HAGANS et al v. NATIONAL MENTOR HEALTHCARE, INC. et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

[ECF No. 195]

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

JOHN HAGANS, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v Civil No, 22-128 (KMW/SAK)

NATIONAL MENTOR HEALTHCARE,
INC., et al,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiffs’! unopposed motion seeking: (1)
preliminary approval of the parties’ proposed settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement’)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
201, ef seg. (“FLSA”), and (2) certification of the proposed collective for purposes of settlement
pursuant to the FLSA. See Pls.’ Mot. [ECF No. 195]. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate Judge to enter a final order on Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 636(c)(1),
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.1, See Consent Order [ECF No.
202]. The Court considered Plaintiffs’ submissions [ECF Nos. 195, 196] and exercises its
discretion to decide Plaintiffs’ motion without oral argument. See FED. R. Cry, P. 78; L. Civ. R.

78.1. For the reasons to be discussed, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.

! John Hagans and Vivian Hagans are referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “Representative Plaintiffs,”
while those who have opted into this action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are referred to collectively
as “Opt-in Plaintiffs.”

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs John Hagans and Vivian Hagans filed this action against National Mentor
Healthcare, Inc., and National Mentor Healthcare, LLC (“NMH” or “Defendants”)’ on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated persons. Plaintiffs, who worked as “Home Host Providers”
(“HHPs”) for Defendants’ in-home healthcare service company, allege violations of the FLSA, the
New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJ WHL”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a, ef seg., and the New
Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”), N.J. Stat. Ann, § 34: 11-4.1, ef. seq. See Am, Compl. [ECF
No. 139]. Representative Plaintiffs allege, infer alia, that they and similarly situated persons were
not fully compensated for time worked in excess of forty hours per week, due to their classification
as independent contractors rather than employees. /d. {J 1-7. Defendants denied these allegations,
contending they properly compensated Representative Plaintiffs and other HHPs, See Defs.’
Answer to Am, Compl. [ECF No. 150].

The Court conditionally granted collective certification of Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, and
approved the related Notice and Consent form, See Order Conditionally Certifying Collective
[ECF No. 78]. Following this conditional certification, multiple workers opted into this action
under 29 U.S.C, § 216(b), the opt-in provision of the FLSA. See Notices of Consent to Join [ECF
Nos. 83-100]. The Court also granted class certification under Rule 23 for Plaintiffs’ NTWHL and
NIWPL claims, Pl.’s Mot. to Certify Class [ECF No. 130]; Minute Entry [ECF No. 172]; Tr. of
Oral Argument [ECF No 184]. A total of 45 HHPs, including Representative Plaintiffs, are both
Rule 23 class members and FLSA collective members. See Pls,” Br, at 4 [ECF No. 196 at 4]. The

instant motion seeks preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, and certification of the

2 The New Jersey Department of Human Services, a named defendant in the initial Complaint
[ECF No. 1], was dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties [ECF No. 170),

2

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

FLSA collective for purposes of settlement only. The Settlement Agreement addresses both state
wage law claims asserted by the Rule 23 class and the FLSA claims asserted by the collective, and
is therefore a proposal to entirely resolve what has proceeded as a “hybrid” action?

I. RULE 23 CLASS CERTIFICATION

Rule 23(e) provides that the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled
only with the court’s approval. Fep. R. Crv. P. 23(e), When a district court is presented with a
class settlement agreement, it must at the outset determine whether class certification is appropriate
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). See Jn re Nat. Football League Players
Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 2014). If class certification is determined to be
appropriate, then the Court may reach the issue of whether the settlement agreement is fair. fd.
Courts may certify a Rule 23 class for the sole purpose of settlement. See Jn re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 786 (3d Cir. 1995), Here, the Court
granted class certification following oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify the Class. [ECF

Nos. 130, 172, 184]. However, prior to a Certification Order being entered, the parties reached a

3 Rule 23 was intended in part to facilitate suits that “challenge widespread rights violations of
people who are individually unable to vindicate their own rights.” Baby Neal for & by Kanter v.
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 64 (3d Cir. 1994). Congress enacted the FLSA to “protect all covered workers
from substandard wages and oppressive working hours[.]” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). In a Rule 23 class action, a prospective party plaintiff is
automatically included in the class unless he or she opts-out of the class upon notice of the action.
Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No, 09-1248, 2011 WL 1344745, at *18 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2011).
Contrastingly, collective members in a FLSA collective action must affirmatively opt-in to be
bound by any judgment. /d. Those cases wherein plaintiffs have sought both class certification
under Rule 23 for claims arising under state wage laws and collective certification of FLSA claims
have come to be known as “hybrid” actions. See, e.g., Lundeen v. 10 W. Ferry St. Operations,
LLC, 156 F.4th 332, 336, 339 Gd Cir. 2025). The Third Circuit has “endorsed the use of ‘hybrid’
actions ... where an FLSA collective and a Rule 23(b)(3) class proceed side by side in the same
case.” Id. at 339 (citing Knepper v, Rite Aide Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 261-62 (3d Cir, 2012).

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

settlement. Consistent with Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s requirement that the Certification Order define the
class, the Court notes the proposed class is defined as “[a]ll Home Host Providers through NMH
who contracted with the New Jersey Department of Human Service (“NJDHS”) and provided
services to NMH’s clients in New Jersey, during the time period between January 11, 2019 and
September 9, 2025.” See Notice of Settlement [ECF No. 196-1 at 20}; Settlement Agreement { 13:
[ECF No, 196-1 at 5]. Also consistent with Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s requirement that class counsel be
appointed and Rule 23(a)’s requirement that class representatives be appointed, the Court now
considers these appointments.
| A. Appointment of Class Representatives

Rule 23(a) requires the representative parties to “fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.” FED. R. Crv. P, 23(a)(4), At a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification,
Honorable Karen M. Williams, U.S.D.J., previously found that John and Vivian Hagans fairly
represent the class interests. [ECF 184 at 52:12—14], This Court further notes that the requirement
that class representatives “must represent a class capably and diligently” is a low bar necessitating
only a “minimal degree of knowledge about the litigation.” Jn re Nat’! Football League Players,
821 F.3d at 430 (quoting New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313
(3d Cir. 2007)). This Court is also satisfied that the interests of the named plaintiffs and the class
members are aligned—both seek to recover unpaid wages and overtime premiums. Additionally,
Plaintiffs have capably pursued this shared interest by retaining counsel and cooperating with
counsel throughout this litigation and related negotiation. Frisch Cert. {| 19-24 [ECF 196-4 at 8-
9]. The Court therefore will preliminarily appoint John Hagans and Vivian Hagans as

representatives of the settlement class.

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

B. Appointment of Class Counsel

The appointment of class counsel is governed by Rule 23(g). This rule provides a non-
exhaustive list the Court should consider in appointing class counsel, Factors include: (1) the work
counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims; (2) counsel’s experience in
handling class actions; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources that
counsel will commit to representing the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g). Here, proposed class counsel,
Andrew R. Frisch, Esquire, and Allison Rattet, Esquire, of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., are capable
of “fairly and adequately protect[ing] the interests” of the class. Fep. R. Civ, P. 23(g)(1)(B). They
possess adequate experience, with decades of practice history and a record of serving as lead
counsel and being found to be adequate class counsel in class action litigation concerning various
states’ wage and hour laws. Frisch Cert, {J 11-13 [ECF 196-4 at 3-7]. Proposed class counsel
have vigorously prosecuted this action, and committed adequate resources to it for over four years.
They have worked with defense counsel to exchange discovery regarding the payroll policies at
the center of this case as well as pay and attendance data pertaining to the class. They have also
navigated discovery disputes, and engaged in motion practice. Further, proposed class counsel
have pursued this action against Defendants at arm’s length, by participating in mediation under
the direction of Judge Thomas J. Reuter, Ret. Therefore, the Court finds the considerations of
Rule 23(g) are satisfied and will provisionally appoint Andrew R. Frisch, Esquire, and Allison
Rattet, Esquire, of Morgan & Morgan, P.A. as class counsel.
Ill, FLSA COLLECTIVE CERTIFICATION FOR PURPOSES OF SETTLEMENT

A court certifies an FLSA collective in two steps. First, an initial preliminary certification
is based on a court determination that “one is subjected to some common employer practice that,

if proved, would help demonstrate a violation of the FLSA.” Payton-Fernandez, 671 F. Supp. 3d

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

at 521 (D.N.J. 2023). This requires a “modest factual showing” involving some evidence “beyond
pure speculation” of a factual nexus between the manner that an employer’s policy affected the
representative plaintiff and the manner in which it affected collective employees. /d, After
preliminary certification, counsel disseminates notice to potential collective members. Here, the
Court conditionally certified this collective on March 17, 2023. See Order Conditionally Certifying
Class [ECF No. 78]. Following this conditional certification, multiple workers opted into this
action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the opt-in provision of the FLSA. See Notices of Consent to Join
[ECF Nos. 83-100].

Plaintiffs now seek final certification of the collective for settlement purposes only. To
obtain certification, Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they and
collective members were “similarly situated.” Rivet v. Off Depot, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 417, 423
(D.N.J. 2016). To determine whether the collective members and Representative Plaintiffs are
similarly situated, courts consider relevant factors, including: “whether the plaintiffs are employed
in the same corporate department, division, and location; whether they advance similar claims;
whether they seek substantially the same form of relief; and whether they have similar salaries and
circumstances of employment.” Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 691 F.3d 526, 536-37 (3d Cir,
2012).

Here, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs and collective
members are similarly situated. All members of this action were HHPs for Defendants’ home
healthcare services company and were compensated solely by a fixed day rate. Pls.’ Br. at 13
[ECF No. 196 at 13]. Further, all members advance the same claims, seck the same relief, and are
subject to the same corporate policies and procedures at issue in this case, Specifically, they allege

that they routinely worked more than forty hours per week, were classified as independent

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

contractors, were not paid overtime for all time worked over forty hours per week, and were not
paid at least the New Jersey minimum wage compensation. Jd. As evidenced by the parties’
discovery exchange of time and payroll records, resolution of members’ claims involves common
factual investigation and arguments. Finding that the collective members are similarly situated
and their claims may be collectively resolved under the Settlement Agreement, the Court will
certify the collective for purposes of settlement approval.

IV. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

A, The Settlement Agreement

Pursuant to the proposed Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay $2,300,000 as a
“Gross Settlement Amount”? for the claims asserted in this action. See Settlement Agreement {]
20 [ECF No. 196-1 at 10]. The Settlement Agreement proposes that the Gross Settlement Amount
be deposited into an interest-bearing escrow account and designated as the Qualified Settlement
Fund. Jd. Following final approval of the settlement and at the direction of the parties, Settlement
Awards will be distributed to each Opt-in Plaintiff by the claims administrator. Jd. The proposed
claims administrator is ILYM Group, Inc. (“ILYM” or “Claims Administrator”), a third-party
administrator tasked with, infer alia, mailing notice to class members and to respective authorities,
and tracking submitted exclusion letters to advise counsel of same. fd. { 13c; Notice of Settlement
4 23 [ECF No. 196-1 at 28]. From the Qualified Settlement Fund, Plaintiffs will each receive a
settlement payment amount based on their pro rata share of the alleged unpaid minimum wage

and/or overtime wage amounts from January 11, 2019 to September 25, 2025, See Settlement

4 The Gross Settlement Amount includes all service awards, attorneys’ fees, expenses due to class
counsel, and amounts payable to the claims administrator. See Settlement Agreement {20 [ECF
No. 196-1 at 10].

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 8 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Agreement [20 [ECF No. 196-1 at 10]; see a/so Formula for Distribution at 1 [ECF No. 196-1 at
18]. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, class representatives would also receive, in addition
to their proportional settlement payment amount, a Service Award, not to exceed $10,000.00. See
Settlement Agreement § 26 [ECF No. 196-1 at 12]. The Service Award recognizes the named
Plaintiffs’ bringing this action and is “[iJn exchange for signing a General Release releasing all
claims against Releasees.” /d.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, within fourteen calendar days after entry of the
Preliminary Approval Order, Releasees are required to provide the Claims Administrator with a
list of all class members and their contact information. /d. 18. Within 10 days of receipt of this
list, the Claims Administrator is required to send the class members a Class Notice of Proposed
Class and Collective Action Settlement (“Notice of Settlement”), which explains how they may
individually exclude themselves from the settlement, Jd. By cashing their settlement checks, the
class representatives, class members, and FLSA collective members agree to release Defendants
from, inter alia, claims for unpaid wages related to hours worked through September 9, 2025 and
liquidated damages. Jd. { 14. Specifically, the release is limited to: (1) “fajll claims for unpaid
wages, including but not limited to regular, minimum wages, and overtime wages . . . through
September 9, 2025;” (2) “[a]l! claims for liquidated and/or penalty damages under the FLSA and/or
any other applicable wage and hour law... .;” (3) “[a]il claims for conversion, breach of contract,
quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, theft of labor, or other common. law cause of action... 3” (4)
“alll claims for attorneys’ fees;” and (5) “[alll claims for interest.” Id.

B. Rule 23(e) Preliminary Approval

Pursuant to Rule 23(e), a court may preliminarily approve a settlement “on finding that [the

settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” In re Nat'l Football League Players, 961 F. Supp.

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 9 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

2d at 713. Review of a proposed class settlement typically proceeds in two stages. At the first or
preliminary approval stage, the court performs a “preliminary fairness evaluation” to determine
“whether the proposed settlement is ‘likely’ to be approved under Rule 23(e)(2).” Wood v. Saroj
& Manju Invs. Phila. LLC, No. 19-2820, 2020 WL 7711409, at *10 (ED. Pa, Dec. 28, 2020)
(quoting Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B)). If preliminary approval is granted, the court then directs
that notice of the settlement be provided to all class members. At the second or final approval
stage, the court conducts a formal hearing to determine whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable,
and adequate.” Weissman v. Philip C. Gutworth, P.A., No. 14-0666, 2015 WL 333465, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015). At the preliminary approval stage, “the ‘fair, reasonable and adequate’
standard [of final approval set forth in Rule 23(e)] is lowered, and the court is required to determine
whether ‘the proposed settlement discloses grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious
deficiencies... .’” In re Nat'l Football League Players, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 714. (internal quotation
marks omitted), Courts in this Circuit have cautioned that preliminary approval must not be a
judicial “rubber stamp” of the parties’ agreement, and that a proposal must be scrutinized for
fairness in accordance with Rule 23. See, e.g., Id. Whether a settlement agreement should be
approved as to the claims of a Rule 23 class is an analysis distinct from whether it should be
approved as to claims under the FLSA. The Court first reviews the proposed settlement for
preliminary approval under Rule 23.

1. The Proposed Settlement is Likely to be Approved under the
Fairness Considerations of Rule 23(e)

Rule 23(e)(2) provides four factors to guide a court’s evaluation of whether a settlement
agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” These include whether (1) the class representatives
and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s

length; (3) the relief provided for the class is adequate; and (4) the proposal treats class members

9

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 10 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

equitably relative to each other. Fep. R. Civ, P. 23(e)(2)(A-D). In light of these factors, some
district courts within the Third Circuit have come to view an analysis employing the nine factors
enumerated in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (Gd Cir. 1975) as redundant.> In this district,
preliminary approval has been found to require only an “initial evaluation” of the fairness of the
proposed settlement that considers whether there is “probable cause” to submit the settlement to
class members [Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No. 09-1248, 2010 WL 11693610, at *3 (D.N.J.
Nov. 19, 2010)], while final approval has required the application of Girsh. See Bredbenner v.
Liberty Travel, Inc., 9-0905, 2011 WL 1344745, at *11 (D.N.J. April 8, 2011), In other words, at
the preliminary approval stage, the Court relies upon Rule 23(e)(2). See In re Nat'l Football
League Players, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 714 n.5 (distinguishing between preliminary and final class
settlement approval, and relegating the Girsh factors to consideration upon final settlement
approval). The Rule 23(e)(2) factors are addressed in turn.
a. Adequate Representation

This factor considers whether John Hagans and Vivian Hagans, as class representatives,
and Andrew R. Frisch, Esquire, and Allison Rattet, Esquire, of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., as class
counsel, have “adequately represented the class.” FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e}(2)(A). This analysis is
“redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule 23(g).” 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG AND RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:49 (6th ed. 2025). As discussed in the
Court’s evaluation pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4), John Hagans and Vivian Hagans took steps to acquire

representation and initiate this action. Additionally, although the Settlement Agreement provides

> See Lunemann v. Kooma II LLC, No, 23-3704, 2024 WL 2133803, at *3 1.6 (E.D. Pa. May 13,
2024); see also Hall v. Accolade, Inc., No. 17-3423, 2020 WL 1477688, at *6 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
25, 2020); Matthews y. Philadelphia Corp. for Aging, No, 22-4632, 2025 WL 992198, at *4 n.2
(E.D, Pa. Apr. 1, 2025),

10

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 11 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

them with a service award not to exceed $10,000, this does not signify conflicting interest, as the
service award recognizes the named Plaintiffs for having participated in this litigation and having
cooperated with class counsel through discovery and mediation. The Court is satisfied that John
Hagans and Vivian Hagans have adequately represented the class for purposes of Rule 23(e)(2)(A).

For the reasons discussed pursuant to Rule 23(g), the Court also finds that Andrew R.
Frisch, Esquire, and Allison Rattet, Esquire, of Morgan & Morgan, P.A, have adequately
represented the class. This factor weighs in favor of preliminary settlement approval.

b. Arm’s-Length Negotiations

The Court must also consider whether the proposed settlement agreement was negotiated
at arm’s length. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B). District Courts within the Third Circuit have found a
presumption of fairness when a settlement agreement was reached with the assistance of a
mediator. See, e.g., Inre CIGNA Corp., No. 02-8088, 2007 WL 2071898, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
2007) (noting it was “clear that negotiations for settlement occurred at arm’s length” when the
parties were assisted by a retired judge as mediator); see also in re Nat'l Football League Players,
301 F.R.D, at 198 (citing 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
11:41 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that courts usually adopt “an initial presumption of fairness when a
proposed class settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s length by counsel for the class, is
presented for court approval”).

Here, the patties participated in settlement talks under the auspices of Judge Thomas J.
Reuter on August 1, 2025 and September 3, 2025. Frisch Cert. (23 [ECF 196-4 at 8-9], Although
the initial mediation sessions did not result in a settlement, negotiations continued in the weeks

thereafter, with a settlement in principle being reached on September 9, 2026, Pis.’ Br. at 3 [ECF

1]

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 12 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

No. 196 at 3]. Given the extent of negotiations and the role played by an experienced mediator,
the Court is satisfied that the proposed settlement is the product of arm’s-length negotiations,
c. Adequate Relief

The Court must also consider whether the relief provided for the class is adequate. FED. R.
Civ. P, 23(e)(2)(C). Rule 23(e) provides four factors which district courts must consider when
evaluating the adequacy of relief: (1) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (2) the
effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of
processing class-member claims; (3) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including
timing of payment; and (4) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3). Id.

i. Cost, Risk, and Delay of Trial and Appeal

In assessing the cost, risk and delay associated with trial, the Court is mindful that “[t}he
role of a district court is not to determine whether the settlement is the fairest possible resolution—
a task particularly ill-advised given that the likelihood of success at trial... can only be estimated
imperfectly.” Jn re Baby Prods, Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2013), Rather,
“ft]he Court must determine whether the compromises reflected in the settlement—-including those
terms relating to the allocation of settlement funds—are fair, reasonable, and adequate when
considered from the perspective of the class as a whole.” /d. A court must recognize that a
settlement is a “yielding of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution” and “guard
against demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the merits.” Jn re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab, Litig., 55 F.3d at 806.

Here, Defendants agreed to pay $2,300,000 to settle this matter. Plaintiffs’ counsel
analyzed the payroll data produced in discovery, and based upon the number of hours each class

and collective member worked, counsel calculated damages ranging from $1,900,000 to

12

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 13 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

$13,500,000. Pls.’ Br. at 9 [ECF No. 196 at 9]. Assuming Plaintiffs would have established
liability at trial, the proposed payment therefore exceeds the minimum calculated damages.
Plaintiffs also recognize that trial presents the risk of an adverse finding regarding the classification
of HHPs as independent contractors, or regarding Defendants’ basis for withholding overtime
premiums. Pls.’ Br. at 9 [ECF No. 196 at 9]; see Verma vy. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 229
(3d Cir. 2019) (whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor is a question of fact as
well as law, and questions as to the economic relationship of the parties would therefore be
submitted to the jury). Continued litigation would also involve substantial cost and delay. Most
immediately, it would require the parties to mount additional discovery, including several
depositions, Pls.’ Br. at 9 [ECF No. 196 at 9], Additionally, Defendants would seek discovery
regarding both the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and the propriety of decertifying the class, /¢/. Both
parties also expressed their mutual intentions to file motions for summary judgment. /d. Thus, the
Court is satisfied that the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal suggest the proposed settlement
provides a fair value to class members.
ii. Proposed Method of Distributing Relief

The Court must also consider “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing
relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims.” FED. R. Cry. P. 23
(e)(2\(C)(iid). The Advisory Committees notes on Rule 23 contemplate that courts will “scrutinize
the method of claims processing to ensure that it facilitates filing legitimate claims” and “be alert
to whether the claims process is unduly demanding.” Fen. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note
to the 2009 amendment. Pursuant to the proposed Settlement Agreement, each class member will
be paid according to his individual wage and hour claim, and will receive a proportional share of

the liquidate damages. Notice of Settlement [3 [ECF No. 196-1 at 21-22], Each class member

13

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 14 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

will be paid so long as the member does not seek exclusion from the class. The member will receive
a check for unpaid wages and a check for liquidated damages with no need to complete a claim
form. Courts in the Third Circuit have found that pro rata allocation of settlement funds is an
effective method of distribution. See, e.g., Lunemann vy. Kooma I LLC, No. 23-3704, 2024 WL
2133803, at *8 (E.D. Pa, May 13, 2024). Courts in this Circuit have also found that notices to
class members advising that they will receive payment so long as they do not opt out of the Rule
23 class and which impose no burden to complete a claim form represent an effective method of
processing claims. See, ¢.g., Lunemann, 2024 WL 2133803, at *8; Hall vy. Accolade, Inc., No. 17-
3423, 2019 WL 3996621, at *5 (E.D. Pa, Aug, 23, 2019); Bennett v. Schnader Harrison Segal &
Lewis LLP, No. 24-00592, 2026 WL 202548, at *4 (E.D. Pa, Jan. 22, 2026). The Court is satisfied
that the proposed method of distributing relief to the class and processing claims is effective for
purposes of Rule 23 (e)(2)(C) (ii).
iii, Attorney’s Fees

The Court must also consider the “terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,
including timing of payment,” FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e)(2)(C)Gii). Here, class counsel seek an award
of attorneys’ fees “not to exceed 1/3 of the total Gross Settlement Amount.” Settlement Agreement
| 24 [ECF 196-1 at 12}. The settlement is not conditioned upon counsel receiving fees of their
choosing, and counsel will receive fees no sooner than the settlement checks are mailed, /d, The
Third Circuit has enumerated factors for determining the fairness of attorneys’ fees, but these are
reserved for the final approval. See In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (looking to,

inter alia, the size of the fund created, the number of persons benefitted, and the skill and efficiency

14

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 15 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

of the attorneys involved)). The Court is satisfied that this factor weighs in favor of preliminary
approval, and will consider the request for attorneys’ fees more fully at the final approval stage.
iv. Any Agreement in Connection with the Proposal

Rule 23(e)(3) requires that “parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any
agreement made in connection with the proposal.” Frp. R. Civ. P. 23 (e)(3). Plaintiffs maintain
that the Settlement Agreement is the only agreement related to this dispute. Thus, the Court finds
that this factor weighs in favor of preliminary approval.

v. Equitable Treatment of Class Members

The Court must consider whether the Settlement Agreement treats class members equitably
relative to each other. Fep, R. Crv. P. 23 (e\(2)(D). Here, as previously discussed, each class
member will be paid according to his individual wage and hour claim, and will receive a
proportional share of the liquidated damages. Notice of Settlement 3 [ECF No. 196-1 at 21-22].
Courts within the Third Circuit have found such a proportional distribution of settlement funds
treats class members equitably relative to each other. Bennett, No. 24-00592, 2026 WL 202548,
at *4 (citing In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig,, No. 16-2724, 2025 WL 2777570, at
*7 (ED, Pa, Sept. 26, 2025)); McDermid v. Inovio Pharms., Inc., No. 20-01402, 2023 WL 227355,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2023). The Court is satisfied that this proposal treats the class members
equitably.

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court perceives no obvious deficiencies in the
Settlement Agreement. The Court preliminarily finds the Settlement Agreement to be fair and

likely be approved pursuant to Rule 23(e).

15

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 16 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Cc, FLSA Settlement Approval
“Although Third Circuit precedent is silent on the matter of judicial approval of FLSA
settlements, district courts in this jurisdiction abide by the principle that settlement of FLSA claims
under 29 U.S.C, § 216(b) requires court approval.” Fritz v. Terminite, Ine., No. 19-15749, 2020
WL 5015508, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2020); see also Orozco, et al. v. Eli Timberland Tree Service,
LLC, et al., No. 24-7045, 2025 WL 2304894, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2025) (—D]istrict courts
within the Third Circuit have . . . assumed that judicial approval is necessary.”). In evaluating a
proposed settlement of an FLSA action, “district courts within the Third Circuit have followed the
guidance set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Lynn's Food Stores, Ine. v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir, 1982).” Fritz, No. 19-15749, 2020 WL 5015508, at *1. Courts
evaluate a proposed FLSA settlement using a three-part analysis. Payton-Fernandez, 671 F. Supp.
3d at 520. “First, the court must determine that the settlement concerns a bona fide dispute.
Second, the court must determine that the settlement is fair and reasonable to the Plaintiff-
employee. And, third, the court must determine that the agreement does not frustrate the
implementation of the FLSA in the workplace.” Gabrielyan v, S.O. Rose Apartments LLC, No. 15-
1771, 2015 WL 5853924, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2015). The Court makes each of these
determinations in favor of Plaintiffs’ proposal and therefore preliminarily approves the Settlement
Agreement.
1. The Settlement Resolves a Bona Fide Dispute
“[A] district court may find that a proposed settlement agreement resolves a bona fide
dispute when it ‘reflect[s] a reasonable compromise over issues, such as FLSA coverage or
computation of back wages, that are actually in dispute,” Jn re Chickie's & Pete’s Wage & Hour

Litig., No. 12-6820, 2014 WL 911718, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing Lynn's Food Stores v.

16

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 17 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

U.S. ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Kraus vy, PA Fit
IE, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“In essence, for a bona fide dispute to exist,
the dispute must fall within the contours of the FLSA and there must be evidence of the defendant’s
intent to reject or actual rejection of that claim... .”). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees, and failed to pay Plaintiffs
overtime wages in violation of the FLSA, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and the New Jersey

. Wage Payment Law. See generally Am. Compl. [ECF No. 139]. In furtherance of their claim,
Plaintiffs conducted an analysis of pay and attendance data to assess the purported wage damages.
See Settlement Agreement { 6 [ECF No, 196-1 at 3].

Defendants denied Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Answer and “continue to deny” these
allegations. See Settlement Agreement § 4 [ECF No. 196-1 at 2], Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims,
Defendants assert that “their classification of payments to Plaintiffs were correctly categorized as
non-employee payments.” /d. { 4. The parties continue to disagree on a variety of issues pertaining
to the classification of payments to Plaintiffs. J. 99] 4, 8. The classification, and the consequential
computation of back wages for purported employees are issues at the forefront of this dispute. The
parties’ adversarial engagement, including alternative dispute resolution featuring the exchange of
pay and attendance data informing competing damages analyses, are also consistent with a bona
fide dispute. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the dispute raises fact-dependent allegations
within the contours of the FLSA.

2. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable

To determine whether the terms of an FLSA collective settlement agreement are fair at the

stage of preliminary approval in the context of a hybrid action such as this, courts in the Third

Circuit rely upon the fairness determination of Rule 23(e)(2). See, e.g., Caddick v. Tasty Baking

17

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 18 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Co., No. 19-02106, 2021 WL 1374607, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2021). As discussed at length
above, the Rule 23(e)(2) factors weigh in favor of preliminary approval of the proposed settlement
as it concerns the state law claims of the Rule 23 class. However, the Court must squarely address
whether the settlement is fair and reasonable in its release of FLSA claims.

Notably, the Settlement Agreement conditions settlement upon a release by Rule 23 class
members of their FLSA claims, and does not distinguish between those who have asserted such
claims and those who have not. See Settlement Agreement J 14 [ECF No. 196-1 at 6]. This raises
a concern that class members, in pursuing the resolution of their state law claims, must waive any
FLSA claims they have yet to pursue. In Lundeen v. 10 West Ferry Street Operations, LLC, the
Third Circuit considered whether such a release violated the FLSA opt-in requirement. 156 F.4th
332 (3d Cir. 2025). Noting that the opt-in provision is limited to providing a private right of action,
the Third Circuit concluded that “the language of § 216(b) does not bar the release of unasserted
FLSA claims in a court-approved Rule 23 settlement.” fd. at 336. However, the Third Circuit
circumscribed its ruling to whether such releases conflicted with the opt-in provision, and was
careful to maintain that the presence of such releases in a settlement agreement was still a relevant
consideration in determining whether an agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Jd, at 341.

The Lundeen Court ultimately reversed the lower court’s denial of preliminary approval of
the hybrid action settlement and instructed a fairness evaluation, noting that courts have approved
similar settlements where there has been a “clear notice to class members of the release and a
meaningful opportunity to opt out.” fd. at 342 (citing Lunemann, No. 23-3704, 2024 WL 2133803,
at *2 (preliminarily approving a settlement agreement where “the parties provided a clear and
comprehensive explanation of the release in the proposed notice” and the class members were

“fully informed as to how to preserve” their unasserted FLSA claims)). Here, the Notice of

18

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 19 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Settlement clearly conveys to the specific audience of class members, both the scope of the release
and class members’ opportunity to opt out. A paragraph unambiguously titled “What am I giving
up to stay in the settlement class?” reads in pertinent part as follows:

If you are a Class Member, you will remain a Class Member unless you exclude
yourself, That means when the proposed settlement becomes final, you will receive
a settlement payment. In exchange for the settlement payment, you will give up
your right to sue NMH and fully release all claims that you have against NMH from
all New Jersey and FLSA wage and hour claims asserted in this lawsuit, including
for unpaid wages, overtime pay, interest, liquidated damages, or other penalties for
unpaid wages, overtime, and related record keeping violations, as well as those
claims that you may not be fully aware of under New Jersey and FLSA wage and
hour laws.

Notice of Settlement {14 [ECF No. 196-1 at 24-25]. Additionally, a paragraph titled, “What are
my options?” explains how a class member may seek exclusion form the settlement. Notice of
Settlement § 7 [ECF No. 196-1 at 22], A clause labeled “Exclude Yourself from this Settlement”
reads in pertinent part as follows:

If you are a Class Member, you can exclude yourself from the Settlement by

informing the Claims Administrator that you want to “opt-out” of the settlement, If

you “opt-out,” you will not recover any money from the settlement. However, if

the settlement becomes final, this is the only option that allows you to keep your

rights to sue NMH for claims related to your alleged wages during the relevant time

period.
Notice of Settlement § 7 [ECF No. 196-1 at 22-23]. The Court is satisfied that the Notice of
Settlement guards against the threat to fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy that is posed by a
release that reaches class members’ unasserted FLSA claims.

3. The Settlement does not Frustrate FLSA Implementation.

In assessing whether a settlement agreement frustrates the purpose of the FLSA, courts
consider “three interrelated FLSA objectives.” Liv. Sushi To Go Cherry Hill, LLC, No, 22-4734,
2023 WL 4958105, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023). These objectives include: (1) “combatting

‘inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees;”” (2) promoting “widespread

19

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 20 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

employer compliance with the FLSA;” and (3) honoring “the ‘private-public character of
employee rights,’ whereby the public has a general interest in employee well-being and access to
fair wages.” Ortiz v. Freight Rite, Inc., No. 21-1060, 2021 WL 5988582, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
2021) (internal citations omitted), Courts look to “the scope of any confidentiality provisions and
the breadth of any release of claims provisions” to assess the settlement’s congruence with these
objectives. 7d, (internal citations omitted). Here, the proposed settlement does not require
Plaintiffs to agree to a confidentiality provision of any kind, so the Court need not consider whether
such a provision frustrates the implementation of the FLSA. Further, the release provision is
appropriately tailored. In consideration of their settlement awards, Opt-In Plaintiffs release
Defendant from any related wages or hours claims for the relevant period through September 9,
2025. See Settlement Agreement § 14 [ECF No. 196-1 at 5]. The release functions by operation
of the cashing of the class or collective member’s settlement check. However, this does not run
afoul of the FLSA requirement that opt-in plaintiffs file a “consent in writing to become such a
party” [29 U.S.C. § 216(b)], because the release expressly applies to “FLSA Collective members”
who have already “filfed] their consent to join.” See Settlement Agreement { 13g [ECF No. 196-
| at 4]; Payton-Fernandez, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 525 (challenging the propriety of opting into a FLSA
collective by cashing one’s settlement check), The Court therefore finds the Settlement Agreement
does not frustrate the implementation of the FLSA.

D. Notice fo the Class

Finally, the Court must consider the adequacy of notice to the class. Rule 23(c)(2)(B)
provides that, for a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) for purposes of settlement, a court must
“direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including

individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” FED. R. Cry. P.

20

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 21 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

23 (c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2)(B) further provides that the notice must “clearly and concisely state”
the following: (1) the nature of the action; (2) the definition of the class certified; (3) the class
claims, issues, or defenses; (4) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney
if the member so desires; (5) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests
exclusion; (6) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (7) the binding effect of a class
judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). dd. The Third Circuit has explained that “due process
further requires that notice be reasonably calculated, under all the cireumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections,” Ja re Nat’l Football League Players, 821 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Here, the Notice of Settlement clearly states the nature of the action as one for “unpaid
minimum wages and overtime under a federal law, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), ... and
under New Jersey state law (the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New Jersey Wage
Payment Law).” Notice of Settlement { 1 [ECF No. 196-1 at 21]. The Notice clearly states the
definition of the class certified as “Home Host Providers (““HHPs”), who contracted with the New
Jersey Department of Human Services (“NJDHS”) and provided services to NMH’s clients in New
Jersey, during the time period between January 11, 2019 and September 9, 2025.” Id. It likewise
summarizes the claims that HHPs were “misclassified as independent contractors, and not paid
legally-mandated federal and state minimum wages and/or overtime wages for all weeks/hours
worked.” Jd. The Notice explains that a class member may be “represented by [his or her] own
lawyer.” Id. { 10 [ECF No. 196-1 at 24]. It further explains that a class member may request
exclusion from the settlement, and outlines the time and manner of exclusion. Specifically, a class

member may request exclusion “by informing the Claims Administrator that [he or she] want[s]

21

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 22 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

to ‘opt-out’ of the settlement” within forty-five days of the mailing of the notice. Id. §/7 [ECF No.
196-1 at 23}. Finally, the Notice indicates to class members the binding effect of class judgment
by defining the class, explaining the mechanism of exclusion, and explaining that this settlement
is in lieu of judgment which may be “less favorable.” /d. {17,4 [ECF No, 196-1 at 22-23]. The
Court is satisfied that the Notice of Settlement is the “best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances” for purposes of Rule 23 (c)(2)(B).

The Court also finds that the Notice satisfies the strictures of due process, Notice to the
class members will be informed by a list of the names and last known physical addresses, email
addresses, and phone numbers provided to the Claims Administrator within 14 days of preliminary
approval of the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement {] 18 [ECF No. 196-1 at 7]. The
Claims Administrator will use standard skip tracing devices to verify the accuracy of all physical
addresses, and then mail individualized notices to those addresses. /d. If a letter is returned to
sender, a diligent search for another address will be undertaken and the notice mailed there within
10 days. Id. The Court is satisfied that this method of identification, taken together with the
contents of the Notice, renders the Notice “reasonably calculated, under al! the circurnstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.” Jn re Nat'l Football League Players, 821 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks
omitted),

Vv. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 16th day of October, 2026, that Plaintiffs’ motion ts

GRANTED as follows:

22

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 23 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

1, The Court hereby preliminary approves the Class and Collective Action Settlement
Agreement (the “Settlement”) attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Approval. This is based on the Court’s determination that, pursuant to applicable law, the
Settlement is fair and reasonable and within the range of possible final approval.

2. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Settlement, and all terms
defined herein shall have the same meaning in this Order as set forth in the Settlement.

3. It appears to the Court on a preliminary basis that the settlement amount and terms
of the Settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable as to all potential Settlement Class and
Settlement Collective Members when balanced against the probable outcome of further litigation
and the significant risks relating to certification, liability and damages for ail parties. It further
appears that investigation and research have been conducted such that counsel for the Parties are
able to reasonably evaluate their respective positions. It further appears to the Court that settlement
at this time will avoid substantial additional costs by all Parties, as well as avoid the delay and
risks that would be presented by further prosecution of the Litigation. Based on the submitted
materials, it appears that the Settlement has been reached as a result of serious and non-collusive,
arms-length negotiations, with both sides represented by experienced counsel familiar with the
applicable facts and law. Additionally, the proposed Settlement was reached after: (1) extensive
discovery, including exchanging documents and business records, and (2) a full day mediation
with an experienced mediator. Thus, the Court preliminarily finds the Settlement is fair, adequate,
and reasonable when balanced against the probable outcome of further litigation and the significant
risks and delays associated therewith,

4, The Settlement specifies for Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees not to exceed 33% of the

Gross Settlement Amount, an award of litigation expenses incurred, and a proposed payment to

23

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 24 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

the Named Plaintiff in exchange for a general release. The Court will review these issues in more
detail in connection with the Final Approval Hearing,

5. Accordingly, for settlement purposes, the Court certifies the following Settlement
Class: |

All Home Health Providers, contracted with the NJDHS, who provided

services to Defendants’ clients in New Jersey, between January 11, 2019 and

September 9, 2025.

6. The Court concludes that the Settlement Class preliminarily meets the requirements
for Rule 23 certification. The Settlement Class is hereby certified, as a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). Pending the outcome of the final fairness hearing, all
members of the Settlement Class are preliminarily enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or
maintaining any claim already asserted in, and encompassed by, this Litigation,

7. The Parties’ proposed resolution of FLSA claims as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement is preliminarily approved as it was reached as a result of contested litigation to resolve
a bona fide dispute, The Court further finds that the proposed FLSA settlement is within the range
of possible final approval.

8. The Court provisionally appoints Andrew R. Frisch and Allison Rattet of Morgan
& Morgan, P.A. as Class Counsel.

9, The Court preliminarily appoints John Hagans and Vivian Hagans as Settlement |
Class Representatives,

10. The Court appoints ILYM Group, Inc. the Settlement Administrator.

11. The Parties are authorized to send notice of the proposed settlement pursuant to

Rule 23 to all Rule 23 Class members. Notice shall be sent in accordance with the procedures set

forth in the Parties’ Settlement Agreement.

24

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 Filed 10/16/26 Page 25 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

12. The Court approves, as to form and content, the proposed notices attached to the
Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B. The Court finds that the procedures for notifying the members
of the Class about the Settlement as described in the Setttement Agreement provide the best notice
practicable under the circumstances and, when completed, shall constitute due and sufficient notice
of the proposed Settlement and Final Approval Hearing to all persons affected by and/or entitled
to participate in the Settlement, in full compliance with the notice requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23, due process, the Constitution of the United States, the laws of the State of New Jersey, and
other applicable laws. The notices are accurate, objective, and informative and provides members
of the Rule 23 Class with all the information necessary to make an informed decision regarding
their participation in the Settlement and its fairness.

13. The deadline for Settlement Class Members to opt out of this Settlement or to file
objections and/or comments to the Settlement Agreement shall be forty-five (45) days after the
Notice of Settlement is initially mailed. Objections shall only be considered if the Settlement Class
Member has not opted out of the Settlement. No Settlement Class Member shall be heard at the
Final Approval Hearing (whether individually or through counsel), unless written notice of the
person’s intention to appear at the Final Approval Hearing has been mailed to the Settlement
Administrator on or before the Objection and Opt-Out Deadline. The postmark date shall be the
exclusive means for determining that an objection is timely.

14. A final approval hearing in this matter is scheduled for January 11, 2027. At the
hearing, the Court will hear arguments concerning whether the proposed settlement is fair,
adequate and reasonable and should be finally approved by the Court. The Court will further
consider whether to approve Plaintiff's attorneys’ fees and costs and the payment to the Named

Plaintiffs in exchange for a general release, All papers in support of final approval and Plaintiffs’

25

Case 1:22-cv-00128-KMW-SAK Document 204 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 26 of 26 PagelD:
<pagelD>

unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and payments to the Named Plaintiffs shall be filed
with the Court no later than 14 days in advance of the Final Approval hearing.
s/ Sharon A. King

SHARON A. KING
United States Magistrate Judge

ce: Hon. Karen M. Williams, U.S.D.J.

26