Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHEWU AHMED,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-10601 (JXN)
LUIS SOTO, et al.,
Respondents.
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Shewu Ahmed’s (“Petitioner”) Second Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Second Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued
detention. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents filed an opposition to the Second Petition (ECF No. 4), and
Petitioner replied in further support (ECF No. 6). Following an Order from the Court, Respondents
provided supplemental briefing (ECF Nos. 8, 10) and Petitioner replied (ECF No. 11). The Court
considered the parties’ submissions in support of and opposition to the Second Petition and decides
the Second Petition without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local
Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Second Petition is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of Ghana, unlawfully entered the United States on November 23, 2021.
Ahmed v. Soto, No. 26-7074, ECF No. 5-1 at 3. On the same day, Petitioner encountered Border
Patrol agents. Id. Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to his country and was served with an
expedited order of removal. Id. On December 10, 2021, Petitioner was released on interim parole.
Id.
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On March 18, 2026, an asylum officer interviewed Petitioner and found a negative claim
of fear. Id., ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-4. On March 21, 2026, Petitioner's wife filed an I-130
application on his behalf. Id., ECF No. 5-1 at 4. On April 24, 2026, immigration officials arrested
Petitioner pursuant to an administrative warrant at the Newark Office of Enforcement and Removal
Operations (“ERO”) in Newark, New Jersey. Id., ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-6. Petitioner requested
review of his negative fear finding by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and was referred to the
Immigration Court. Id. On May 6, 2026, an IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s negative fear findings.
Id., ECF No. 5-7.
On June 13, 2026, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition, challenging his detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id., ECF No. 1. Respondents opposed the first petition, arguing that
Petitioner was lawfully detained and subject to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
Id., ECF No. 5. On July 23, 2026, the Court issued an Opinion and Order, denying Petitioner’s
first petition. Id., ECF Nos. 7, 8. The Court noted that Petitioner’s final order of removal became
administratively final on May 6, 2026, and that he remained within the 90-day mandatory detention
period. Id. Accordingly, the Court found that Petitioner’s challenge to his § 1231(a) detention was
premature. Id.
On August 13, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Second Petition arguing that (1) his
continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) violates his constitutional rights, and (2) his
continued detention is causing medical harm. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Respondents responded
arguing that Petitioner’s detention is not unduly prolonged (ECF No. 4), his removal is likely in
the foreseeable future (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner is receiving adequate medical treatment (ECF
No. 10). Petitioner replied. (ECF Nos. 6, 11.)
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody” and
the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). A district court’s authority
includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner filed the instant Second Petition arguing that (1) his continued detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a) violates his constitutional rights, and (2) his continued detention is causing
medical harm. (See generally ECF No. 1.)
I. 	Prolonged Detention
In his Second Petition, Petitioner argues that his 90-day mandatory detention “removal
period” under §1231(a) has expired and Respondents have not shown that there is significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Id. at 9-10.)
The record establishes that Petitioner has been subject to a final order of removal since
May 6, 2026, when the IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s findings of negative fear. Ahmed, No. 26-
7074, ECF No. 5-7. Section 1231 states in relevant part that “when [a noncitizen] is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within a
period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
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This 90-day detention is mandatory. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (“While removal proceedings
are in progress, most [noncitizens] may be released on bond or paroled. After entry of a final
removal order and during the 90-day removal period, however, [noncitizens] must be held in
custody.” (internal citation omitted))
The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
(i) 	The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.
(ii) 	If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the
removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order.
(iii) 	If the [noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an immigration
process), 	the 	date 	the 	[noncitizen] 	is 	released 	from 	detention 	or
confinement.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Here, Petitioner’s 90-day mandatory “removal period” began when the
IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s negative fear finding on May 6, 2026. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii).
The mandatory removal period expired on August 4, 2026.
ICE is not required to release the noncitizen once the removal period has expired, but “[d]ue
process rights may be implicated where . . . there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Cepeda v. I.N.S., 273 F. Supp. 2d 222, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that post-removal-order
detention becomes constitutionally suspect only when it is prolonged beyond a presumptively
reasonable six-month period and removal is not reasonably foreseeable. 533 U.S. at 701
(establishing a six-month presumption of reasonableness for post-removal-order detention).
Petitioner’s detention—measured from when ICE took him into custody on April 24, 2026—falls
short of six months, rendering his claim premature.
Additionally, Petitioner “has not made an initial showing in this matter that his removal is
not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and he therefore cannot show that his continued
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detention under § 1231(a) is unlawful.” Calle Guaman v. Soto, et al., No. 26-cv-1783, 2026 WL
811353, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2026). Petitioner claims that Respondents have not identified a
completed travel document, itinerary, scheduled flight, or date certain for removal. (ECF No. 1 at
9.) However, Respondents have provided a Declaration from Maurice E. Williams, a Supervisory
Detention and Deportation Officer with ICE, ERO, Newark Field Office, in which he states that
ERO has a photocopy of Petitioner’s passport and has established Petitioner’s identity. (ECF No.
8-1 at ¶ 3.) On September 3, 2026, ERO requested travel documents from the Embassy of Ghana.
(Id. at ¶ 4.) The Declaration from Maurice E. Williams states that it generally takes 2-3 weeks to
obtain the travel document, and once the Court lifts the no-transfer order, Petitioner’s removal can
be effectuated. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) Petitioner has failed to overcome the six-month presumption of
reasonableness for his post-removal-order detention.
II. 	Conditions of Confinement- Medical Claim
Petitioner raises a conditions of confinement claim regarding his medical care, arguing that
his continued detention exposes him to a known and grave health risk and violates his due process
rights. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11.) Petitioner claims that he has had two separate medical incidents
requiring emergency medical treatment. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner argues that on or about May 31, 2026,
Petitioner “swallowed or choked on broken plastic contained in food served at Delaney Hall.” (Id.)
Petitioner submits that on August 17, 2026, he was transported to the hospital because of high
blood pressure. (Id.) In their response, Respondents provided a Declaration from Dr. Jamal
Gwathney, the Chief Medical Officer for ICE Health Service Corps, and Petitioner’s medical
records. (ECF Nos. 10-1, 10-2.) Dr. Gwathney opined that Petitioner’s medical complaints have
been adequately addressed and that he has received adequate care. (ECF No. 10-1 at ¶ 18.)
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In Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2020), the Third Circuit
held that § 2241 may, in extraordinary circumstances, provide a vehicle for detainees to seek
release based on unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Hope involved civil immigration
detainees facing acute and imminent medical risk during the COVID-19 pandemic; the conditions
at issue were so “severe” and “unique” that release was the only remedy capable of addressing the
alleged constitutional harm. Id. at 323-325.
Crucially, however, Hope expressly reserved the question of whether less serious
conditions, those not presenting the kind of existential threat confronted during an uncontrolled
pandemic, could support a habeas claim. Id. at 325. Subsequent decisions have emphasized the
“extraordinary” and fact-specific nature of Hope, limiting its reach. See, e.g., Perri v. Warden FCI
Fort Dix, 2024 WL 3633567, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (declining to extend Hope where “the
extraordinary circumstances” present during the early COVID-19 pandemic were no longer
present). Accordingly, “[a] conditions-of-confinement claim is cognizable in § 2241 proceedings
‘only in extreme cases.’” Folk v. Warden Schuylkill FCI, No. 23-1935, 2023 WL 5426740, at *1
(3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2023) (emphasis in original) (quoting Hope, 972 F.3d at 324.)
Here, Petitioner argues that he has required emergency treatment since entering Delaney
Hall. (See ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) The Court has reviewed the medical records Respondents provided
and finds that the record does not establish an extraordinary circumstance. The medical records
show that on May 31, 2026, Petitioner was transported from Delaney Hall to the hospital after
complaining about swallowing plastic fragments while eating lunch and stating that he felt a
foreign body sensation in his throat. (ECF No. 10-2 at 84-89.) The emergency department
performed imaging, and no foreign body was identified. (Id. at 79.) On June 4, 2026, Petitioner
was seen for a follow-up visit with complaints of throat irritation and was started on a 30-day
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course of Protonix to address it. (Id. at 76.) On the same day, it was noted that Petitioner has
hypertension and started Lisinopril (Id.) On June 15, 2026, Petitioner refused his scheduled
medications, complaining of stomach pain. (Id. at 69.) He was “educated that abdominal pain is
not a common side effect of antihypertensives.” (Id.) On June 18, 2026, Petitioner complained of
intermittent abdominal pain, but reported no new symptoms. Pecid was ordered, and a GI consult
was requested. (Id. at 65.) On July 7, 2026, Petitioner was again transported to the hospital after
complaining of abdominal pain following eating. (Id. at 52-57.) Petitioner received another CT
scan, which showed no abnormalities. (Id. at 49.) Upon returning to Delaney Hall, Petitioner stated
that his abdominal pain was resolved, and he was diagnosed with acid reflux. (Id.) Petitioner was
started on Omeprazole and Norvasc. (Id. at 50.) On August 26, 2026, Petitioner complained of
dyspnea and chest pain with difficulty breathing. (Id. at 45.) Petitioner was transferred to the
hospital for further evaluation. (Id.) Upon returning to Delaney Hall, Petitioner’s breathing was
even and unlabored, and he stated that he felt fine.1 (Id. at 38.) Petitioner is currently taking
Lisinopril, Amlodipine, and Hydrochlorothiazide for blood pressure, and Pantoprazole as
recommended by the gastroenterologist. (ECF No. 10-1 at ¶ 17.) The medical records show that
Petitioner is being treated for his complaints and symptoms. Petitioner fails to present facts that
Respondents are not providing him with appropriate medical care or that they are not capable of
treating his medical conditions. As Petitioner has been receiving consistent care for his
hypertension and abdominal pain, the Court finds Petitioner has not presented an extreme case or
an extraordinary circumstance warranting habeas relief of release at this time. See Hope, 972 F.3d
1 Petitioner claims he was also transported to the hospital on August 17, 2026 for high blood pressure. (ECF No. 1 at
7.) In his Declaration, Dr. Gwathney indicates that on August 17, 2026, Petitioner was again sent to the hospital for
abdominal pain, and another CT scan revealed “unremarkable results.” (ECF No. 10-1 at ¶ 14.) This incident is not in
the medical r/ecords provided to the Court. (See generally ECF No. 10-2.) However, Petitioner is being treated for
high blood pressure.
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at 329 (“‘mere disagreement’ as to the response to the risk to Petitioner[ ] in light of their medical
condition will not support constitutional infringement”).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Second Petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED without
prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATED: 10/9/2026
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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