ISAACS v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANDREW ISAACS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 25-13626 (GC) (JBD)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Andrew Isaacs’s Motion to
Remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County (ECF No. 17) and
Defendant Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. 	(ECF No. 18.)
Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s Motion; Plaintiff did not reply. (ECF No. 20.) 	Plaintiff opposed
Defendant’s Motion, and Defendant replied. 	(ECF Nos. 19, 21.) 	The parties also submitted
supplemental briefing at the Court’s direction. 	(ECF Nos. 27, 28.) 	The Court has carefully
reviewed the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below,
and other good cause shown, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED as moot.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background1
In February 2020, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as Chief of Staff, Commercial
Acceleration. 	(ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 1.) 	Plaintiff alleges he received “consecutive ‘outstanding’
performance reviews,” was sought as a coach and mentor, and earned the trust and appreciation of
his colleagues. (Id. ¶ 3.) By June 2022, Defendant had promoted Plaintiff twice. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Three employees filed complaints against Plaintiff between 2021 and 2023 regarding
alleged comments made by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant denied each
claim as unsubstantiated and dismissed them. 	(Id.) 	Despite this, in January 2024, Plaintiff
received a final warning, “purportedly based on the prior complaints.” (Id. ¶ 7.) On June 3, 2024,
after a fourth employee complained of Plaintiff’s conduct, Defendant terminated Plaintiff “for
cause” due to “misconduct.” (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiff disputes the circumstances of his termination
and alleges he “was not given a meaningful opportunity for due process to challenge” the
complaints against him. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that his termination was involuntary and without cause, and as such, he is
entitled to a “severance package.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the terms of his
employment and “the company’s severance policy” entitled Plaintiff to severance. 	(Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff alleges that, had Defendant not terminated him for cause due to misconduct, his severance
package would have totaled $1,038,564.97. (Id.) He further alleges that his severance would have
included nine months of pay, comprised of a 90-day notice period “before [his] last day on payroll”
1 	On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts as true, but
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
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and six months of pay after separation, a “cash bonus” for work performed during 2024, and
unvested stock options. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims he sought to appeal his termination, but that Defendant informed him that
“only his [m]anager” could appeal, and that his manager had declined to do so. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff
also alleges he inquired with Defendant as to the process to challenge Defendant’s conclusion that
his termination was “for cause,” but that Defendant informed him there was “no process” to
challenge the “for cause” nature of his termination. (Id. ¶ 15.)
B. 	Procedural Background
On June 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset
County, asserting breach of contract, quantum meruit (reasonable value), unjust enrichment and a
violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (NJWPL). 	(ECF No. 1-1.) 	On July 22, 2025,
Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2 (ECF No. 1 at 2.)3 On
November 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand this action back to the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Somerset County. (ECF No. 17.) On November 20, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts Plaintiff’s claims and that, in
any case, Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated any claims against Defendant. (ECF No. 18.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may remove a case from state to federal court where “the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction.” Entrekin v. Fisher Sci. Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 594, 603
2 	Defendant also asserts that the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367 over any of Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.)
3 	Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
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(D.N.J. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). 	Following the removal of a case, the plaintiff may
move to remand the case to state court. 	See Atl. Neurosurgical Specialists v. Anthem, Inc., Civ.
No. 21-20052, 2022 WL 3273952, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2022). When an action is removed to
federal court, the removing party maintains the burden of showing that the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). The
court must evaluate whether remand is proper at the time of removal and not after. Lawless v. N.J.
Dep’t of Corrs., Civ. No. 12-14670, 2022 WL 1830778, at *2 (D.N.J. June 3, 2022). “The [c]ourt
must also strictly construe the removal statutes against removal and resolve any doubts in favor of
remand.” Entrekin, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 604; see also Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108,
111 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A district court must resolve all contested issues of substantive fact . . . and . . .
any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant removed this case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the grounds
that Plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by ERISA such that ERISA’s “sweeping
preemptive effect” extends to all of Plaintiff’s causes of action. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks
to remand this action to state court on the grounds that his severance claims do not require the
application of ERISA, such that no federal question is implicated. (ECF No. 17 at 20.) Thus, the
issue in this case is whether Defendant’s ERISA-approved Severance Pay Plan (the Plan)
completely preempts Plaintiff’s common law claims such that Plaintiff’s claims are federal in
nature and subject to this Court’s original federal subject matter jurisdiction.4 (ECF No. 18-1 at
4 	Plaintiff does not dispute that the Plan is governed by ERISA. 	(See ECF No. 19 at 1
(referring to the Plan as an “ERISA document”).)
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12-24; see also ECF No. 18-3.) 	The Court addresses the preemption issue first because it
implicates this Court’s jurisdiction over the case.
The well-pleaded complaint rule states that “a cause of action ‘arises under’ federal law,
and removal is proper, only if a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.” 	Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12
(1983)). There is, however, a “narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for instances
where Congress has expressed its intent to ‘completely pre-empt’ a particular area of law such that
any claim that falls within this area is ‘necessarily federal in character.’” In re U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1987)). 	“[C]omplete preemption operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction
notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.” 	Id. As
such, if a federal law completely preempts a state law cause of action, a matter may be removed
to federal court on that basis alone, “even if the well-pleaded complaint rule is not satisfied.” Joyce
v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1997). A federal court may look beyond
the face of the complaint to determine whether a plaintiff has “artfully pleaded his suit so as to
couch a federal claim in terms of state law.”5 	Pascack Valley Hospital v. Local 464A UFCW
Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2004). 	ERISA’s 	civil 	enforcement
mechanism, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), “is one of those provisions with such extraordinary pre-emptive
power that it converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” 	29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Pascack Valley, 388
5 	Defendant attached a copy of the Plan to its Notice of Removal as well as to its Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 1-2, 18-3.)
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F.3d at 400 (internal quotations omitted). 	Relevant here, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) allows a
“participant or beneficiary” to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan[.]” By its terms, standing under the statute is limited to participants
and beneficiaries. 	Pascack Valley, 388 F.3d at 400. 	The term “participant” is naturally read to
mean either “employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment” or
former employees who “have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment” or
who have a “colorable claim” to vested benefits. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 117 (1989).6 “The burden of persuasion for establishing a colorable claim is less exacting
than that needed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.” 	Baldwin v. University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center, 636 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Court holds that Plaintiff does not have a colorable claim to vested benefits under the
Plan, such that ERISA does not completely preempt Plaintiff’s claims or operate to confer original
jurisdiction in this case. The Plan presented by Defendant includes a section titled “Eligibility”
with a subsection titled “Exclusions from Eligibility.” (ECF No. 18-3 at 4.) It states that, “[y]ou
will be ineligible to receive severance pay and other benefits under this plan under the following
circumstances: . . . If you are terminated for poor performance which, in the opinion of the
company, was . . . misconduct[.]” (Id.) In other words, by the plain language of the Plan, when
Defendant terminates an employee and identifies the cause as poor performance due to
misconduct, the terminated employee is ineligible for the Plan’s benefits. While Plaintiff argues
that Defendant improperly terminated him “for cause” due to “misconduct,” (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 1-
6 	A “beneficiary” is “a person designated by a participant to recover benefits in the event of
the participant’s death.” See Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
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9), Plaintiff does not allege that he participated in the appeal process that was available to him to
challenge the grounds for his termination or to seek severance pay. 	(ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 14-15.)
Indeed, while the Plan provides for an appeal process whereby a participant must submit a “written
application to the plan administrator within 90 days of [the participant’s] termination,” (ECF No.
1-2 at 10) Plaintiff does not allege that he submitted a written application or otherwise attempted
to participate in the appeal process. 	Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he was advised by Defendant
that “there was no process to challenge” his termination for cause. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 14-15.)
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is a participant under the Plan because he “may become
eligible to receive a benefit” and he need not establish “a present, undisputed right to payment.”
ECF No. 28 at 2-3. According to Defendant, the “relevant jurisdictional question is not whether
Plaintiff has already established a right to payment; it is whether he is the sort of former employee
who may assert a non-frivolous claim under the Plan.” 	(ECF No. 28 at 2.) 	The Court finds
Defendant’s argument unavailing. 	While the standard for finding a plaintiff has asserted a
colorable claim is less than that needed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court
disagrees with Defendant’s assertion that a finding that Plaintiff has asserted a “non-frivolous
claim” is sufficient to find the claims preempted by ERISA. Baldwin, 636 F.3d at 75. Based on
the plain language of the Plan, the Court finds Plaintiff has not asserted a colorable claim for vested
benefits to confer original subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 	Ericson v. Greenberg & Co.,
P.C., 118 F. App’x 608, 611 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that because the plaintiff was no longer owed
anything by the plan, she did not have a colorable claim to benefits from the plan at the time she
filed her complaint and therefore could not be characterized as a participant). Because “the party
asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the
litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court,” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d
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188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007), Defendant’s failure to show Plaintiff was a participant under the Plan
compels the Court to find that removal was improper and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF
No. 17) is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 18) is
DENIED as moot. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: October __, 2026
______________________________
G EORGETTE CASTNER
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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