Wang v. Keeper Holdings, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------X
JONG BU WANG,
Plaintiff, 	ORDER
24 CV 672 (PCG)
-against-
KEEPER HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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CROSS-GOLDENBERG, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Jong Bu Wang brought this action against Defendants Keeper Holdings, Inc.,
Steven Yang, and Katy Lee for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and the
New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) for wage and hour violations committed while she was
employed as a live-in housekeeper. Following a three-day trial, the jury found Defendants
Steven Yang and Katy Lee were liable under the NYLL for failure to pay Plaintiff overtime
wages and spread-of-hours premiums for her work as a housekeeper. Plaintiff had projected
damages ranging from $382,537.04 to $1,006,222.81, but the jury awarded Plaintiff only
$5,168.75. Plaintiff then filed a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(1)(A), which was denied by the Honorable Cheryl L. Pollak, the Magistrate Judge who
presided over the trial. Familiarity with Judge Pollak’s thorough and well-reasoned decision,
and with the procedural history of this litigation, is presumed.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, seeking
reimbursement of $171,862 in attorneys’ fees and $13,113.38 in costs. (Dkt. No. 54 (“Mot.”)).
(See also, Dkt. No. 54-1 (“Kim Decl.”) ¶¶ 13, 14). Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion,
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arguing that Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates were excessive, the hours billed were unreasonable and
included non-compensable billing entries, the award should be decreased considering the time
spent on unsuccessful claims and Plaintiff’s level of success at trial, and Plaintiff is not entitled
to recover any costs incurred after the Defendants’ Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. (Dkt. No. 61
(“Opp.”)). The Court also considers Defendants’ unopposed Motion to defer a ruling on
attorneys’ fees pending appeal of the jury verdict. (Dkt. No. 68).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 30, 2024. The parties engaged in mediation
but, on January 8, 2025, the Court’s ADR administrator reported the mediation unsettled.
Defendants served Plaintiff with a Rule 68 Offer on November 12, 2025 “in the amount of
$140,000, exclusive of necessary costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by Plaintiff
through the date of this offer.” (Opp. at 2; Dkt. No. 61-5). The Offer lapsed 14 days later. (Id.).
At the final pretrial conference, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Wage Theft Protection Act claims
and Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her FLSA claims, leaving only the claims arising under the
NYLL.
Although Plaintiff prevailed at trial, her success was limited. The jury returned a verdict
sheet finding (1) Defendant Keeper Holdings, Inc. was not Plaintiff’s “employer” as defined
under New York Labor Law; (2) Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she
worked greater than 44 hours in any week during the course of her employment; (3) Plaintiff
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there were days she worked greater than 10
hours and was not paid a spread-of-hours premium; (4) Defendants had a good faith basis to
believe that their underpayment of wages was in compliance with the law; and (5) the number of
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hours actually worked by Plaintiff and the days she worked was greater than 10 hours. (Dkt. No.
64).
Plaintiff submitted three damages charts, projecting damages ranging from $382,537.04
to $1,006,222.81, including WTPA damages and interest, (see Dkt. No. 61-5), but the jury
awarded Plaintiff only $5,168.75. (See Dkt. No. 65).
I. 	The Court Denies Defendants’ Request to Hold This Decision In Abeyance
The Court must first address Defendants’ March 19, 2026 Motion requesting that this
Court defer ruling on attorneys’ fees pending resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal. Defendants argue
that deferring the Court’s ruling would promote judicial economy and avoid the need for
potentially duplicative or inconsistent rulings. The Court disagrees. Ruling on fees prior to the
Second Circuit’s decision will provide the Circuit with this Court’s full determination of the
issues in this litigation and may prevent piecemeal appeals. If the Second Circuit were to
remand back to this Court for a new trial, there is the possibility that Plaintiff may obtain a
verdict more valuable than the Rule 68 Offer and thus would be entitled to additional fees. The
Court can address that issue if it becomes ripe and doing so would result not result in
inconsistent opinions, but rather a subsequent opinion would reflect the new posture of the
case. As such, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion.
II. 	Attorneys’ Fees
The NYLL is a fee-shifting statute which entitles a prevailing party to an award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in wage-and-hour actions. NYLL § 663(1); Rodriguez v.
MRC Bakery Corp., 802 F. Supp. 3d 393, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Ballari v. Blackman
Plumbing Supply, Inc., No. 11 CV 3655, 2020 WL 2771008, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2020),
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report and recommendation adopted by, 2020 WL 2769266 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020)).
Prevailing employees are entitled under the NYLL to “recover in a civil action the amount of any
such underpayments, together with costs[,] all reasonable attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest as
required under the civil practice law and rules . . . .” NYLL § 663(1). A plaintiff is the
prevailing party in an NYLL action “‘if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’” Khalil v. Original Old
Homestead Rest., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 470, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The employee “may be considered a prevailing party even though
the relief ultimately obtained is not identical to the relief demanded in the complaint.” Koster v.
Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1990).
Although the jury awarded her far less in damages than she sought, Plaintiff is a
prevailing party for the purposes of the NYLL. She therefore is able to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that Plaintiff may
recover $21,990 in attorneys’ fees and $4,416.48 in costs. The Court also determines that
Defendants may recover $6,929.20 in costs incurred following their Rule 68 Offer.
A. Rule 68 Precludes Recovery of Fees and Costs Incurred After November 12, 2025
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides that a defendant may serve an offer of
judgment on plaintiff at least 14 days before trial, with the costs then accrued. Fed. R. Civ. P.
68(a). Rule 68 exists to “encourage plaintiffs to accept reasonable settlement offers rather than
forcing defendants through the expensive process of going to trial.” McDowall v. Cogan, 216
F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quotation and emphasis omitted). If a plaintiff’s final judgment
obtained “is not more valuable than the offer of judgment, the plaintiff may not obtain attorney’s
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fees and costs that accrue after the offer of judgment was made.” Weber v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No.
01 CV 1967, 2007 WL 2907306, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007) (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1, 5, 9 (1985); Jolly v. Coughlin, No. 92 CV 9026, 1999 WL 20895, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
19, 1999)). The rule applies to all costs awardable under the statute that is the basis for the
underlying claim. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). Rule 68 acts as a fee-shifting statute
as well, requiring a prevailing plaintiff to pay defendant’s post-offer costs, excluding attorneys’
fees, if the final judgment is not more valuable than the rejected Rule 68 Offer. Stanczyk v. City
of New York, 752 F.3d 273, 281 (2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff rejected Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer of $140,000 but the jury awarded her only
$5,168.75 after trial. (See Dkt. No. 65). Because Plaintiff’s final judgment was not more
favorable than the Rule 68 Offer, Plaintiff is not entitled to fees and costs incurred after
November 12, 2025, and is responsible for Defendants’ post-offer costs, excluding attorneys’
fees.
B. Lodestar Analysis
“The district court retains discretion to determine…what constitutes a reasonable fee.”
Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1998)). In deciding what constitutes “reasonable” fees,
courts in this Circuit begin by calculating the “lodestar” amount—a presumptively reasonable fee
derived from multiplying the reasonable hourly rate and reasonable number of hours required by
the case. Id. (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522
F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)); Moore v. Diversified Collection Servs. Inc., No. 07 CV 397, 2013
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WL 1622949, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by, 2013 WL
1622713 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013).
To determine the lodestar amount, a court must determine the “number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation” and multiply that number “by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Moore v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., No. 07 CV 397, 2013 WL 1622949, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1622713 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013); see also Adusumelli v.
Steiner, Nos. 08 CV 6932, 2013 WL 1285260, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (explaining that
“[c]ourts in the Second Circuit use the familiar ‘lodestar’ method of calculating reasonable
attorney’s fees – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly
rate” (citing Millea v. Metro-North R.R., Co., 658 F.3d at 166)).
Although the lodestar approach results in a “presumptively reasonable” fee, “it is not
‘conclusive in all circumstances.’” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d at 166–67 (quoting
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010)). Rather, in “rare circumstances,” a
court may adjust the lodestar “when [the lodestar method] ‘does not adequately take into account
a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.’” Id. (quoting Perdue,
559 U.S. at 553); see also Adusumelli, 2013 WL 1285260, at *2; Conwan v. Ernest Codelia,
P.C., No. 98 CV 5548, 2001 WL 30501, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2001), aff’d, 50 F. App’x 36
(2d Cir. 2002); Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1999). In other words, “a
court may not adjust the lodestar based on factors already included in the lodestar calculation
itself because doing so effectively double-counts those factors.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R.
Co., 658 F.3d at 167. Indeed, “the ‘lodestar figure [already] includes most, if not all, of the
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relevant factors constituting a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Id. (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. 542,
553 (2010)).
1. 	Reasonable Rate
In order to calculate the lodestar, the Court must first determine a reasonable hourly rate
for the legal services performed. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County
of Albany, 522 F.3d at 190. The Second Circuit has adopted the following factors, inter alia, to
guide the inquiry as to what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 186 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.
1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)). A number of
recent cases have considered these factors when awarding attorneys’ fees. See Lisnitzer v. Shah,
No. 11 CV 4641, 2022 WL 3931388, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. by, Lisnitzer v. Zucker, 2022 WL 3914964 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022),
amended by, 2023 WL 2020963 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2023) (adjusting award by 62 cents); see
also Smith v. City of New York, No. 19 CV 6198, 2022 WL 939711, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2022).
Courts are also instructed to balance:
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the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise
and capacity of the client’s other counsel (if any), the resources
required to prosecute the case effectively . . . , the timing demands
of the case, whether the attorney might have an interest
(independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the
litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether the
attorney might have initially acted pro bono . . . , and other returns
(such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the
representation.
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d at 184.
In determining the appropriate rate to be charged, courts may consider evidence of prevailing
rates for similar services beyond the fee application itself. See Chambless v. Masters, Mates &
Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058–59 (2d Cir. 1989). In addition to the parties’
evidentiary submissions, the Court may consider its own experience and familiarity with the case
and with rates generally charged. See Hollander Glass Texas, Inc. v. Rosen-Paramount Glass
Co., 291 F. Supp. 3d 554, 561, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“‘Because attorney’s fees are dependent on
the unique facts of each case, the resolution of this issue is committed to the discretion of the
district court.’”) (quoting Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1992)).
The Court may also “look to fees awarded in recent…NYLL cases in the Eastern District
of New York in order to determine whether the fees requested are reasonable.” Fermin v. Las
Delicias Peruanas Rest., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). In calculating the
presumptively reasonable fee, “courts ‘should generally use the hourly rates employed in the
district in which the reviewing court sits.’” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d
170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that when
awarding attorneys’ fees, there is a presumption in favor of relying on the rates where the case is
litigated, not where the attorneys are located); Rueda v. A&G Iron Works Corp., No. 25 CV
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1791, 2026 WL 183692, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2026) (citing Kyros L. P.C. v. World
Wrestling Ent., Inc., 79 F.4th 532, 547 (2d Cir. 2023)). Courts in this Circuit determine the
presumptively reasonable fee, in part, by reference to the rates “prevailing in the community for
similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Seong
Soo Ham v. Sushi Maru Express Corp., No. 15 CV 6138, 2017 WL 4023131, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 13, 2017) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)).
Reasonable rates in the Eastern District of New York are $450 to $650 for partners, $300
to $450 for senior associates, $150 to $300 for junior associates, and $100 to $150 for paralegals.
Moore v. Rubin, 766 F. Supp. 3d 423, 428 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2025). Additionally, “[n]umerous
cases in the Eastern District hold that the hourly rates awarded to law clerks (who are not
admitted to the bar) should be comparable to those awarded to paralegals.” Douton v. NY Med.
Health Care, P.C., 49 F. Supp. 3d 328, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases).
In determining a reasonable rate in this case, the Court has considered the factors
identified by the Second Circuit. The case required counsel experienced in wage and hour
litigation, but it did not present novel or difficult questions of wage and hour law. The time,
labor and skill required, and the time limitations imposed by this case prior to the Rule 68 Offer
were similar to those present in similar cases litigated in this District by Plaintiff’s counsel.
There is nothing about the facts of this case that would justify a rate higher than a customary rate
awarded in wage and hour litigation in the Eastern District of New York.
Plaintiff’s counsel seeks rates between $550 and $600 per hour for work completed by
Ryan J. Kim, the name attorney at Ryan Kim Law, P.C. (Dkt. No. 54-1 (“Kim Decl.”) ¶ 7; Dkt.
No. 54-2). Mr. Kim has been practicing law and litigating wage and hour cases for
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approximately 23 years. (Kim Decl. ¶ 7). Counsel seeks $350 per hour for work completed by
Youngchae Cho, an associate at the firm who was not yet admitted to the bar at the time of the
trial, and seeks between $120 and $200 per hour for work completed by Jia Choi, a paralegal
with approximately 12 years of experience in labor and employment litigation. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10).1
Mr. Kim’s and Ms. Choi’s hourly rates have been frequently scrutinized in this District.
See Kim v. Kini LIC Corp., 806 F. Supp. 3d 277, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases and
reducing Mr. Kim’s rates from $550 per hour to $450 per hour); Shin v. Party Well Rest &
Oriental Bakery, Inc., No. 20 CV 1319, 2023 WL 8701337, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted by, 2024 WL 1327420 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024) (reducing
attorney Ryan Kim’s hourly rate from a requested $550 to $450 and reducing paralegal Jia
Choi’s hourly rate from a requested $120 per hour to $100, in line with previous awards made to
Mr. Kim and Ms. Choi at the time), aff’d sub nom. Shin v. Party Well Rest. & Oriental Bakery,
Inc., No. 24-1189, 2025 WL 783737 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2025); Kim v. J&J Safetymate Corp., No.
22 CV 1070, 2025 WL 2783273, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (reducing Mr. Kim’s rates
from $550 to $450 and Ms. Choi’s rates from $200 to $125 in line with previous awards at the
time). Even cases analyzing the increased Eastern District rates established by Rubin have
refused to award Mr. Kim a $550 hourly rate. See Kim v. J&J Safetymate Corp., No. 22 CV
1070, 2025 WL 2783273, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (considering Rubin and reducing Mr.
1 Counsel’s billing records also show two entries for somebody named Min Suk Choi who billed 5.5 hours
at a rate of $300 per hour to attend the mediation and 3.5 hours at a rate of $350 per hour to draft a deficiency letter.
The present fee application does not request that the Court award these fees, and the Court does not award them.
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Kim’s rate from $550 per hour to $500 per hour and reducing Ms. Choi’s rate from $200 per
hour to $125 per hour).
Based on rates generally charged in this District, and considering Mr. Kim’s experience
and the facts of this case, the Court finds that Mr. Kim is entitled to a rate of $500 per hour in
this case and Ms. Choi is entitled to a rate of $125 per hour. The Court need not analyze Mr.
Cho’s rates because all of his billing entries occurred after the Rule 68 Offer and the Court has
already determined those entries are non-compensable. (See infra at 16).
2. 	Reasonable Hours
To determine the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fees request, “[t]he Court must make ‘a
conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of
hours were usefully and reasonably expended.’” Maldonado v. La Nueva Rampa, Inc., No. 10
CV 8195, 2012 WL 1669341, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) (quoting Lunday v. City of
Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994)), report and recommendation adopted by, (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2012). “The critical inquiry is ‘whether, at the time the work was performed, a
reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.’” Id. (quoting Grant v.
Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)). In this Circuit, judges are required to “use their
experience with the case, as well as their experience with the practice of law, to assess the
reasonableness of the hours spent . . . in a given case.” Cho v. Koam Med. Servs. P.C., 524 F.
Supp. 2d 202, 208 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2007) (quoting Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, No. 03 CV
5166, 2005 WL 2305002, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2005)). “Not all tasks in a civil litigation
merit an award of attorney’s fees,” Zabala v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23 CV 1596,
2025 WL 948099, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2025), and the Court has discretion to reduce the
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claimed hours where the entries are unsupported by evidence or are objectively unreasonable.
Smith, 2022 WL 939711, at *6.
A district court is not required to “set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may
be countless objections to individual billing items.” Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134
(2d Cir. 1994). 	The Court “need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade
accountant[,]” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011), and therefore “has discretion simply to
deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed ‘as a practical means of trimming
fat from a fee application.’” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quotation omitted).
The Court finds the claimed hours exceed what is reasonable in several respects and, as a
result, applies a 60% across-the-board reduction to the total number of hours requested by
counsel.
a. 	Degree of Success
A plaintiff’s degree of success is “‘the most critical factor’ in a district court’s
determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.” Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health &
Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 152 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114
(1992)). When a plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims are intertwined, district courts
analyze “the quantity and quality of relief obtained, as compared to what the plaintiff sought to
achieve as evidenced in her complaint.” Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 255
(E.D.N.Y. 2020). “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The
district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply
reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Hensley v. Exkerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436–
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37 (1983). As the Supreme Court has recognized, the decision to reduce fees to account for a
plaintiff’s limited success rests within the Court’s discretion. Id. Courts in this District have
wielded this discretion to apply downward adjustments to attorneys’ fees as high as 80%. See,
Struthers v. City of N.Y., No. 12 CV 242, 2013 WL 5407221, at * (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2013)
(reducing the lodestar by 80% after plaintiff rejected a Rule 68 offer of judgment and the jury
awarded only $685 in punitive damages and $1 in nominal damages); Torcivia, 437 F. Supp. 3d
at 256 (reducing fees by 40% “due to limited success”); Hine v. Mineta, 253 F. Supp. 2d 464,
467 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (reducing fees by 60% where plaintiff succeeded on only one of three
causes of action and the jury awarded 1.7% of all requested damages).
Here, Plaintiff’s success was extremely limited. At the outset of this litigation, Plaintiff
brought eight claims under the FLSA and the NYLL for failure to pay minimum wage and
overtime wages, failure to pay spread of hours premiums, failure to provide wage notices and
wage statements, and failure to provide a day of rest. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 51-100). At the final pretrial
conference, Plaintiff dropped her FLSA claims and the Court dismissed the Wage Theft
Prevention Act claim arising under the NYLL. (Dkt. No. 48 at 5. See Dkt. No. 58 at 5 n.7). At
trial, Plaintiff estimated damages ranging between $382,537.04 and $1,006,222.81. (Dk. No. 66
at 6). However, the jury awarded only $5,168.75. (See Dkt. No. 65). In other words, Plaintiff
obtained 0.5% of the total possible damages at trial. Much of the legal work was not necessary
to achieve Plaintiff’s limited success because it related to dismissed or abandoned claims.
b. 	Translation Work
Translation work is not legal work. Ruo Guo Zhang v. Lin Kumo Japanese Rest. Inc.,
No. 13 CV 6667, 2015 WL 5122530, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015). Although interpretation
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services may be recoverable, see Shin, No. 2023 WL 8701337, at *11, where an attorney
performed non-legal translation work, courts have reduced the rates to a “reasonable
paraprofessional rate.” See, e.g., De La Cruz Rosas v. Just Salad 60 Third LLC, No. 18 CV
7342, 2023 WL 5423982, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2023), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. by, Rosas v. Just Salad 600 Third LLC, 2023 WL 5390985 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023).
Courts in this District therefore typically award a $125 per hour rate for legal support staff
performing language interpreter services. See Aponte v. 5th Ave. Kings Fruit & Vegetables
Corp., No. 20 CV 5625, 2022 WL 17718551, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2022) (collecting cases).
Here, Jia Choi billed 22.1 hours at rates between $120 and $200 for translation services
before the Rule 68 Offer and seeks compensation for $2,652 for this work. (Dkt. No. 54-2).
Ryan Kim billed 1.8 hours for translation services at a $550 hourly rate prior to the Rule 68
Offer, seeking a total of $990 for this work. (Id.) This work is non-compensable at these rates
above $125 per hour. The Court factors this into the across-the-board reduction.
c. 	Clerical Tasks
District courts “have ‘the authority and discretion to either reduce an attorney’s hourly
rate for time spent on clerical tasks or apply an across-the-board reduction to the hours billed or
total fee award to account for time spent on clerical tasks.’” Smith, 2022 WL 939711, at *10
(quoting Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Uniform percentage
deductions are warranted for attorney time spent on administrative tasks or work that should
have been performed by lower-billing attorneys.” Id. (citing De La Paz v. Rubin & Rothman,
LLC, No. 11 CV 9625, 2013 WL 6184425, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013)). See also, Khalil v.
Original Old Hempstead Rest. Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding time
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“spent executing purely clerical tasks, like downloading documents, speaking with copy vendors,
filing, and faxing documents” are not recoverable); G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch.
Dist., 894 F. Supp. 2d 415, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding time “spent reorganizing the file and
preparing [trial] exhibits” was a “clerical non-reimbursable task”); Torcivia, 437 F. Supp. 3d at
253 (holding that “sending and receiving faxes, requesting and receiving medical records,
serving papers, and hand-delivering courtesy copies of filings to the courthouse, and preparing a
summons and complaint for service, ECF filings, entering dates into a calendar, and
communications regarding ordering a court reporter” are clerical tasks) (quotation omitted);
DeMarco v. Ben Krupinski Gen. Contractor, Inc., No. 12 CV 573, 2014 WL 3696020, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (holding “faxing documents, preparing duplicates, serving papers
on defendants, and filing documents” are clerical tasks). Courts make these reductions because
“a reasonable client would not pay an attorney’s rate for the performance of administrative or
clerical work.” Chauca v. Park Mgmt. Sys., LLC, No. 10 CV 5304, 2016 WL 8117953, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2016) (citing Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
These tasks may only be recovered at a paralegal rate. Chauca, 2016 WL 8117953, at *4.
Defendants point to several entries for clerical or administrative work that are not
compensable at the attorney rate. For example, on August 5, 2025, Mr. Kim billed $110 for 0.2
hours of work“[t]rying to figure out a mediation date that works for everyone involved.” (Dkt.
No. 54-2). The Court has identified a total of 7.4 hours of clerical or administrative tasks billed
at Mr. Kim’s partner rate, including scheduling, monitoring the docket, filing waiver of service,
and reviewing opposing counsel’s notice of appearance. (Id.). These entries also are factored
into the across-the-board reduction.
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d. 	Travel
Attorneys may be compensated for travel time to appearances with the Court. Chauca,
2016 WL 8117953, at *5. However, such time is only compensated at no more than fifty percent
of an attorney’s hourly rate. Shin, 2023 WL 8701337, at *8 (reducing attorney Ryan Kim’s
hourly rate for travel time); Singh v. Zoria Housing LLC, No. 16 CV 2901, 2017 WL 6947717,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017); Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05 CV 985, 2011 WL 2945825, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) (“it is customary in this circuit to reduce attorney's fees by fifty
percent for travel time”).
Here, Ryan Kim billed 10.5 hours of travel time prior to the November 12, 2025 Rule 68
Offer. (Dkt. No. 54-2). He billed at his full attorney rate. For example, on October 9, 2024, he
billed 7 hours at a rate of $550 per hour for “[t]ravel to and from EDNY to attend in-person
mediation.” (Id. at 5). These entries also are factored into the across-the-board reduction.
e. 	Duplicative Billing
Courts “may ‘trim[] fat from a fee application’ and eliminate excessive or duplicative
hours.” King v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (NYCERS), No. 13 CV 4730, 2017 WL 1317851, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017) (alteration included) (quoting Kirsh v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 148,
173 (2d Cir. 1998)), report and recommendation adopted by, 2017 WL 1317223 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
5, 2017). However, “the presence and collaboration of multiple lawyers on behalf of plaintiff in
the case herein, do not, by themselves, indicate needless duplication or overstating.” De La Paz,
2013 WL 6184425, at *15.
Here, Defendants object to portions of Plaintiff’s fee application on the basis that Mr.
Kim and Mr. Cho each billed for similar tasks, including having spent a combined 20 hours on
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jury instructions. (Opp. at 12). The Court disagrees that such billing is duplicative. This case is
far from overstaffed—it was staffed with one partner, one associate, and one paralegal. The
legal profession is an apprenticeship profession and collaboration between a partner and more
junior associates is expected in any case. Additionally, Mr. Cho’s first billing entry appears on
November 21, 2025, after the Rule 68 Offer, and the Court has already held supra that such time
is not compensable. Therefore, the Court does not find duplicative billing a basis for cutting
counsel’s hours.
* * *
The “essential goal” in fee shifting cases “is to do rough justice, not to achieve
accounting perfection.” Shin, 2023 WL 8701337 at * 11 (quoting Fox, 563 U.S. at 838). In light
of Plaintiff’s limited success and the other aspects of the fee application discussed above, the
Court finds a 60 percent across-the-board reduction in the number of hours is appropriate and
reflects a reasonable amount of attorney hours.
3. 	Total Fee Award
In light of the foregoing, the Court calculates the reasonable attorneys’ fees to which
Plaintiff is entitled as follows:
Total Hours
Billed Before
Expiration of
Rule 68 Offer
Adjusted Hours 	Adjusted Rate 	Total Award
Ryan Kim 	96.9 	38.76 	$500 	$19,380
Jia Choi 	52.2 	20.88 	$125 	$2,610
TOTAL: 	$21,990
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III. 	Costs
Both parties seek to recover costs. Because Plaintiff’s recovery at trial did not exceed the
Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs that accrued prior to the Rule 68
Offer and Defendants are entitled to recover costs that accrued after the Offer.
District courts generally award “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
attorney and which are normally charged fee-paying clients.” Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati
& Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 1978) (quotation and citation omitted). Costs
including filing fees, mediation, service of process, deposition transcripts, interpretation services,
court reporters, transcripts, mailings, supplies, and postage are routinely recoverable. Shin, 2023
WL 8701337, at *11. Costs that are merely a substitute for an attorney’s time that is
compensable under an attorney’s fee application, such as computer research, is not compensable.
Stein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 16 CV 6252, 2019 WL 1099946, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2019). Costs for overhead, such as legal research subscription fees, are also non-compensable.
BD v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
The party seeking costs “bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of each
charge; failure to provide adequate documentation of costs incurred will limit, or even defeat,
recovery.” John v. DeMaio, No. 15 CV 6094, 2016 WL 7469862, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2016). Without invoices, a Court generally cannot award costs. Id. However, courts may take
judicial notice of the filing fee and award such costs if verified by the docket. Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Benitez, No. 18 CV 6476, 2020 WL 5519200, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
2020); Feltzin v. Union Mall LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 204, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citations
omitted).
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A. Plaintiff’s Costs
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of $13,113.38 in costs incurred during this litigation for
“court filings, a deposition, service of process, translation services, and inquest materials.” (Mot.
at 10; Kim Decl. ¶ 14). In support of this request, counsel attaches a list of expenses, including
the court’s filing fee, an “initial case set up charge,” service costs, court reporter and transcript
costs, transportation costs and mileage reimbursement, translation and interpreter fees, copying
costs, online research costs, and the cost of trial materials. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 21–23). He
submitted some invoices to support his fee application. (Dkt. No. 55).
Many of Plaintiff’s costs were incurred after the Rule 68 Offer was made and the Court
therefore does not award them. Plaintiff’s costs prior to the Rule 68 Offer include the $405 filing
fee, a $300 “[i]nitial case set up charge” which counsel billed to Plaintiff, two $8.24 expenses for
“LetterStream Inc.,” $3,219 in deposition costs, $792.48 in translation services, $25 for petty
cash given by counsel to Plaintiff for “[b]us, parking, and toll fee,” $600 for an Apple TrialPad
Subscription, and $3,155 in legal research subscription fees.
Plaintiff has not met the burden of showing the reasonableness of several of the requested
costs. The Court cannot discern from Plaintiff’s motion or the supporting documentation what
the “initial case set up charge,” “LetterStream Inc.,” or “Apple TrialPad” costs are or whether the
charges were reasonable. Counsel’s petty cash receipt is not accompanied by the actual invoice
of costs paid by Plaintiff and the Court cannot therefore determine whether that expense was
actually incurred. Counsel’s legal research fees are an overhead item and not compensable. The
remaining $4,416.48 in costs are compensable out-of-pocket expenses.
Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff $4,416.48 in costs
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B. Defendants’ Costs
Defendants seek to recover their post-offer costs amounting to $9,460.31. (Opp. at 21).
In support of their request, Defendants include invoices for (1) $2,531.11 in transcript fees, (2)
$6,229.20 in court reporter fees, and (3) $700 in interpreter fees. (Dkt. No. 61-6). The transcript
invoice includes a “job date” of May 16, 2025. Because this date occurred before the Rule 68
Offer, Defendants are not entitled to recover that cost. The other costs are recoverable.
Accordingly, the Court awards Defendants $6,929.20 in costs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion in part and awards (1)
$21,990 in attorneys’ fees, and (2) $4,416.48 in costs. The Court awards Defendants $6,929.20
in costs. The Court denies Defendants’ Motion to defer this decision on attorneys’ fees.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to the parties either electronically
through the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system or by mail.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 25, 2026
/s/ Peggy Cross-Goldenberg
Peggy Cross-Goldenberg
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
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