Draghi v. New York City Department of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x
CHRISTOPHER DRAGHI,
Plaintiff,
-against-
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.
------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-cv-2920 (EK)(MMH)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Christopher Draghi brings this action against the New
York City Department of Education pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 	He asserts claims for discrimination, refusal
to provide a reasonable accommodation, hostile work environment,
and retaliation. 	He also brings analogous claims under state
and city law.
The Department now moves to dismiss the federal
claims.1 	For the reasons set out below, that motion is granted.
The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the non-
federal claims.
1 The Department is a suable entity because “the City of New York and
the Department of Education are separate legal entities.” 	Brainbuilders LLC
v. EmblemHealth, Inc., No. 21-CV-4627, 2022 WL 3156179, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
8, 2022) (collecting cases); see also N.Y. Educ. Law § 2551 (“The board of
education of each city school district of a city with one hundred twenty-five
thousand inhabitants or more according to the latest federal census is hereby
continued as a body corporate.”).
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Background
The following facts are drawn from the amended
complaint, and they are presumed true for the purposes of this
motion. 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007).2
Christopher Draghi worked as a paraprofessional with
special-needs students at a public school in Brooklyn. 	Draghi
suffers from anxiety. 	Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 6. 	This anxiety
“impacts his ability to sleep and concentrate,” and can cause
“physical manifestations” such as “extreme tightness in his
chest.” 	Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. 	Draghi alleges that on June 13, 2019, a
teacher called him “stupid” in a classroom full of students,
triggering an anxiety attack. 	Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 	In response, he
asked the assistant principal — Paul Parella — to be moved to a
different classroom or, alternatively, for a leave of absence.
Parella declined, stating that there were “only two weeks left
in the school year.” 	Id. ¶¶ 18-21. 	Draghi took the next day
off from work. 	Id. ¶ 22.
Around five days later, Parella assigned Draghi to
work in a different classroom. 	Id. ¶¶ 24-26. 	He also issued
Draghi a “disciplinary notice” for “excessive absenteeism.” 	Id.
¶ 23. 	At an ensuing disciplinary conference, Parella “berated
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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Draghi over his . . . request[s] for a change in schedule or a
leave of absence.” 	Id. ¶ 26. 	Parella further stated that June
13 (the day of the anxiety incident) was the “day . . . the
wheels came off the wagon” and was “the only reason” they were
having the disciplinary conference. 	Id. ¶ 26. 	Parella later
wrote Draghi a disciplinary letter, citing his “attendance” and
“professionalism” issues. 	Id. ¶ 29.
Tensions continued into the next academic year. 	In
October 2019, Parella sent Draghi another disciplinary letter,
claiming he was not abiding Parella’s instructions about how to
help certain special needs students. 	Id. ¶ 34. 	Draghi alleges
that Parella had never given him these instructions. 	Id. ¶¶ 32,
34. 	During a disciplinary conference related to that letter,
Parella stated the view that Draghi was “having some type of
anxiety breakdown.” 	Id. ¶ 33.
Several months later, in May 2020, Draghi filed his
first complaint with New York State Division of Human Rights
(“SDHR”), claiming disability discrimination and retaliation.
Id. ¶ 35; see also Pl.’s First SDHR Compl., ECF No. 12-3.3 	He
claims that this filing prompted a further “campaign of false
3 Draghi does not append this SDHR complaint to his pleading. 	However,
the Court may (and does) judicially notice it, as well as a second SDHR
complaint that is discussed below. 	See Quarles v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.,
No. 22-CV-4553, 2023 WL 3880015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2023) (collecting
similar cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5321034 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2023).
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and baseless discipline.” 	Id. ¶ 37. 	Draghi points to a series
of events that occurred almost two years later, including: (1) a
week-long suspension without pay in February 2022 for failing to
complete paperwork; (2) a disciplinary letter in March 2022 for
failing to supervise students; (3) another disciplinary letter
in March 2022 for miscellaneous infractions, such as writing
“inappropriate” notes on his students’ behavioral forms; and
(4) the assignment in April 2022 of two new students to him
without updated documentation about their educational needs,
which “set[] [him] up to fail.” 	Id. ¶¶ 38-51.
Multiple suspensions followed. 	The school suspended
him in May 2022, allegedly on unstated grounds. 	Id. ¶ 52. 	It
then informed him that he was being investigated for sexual
misconduct with a student. 	Id. ¶ 55. 	He was suspended again in
August 2022, again allegedly without explanation. 	Id. ¶ 56.
Draghi filed his second complaint with the SDHR in
January 2023. 	See generally Pl.’s Second SDHR Compl., ECF
No. 12-5. 	Eight months later, the school fired him for
“engag[ing] in inappropriate conduct with students.”
Compl.¶ 57. 	The complaint reports that certain unnamed
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supervisors had accused Draghi of, among other things,
“look[ing] into the girls’ bathroom.” 	Id.
This suit, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
followed.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. 	A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The
Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. 	See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711
F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013). 	At the same time, the Court is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Discussion
A. 	Timeliness
Before addressing the merits of Draghi’s ADA claims,
we consider the matter of timeliness. 	An ADA claim accrues
“when [the plaintiff] knew or had to reason to know of the
injury serving as the basis for his claim.” 	Harris v. City of
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New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). 	At that point, a
New York plaintiff has “300 days to file his ADA complaint” with
the EEOC or its state counterpart. 	Id. at 247 & n.2.
1. 	Most of the Challenged Conduct Is Time-Barred
Most of the conduct Draghi challenges falls outside
the 300-day window. 	Draghi filed his first SDHR complaint on
May 27, 2020. 	ECF No. 12-3. 	So, any conduct that occurred
before August 1, 2019 is not independently actionable. 	Harris,
186 F.3d at 247. 	This includes the June 13 incident (during
which a teacher called Draghi “stupid”) and the ensuing
disciplinary action and request for accommodation. 	Draghi filed
his second SDHR complaint — which recounted allegations of
further discrimination from December 2021 onward — on January
26, 2023. 	See ECF No. 12-5. 	So, any conduct that occurred
before April 1, 2022 (and that does not fall within the 300-day
window covered by Draghi’s first complaint) is likewise
inactionable. 	See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a
new clock for filing charges alleging that act.”).
2. 	The Continuing-Violation Doctrine Does Not Apply
The parties agree that much of the challenged conduct
falls outside the required windows. 	See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of
Dismissal 5-6, ECF No. 12-1; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Dismissal 3,
ECF No. 15. 	They disagree, however, about whether such conduct
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remains independently actionable under the continuing violation
doctrine. 	See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Dismissal 4-5; Def.’s
Reply in Supp. of Dismissal 2-4, ECF No. 17.
The continuing violation doctrine has been described
as “heavily disfavored in the Second Circuit.” 	Trinidad v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Correction, 423 F. Supp. 2d 151, 165 n.11
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., 87
F. Supp.2d 234, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same) (collecting cases).
It does not apply to “discrete unlawful acts, even where those
discrete acts are part of a serial violation.” 	Gonzalez v.
Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015). 	Instead, it applies
only to “claims that by their nature accrue . . . after the
plaintiff has been subjected to some threshold amount of
mistreatment,” id., such as hostile work environment claims.
See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 	“[T]ermination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, . . . refusal to hire,” and the
filing of disciplinary charges are all discrete acts. 	Id. at
114; Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir.
2004).
The continuing violation doctrine thus does not apply
to Draghi’s discrimination, retaliation, or accommodation
claims. 	Those claims are predicated on a three-year-long
sequence of discrete events, including discipline, suspension,
and termination. 	See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 23 (June 2019 disciplinary
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notice for excessive absenteeism); id. ¶ 40 (February 2022
suspension for failure to adequately complete paperwork); id.
¶ 57 (September 2023 termination for engaging in inappropriate
conduct with students). 	Those discrete acts cannot constitute a
continuing discrimination violation. 	See, e.g., Langella v.
Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 18-CV-10023, 2020 WL 2836760, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020) (no continuing violation where
plaintiff, despite alleging a “campaign of discrimination,”
nevertheless relied on claims of baseless discipline that
“squarely constitute[d] discrete acts”); Smith v. Nat’l Grid
USA, No. 2:21-CV-6899, 2025 WL 1248676, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
30, 2025) (no continuing violation because series of allegedly
retaliatory actions constituted “discrete acts”).
The upshot is that Draghi cannot directly challenge
most of the conduct alleged in the complaint. 	Most importantly,
he cannot challenge the June 13 incident, or the disciplinary
conduct stemming from that incident. 	See Patterson v. Cnty. of
Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he mere fact
that an employee was dismissed within the statutory period
cannot be used to pull in a time-barred discriminatory act[.]”).
There are, however, two important qualifications here.
First, Draghi also brings a hostile work environment
claim. 	And the Supreme Court has held that a hostile work
environment claim is timely “so long as an act contributing to
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that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time
period.” 	Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105. 	If that criterion is
satisfied, “the entire time period of the hostile environment
may be considered by a court . . . .” 	Id. at 117. 	Because
Draghi challenges some conduct (such as his suspensions) that
falls within the limitations period,4 the Court may consider some
older misconduct when evaluating Draghi’s hostile work
environment claim.
Second, the Court may consider otherwise stale conduct
as “background evidence to support” Draghi’s claims of
discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation, even if
that misconduct cannot be an independent basis for liability.
Id. at 112.
B. 	Employment Discrimination
To plead employment discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that “(1) his employer is subject to the
ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of
his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he
suffered an adverse employment action because of his
disability.” 	Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 71 (2d
4 An allegedly discriminatory suspension can contribute to a hostile
work environment. 	E.g., Bader v. Special Metals Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 291,
328 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he discriminatory warnings and suspensions discussed
[herein] contributed to the severity or pervasiveness of the hostile work
environment.”).
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Cir. 2019). 	Only the second and fourth elements are disputed on
this motion.
1. 	Draghi Has Alleged a Cognizable Disability
As relevant here, a plaintiff is plausibly disabled
within the meaning of the ADA if he alleges that he: (1) has “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of [his] major life activities,” or (2) is “regarded as
having such an impairment.” 	Capobianco v. City of New York, 422
F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). 	While
Draghi fails to allege a disability under the first prong, he
alleges a disability under the second: that his employer
“regarded” him as having a disability.
The complaint’s primary allegation about the nature
and severity of Draghi’s anxiety is that it “impact[ed] his
ability to sleep and concentrate.” 	Compl. ¶ 7.5 	This is not
enough. 	To be sure, sleeping and concentrating are major life
activities. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). 	But the complaint
says nothing about the degree to which Draghi’s anxiety impaired
those activities. 	It simply “recite[s] activities found in the
[ADA] that [Draghi] could not adequately perform . . . .”
5 Draghi also alleges that his anxiety caused “extreme tightness in his
chest” during the June episode. 	Compl. ¶ 12. 	But he has not “hinted at how
this [symptom] affected him other than on that day,” and never explains how
such tightness substantially affected other major life activities. 	DeFranco
v. N.Y. Power Auth., 731 F. Supp. 3d 479, 493 (W.D.N.Y. 2024). 	Accordingly,
this “single episode — without more — does not constitute a disability under
the ADA.” 	Id. at 492.
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Dancause v. Mt. Morris Cent. Sch. Dist., 590 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d
Cir. 2014). 	This type of superficial description does not
suffice to allege a substantial limitation on a major life
activity. 	See id. at 28-29.
Draghi does, however, plausibly allege that his
employer regarded him as having a disability. 	See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1) (defining “disability” to extend to individuals who
are “regarded” by their employer “as having” a qualifying
physical or mental impairment). 	To plead that he is “regarded
as” having a disability, a plaintiff must allege that his
employer perceived him as having some disability, even if the
employer did not perceive that disability as substantially
limiting. 	Horsham v. Fresh Direct, 136 F. Supp. 3d 253, 262
(E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 129
(2d Cir. 2012). 	This definition of disability “does not apply
to impairments that are both ‘transitory and minor’, which [the
ADA] defines as impairments with ‘an actual or expected duration
of [six] months or less.’” 	Horsham, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 262-63
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(f).
Here, Draghi has plausibly alleged that Parella viewed
him as suffering from anxiety. 	Indeed, Parella described the
June 13 incident as an “anxiety breakdown.” 	Compl. ¶ 33.
Moreover, the complaint permits the reasonable inference that
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Parella viewed Draghi’s anxiety as an ongoing condition.
Parella implied that Draghi’s “excessive absenteeism” was
“connected” to his anxiety by bringing the June 13 incident up
at a disciplinary conference and stating that June 13 was the
day “the wheels came off the wagon.” 	Id. ¶ 26. 	And in
September 2019, more than three months after the June incident,
he observed that Draghi was suffering from an “anxiety
breakdown.” 	Id. 	Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in
Draghi’s favor, the complaint plausibly alleges that his
employer perceived him as suffering from an ongoing, non-
transitory impairment (i.e., anxiety). 	The complaint therefore
sufficiently alleges a disability under the ADA.
2. 	Draghi Has Not Plausibly Alleged Causation
While Draghi has alleged a cognizable disability, he
has not alleged a causal link between that disability and an
adverse employment action. 	So, his discrimination claim still
fails.
“An adverse employment action is a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment.” 	Atkins v.
Rochester City Sch. Dist., 764 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2019).
Generally speaking, disciplinary actions that have “no negative
impact on compensation, benefits, or title” are not adverse
employment actions. 	Id. 	Here, Draghi has plausibly alleged
several adverse employment actions. 	He was fired in the fall of
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2023, Compl. ¶ 57, and dismissal is a “[q]uintessential” adverse
employment action.6 	Sealy v. State Univ. of N.Y. At Stony Brook,
408 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 	He has also alleged
that the Department suspended him without pay in May 2022 and
August 2022. 	Compl. ¶ 56. 	Those actions count as well.
Collazo v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 163 F. Supp. 3d 27, 53 (E.D.N.Y.
2016). 	Draghi’s remaining allegations involve disciplinary
letters, conferences, and reprimands, which do not — on their
own — amount to adverse employment actions. 	See, e.g.,
Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254-55
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Criticism of an employee in the course of
evaluating and correcting her work is not an adverse employment
action.”).
Once a plaintiff has alleged an adverse employment
action, they must plead “plausible support [for] a minimal
inference of discriminatory motivation.” 	Dooley v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., 636 F. App’x 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2015). 	The facts
alleged must support an inference of but-for causation.
Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2019).
Such an inference may arise from “the employer’s criticism of
6 Draghi’s termination post-dated his second SDHR complaint. 	This
suggests that Draghi may not have exhausted his claim based on that
termination. 	Soules v. Conn., Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882
F.3d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2018). 	But the defendants do not raise this issue,
and exhaustion is waivable. 	See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543-
44, 553 (2019).
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the plaintiff’s performance in . . . degrading terms; or its
invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected
group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the
protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the
plaintiff’s discharge.” 	Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795
F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015).
Draghi has not pled a plausible inference of
discriminatory intent with respect to his suspensions or
termination. 	He does not allege that his employer spoke about
his anxiety in degrading terms, nor does he allege generally
invidious comments about people suffering from anxiety or any
other disability. 	The statement that comes closest is Parella’s
use of the word “breakdown” in September 2019. 	Compl. ¶ 33.
But this comment came years before Draghi was suspended and
eventually terminated and therefore cannot support a plausible
inference of causation. 	See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other
grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)
(“[T]he more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation to
the employer’s adverse action, the less they prove that the
action was motivated by discrimination.”). 	Just as importantly,
the word “breakdown” — while perhaps anachronistic — does not
reflect negative “assumptions or attitudes” regarding the
abilities of persons with anxiety as a class. 	Id. at 116.
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Parella’s comments about Draghi’s June 13, 2019
episode are also too remote in time from his suspensions and
firing to support an inference of discriminatory intent. 	While
Parella is alleged to have said that Draghi’s anxiety attack and
resulting request for an accommodation were the “only reason”
for the discipline he faced in June 2019, Compl. ¶ 26, any
challenge to that discipline is time-barred. 	The first
actionable employment action that Draghi faced — his May 2022
suspension — occurred around three years later. 	Compl. ¶ 52.
The lengthy gap between Parella’s comments in June 2019 and
Draghi’s eventual suspension undercuts any causal connection
between the two incidents. 	Tomassi, 478 F.3d at 115; see also
Graham v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 14-CV-3192, 2016 WL 354897, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 675 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“Merely because an employee or employees at some point mocked
or dismissed [plaintiff’s] disabilities does not mean that any
later adverse actions taken against her by Macy's were because
of her disability.”).
Draghi does assert that similarly situated employees
without disabilities were not subject to the same discipline he
received. 	See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39-40, 42, 44. 	But he offers no
supporting facts to buttress this allegation. 	It is, therefore,
the type of conclusory allegation that the Court need not credit
at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
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(plaintiff may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements”).
C. 	Failure To Accommodate
To plead a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff
must allege (1) that he had a disability; (2) that the employer
knew it; (3) that he could perform the essential functions of
the job with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) that the
employer refused to provide such an accommodation. 	Mitchell v.
Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Court need not apply this standard, however, because
Draghi’s claim is time-barred.
The complaint reveals only one request for an
accommodation: Draghi’s request to switch assignments in June
2019. 	Compl. ¶¶ 16-20. 	But as discussed above, the June
incident (and the events immediately following it) are not
actionable, because they fall outside the 300-day window covered
by Draghi’s first SDHR complaint. 	Accordingly, the failure-to-
accommodate claim is dismissed.
D. 	Hostile Work Environment
To allege a hostile work environment, “a plaintiff
must show that (i) the workplace was permeated with
discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] work environment, and
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(ii) the harassment was based on [his] protected group.”
Williams v. Geiger, 447 F. Supp. 3d 68, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(Cave, M.J).
Draghi has not alleged severe or pervasive harassment.
He mainly alleges that, over four years, Parella and other
supervisors criticized him, wrongly disciplined him, or paired
him with teachers who made him anxious.7 	But “the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
abusive language, do not rise to a level constituting a hostile
work environment.” 	Montanez v. McDean LLC, 770 F. App’x 592,
594 (2d Cir. 2019). 	And courts in this circuit have held that a
complaint that relies primarily on allegations of meritless
discipline (like Draghi’s) does not adequately allege a hostile
work environment. 	See, e.g., Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321
(allegations of “harsh tones” and “wrongful[] reprimand[s]”
insufficient for hostile work environment claim); Trachtenberg
v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 937 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472-73
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“negative performance evaluations and
7 Draghi does not claim that his colleague’s remark that he was “stupid”
was discriminatory against persons with anxiety. 	That argument would fail in
any event, because (a) stupidity is not, of course, a disability, even if it
may be invoked to demean the listener; and (b) Draghi does not allege any
other discriminatory epithets in his complaint. 	“Isolated comments . . .
without more, are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.”
Maines v. Last Chance Funding, Inc., No. 17-CV-5453, 2018 WL 4558408, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2018), amended, 2018 WL 4610898 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2018);
see also Kemp v. A & J Produce Corp., 164 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that “more than a few isolated incidents” of discriminatory language
are necessary to allege hostile work environment).
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letters . . . that contained scurrilous charges” did not
constitute severe or pervasive harassment).
E. 	Retaliation
To state an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) he engaged in protected ADA activity (e.g.,
requesting reasonable accommodation or filing a discrimination
complaint); (2) the employer was aware of this; 3) the employer
took adverse action against him; and (4) a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Vale v. Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist., 80 F. Supp. 3d
426, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 	The parties dispute only the fourth
element.
“To prove a causal connection, a plaintiff must show
that but for the protected activity, the adverse action would
not have been taken.” 	Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.,
103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024). 	A plaintiff can allege
causation by pointing to “direct evidence of retaliatory
animus,” or by “showing that the protected activity was followed
closely by discriminatory treatment.” 	Id.
Draghi has not alleged a plausible causal connection
here. 	To be sure, Draghi engaged in protected activities:
filing complaints with the SDHR and requesting an accommodation
(though the latter is time-barred). 	See Zoulas v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 25, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (filing SDHR
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complaint is protected activity); Laface v. Eastern Suffolk
Boces, 349 F. Supp. 3d 126, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (requesting a
reasonable accommodation is protected activity). 	However,
Draghi’s suspensions and firing occurred more than two years
after he filed his first SDHR complaint, and more than three
years after he requested the accommodation. 	The closest-in-time
activity was the filing of his second SDHR complaint, which
occurred eight months before his termination. 	ECF No. 12-5; see
also Compl. ¶ 57. 	But all these temporal gaps are too long to
permit a plausible inference of causation. 	See Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (temporal
proximity must be “very close”); Flood v. UBS Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
No. 10-CV-374, 2012 WL 288041, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012)
(“[C]ourts in this Circuit have consistently held that a passage
of more than two months between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action does not allow for an inference of
causation.”). 	And Draghi has alleged no facts suggesting the
suspensions or firings — rather than the minor discipline he
faced three years earlier — were motivated by “direct evidence
of retaliatory animus.” 	Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 170. 	So, the
retaliation claim must be dismissed.8
8 Draghi also claims that the Department engaged in a retaliatory
“campaign of false and baseless discipline” against him during the winter and
spring of 2022. 	Compl. ¶ 37. 	Almost all of that conduct is time-barred and,
regardless, it runs into the same causation problem — it occurred more than
18 months after Draghi filed his first SDHR complaint.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the federal ADA claims is granted in full. 	Because
Draghi has not sought leave to amend, his federal claims are
dismissed with prejudice. 	See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364,
369 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[N]o court can be said to have erred in
failing to grant a request [for leave to amend] that was not
made.”); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp. Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1132
(2d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not deem it an abuse of the district
court’s discretion to order a case closed when leave to amend
has not been sought.”). 	Given that dismissal, the Court
declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, which
are dismissed without prejudice to Draghi refiling those claims
in an appropriate state court. 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). 	The
Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	January 9, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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