JTS/Simms, LLC

1 As is customary for this Court, the notes were prepared by
the Court to deliver its decision, and are close to a verbatim
transcript of the Court’s prepared remarks. 	Of course, the
actual record for appeal or any other purpose is the electronic
file created by the Court’s digital audio recording system and
stored on various servers. 	For the reader’s convenience, a copy
of the notes are attached to this opinion.
Page 1 of 	18
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
In re:
JTS/Simms, LLC,
Debtor. 	No. 11-07-12153 SA
SUPPLEMENT TO ORAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STAY RELIEF
FILED BY SILAR SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LP
In support of its order (doc 115) denying the motion for
stay relief (doc 14) filed by Silar Special Opportunities Fund,
LP (“Silar”), the Court issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law orally on the record as permitted by Rule 7052, F.R.B.P.
Minutes, Attachment 1 (notes of oral ruling 1) – doc 108. 	The
Court ruled that even if Silar was entitled to charge the rates
of interest and the back-end loan fee (or “back-end fee”)
specified in the loan documents, the collateral had sufficient
value (over $8.5 million) to provide an equity cushion for
Silar’s interest in the property to justify not modifying the
stay.
These additional (written) findings of fact and conclusions
of law which the Court now issues (also prepared pursuant to Rule
7052) address issues raised by the parties which the Court did
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2 Even though stay litigation is often summary in form and
therefore the adjudication of the issues therein is also often
somewhat preliminary, the parties in this instance were clearly
looking to the Court for decisions concerning the interest rate
and back-end loan fee that they could use in subsequent
proceedings without having to try the issues again.
Page 2 of 	18
not need to address initially in the course of deciding the
motion for stay relief, even though the parties had submitted
those issues to the Court for its decision as part of the stay
litigation. 2 	The Court is now deciding these additional issues
because they bear on new matters that have arisen in the case,
particularly Debtor’s motion to auction off the bulk of the
estate’s assets (doc 112) and Debtor’s objection to Silar’s proof
of claim (doc 122).
Additional Factual Background
Silar’s loan documents include the bridge loan agreement
(Silar exhibit 1), a real estate promissory note (Silar exhibit
2), a mortgage (Silar exhibit 3), and a collateral assignment of
rents and leases (Silar exhibit 4). 	The terms of the loan were
the subject of considerable negotiation and the deal was finally
inked when, in Silar’s perception, Troy Baillio on behalf of
Debtor gave Silar a deadline to sign documents and do the deal or
risk being sued. 	The parties had been negotiating a 12-month
term loan, but because of the shortage of time arising from
Debtor’s deadline to purchase the property, the parties executed
an interim or bridge loan. 	Silar exhibit 1 (Recitals and
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3 “This Note is given to evidence a business loan for the
business purpose of Maker.” 	Silar Exhibit 2 at 1.
4 The provision for the default rate of interest contains a
typographical error: “... and thereafter at the rate of twenty
percent (24%) per annum....” 	The parties discussed a default
rate of 24%, the term sheets provided a default rate of 10% above
the non-default rate (which suggests that the larger 6% rather
than 2% over the non-default rate was what the parties were
contemplating), and six percent above the non-default rate rather
than two percent is far more common. 	In consequence the Court
has decided that the parties intended 24% to be the default rate.
Page 3 of 	18
paragraphs 2 and 3). 	The loan documents were executed May 23,
2007; the loan was due July 23, 2007; and Debtor filed its
petition August 31, 2007. 	As is apparent, this is not a consumer
case 3, and whatever one might say about the terms, there is no
evidence of predatory lending practices. 	These were
sophisticated parties on both sides of the negotiations, and this
loan entailed significant risk of late or otherwise troubled
repayment.
The note sets an interest rate of 18% and a default interest
rate of 24%. 4 	The note also provides as follows:
This Note is payable as follows: 	Maker shall pay
accrued interest only on or before the twenty-third
(23 rd ) day of June, 2007. 	The entire indebtedness
evidenced by this Note plus all accrued and unpaid
interest and a back-end loan fee (the “Fee”) in the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 Dollars
($405,000.00) shall be due and payable on July 23, 2007
(a “Maturity Date”). 	All payments shall be made at
Lender’s address at Attn: Robert Leeds, 333 Seventh
Avenue, 3 rd Floor, New York, NY 10001.
Maker may prepay this Note, in whole or in part, at any
time without penalty other than payment of the Fee upon
a payment in full. 	No partial payment and no
prepayment, other than payment in full, shall entitle
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5 A helpful discussion of the issue, including a summary of
the cases as of 1998, is in Crabbe, Should an Over-Secured
Creditor be Entitled to Post-Petition Interest at the Default
Rate?, March 1998 ABI Journal 8.
6 More precisely, the United States had a prepetition
oversecured tax claim, and the debtor in possession argued that
§506(b) did not permit the United States to be paid interest on
the claim because it was a non-consensual lien; i.e., it did not
arise from an agreement between the two parties. 	Interpreting
Page 4 of 	18
Maker to the release of any portion of the Property
from the Mortgage.
Upon any failure to make any payment on this Note as
agreed or any failure to perform Maker’s obligations
under the Mortgage or any other document evidencing,
securing or otherwise executed in connection with the
loan evidenced by this Note, Lender, at its sole
discretion, may declare the entire outstanding
principal of this Note plus all interest thereon, the
Fee and any other amounts due to be immediately due and
payable on the date of such failure (a “Maturity
Date”).
The interest rates and the back-end loan fee are the subject of
the parties’ disputes.
Analysis
INTEREST RATES 5
“[F]ederal bankruptcy law, not state law, governs the
distribution of a bankrupt’s assets to his creditors.” 	American
Surety Co. of New York v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269, 272 (1946).
(Citations omitted.) 	With respect to preconfirmation interest,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989), held that while an award of
“fees, costs, or charges” is dictated by the loan agreement, the
award of interest is not. 6 	Thus, applying the Ron Pair
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that part of §506(b) which provides in part that for oversecured
claims “there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim
arose”, the court held that there did not need to be an agreement
that provided for interest in order for interest to be allowed on
the claim. 	Id. at 241-42.
7 In Ron Pair Enterprises, the government held nonconsensual
oversecured prepetition claims. 	In this case Silar’s lien is
consensual.
Page 5 of 	18
Enterprises ruling to the opposite set of facts 7 , one could
conclude that the Court is not tethered to the Note in ruling
what the preconfirmation interest rates should be.
Debtor has cited several cases to the Court in which
interest rates have been reduced. 	And some of those cases have
an impressive pedigree; e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946), holding that
equitable principles governing bankruptcy distribution determined
that senior lienholders were not entitled to be paid interest on
interest which would substantially reduce the payment to junior
creditors:
It is manifest that the touchstone of each decision on
allowance of interest in bankruptcy, receivership and
reorganization has been a balance of equities between
creditor and creditor or between creditors and the
debtor.
Id. at 165. 	See generally Sampsell, 327 U.S. at 272-73
(controlling equitable principles permitted payment to surety to
be subordinated to payment of claims of laborers and
materialmen); and Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939)
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Page 6 of 	18
(“[A] bankruptcy court has full power to inquire into the
validity of any claim asserted against the estate and to disallow
it if it is ascertained to be without lawful existence.”).
(Citation omitted.)
Nevertheless, at least the starting point for consideration
of the issue should be the rates the parties agreed on at the
time of the transaction. 	Further, the mere fact that a debtor
filed a bankruptcy petition should not open a tabula rasa on the
issue. 	There is nothing about bankruptcy per se which
automatically requires a complete reconsideration (or, as between
the parties, a complete renegotiation) of the preconfirmation
interest rate.
Bankruptcy courts have construed Ron Pair to require
analyzing default rates based on the facts and equities
specific to each case. In re Consolidated Properties
Ltd. Partnership, 152 B.R. 452, 457 (Bankr.D.Md.1993);
In re DWS Invs., 121 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr. C.D.Cal.
1990). This does not render the contracted-for default
rate irrelevant. “[D]espite its equity pedigree,
[bankruptcy] is a procedure for enforcing
pre-bankruptcy entitlements under specified terms and
conditions rather than a flight of redistributive
fancy.” In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221, 223 (7th
Cir.1990). Creditors have a right to bargained-for
post-petition interest and “bankruptcy judges are not
empowered to dissolve rights in the name of equity.”
Id. at 224. What emerges from the post- Ron Pair
decisions is a presumption in favor of the contract
rate subject to rebuttal based upon equitable
considerations. In re Courtland Estates Corp., 144 B.R.
5, 9 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992); In re Hollstrom, 133 B.R.
535, 539 (Bankr.D.Colo.1991); DWS Invs., 121 B.R. at
849 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1990).
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Page 7 of 	18
In re Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 241, 243 (7 th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied Invex Holdings, N.V. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of
Iowa, 513 U.S. 948 (1994) (upholding trial court’s decision not
to reduce interest rate of second mortgagee in order to create
equity for third mortgagee). 	But compare, e.g., In re Laymon,
958 F.2d 72, 75 (5 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied Crozier v.
Bradford, 506 U.S. 917 (1992) (remanded for examination of the
equities in allowing a 10% non-default rate vs. 18% default
rate).
As noted above, this project was not the safest to loan on.
Everyone knew that going into the deal. 	Indeed, that was why
Debtor was borrowing from a hedge fund instead of a local bank.
And of course the hedge fund took that into consideration in
calculating the pricing of its loan. 	In the circumstances,
including taking into account the back-end fee (and without of
course gainsaying the well established authority of a bankruptcy
court to alter repayment terms on equitable grounds), 18% is not
an unreasonable or inequitable predefault interest rate. 	The
mere fact that a relatively high rate of interest may deprive
other creditors of any distribution, or may even result in a
failed reorganization, are not sufficient reasons by themselves
to now bend the terms more in favor of the estate.
Finally, the [trial] court emphasized the importance of
enforcing, as close as possible, the parties
bargained-for contract rights. When Invex Holdings
entered its agreement with Terry, it did so fully aware
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Page 8 of 	18
of Roosevelt's and Equitable's superior interests in
the property and the extent of those interests. In
short, Invex Holdings bargained for the risky position
in which it later found itself, and as the court
stated, “There is nothing equitable, however, in
diminishing one creditor's bargained for rights in
order to augment the rights bargained for by a second
creditor.”
In re Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d at 243.
The same can be said of the 24% default rate of interest.
Pre and post-default interest rates are simply matters
of pricing. The money costs more if not repaid when
agreed. Had Congress wished to distinguish between the
treatment of pre and post-default interest by section
506(b), it could easily enough have said so.
In re K & J Properties, Inc., 338 B.R. 450, 458 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2005) (allowing 36% default interest rate). 	An additional six
percent above the predefault rate is not surprising or shocking;
in fact, it is quite common.
Thus, despite the intellectual prowess and careful reasoning
of the other courts which have come to different conclusions than
this Court, the Court disagrees with the results of those other
cases cited by Debtor. 	E.g., In re Hollstrom, 133 B.R. 535, 539-
541 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (rejecting 36% interest rate as
completely unrelated to market rates or any risk of loss and
having the effect of depriving remaining creditors of any
distribution); In re DWS Investments, Inc., 121 B.R. 845, 846
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (creditors not entitled to contractual
default interest rate of 25% absent showing that 25% rate had any
relationship to actual or projected losses as a result of
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8 Whether the creditor has effectively increased the expense
of the loan (and thereby likely increased its return) by actions
it takes in the bankruptcy case, is of course subject to review
by the Court. 	Thus allowance of the 24% default interest rate
plus the back-end loan fee does not preclude Debtor from
contesting the ultimate amount allowed for the claim, including
attorney fees and interest expense that would not have been
incurred but for unjustified action, if any, by the creditor.
9 The Court has considered but rejected for lack of evidence
the possibility that Silar closed the loan to avoid being sued
but did so with the intention of not following through with the
term loan.
Page 9 of 	18
debtor’s nonpayment – collateral valued at over 2 - 2.5 times the
debt); In re White, 88 B.R. 498, 511 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(contract default interest rate of 48% not usurious under state
law and creditor never faced realistic risk of nonpayment of its
debt; nevertheless default rate shocked conscience of court and
rate held unenforceable as a penalty); and In re W.S. Sheppley &
Co., 62 B.R. 271, 278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (default rate of
12% disapproved in view of facts that, inter alia, 9.27% non-
default rate was a market rate, that creditor faced no prospect
of nonpayment and that creditor was at least partly responsible
for delaying the rapid disposition of the collateral 8 ).
Without at all denying the authority of a bankruptcy court
to modify interest rates, the Court finds that the facts of this
case – a loan agreement vigorously negotiated between two
sophisticated parties (with Silar closing the loan on short
notice because of a perceived threat of suit 9) and some risk of
less than full payment to Silar – coupled with a hesitation to
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Page 10 of 	18
change for general equitable reasons the terms that the parties
negotiated, justify leaving the contractual default interest rate
in place. 	The Court does not have carte blanche in the name of
“equity” to refashion agreements. 	The exercise of such a power
would be unfair to one of the parties. 	It would also potentially
undermine the entire dispute-resolution system that the courts
represent. 	See In re K & J Properties, Inc., 338 B.R. at 460.
Of course, the allowance of the contractual default interest
rate necessarily relates to the issue of the back-end loan fee.
The Court now turns to that issue.
BACK-END LOAN FEE
Silar’s representative Hin-King Tai testified that the back-
end fee was part of what Silar needed to earn on this loan to
make it worth doing, and it was a “back-end” fee rather than a
“front-end” fee simply because Debtor did not have the cash to
pay it up front. 	Mr. Baillio testified that the back-end fee was
to compensate Silar if Debtor obtained term financing from some
source other than Silar, who wanted to do the replacement or term
financing (or at least wanted to have the first crack at it).
Silar exhibit 1 at 2, and term sheet. 	In consequence, Debtor
argues, when Silar failed to provide the term financing for no
good reason, it lost its entitlement to the back-end fee.
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10 In fact, the Court found Mr. Tai to be an entirely
credible witness.
11 Silar borrowed the funds from Wells Fargo using a special
purpose entity, a (no longer so exotic) financing vehicle.
Page 11 of 	18
The Court finds Mr. Tai’s account more credible. 10 	The
testimony and the documents all tell a tale of a rather desperate
borrower trying to piece together the funding to purchase and
renovate a property that had the potential to increase in value
substantially if enough money was available. 	The tale includes a
hedge fund looking for what might be considered an outsized
return, and the capacity to supply the needed funds 11 (through
borrowing from Wells Fargo coupled with the requisite [no longer
exotic] financing vehicle) to achieve that size of return. 	An
added “cash hit” of $405,000, even when added to the 18%
interest, fits perfectly into this tale.
The Court also interprets the documents as supporting
Silar’s version of the events. 	Nothing in the promissory note
suggests it was anything but an additional cost to Debtor of
borrowing the money, just like the interest provision that
appears in the same sentence. 	Silar exhibit 2. 	Similarly, the
term sheet attached to the bridge loan agreement provides for an
“upfront fee” of 2% and an “exit fee” of 4% of the “gross loan
amount”, specified as $6,700,000 in the term sheet. 	A total of
6% of $6,700,000 is $402,000; 6% of $6,750,000 (the amount
actually loaned) is $405,000.
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12 The Court has used the May 23 date in this example simply
as an example and not as a prediction. 	The discussion of
interest rates does not address costs of course, which in theory
ought to be a wash for Silar.
Page 12 of 	18
The back-end fee is the equivalent of interest. 	In effect,
therefore, had Debtor repaid the principal plus two months of
interest at 18% ($202,500) plus $405,000 for a total of $607,500,
Debtor would have been paying interest on the two-month loan at
an annualized rate of 54%. 	However, given that the $405,000 is a
fixed number, and even with a 24% interest rate, the annualized
rate decreases steadily as time passes. 	For example, if Silar
were to be paid in full on May 23, 2008 12 (principal plus 18% for
two months and 24% for ten months plus $405,000), the total
interest would make for an effective annualized interest rate of
29%. 	Had Silar been paid in full on August 23, 2007 (18% for two
months and 24% at one month, plus $405,000), the effective
annualized rate would have been 44%.
Fifty-four percent is a breathtaking figure (albeit, at this
point in the case, an inapplicable one). 	Nevertheless, the
discussion concerning interest rates above is equally applicable
to the back-end fee. 	The $405,000 was part of the deal that
these parties, competent to represent their own interests,
struck. 	No one has suggested that the deal, and particularly the
cost of borrowing the money, violates any public policy. 	The
agreement should be enforced by the Court absent some overriding
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Page 13 of 	18
equitable considerations.
In this case, Debtor has not shown any such equitable
considerations. 	In fact, to some extent, the equitable
considerations militate against Debtor. 	In particular, the Court
is concerned about the representations made to Silar about the
additional financing that Debtor or related entities obtained.
While these representations may not have been technically
contrary to its agreement with Silar (see the Existing
Encumbrances provision on page 4 of the term sheet attached to
the Bridge Loan Agreement – Silar exhibit 1), it does appear that
Silar was deceived.
The first example of that apparent deception concerns what
seems clearly to be a “carry back” or retention of some of the
debt by the seller Simms Building, Inc. 	Silar exhibits 20, 21
and 22. 	Mr. Baillio admitted that at closing he was about
$650,000 short, but that he solved that problem by getting
concessions from the realtors and “the building”. 	(The solution
was at best temporary; he also testified that the shortfall has
not been satisfied.) 	Silar exhibit 22 is a copy of a collection
action filed against Mr. Biallio and his spouse, attached to
which are promissory notes of $50,000, $50,000 and $530,000,
respectively dated March 21, May 10 and May 25, 2007. 	Silar
exhibit 21 is in part a copy of a check dated May 21, 2007 (two
days before the May 23 closing) in the amount of $530,000 written
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13 Mr. Baillio conceded the signature on the check was his,
but explained that he would sign several checks in blank for use
by his staff as needed, and that someone with access to the
checks must have sent this check but without his knowledge. 	The
explanation would be perfectly reasonable if the check were, for
example, made payable to a utility for several thousand dollars.
The explanation becomes less reasonable when the amount of the
check exceeds a half million dollars and is made payable to the
former owner.
Page 14 of 	18
on the account of JTS Properties and Investments, LLC (“JTSP&I”),
the 97% owner of Debtor. 	And Silar exhibit 20 is a copy of a May
25 letter in which Simms Building, Inc. told the title company
(and therefore Silar) it was “not ‘carrying back’ any monies from
the sale of the Simms Building.” 	Perhaps Simms Building, Inc.
thought it had been paid by means of the $530,000 check, but Mr.
Baillio testified that the check was never cashed or even
processed and in any event the execution of the $530,000 note
dated May 25 would belie that. 	Indeed, Mr. Baillio testified
that he had no knowledge at that time of that letter being
written, nor of the check. 13 	Perhaps that is true. 	On the other
hand, one would have expected Silar to have asked exactly the
same question of Mr. Baillio, and had he responded truthfully to
Silar, Silar would not have had to rely on the response of Simms
Building, Inc. to the title company inquiry.
Another instance of deception was the letter dated July 13,
2007 to Silar whereby Timothy Steider stated that “Phoenix Equity
Ventures, LLC does not have a lien of record or any other
instrument or record [sic], and does not claim a lien interest
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14 It may be that Mr. Steider intended to say that Phoenix
did not have any other “instrument of record” rather than any
other “instrument or record”. 	Silar exhibit 17. 	If so, that
would make the letter technically accurate (assuming “of record”
means “of public record”, which is typically what that means in
these circumstances). 	However, the letter would still be a
careful skirting of what Silar was really inquiring about.
Page 15 of 	18
against JTS Simms, LLC on the Simms Building.” 	That assurance
was false. 	Attached to the collection complaint that Phoenix
Equity Ventures (“Phoenix”) has filed against Debtor and others,
is the documentation for a loan by Phoenix to JTSP&I for
$250,000, secured by an escrowed warranty deed for a half
interest in the property. 	JTSP&I executed the documentation
through JTS/Simms, LLC, by Mr. Baillio. 	It is hard to believe
that Mr. Baillio was not at least aware, if not outright
complicit, in the deception practiced by Phoenix. 14 	The fact
that the July 13 letter was faxed to Joel Davis (Silar exhibit
17, at 1), who was an attorney representing JTS/Simms, LLC ten
days later (Exhibits E and F to Complaint, Silar Exhibit 18),
makes it even less likely that Mr. Baillio was not aiding in the
deception of Silar.
Debtor’s nonperformance of some of the prerequisites for the
term loan also militates against disallowing the back-end loan
fee. 	Two of those requirements (in addition to the requirement
that there be no other liens on the property, discussed above)
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15 Mr. Baillio correctly testified that tenant estoppels are
not explicitly listed in the term sheet as a requirement for the
term loan. 	Silar exhibit 1, exhibit B (the term sheet).
Nevertheless, the last words on the term sheet are that the
foregoing list of requirements is not exclusive. 	In addition,
the bridge loan agreement was entered into because the shortness
of time did not allow Silar to complete its due diligence. 	Silar
exhibit 1 (Recitals and paragraphs 2 and 3). 	That due diligence
in a transaction of this sort would include tenant estoppels.
Paragraph 3 permits Silar to demand and requires Debtor to
provide “such additional agreements, documents, reports,
materials, insurance, indemnities, opinions, amendments,
confirmations and other materials and things of any nature as
Lender may require to more fully and accurately implement the
intent of this Agreement and to protect and ensure Lender’s
rights under and security for the Bridge Loan.” 	The conduct of
the parties makes clear that Silar demanded the tenant estoppels
and that Debtor thought it should provide them.
16 Given the foregoing analysis, the Court need not look for
any further failures by Debtor to fulfil the requirements for the
term loan.
Page 16 of 	18
were the tenant estoppels 15 and the lockbox arrangement. 	Given
the somewhat disheveled status of the tenant leases when Debtor
purchased the property, the requirement for the tenant estoppels
was particularly appropriate. 	By delivering at best a little
over half of the estoppel certificates, not setting up the
lockbox, and then failing to communicate with Silar as it sought
answers for its questions and a way to implement the term loan,
Mr. Baillio provided ample reason for Silar not to fund the term
loan for Debtor. 16
Conclusion
Given the background of how this financial arrangement came
to be, and Debtor’s performance since then, the Court finds no
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Page 17 of 	18
good reason, equitable or otherwise, to relieve Debtor of the
contractual terms which it negotiated and entered into bankruptcy
with. 	This is so even if modifying those arrangements would
result in a higher return for other creditors or even Debtor.
Thus Silar may charge the 24% contract default interest rate and
may collect the back-end loan fee of $405,000, subject to
offsets, if any, which any final claim resolution may show Debtor
entitled to.
Since the foregoing are merely further findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of the order already entered which
denied stay relief to Silar (doc 115), no further order will
enter at this time.
James S. Starzynski
United States Bankruptcy Judge
date entered on docket: 	January 4, 2008
COPY TO:
Jennie Deden Behles
Behles Law Firm, PC
PO Box 7070
Albuquerque, NM 87194-7070
Gail Gottlieb
Sutin, Thayer & Browne
PO Box 1945
Albuquerque, NM 87103-1945
George D Giddens, Jr
10400 Academy Rd NE Ste 350
Albuquerque, NM 87111-1229
Robert H Jacobvitz
500 Marquette NW Ste 650
Albuquerque, NM 87102-5309
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Page 18 of 	18
Chris W Pierce
Velarde & Pierce
2531 Wyoming Blvd. NE
Albuquerque, NM 87112
Deron B Knoner
PO Box 25687
Albuquerque, NM 87125
Michael Wile
Vogel Campbell & Blueher PC
6100 Uptown Blvd. NE
Suite 500
Albuquerque, NM 87110
James A Askew
PO Box 1888
Albuquerque, NM 87103-1888
Alice Nystel Page
PO Box 608
Albuquerque, NM 87103-0608
Grubb & Ellis New Mexico
ATTN: Elizabeth Liming
2400 Louisiana Blvd, NE
Bldg1, Ste 220
Albuquerque, NM 87110
Case 07-12153-s7 Doc 137 Filed 01/04/08 Entered 01/04/08 15:46:17 Page 18 of 18