HAUSER-MERKLIN v. VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,

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Case 2:26-cv-04879-WJM-JRA Document16 Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 3 PagelD:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ROBYN HAUSER-MERKLIN, individually
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated

individuals, No. 26-cv-4879
Plaintiff,

OPINION

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J:

Before the Court is Defendant Valley Health System, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Valley
Heaith”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”). ECF No. 9. The
Court decides the Motion on the papers and without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ.
R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.

L BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are accepted as true only for the
purposes of resolving the instant Motion.

Plaintiff Robyn Hauser-Merklin began her employment as a medical assistant with
Defendant at some point in 2021, Compl. 7 16, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff worked at several of
Defendant’s healthcare locations throughout her term of employment, which ended in October
2025. fd. During her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff “generally worked at least forty (40)
hours per week.” /d. Plaintiff was an hourly employee, and as such was “required to clock in and
out” of her shifts to record her hours worked. /d. { 20.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant implemented a policy that asked employees to clock in no
more than seven minutes before the start of their shift, and clock out no more than seven minutes
after the end of their shift. Jd. 422. The policy was allegedly implemented to ensure that any time
worked prior to the beginning of a shift was rounded up to the shift start time, and any time worked
after the end of the shift was rounded down to the shift end time. Plaintiff alleges that, in addition
to the rounding policy, Defendant told employees that they would be penalized if they “clock in
one minute late or clock out one minute early,” regardless of whether they clocked in early or
clocked out late. /d. | 23. Plaintiff alleges that during her employment she “regularly clocked in
several minutes prior to the beginning of her shift” and “regularly worked after the end” of her
shift but was not paid for the extra time. /d. J] 24-25.

Plaintiff filed a collective and class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and other current
and former Valley Health employees bringing claims for failure to pay overtime wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (““NJWHL”), and

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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claims for failure to pay all wages and failure to provide pay deductions under the New Jersey
Wage Theft Act (““NJWTA”). Valley Health filed this Motion, which Plaintiff opposes.

IL. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint if it fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), courts must “accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences
from the facts alleged in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The burden to show that no claim has been stated
falls on the moving party. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 Gd Cir. 2005). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

ill. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to satisfy
the pleading standard for overtime claims under the FLSA as articulated by the Third Circuit in
Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 765 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2014). The Court agrees.

The FLSA requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times their regular hourly
wage for overtime hours, which are those exceeding forty hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1). In Davis, the Third Circuit addressed the level of detail required for a complaint to
plausibly allege an overtime claim under the FLSA. In adopting a “middle-ground approach,” the
Third Circuit held that a plaintiff is not required to “identify the exact dates and times that [they]
worked overtime,” but is required to allege facts that they worked more than forty hours in at least
one week. Davis, 765 F.3d at 242-43. The Third Circuit offered a specific example of factual
allegations that would satisfy this standard, noting that “a plaintiffs claim that she ‘typically’
worked forty hours per week, worked extra hours during such a forty-hour week, and was not
compensated for extra hours beyond forty hours . . . during one or more of ‘Hose forty hour weeks,
would suffice.” /d. at 243 (emphasis in original).

In applying that standard, the Third Circuit held that although the complaint alleged
plaintiffs “typically worked at least forty hours per week,” there were no facts to indicate that
plaintiffs worked extra hours during a typical forty-hour week. Jd. The absence of a link between
the plaintiff's typical week and the weeks in which extra hours were worked was fatal. It is the
existence (or lack thereof) of such a link that the analysis turns on.!

' Plaintiff cites to several cases in this district applying the Davis standard in what she advances are analogous
factual circumstances. However, the cases cited by Plaintiff instead highlight the deficiency in her pleading. The
cases cited contain some allegation showing a link between the plaintiff's standard work week and extra hours
worked. See Bowman v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 23-22507, 2026 WL 657277, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 9,
2026) (“Plaintiff [] alleges that ... when she would typically work eight-hour shifts five days a week . . . ‘each
week’ she worked ten to fifteen minutes of uncompensated overtime.”), Young v. Wipra Lid, No. 25-14949, 2026
WL 1983793, at *4 (D.N.J. July 9, 2026) (“Plaintiff alleges that his ‘standard schedule was to work 40 hours per
week’ and that, before ‘every shift,’ has [sic] was required to perform approximately fifteen to twenty minutes of
uncompensated pre-shift work.”}; Ward vy. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, Na, 18-2155, 2019 WL 643605, at *7

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Here, Plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true, lack a connection between her typical work
week and any extra time worked beyond forty hours. Plaintiff alleges that she “generally worked
at least forty (40) hours per week.” Compl. 4 16. Plaintiff further alleges that she “regularly clocked
in several minutes prior to the beginning of her shift,” and “regularly worked after the end of [her]
shift times.” /d. | 24, 25, But Plaintiff does not allege that the forty hours is exclusive of the
additional work, or that her pre- and post-shift work was in addition to her typical forty hours or
occurred during at least one of her forty-hour weeks.

While Plaintiff does allege that she “often stopped working four (4), five (5), or six (6)
minutes after the end of her shift,” she does not allege that these additional minutes caused her to
exceed forty hours in a week. See id, | 26. Because there is no specific allegation of a link between
the pre- and post-shift work and her typical forty-hour work week, Plaintiff has failed to meet the
standard outlined in Davis that she worked extra hours during a typical week and exceeded forty
hours without compensation.

Given the dismissal of Plaintiff's FLSA claim (Count I), the Court has “dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction” and may decline to exercise suppiemental
jurisdiction over remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's claims under the
NJWHL and NJWTA (Counts II-TV).

Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.

Date: October 2026

(D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2019) (‘Plaintiff has stated that he typicafly worked forty hours a week, typically worked sixteen
additional hours above those forty hours, and was not compensated for his overtime.”) (emphasis added).

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