Golfinopoulos et al v. HM Advisors LP et al

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OPINION AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AS SANCTIONS
APPEARANCES
RABINOWITZ, LUBETKIN & TULLY, LLC
Jonathan I. Rabinowitz, Esq.
Barry J. Roy, Esq.
293 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 100
Livingston, NJ 07039
Counsel to Plaintiffs
CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC
Sam Della Fera, Jr., Esq.
105 Eisenhower Parkway
Roseland, NJ 07068
Mediator
IBRAHIM AHMED LAW GROUP P.C.
Sergei Orel, Esq.
4105 US-1 South, Suite 2
Monmouth Junction, New Jersey 08853
Counsel to Defendants
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
In Re:
OLGA T. GOLFINOPOULOS and O.T.G. LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Debtor.
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OLGA 	T. 	GOLFINOPOULOS 	and 	O.T.G.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HM ADVISORS LP, CALEB WALSH, and JOHN DOE
AND JANE DOE NOS. 1 THROUGH 5 INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants.
Case No.: 23-21211 (VFP)
Chapter: 	11
Adv. Pro. No.: 25-01193 (VFP)
Judge: Vincent F. Papalia
FILED
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HONORABLE VINCENT F. PAPALIA
United States Bankruptcy Judge
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court pursuant to its December 8, 2025 Order: (I) Granting
Defendant Caleb Walsh’s Motion to Vacate Default on Conditions; (II) Denying as Moot
Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Entry of Default Judgment; and (III) Granting Related Relief (the
“December 8, 2025 Order”). Based on the failure of Defendants’ Counsel, Sergei Orel, Esq. of
Ibrahim Ahmed Law Group, P.C. (“Defendants’ Counsel”), to attend a scheduled mediation
session, a pre-trial conference and a hearing on Defendants’ Counsel’s own Motion to Vacate the
Entry of Default in this matter, the December 8, 2025 Order awarded sanctions against
Defendants’ Counsel, the Ibrahim Ahmed Law Group. P.C. (the “Ahmed Law Firm”), and in
favor of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Rabinowitz, Lubetkin & Tully, LLC (“Plaintiffs’ Counsel”), and the
Mediator, Sam Della Fera, Jr. (the “Mediator”), as follows:
(i) 	Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in applying for
Entry of Default;
(ii) 	Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in appearing at the
Hearing on December 2, 2025, at which Defendants’
Counsel failed to appear, even though it was the hearing
date for Defendant Caleb Walsh’s Motion;
(iii) 	Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in
connection with Defendant’s failure to appear at court-
ordered mediation and related correspondence prepared by
Plaintiffs’ attorneys in attempting to reschedule mediation,
but not the preparation of Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ mediation
statement; and
(iv) 	fees and expenses of the Mediator incurred in connection
with Defendant’s failure to appear at court-ordered
mediation and the related correspondence in attempting to
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reschedule mediation, and the Mediator’s attendance at the
hearing on December 2, 2025.
The December 8, 2025 Order allowed Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Rabinowitz, Lubetkin & Tully,
LLC, and the Mediator ten (10) days from its entry to file a Certification of Fees and Expenses
incurred in connection with the matters identified above and allowed Defendants’ Counsel ten
(10) days to object. That Order further provided that any such objection was limited to the
reasonableness of the fees and/or that the fees are not related to the identified matters. Plaintiffs’
Counsel timely filed a Certification seeking recovery of fees in the amount of $18,095.00 [Dkt.
No. 50]. The Mediator timely filed a Certification seeking recovery of fees in the amount of
$2,700.00 [Dkt. No. 53]. Defendants’ Counsel filed its objection to Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s
Certification of Fees on December 22, 2025 [Dkt. No. 54]. Defendants’ Counsel filed its
objection to the Mediator’s Certification of Fees on December 26, 2025 [Dkt. No. 55]. Plaintiffs’
Counsel filed a reply on December 30, 2025 [Dkt. No. 56].
II. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In accordance with this Court’s standard procedures in adversary proceedings such as this
one, the Court entered Orders: (i) scheduling pre-trial matters (the “Joint Scheduling Order”);
and (ii) an Order referring this matter to mediation, with Sam Della Fera, Jr., being appointed as
Mediator (the “Mediation Order”). These Orders were entered after early motion practice during
which the Court denied Plaintiffs’ application for a permanent and mandatory injunction and
efendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The mediation of this matter was scheduled for September 10, 2025 with the agreement
of all parties. See September 11, 2025, Letter from Mediator [Dkt. No. 29]. Plaintiffs submitted
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their mediation statement, but Defendant HM Advisors LP did not.1 	Neither Defendants’
Counsel nor Defendant appeared at the mediation session and 	failed to
respond to the Mediator’s “multiple emails” regarding Defendant’s attendance at the mediation
and its mediation statement. Id. By Defendants’ Counsel’s own admission, he did not respond to
the Mediator until September 19, 2025, “explaining” that he was on vacation and proposing a
new date for the mediation during the week of September 22, 2025. See October 9, 2025, Letter
from Defendants’ Counsel [Dkt. No. 32] at p. 1. The word “explaining” is placed in quotes
because the Court does not believe that an email sent nine (9) days after the scheduled mediation
is a valid or somehow excusable explanation, especially when Defendants’ Counsel previously
agreed to the September 10, 2025 date.
At around the same time as the September 19th 	email, Defendants’ Counsel apparently
had a telephone conversation with Plaintiff Olga Golfinopoulos’s sister. In that conversation, Ms.
Golfinopoulos allegedly made certain claims of fraud by her sister, Olga, that were not explained
or substantiated by Defendants at that time, or at any time in the four months since September
19, 2025. Id. at 2. Based on these unsubstantiated allegations, as to which no connection to this
adversary proceeding has been shown or much less proven, Defendants’ Counsel apparently
unilaterally determined that the “mediation was no longer necessary” and that he would ask the
Court to “cancel” it. Id. at 2 Ex. A and B. Like the unsubstantiated fraud allegations, this request
never came before the Court.
Defendants’ Counsel’s October 9, 2025 letter was written only after he also failed to
appear at the pre-trial conference scheduled for that day at 10:00 a.m., during which the
1 	The only original Defendant on this case was HM Advisors, LP (“HM”). Its principal, Caleb Walsh, was later
added by Plaintiffs in an Amended Complaint and Answer filed in response to Defendant HM’s Answer and
Counterclaim [Dkt. No. 26] 	The Ahmed Law Firm represents (or represented) both Defendants HM and Caleb
Walsh. Mr. Walsh had apparently not been served at the time of the scheduling of the mediation session.
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mediation was to be discussed. Though both Plaintiffs’ Counsel and the Mediator appeared at the
hearing, Defendants’ Counsel failed to do so and attempts by the Court and Plaintiffs’ Counsel to
reach him were unsuccessful. Just before Court concluded its calendar for the morning, and well
after the 10:00 a.m. start time for the pre-trial conference and this case was called, Defendants’
Counsel belatedly explained to the Court that he was unable to attend the hearing because he was
on trial until that morning. As an accommodation to Defendants’ Counsel, the Court rescheduled
the pre-trial hearing for late that afternoon (at 3:30 p.m.), at which Defendants’ Counsel again
failed to timely appear, even though the Mediator and Plaintiffs’ Counsel did. See 	Email
Exchange [Dkt. No. 33]. Defendants’ Counsel states he was on the call scheduled for 3:30 p.m.,
but not until 4:17 p.m. By then, the adjourned conference had concluded, and Plaintiffs’ Counsel
and the Mediator had left the hearing because Defendants’ Counsel had again failed to appear.
In the meantime, Third-Party Defendant Caleb Walsh, the principal of the Defendant HM,
failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ Third-Party Complaint despite it being served on Mr. Walsh and
HM’s counsel. [Dkt. No. 31]. Accordingly, Default was entered against Mr. Walsh on October 24,
2025 [Dkt. No. 37]. Without leave of Court, Defendants’ Counsel filed an Answer to the Third-
Party Complaint on behalf of Mr. Walsh on October 28, 2025. [Dkt. No. 40]. On the same date,
Defendants’ Counsel also filed an “Opposition to Entry of Default and Motion to Vacate Entry of
Default” (the “Motion to Vacate”). [Dkt. No. 41]. The Motion to Vacate did not include a hearing
date 	as 	required by this Court’s Local Rules, so the Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion to
Vacate and the Cross-Motion subsequently filed by Plaintiffs to enter default judgment, for
December 2, 2025. See [Dkt. No. 42]. Inexplicably, Defendants’ Counsel failed to attend the
hearing on his own Motion and the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion on December 2, 2025.
Despite the unacceptable and unprofessional conduct of Defendants’ Counsel, the Court
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proceeded with the hearing on December 2nd 	and granted the Defendants’ Motion to Vacate,
subject to the sanctions imposed against Defendants’ Counsel pursuant to its December 8, 2025
Order, as noted above. Defendants’ Counsel opposed the fee award sought by Plaintiffs’
Counsel and the Mediator in a general and conclusory fashion, arguing
that the services for which sanctions are sought 	beyond the limited categories set forth in
the December 8, 2025 Order, and even more generally, that the fees must be “reasonable,
necessary and non-duplicative, compensatory and not punitive, and consistent with due process
and fundamental fairness.” See Objection to Professional Fees [Dkt. No. 54]. Defendants’
Counsel’s opposition to the Mediator’s fees is even more general, as it consists only of a single
sentence that does not raise any specific or general objections at all. [Dkt. No. 55].
A. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Fees
As is pointed out by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Defendants’ Counsel’s objection cites to
absolutely no law and no specific instances in which his general arguments apply. See generally
N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds v. Perfect Concrete Cutting, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54547 at *3 (D.N.J. June 2, 2010) (denying relief where “Respondent’s brief cites no law; no
statutory law, no case law, no scholarly authority. An undeveloped argument in a brief is
waived.”); see also Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1002 n. 1 (7th 	Cir. 2001) (same).
Similarly, as to Defendants’ principal objection—that the services for which sanctions are
sought fall outside the scope of the December 8, 2025 Order—Defendants fail to identify a single
time entry that falls outside th 	scope. Thus, Defendants’ opposition could be denied on these
grounds alone. See West v. Hess Envtl. Servs., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8127, at *7 (6th 	Cir. April
17, 1997) (“[P]arties should raise objection with specificity, pointing out particular items, rather
than making generalized objections to the reasonableness of the bill as a whole. Where a party
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fails to offer specific objections…we review the statement only to eliminate those charges which
are unreasonable on their face.”) (quoting Woolridge v. Marlene Industries Corp., 898 F.2d
1169, 1176 n. 14 (6th 	Cir. 1997)).
Notwithstanding these failures, this Court will nonetheless undertake its own analysis of
the fees sought to determine whether they are unreasonable and/or fall outside the scope of the
December 8, 2025 Order, as it believes it is obligated to do. See In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs.,
19 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he bankruptcy court has a duty to review fee applications,
notwithstanding the absence of objections…a duty which the Code does not expressly lay out but
which we believe derives from the Court’s inherent obligation to monitor the debtor’s estate and
to serve the public interest.”) (emphasis in original). Although what is before the Court here is
not a fee application, but an analogous sanctions award, the Court believes that the principle of
Busy Beaver—that the Court has an inherent obligation to review fee applications—applies in
these circumstances as well.
In conducting its review, the Court notes that the initial burden of establishing the
reasonableness of the fees falls upon Plaintiffs’ Counsel. See Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co.
v. Hospitality Supportive Sys. LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136922 at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14,
2018). After that, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate that the fees are
unreasonable and, in this case, also whether they fall outside the scope of the award. See In re
Molina, 632 B.R. 561, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021). Here, the Court finds that although
Defendants’ Counsel has completely failed to carry his burden, the Court’s independent duty to
review any such award requires the reduction of the fees sought by Plaintiffs’ Counsel in certain
respects.
The Court first notes that its December 8, 2025 Order awards sanctions for the Plaintiffs’
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attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred “in applying for Entry of Default.” The Court specifically
did not award fees for Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (which the Court
denied). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s certification of fees reflects multiple entries for
services related to the Cross-Motion for Entry of Default Judgment.
The Court did not award sanctions for those fees related to the Cross-Motion for Entry of
Default Judgment—other than for attending the December 2, 2025 hearing—because it felt those
fees could and should have been avoided, especially given the liberal standards for vacating
default and the Third Circuit’s often stated preference for cases to be decided on the merits. See
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starlight Ballroom Dance Club, Inc., 175 Fed. App’x 519, 521
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[o]ur Court’s policy is one ‘disfavoring default judgments and encouraging
decisions on the merits.’”) (citing Harad v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 839 F.2d 979, 981 (3d Cir.
1988)); Handle v. Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, 806 Fed. App’x 95, 100 (3d
Cir. 2020) (“there is a strong presumption in favor of resolving cases on the merits.”) (collecting
cases).
Additionally, as was stated at the hearing on the Motion to Vacate, the other Defendant in
the case, HM Advisors, LP, had timely answered and the case would have to proceed with many,
if not all, of the same issues and discovery, even if default judgment was entered against Mr.
Walsh. Accordingly, the Court will deduct from the award the fees for services related to
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. Based on the Court’s review, these
entries total $3,067.50, and are identified in the attached Schedule A.2
2 	The Court recognizes that there may be certain entries as to which it is unclear whether the services related
exclusively to opposing the Motion to Vacate Default, which the Court is allowing, or supporting 	Cross-
Motion to Enter Default Judgment, which the Court is not allowing. Because of the egregious nature of
Defendants’ Counsel's conduct, and the failure of Defendants’ Counsel to specifically identify any of the time
entries to which it is objecting (as is its burden), the Court is resolving any doubts or ambiguities in these regards
in favor of Plaintiffs’ Counsel.
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Here, the Court wishes to explain that the fees are being deducted not because the Court
believes them to be unreasonable, but principally because the fees relate to the preparation of
pleadings and communications regarding Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment, which were not within the scope of the fees awarded by the Court in the December 8,
2025 Order.3 	The Court also wishes to express its hope that Mr. Orel and the Ahmed Law Firm
will proceed in a more professional and responsive manner going forward, which will be for the
benefit of all involved. Conversely, perpetuation of this type of conduct will be to detriment of
all.
B. Mediator’s Fees
As was noted, Defendant’s Counsel’s “informal opposition” to the fees of the Mediator
did not identify any objection at all, specifically or generally. Nonetheless, the Court undertook
the same independent review of the fees requested by the Mediator under the same standards. On
the basis of that review, the Court finds that the Mediator’s fees are within the scope of the
December 8, 2025 Order and are reasonable and appropriate in all respects. Therefore, the fees
requested by the Mediator will be awarded in full.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court will enter an Order awarding sanctions against Defendants’
Counsel and in favor of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the amount of $15,027.50 and in favor of the
Mediator in the amount of $2,700.00.
An Order consistent with this opinion is being separately entered on the docket.
3 	The Court’s $3,067.50 deduction of the fees set forth in Schedule A is not intended to affect or impact in any way
the obligation of the Plaintiffs to pay the unawarded fees of their Counsel pursuant to the agreement between them.
Dated: 	____________________________________
Vincent F. Papalia
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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SCHEDULE A
DISALLOWED FEES
DATE 	TIME ENTRY 	AMOUNT
10/27/2025 	Case Administration –
Review application for entry
of default judgment.
$195.00
10/28/2025 	Case Administration –
Correspondence to client
regarding default judgment
certificate.
$50.00
10/28/2025 	Case Administration –
Correspondence from O.
Golfinopoulos regarding
default judgment request.
$100.00
1029/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Jonathan I.
Rabinowitz regarding motion
to vacate default (disallowed
as duplicative).
$210.00
11/03/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Jonathan I.
Rabinowitz regarding motion
to default.
$100.00
11/04/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Barry J. Roy
regarding motion for default.
$130.00
11/11/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Jonathan I.
Rabinowitz regarding cross
motion for DJ.
$100.00
11/11/2025 	Case Administration –
Research judicial notice;
review and revise
certification in opposition to
motion to vacate default and
in support of cross-motions to
enter default judgment.
$650.00
11/11/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Barry J. Roy
regarding cross motion for
default judgment.
$130.00
11/13/2025 	Case Administration – 	Revise
Olga certification.
$50.00
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11/13/2025 	Case Administration –
Correspondence to client
regarding revised
certification.
$50.00
11/20/2025 	Case Administration –
Telephone call with Court
regarding cross motion
$50.00
12/01/2025 	Case Administration –
Prepare for default judgment
hearing.
$500.00
12/02/2025 	Case Administration – Email
to J. Filgueiras regarding
default judgment hearing.
$50.00
12/02/2025 	Case Administration – Email
from J. Filgueiras regarding
default judgment hearing.
$50.00
12/02/2025 	Case Administration –
Continue to prepare for
default judgment hearing.
$250.00
12/02/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Henry M.
Karwowski regarding default
judgment hearing.
$50.00
12/02/2025 	Case Administration – Office
conference with Barry J. Roy
regarding default judgment
hearing.
$52.50
12/08/2025 	Case Administration – Email
from court regarding order
denying default judgment
motion
$150.00
12/08/2025 	Case Administration –
Correspondence to S. Orel
regarding order denying
default judgment motion.
$150.00
TOTAL: 	$3,067.50
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