaintiff’s protected leave and leave-related status
were negative factors in the termination decision.
Amended Complaint at paras. 58-61. 	More specifically, Snow
argues:
A reasonable inference in Plaintiff’s favor is that
Defendant viewed the length of Plaintiff’s protected
leave and leave-related absence as a burden and used
it as a negative factor in the termination decision.
The phrase ‘waited long enough’ directly references
the time Defendant had been waiting for Plaintiff’s
return. 	Combined with Defendant’s statements that it
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needed someone immediately and could not work
Plaintiff back into the budget, the statement
plausibly supports causation.
Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum (document no. 17) at 2-3
(emphasis supplied). 	The court disagrees.
As BeyondTrust notes, Snow seems to conflate the concepts
of protected FMLA leave with unprotected post-FMLA “leave-
related absence” from work. 	The former cannot be considered by
an employer when making employment related decisions, while the
latter - that is, the inability to return to work following FMLA
leave - 	is certainly a factor that an employer can consider
when deciding whether or not to retain an employee. 	See, e.g.,
Bellone v. Southwick-Tolland Reg’l Sch. Dist., 748 F.3d 418,
424–25 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We have held that an employee is not
entitled to reinstatement under the FMLA if he is unable to
return to work until after the expiration of his leave.”); Brown
v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 235, 239 (D. Mass.
2019) (“An employee has no right to reinstatement, however, if
she does not return when her leave period expires.”); Green v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 128, 140 (D.
Me. 2002) (“By the same token there is no remedy under the FMLA
for Plaintiff’s termination, since Defendant had the right to
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terminate her once she did not return to work after her leave
had expired.”). 	See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c).
While Snow disputes the precise timing of his potential
ability to return to work, he unambiguously concedes that he was
unable to return to work at the conclusion of his FMLA leave
(and, in fact, never returned to work before BeyondTrust
terminated his employment). 	The only indication that he
provided to BeyondTrust of a potential return date was the Work
Release Form submitted by his medical provider saying,
unequivocally, that Snow was “unable to return to work until
1/15/24.” 	Work Release Form (document no. 1-3) at 5.1
1 	Snow now argues that the Work Release Form provided to
BeyondTrust was unclear or ambiguous. 	In support of that claim,
he has submitted a letter dated May 21, 2026, in which his
medical provider says the letter he authored more than two years
earlier in which he provided the January 15, 2024 return-to-work
date was not intended as an unambiguous statement of when Snow
could actually resume work. 	Instead, it was simply the date on
which Snow next had an appointment with the medical provider.
“If it was determined he could work sooner, updated paperwork
could have been provided. 	The time away from work was intended
to be temporary.” 	Letter from Adam Kurish, MD (document no. 17-
1). 	Of course, because that letter was not provided to
BeyondTrust until a few months ago (and not made a part of
Snow’s amended complaint), it has little probative value and
provides virtually no support for Snow’s claim that
BeyondTrust’s subjective intent was to retaliate against him for
taking FMLA leave, rather than its expressed intention to fill a
vacant employment position that Snow could not return to in a
timely manner.
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Aside from the temporal proximity between Snow’s having
taken FMLA leave and his subsequent discharge, the amended
complaint (like Snow’s original complaint) includes no factual
allegations arguably linking BeyondTrust’s decision to fire him
with his invocation of rights under the FMLA. 	As the court
noted in its earlier order, Snow’s amended complaint is similar
to that presented in Carrero-Ojeda, which the court of appeals
determined was subject to dismissal for failure to plausibly
allege a viable FMLA retaliation claim:
While temporal proximity is one factor from which an
employer’s bad motive can be inferred, by itself, it
is not enough — especially if the surrounding
circumstances undermine any claim of causation.
Carrero gives us no facts beyond the timing of her
discharge — e.g., no negative comments, complaints, or
expressions of reluctance by her superiors or co-
workers about her FMLA leave-taking, no discussion of
her FMLA leave status in performance reviews, etc. —
that would lead us to think that defendants took her
FMLA requests or leave status into account when
deciding to discharge her.
Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 720 (citations omitted).
Conclusion
According to the amended complaint, after Snow completed
his FMLA leave, he remained unable to return to work. 	And, his
treating medical provider informed BeyondTrust that he was
“unable to return to work until 1/15/24” - that is, nearly six
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weeks beyond the expiration of Snow’s FMLA leave. 	There is no
suggestion that BeyondTrust was unprepared to have Snow return
to his position at the conclusion of his FMLA leave. 	But, when
he was unable to do so, BeyondTrust made the “business decision”
to terminate his employment. 	Amended Complaint at para. 58. 	As
BeyondTrust explained to Snow, its support team “needed someone
who could perform support duties immediately.” 	Id. at para. 59.
The only plausible reading of the amended complaint suggests
that it was Snow’s inability to return to work at the end of his
FMLA leave that prompted BeyondTrust to terminate his employment
- not any retaliatory motive in response to Snow’s invocation of
his FMLA rights. 	Under such circumstances, an employer is
permitted to fire an employee.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
defendant’s legal memoranda (documents no. 16-1 and 18), Snow’s
amended claim that BeyondTrust retaliated against him for having
invoked his FMLA rights fails to plausibly allege the essential
elements of a viable claim. 	Necessarily, then, that claim must
be dismissed.
BeyondTrust’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
(document no. 16) is granted. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.
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SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
August 31, 2026
cc: 	Kyle Snow, pro se
Counsel of Record
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