KINCH v. SMITH, et al

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANTHONY MAURICE KINCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUAN SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:23-cv-2076 (BRM)(SDA)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court are three motions to dismiss Plaintiff Anthony Maurice Kinch’s
(“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) (ECF No. 3) pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by: (1) Defendant Linda Wasyluk (“Wasyluk”) (ECF No. 95);
(2) Defendants Juan Smith, Antonio Lacosta, Jonathan Berrios, Matthew Wisnowski, Jimmy
Solana, Gabriel Mesaros, John Basich, Slawomir Polchlopek, Daniel Turon, Lindsey Parker
(collectively, the “Linden Defendants”) (ECF No. 100); and (3) Defendants James Brady
(“Brady”) and Dylan Cosgrove’s (“Cosgrove”) (collectively, the “UCPO Defendants”) (together
with Wasyluk and Linden Defendants, “Moving Defendants”) (ECF No. 103). Plaintiff has not
opposed or otherwise responded to the motions. Having reviewed and considered the submissions
filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hear oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing,
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Wasyluk’s Motion to Dismiss, the Linden Defendants Motion to Dismiss, and the UCPO
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
For purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the Court also considers
any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this civil-rights action against numerous defendants
alleging various constitutional deprivations arising from a traffic stop on July 7, 2021, and his
subsequent arrest on July 8, 2021. (ECF No. 3.) As the Court has previously observed, Plaintiff’s
factual pleading is generally unclear.1 (ECF No. 40 at 2 n.2.) Plaintiff alleges deprivation of his
constitutional rights, conspiracy to deprive him of those rights, failure to protect him from that
conspiracy, and false imprisonment without due process. (ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 2, 11.)
Although difficult to discern, the following facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) On July 7, 2021, while driving on a New Jersey street, Plaintiff was
1 The Court will not rewrite Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to craft a clearer or more logical factual
narrative than the one Plaintiff presented. See Shah v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex., Civ. A. No.
16-8803, 2018 WL 1293164, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2018) (noting that a court will not rewrite a
plaintiff’s complaint to allow it to state a claim); Miyayama v. Burke, Civ. A. No. 20-01683, 2021
WL 6134361, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 29, 2021) (“While Plaintiff urges the Court to overlook [a]
mistake and find the factual allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the Court has
neither the time nor duty to rewrite Plaintiff’s complaint.”); Teetz v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Sedgwick Cnty. Kan., Civ. A. No. 22-1134, 2023 WL 7698030, at *5 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2023) (“The
Court cannot consider new allegations made outside the Complaint. And the Court cannot rewrite
Plaintiff’s Complaint for him.”).
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followed home by several named defendants, including the Linden Defendants and the UCPO
Defendants, after being told to go home by Officer Juan Smith. (Id. ¶ 11.) At some point, Plaintiff’s
vehicle was towed. (Id.) The following day, Plaintiff was arrested when attempting to leave a City
of Linden Police Department building due to an outstanding warrant. (Id.) Plaintiff challenges the
legality of the stop, search, and subsequent arrest, and seeks damages relating to those events. (See
generally ECF No. 3.)
However, beyond the allegation that the Linden Defendants and the UCPO Defendants
were among a group of individuals who followed Plaintiff home, the Amended Complaint largely
refers to “Defendants” collectively. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants” detained
and arrested him, required him to pay tickets, directed him to appear in court, and were assigned
to a courtroom in which Plaintiff was required to appear. (See id. ¶¶ 11, 14, 17, 19.) The Amended
Complaint does not identify which of these acts, if any, was undertaken by the Linden Defendants,
which was undertaken by the UCPO Defendants, or how any particular individual’s conduct
caused the constitutional deprivations Plaintiff alleges.
The pleading is even more deficient as to Wasyluk. Although Wasyluk is identified as a
defendant in the caption, the body of the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations
concerning her. She is not alleged to have participated in the July 2021 traffic stop, arrest,
prosecution, towing of Plaintiff’s vehicle, conspiracy, or any other event described in the pleading.
(See generally ECF No. 3.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 12, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) He filed the operative
Amended Complaint on May 4, 2023. (ECF No. 3.) On April 17, 2024, the Court granted
defendants Joanna Rajoppi and Peter Corvelli’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for
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failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 40, 41.) In doing so, the Court concluded Plaintiff’s allegations
were insufficiently supported by factual allegations and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.
(ECF No. 40 at 7–10.) Plaintiff did not file a second amended complaint.2
Following additional motion practice regarding service and default, on March 31, 2026,
the Court denied Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment and vacated the entries of default against
the Moving Defendants. (ECF Nos. 93, 94.) The Court permitted the Moving Defendants to pursue
renewed motions to dismiss as appropriate.3 (ECF No. 93 at 1 n.1.)
Wasyluk filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 6, 2026 (ECF No. 95), the Linden Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 28, 2026 (ECF No. 100), and the UCPO Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss on May 12, 2026 (ECF No. 103). Plaintiff did not file opposition to any of the
three motions. On June 5, 2026, mail sent to Plaintiff at his address of record was returned as
undeliverable. (ECF No. 106.) On August 19, 2026, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff
to provide the Clerk’s Office with a valid address, as required by Local Civil Rule 10.1,4 by
September 2, 2026. (ECF No. 107.) In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court also extended his
deadline to oppose the pending motions to September 2, 2026, and advised that failure to comply
with the Order could result in the motions being considered unopposed and the case being
2 Plaintiff has requested and was given multiple opportunities to file a second amended complaint
but never did. (ECF Nos. 7, 17, 41.)
3 Some of the motions to vacate or set aside default also included requests for dismissal. In light
of the vacatur of the defaults, the Court did not reach those dismissal requests, but noted that the
allegations were likely deficient as to Wasyluk and the Linden Defendants. (ECF No. 93 at 7, 8.)
The Court administratively terminated any motions to dismiss and granted Moving Defendants
leave to file renewed motions to dismiss as appropriate. (ECF Nos. 93, 94.)
4 All litigants, whether pro se or represented, must file a notice with the Clerk informing the Court
of their new mailing address within seven days of an address change. See L. Civ. R. 10.1(a).
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dismissed (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not provided a valid address, filed an opposition to any of the
pending motions, or otherwise responded to the Order.
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips, 515 F.3d
at 228. “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual
allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id at 663. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint
allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations”
are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”
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must be pled; it must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a
recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’— ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
While as a general rule, a court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the
complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held “a court may
consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to
one for summary judgment pursuant under Rule 56].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184
F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any “document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at
1426. In assessing plausibility, however, the court may not consider any “[f]actual claims and
assertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2022).
III. 	DECISION
A. Wasyluk’s Motion to Dismiss
Wasyluk argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim because, apart from identifying her as a
defendant in the caption, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations concerning her conduct
or involvement in the events underlying this action. (ECF No. 95.) The Court agrees.
Even affording the Amended Complaint the liberal construction due a pro se pleading,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Wasyluk upon which relief can be granted. While pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
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complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations
concerning Wasyluk. As this Court has already found, Plaintiff “makes no allegations against
Wasyluk in the amended complaint” and “she is only mentioned in the caption.” (ECF No. 93 at
9.) In the absence of any factual allegations as to Wasyluk’s involvement, the Court cannot
reasonably infer she is liable for any of the conduct alleged. See Edwards v. Off. of Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, Civ. A. No. 13-3710, 2014 WL 546334, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014) (dismissing
complaint against defendant due to “no factual allegations which might support any claims”
against the defendant); Riker v. CMS, Inc., Civ. A. No. 10-1752, 2011 WL 5828567 (D.N.J. Nov.
17, 2011) (dismissing claims where the defendant was referenced only in the caption and the
complaint contained no allegations concerning that defendant’s conduct).
Because Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Wasyluk upon which relief may be granted,
Wasyluk’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
B. Linden Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Linden Defendants argue, among other things5, that Plaintiff’s claims fail because the
Amended Complaint does not identify which Linden Defendants committed any constitutional
violation and instead relies on collective allegations. (ECF No. 100-3 at 9–11.) The Court agrees.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or federal law by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
5 The Linden Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds, including that Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1944), abstention is warranted under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating the
personal involvement of any Linden Defendant in a constitutional deprivation. (ECF No. 100-3.)
Because the Court concludes Plaintiff fails to plead the Linden Defendants’ personal involvement,
the Court need not reach the Linden Defendants’ alternative arguments.
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48 (1988). “The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of
the underlying right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged
a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.’” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).
Because liability under § 1983 is personal in nature, a defendant “must have personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A plaintiff
therefore must allege facts showing not only a violation of a federally protected right, but also each
defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.
The Amended Complaint does not satisfy this requirement. Although Plaintiff names the
Linden Defendants and alleges generally that several Defendants followed him home on July 7,
2021, the pleading otherwise attributes the challenged conduct to “Defendants” collectively. (ECF
No. 3 ¶¶ 11, 14, 17, 19.) It does not identify which Linden Defendant stopped or detained Plaintiff,
searched his person or property, effectuated the towing of his vehicle, procured the outstanding
warrant, arrested him the following day, or otherwise personally caused a constitutional
deprivation. 6 Such collective allegations do not permit a reasonable inference that each individual
Defendant is personally liable for the conduct alleged. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (requiring allegations identifying the conduct, time, place,
and persons responsible).
6 Even if Plaintiff alleged that a particular defendant stopped Plaintiff, searched his person or
property, caused his vehicle to be towed, or arrested him, the bare allegation that such an act
occurred does not itself establish a constitutional violation. A plaintiff must plead facts permitting
a reasonable inference that a stop, seizure, or arrest was unlawful. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20–22 (1968); Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). The Amended
Complaint does not do so and, as to the arrest, affirmatively alleges an outstanding warrant. (ECF
No. 3 ¶ 11.)
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Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged either a constitutional deprivation by, or the
personal involvement of, any Linden Defendant, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim
under § 1983. Therefore, the Linden Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 100) is
GRANTED.
C. UCPO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff also asserts claims pursuant to § 1983 against the UCPO Defendants for various
alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The UCPO Defendants move to dismiss, arguing:
(1) the Court should abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (2) Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1944); (3) the Amended Complaint
constitutes improper group pleading; and (4) Plaintiff otherwise fails to state a claim because he
has not pleaded the UCPO Defendants’ personal involvement, any official-capacity claims are not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the UCPO Defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified
immunity. (ECF No. 103-1.)
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that either Brady or Cosgrove personally violated a
constitutional right. Here, the only discernable factual allegation directed specifically to Brady or
Cosgrove is that both were among several individuals who allegedly “followed [Plaintiff] home”
on July 7, 2021. (ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 3, 11.) Plaintiff does not otherwise identify any conduct attributable
to the UCPO Defendants or explain how their conduct deprived him of a constitutional right. The
Amended Complaint does not allege either UCPO Defendants stopped Plaintiff, searched his
person or property, ordered or effectuated the towing of his vehicle, procured the outstanding
warrant, or participated in Plaintiff’s arrest the following day. (See generally id.)
Merely identifying constitutional provisions without proffering facts connecting the
defendants’ conduct to a deprivation of the rights those provisions protect is insufficient to state a
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claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Accordingly, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks to hold Brady or Cosgrove liable for the stop, search, towing of his vehicle, or
subsequent arrest, the Amended Complaint fails to allege the personal involvement necessary to
state a claim under § 1983.
The UCPO Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 103 at
34.) Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless their conduct violates a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009). Courts consider “(1) ‘whether the facts that the plaintiff
has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘whether the right at issue was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Kedra v. Schroeter, 876
F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). Courts retain discretion to address
either prong first. Id. at 236. At the pleading stage, the first prong overlaps with the Rule 12(b)(6)
inquiry: a complaint that fails to plausibly plead the violation of a constitutional right likewise fails
the first prong of qualified immunity. Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 85, 88 n.9 (3d Cir.
2025). Because the Complaint does not plausibly allege that Brady or Cosgrove violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry. The
Court therefore need not determine whether any asserted right was clearly established.7
Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against the UCPO Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, and their Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
7 Because these grounds are sufficient to resolve the claims against Brady and Cosgrove, the Court
need not address whether the UCPO Defendants are also entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity or whether Plaintiff’s claims are otherwise barred by the Younger abstention doctrine
and the Heck bar.
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D. 	Leave to Amend
The Court next considers whether Plaintiff should be afforded further leave to amend. The
decision to grant leave to amend rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1970). In determining a motion for leave to
amend, courts consider the following factors: (1) undue delay on the part of the party seeking to
amend; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive behind the amendment; (3) repeated failure to cure
deficiencies through multiple prior amendments; (4) undue prejudice on the opposing party; and/or
(5) futility of the amendment. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP,
615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). An
amendment is futile if it “is frivolous or advances a claim . . . that is legally insufficient on its
face.” Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Imp., Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). To evaluate futility, the Court uses “the same standard of
legal sufficiency” as applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d
113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). Where a plaintiff has been placed on notice of pleading defects and has
had a meaningful opportunity to cure them, denial of further leave may be appropriate. See Krantz
v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgm. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d. Cir. 2002) (“A District Court has
discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the
deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”).
Based on the record before the Court, amendment to the Complaint would be futile because
Plaintiff cannot set forth allegations sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff has already amended his
Complaint, and the Court previously identified similar pleading deficiencies in dismissing claims
against other Defendants in this action and afforded him multiple opportunities to amend. (ECF
Nos. 40, 41); ECF No. 93 at 2 n.4 (citing ECF Nos. 7, 17, 41).) Plaintiff “chose not to resolve
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them.” Krantz, 305 F.3d at 144. The Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations plausibly
connecting the conduct of the Moving Defendants to any constitutional deprivations. Given
Plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure deficiencies despite prior opportunities to amend, the Court finds
that further leave to amend is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court declines to afford Plaintiff
further opportunity to amend.
E. Failure to Prosecute and Dismissal with Prejudice
The Court separately considers whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted based on
Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s August 19, 2026 Order. (ECF
No. 107.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that an action may be dismissed when a
plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A
district court possesses authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute. See Link
v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Kenney v. California Tanker Co., 381 F. 2d 775,
777 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968).
When a court dismisses a case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b),
the court employs the six-factor balancing test set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Cas. Co., 747 F.2d
863 (3d Cir. 1984). These factors include: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2)
the prejudice to the adversary caused by the plaintiff’s conduct; (3) the history of dilatoriness; (4)
whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. No single Poulis factor is determinative, and
dismissal may be appropriate even if some of the factors are not met. See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964
F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Here, the first Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal. Because Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, he bears personal responsibility for prosecuting this action and complying with the Court’s
orders. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258–59 (“[A] pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for
the progress of [his] case.”). After the mail sent to Plaintiff was returned as undeliverable, the
Court ordered him to provide a valid address by September 2, 2026, and extended his deadline to
oppose the pending motions to the same date. (ECF No. 107.) Plaintiff did neither.
The second factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. This action has been pending since
April 2023, and the Moving Defendants have appeared, litigated issues concerning default, and
filed renewed motions to dismiss. Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the pending motions or maintain
a current address has delayed resolution of the action and prevented the litigation from proceeding
in an orderly manner.
Third, the record reflects a history of dilatoriness. Plaintiff received multiple opportunities
to file a second amended complaint but did not do so. (ECF Nos. 7, 17, 41; ECF No. 93 at 2 n.4.)
He also failed to oppose three dispositive motions, maintain a current address, or comply with the
Court’s August 19, 2026 Order. (ECF No. 107.) This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fourth factor weighs against dismissal because the record does not establish willfulness
or bad faith. Although Plaintiff is responsible for his noncompliance, the Court cannot determine
why he failed to update his address or respond to the ending motions, particularly where mail sent
to his address of record was returned as undeliverable. See Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135.
As to the fifth Poulis factor, the availability of alternative sanctions, the Court already
extended Plaintiff’s opposition deadline and directed him to provide updated contact information,
to no avail. (ECF No. 107.) Monetary sanctions are unlikely to compel participation by an absent
pro se litigant, and, without a current address, the Court cannot reliably communicate a lesser
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action to Plaintiff. See Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (finding there was no effective alternative sanction
due to the plaintiff’s financial situation).
Lastly, the sixth meritoriousness factor weighs in favor of dismissal. For purposes of a
Poulis analysis, a claim is considered meritorious when the allegations, if established at trial,
would support recovery; courts apply a standard comparable to Rule 12(b)(6). See Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 263. The Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations against Wasyluk and fails to
plead the personal involvement of the Linden Defendants or UCPO Defendants in any
constitutional deprivation. The Court previously identified similar pleading deficiencies when it
dismissed claims against other Defendants and again observed those defects when the default
motions were decided. (ECF Nos. 40, 93.) Accordingly, the meritoriousness factor weighs in favor
of dismissal.
The Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The Court recognizes dismissal with
prejudice is an extreme sanction and cases should ordinarily be decided on their merits. See
Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 132. Here, however, Plaintiff was afforded multiple opportunities to
amend his pleading, failed to oppose three dispositive motions, failed to maintain a valid address
as required by Local Civil Rule 10.1(a), and failed to comply with the Court’s August 19, 2026,
Order directing him to provide a valid address and extending his deadline to oppose the pending
motions to September 2, 2026. (ECF No. 107.)8 Under these circumstances, and after balancing
the six Poulis factors, the Court finds no lesser sanction would be reasonably likely to secure
Plaintiff’s participation.
8 The September 2, 2026 Order expressly cautioned Plaintiff that failure to comply could result in
the motions being considered unopposed and the case being dismissed. (ECF No. 107.)
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Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Wasyluk 	and 	the 	UCPO 	Defendants 	are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Wasyluk’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 95) is
GRANTED, the Linden Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 100), is GRANTED, and the
UCPO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 103) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 3) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDCE. An appropriate order follows.
Date: October 13, 2026 	/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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