Andrade Gutierrez et al v. Reilly

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
MEMORANDUM &
ORDER
24-CV-3953
(Marutollo, M.J.)
MARIA ELENA ANDRADE GUTIERREZ and JOAN
MIGUEL DIAZ RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
EDWARD REILLY and BELL CONTAINER
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:
This diversity action1 arises out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident that occurred on
January 10, 2023 (“the Accident”). Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 40. Plaintiffs Maria Elena Andrade Gutierrez
and Joan Miguel Diaz Rodriguez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against
Defendants Edward Reilly and Bell Container Corporation (“Bell Container”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) alleging that Reilly negligently caused Defendants’ vehicle to strike Gutierrez’s
vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 25-28. Rodriguez was a passenger in Gutierrez’s vehicle at the time of the
Accident. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for their alleged serious injuries
resulting from the Accident, pursuant to New York’s “No-Fault” Insurance Law, N.Y. Ins. Law §
5102(d). Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 29-30, 44-45. Defendants also raise a counterclaim against Gutierrez,
arguing that “if and in the event [Plaintiffs] sustained the injuries or damages complained of (which
injuries/damages are specifically denied by [Defendants], such injuries and damages were caused
1 The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiffs are both
residents of New York. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 1-2. Reilly is a resident of New Jersey and Defendant Bell Container
Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. See id. at 10.
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
in whole or in part by the reason of the wrongful conduct, negligence, recklessness and/or
carelessness” of Gutierrez. Dkt. No. 21 at 10.2
The parties consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction in this matter. See Dkt. Nos. 15,
16.3 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability,
brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.4 See Dkt. No. 46. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability.
I. Background
The following facts, taken from the parties’ respective Local Civil Rule 56.1 statements of
fact and relevant portions of the record, are undisputed unless otherwise noted.5
2 Page citations are to the ECF-stamped pages unless otherwise noted.
3 Gutierrez, in her capacity as a counter-defendant, also noted her consent to the undersigned’s jurisdiction.
See Text Order, dated Jan. 10, 2025.
4 The parties filed a total of four summary judgment motions: Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability (Dkt. No. 46); Defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment
against each Plaintiff (Dkt. Nos. 47, 49); and Gutierrez’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’
counterclaim (Dkt. No. 51). The Court addresses only Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment in
this Memorandum and Order. The Court will consider and address the three remaining summary judgment
motions separately.
5 “[A] standalone citation to a party’s Local Rule 56.1 statement denotes that the Court has deemed the
underlying factual allegation undisputed.” Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claims Servs., Inc., No.
12-CV-6383 (PKC) (SIL), 2025 WL 948111, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025). “Any citation to a party’s
Local Rule 56.1 statement incorporates by reference the documents cited therein.” Id. “Where relevant,
the Court may cite directly to an underlying document,” but “where either party (i) admits or (ii) denies
without citing to admissible evidence certain of the facts alleged in the other’s 56.1 statement, the Court
may deem any such facts undisputed.” Id. (citations omitted); Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c)-(d); see also Ward v.
Nassau Cnty., No. 15-CV-4309 (GRB) (LGD), 2023 WL 5417329, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023)
(“Merely denying certain statements in the moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts without
stating the factual basis for such denial and without disclosing where in the record is the evidence relied
upon in making such denial does not constitute a ‘separate, short, and concise statement of the material
facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried’—as is required to controvert
the moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts.” (quoting Covelli v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib.
Corp., No. 99-CV-500E(M), 2001 WL 1823584, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2001), aff’d, 49 F. App’x 356
(2d Cir. 2002))); Su v. Top Notch Home Designs Corp., No. 20-CV-5087 (GRB) (JMW), 2023 WL
8878553, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023) (same).
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
The Accident occurred on the westbound side of I-278 Brooklyn-Queens Expressway
(“BQE”) at or near Queens Boulevard in Queens, New York. See Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 58
at 3, 8. Traffic was described as “light” and “medium,” with vehicles purportedly driving at
consistent speeds. Dkt. No. 58 at 7-8.
At the time of the Accident, a tractor trailer owned by Bell Container and operated by Bell
Container employee Reilly came into contact with the rear bumper of a vehicle operated by
Gutierrez. See Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶¶ 9, 12, 15; Dkt. No. 58 at 3-4, 7, 8. Reilly operated the vehicle as
part of his employment with Bell Container on the day of the Accident. Dkt. No. 58 at 7.
Plaintiffs allege that Gutierrez’s vehicle was traveling at fifty-five miles per hour in the
middle lane on the BQE for less than ten minutes when Defendants’ vehicle came into contact
with the rear bumper of Gutierrez’s vehicle.6 Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶¶ 11-14; Dkt. No. 46-11 at 91, 93;
Dkt. No. 58 at 6. Gutierrez testified at her deposition that she was in the middle lane at the time
of the Accident and had not changed lanes the entire time she was on the BQE. Dkt. No. 46-11 at
91. Gutierrez testified that she did not “hit [her] brakes” to slow her vehicle down or stop at any
point prior to the Accident. Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 46-11 at 98, 151. Plaintiffs contend that
even though Reilly engaged the brakes in his vehicle, his vehicle still “skidded 80 feet and struck
[Gutierrez’s] vehicle bumper.” Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 15. Rodriguez, the passenger in Gutierrez’s
vehicle, testified that his eyes were closed at the time of the Accident and that he did not see
Defendants’ vehicle until after it came into contact with Gutierrez’s vehicle. Dkt. No. 58 at 7; Dkt.
No. 57-4 at 55, 59.
In contrast to Plaintiffs’ version of events, Defendants allege that when Reilly first saw
Gutierrez’s vehicle (only five to ten seconds before the Accident occurred), Gutierrez’s vehicle
6 The BQE is composed of three lanes. Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 12.
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
was travelling at approximately twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No.
57-3 at 28-29. Reilly testified that he was traveling forty-five miles per hour prior to the Accident.
Dkt. No. 57-3 at 27, 28-29. Unlike Plaintiffs’ version of events, Defendants contend that
Gutierrez’s “brakes were tapping (brake lights going on and off),” and that Gutierrez was
“increasingly slowing” her speed. Dkt. No. 58 at 8 (emphasis added); Dkt. No. 57-3 at 29.
According to Defendants, Reilly gradually “applied his brakes as soon as he noticed [that
Gutierrez’s vehicle’s] brake lights were going on and off.” Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 30-
31. Reilly noted that when Gutierrez’s vehicle “slowed down, he slowed down as well[.]
[Plaintiffs] then went slower and slower, veered to the right lane, then came back over to the middle
lane and stopped the vehicle in the middle lane.” Dkt. No. 58 at 8; see also Dkt. No. 57-3 at 31
(“I seen [sic] [Gutierrez’s] car slowing down. As I was approaching, I slowed down. [Gutierrez]
was getting slower and slower. So I maintained maybe the same speed she was going at that time.
However, then I seen [sic] the brakes go back on. She veered into the right lane, and then she
came back over to the middle lane and just stopped the car.”). According to Defendants,
Gutierrez’s vehicle did not use its turn signal when changing lanes. Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-
3 at 31. Prior to coming to a complete stop, Gutierrez’s vehicle “braked suddenly” as soon as
Gutierrez’s vehicle veered back into the center lane. Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 34. The
impact between the vehicles then occurred. Dkt. No. 58 at 8. When the impact occurred,
Gutierrez’s vehicle was “almost in the center lane” and partially in the right lane. Id.; Dkt. No.
57-3 at 32-33. Photos of damage from the collision and testimony show that the damage to
Gutierrez’s vehicle was primarily on the rear-left/driver’s side. See Dkt. No. 57-1 at 157; Dkt. No.
57-2 at 95-98.
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Plaintiffs allege that they both suffered “serious injuries as defined under No-Fault
Insurance Law § 5104(d) and § 5102(d)” as a result of the Accident. Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 10.
II. Procedural History
On November 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Reilly and Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc. (“Ryder Truck”) in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County. See
Dkt. No. 1-1. On January 2, 2024 and January 19, 2024, Ryder Truck and Reilly, respectively,
filed their Answers, asserting several affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against Gutierrez.
Dkt. Nos. 1-2, 1-3. On May 31, 2024, Reilly and Ryder Truck removed the action to this Court
on diversity jurisdiction grounds. Dkt. No. 1.
On July 23, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to Ryder Truck. Dkt. No.
13. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Reilly and Bell Container on August 9, 2024.
Dkt. No. 20. On August 22, 2024, Defendants filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint,
asserting numerous affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against Gutierrez. Dkt. No. 21.
Discovery closed on April 5, 2025. Text Order, dated Apr. 5, 2025.
On June 9, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability.7 Dkt.
No. 46. Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion on June 27, 2025. Dkt. No. 56.
Plaintiffs filed their reply on July 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 61.
7 Although not relevant for purposes of deciding the instant motion, the Court notes, for completeness, that
on June 13, 2025, Defendants filed their separate motions for summary judgment against each of the
Plaintiffs, and Gutierrez moved for summary judgment on Defendants’ counterclaim against her. Dkt. Nos.
47 (Defendants’ motion as to Rodriguez’s claim), 49 (Defendants’ motion as to Guitierrez’s claim), 51
(Gutierrez’s motion). Gutierrez and Rodriguez opposed Defendants’ motions on July 9, 2025 and July 10,
2025, respectively. Dkt. Nos. 62-68. Rodriguez opposed Gutierrez’s motion on July 10, 2025. Dkt. Nos.
69-71. Defendants filed their replies as to their motions on July 18, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 72-75. Those motions
will be addressed in separate orders.
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). Genuine disputes as to any material fact do not exist where:
(1) the parties agree on all facts (that is, there are no disputed facts); (2) the parties
disagree on some or all facts, but a reasonable fact-finder could never accept the
nonmoving party’s version of the facts (that is, there are no genuinely disputed
facts); or (3) the parties disagree on some or all facts, but even on the nonmoving
party’s version of the facts, the moving party would win as a matter of law (that is,
none of the factual disputes are material).
Lange v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., No. 17-CV-3443, 2018 WL 4636986, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 26,
2018) (Sullivan, J.) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The movant bears
the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In determining whether a fact is genuinely disputed, the Court “is not to weigh the evidence
but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew
credibility assessments.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Sutera v.
Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a court’s responsibility in
assessing the merits of a summary judgment motion is not to try issues of fact, but merely to
“determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried” (quoting Katz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 737 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1984))). “In determining whether there is a genuine dispute as to
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
a material fact, we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party.”
Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., 124 F.4th 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, to show a genuine dispute, the nonmoving party must provide “hard
evidence,” D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998), “from which a
reasonable inference in [its] favor may be drawn,” Binder & Binder PC v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141,
148 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Neither “[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture, [nor]
speculation,” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998), nor a mere “scintilla of
evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, are sufficient
to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. “In other words, ‘[t]he litigant opposing summary
judgment . . . may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials as a vehicle for obtaining
a trial.’” Jimenez v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-6133 (RPK) (JRC), 2024 WL 198319, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438,
445 (2d. Cir. 1980)).
IV. Discussion
“Because this is a negligence action that was removed to federal court on diversity
grounds,” this Court must “apply New York’s substantive law.” Kissoon v. Wal-Mart Real Est.
Bus. Tr., No. 24-2822, 2025 WL 3119444, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2025) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). “To establish a prima facie case of negligence under New
York law, the plaintiff must demonstrate ‘(i) the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff, (ii) breach of that duty, and (iii) damages or injury proximately caused by the
defendant’s breach.’” Id. (quoting Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also
Dooley v. United States, 83 F.4th 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2023) (same). “The symmetry is clear: absent
a duty, there is no breach and, without a breach, there is no liability.” Vogel v. W. Mountain Corp.,
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
470 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (“[W]hether a duty exists presents a question of
law to be determined by the court based upon the facts and circumstances of the case.”). A
“defendant’s negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is a substantial cause of the events
which produced the injury.” Dooley, 83 F.4th at 162 (citing Mazella v. Beals, 57 N.E.3d 1083,
1090 (N.Y. 2016)).
“[A] violation of a [s]tate [or federal] statute that imposes a specific duty constitutes
negligence per se.” Mahoney v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., No. 21-CV-4127 (MKB), 2025 WL
2772949, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025) (quoting Espinoza v. Foundry Workers LLC, 792 F. Supp.
3d 344, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)). In New York, the Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) defines the
duties of motorists, and “[a] violation of the [VTL] constitutes negligence as a matter of law.”
Dooley, 83 F.4th at 163 (quoting Desio v. Cerebral Palsy Transp., Inc., 994 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014)). New York law “impose[s] a duty upon drivers to operate their vehicles
with reasonable care taking into account the actual and potential dangers existing from weather,
road, traffic and other conditions.” Vaselli v. United States, No. 12-CV-6221, 2014 WL 4961421,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014) (Bianco, J.) (quoting Goldstein v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 2d 175,
186 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)). Such longstanding duty “requires drivers to maintain a reasonably safe rate
of speed, have the automobile under reasonable control, to keep a proper lookout under the
circumstances then existing to see and be aware of what was in their view, and to use reasonable
care under the circumstances to avoid an accident.” Id. (quoting Goldstein, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 186).
Where a defendant violates a statute that “defines the degree of care to be used under certain
circumstances,” such a violation “constitutes negligence per se if (1) it causes the injury, (2) the
plaintiff is a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statute, and (3) the statute is
intended to protect against the very hazard that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (quoting Mauro
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 09-CV-1391 (VVP), 2013 WL 3816731, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 22,
2013)). VTL § 1128(a) states that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained
that such movement can be made with safety.” N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1128(a). VTL § 1163(a),
in turn, prohibits a driver from “mov[ing] [a vehicle] right or left upon a roadway unless and until
such movement can be made with reasonable safety.” N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1163(a).
Together, these provisions impose a duty upon drivers to operate their vehicles “within a
designated lane, to signal prior to changing lanes or turning, and to change lanes or turn only when
it is safe to do so . . . and to see that which [he] should have seen by the proper use of [his] senses.”
Guerrero v. Loiacono, 688 F. Supp. 3d 50, 59-60 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation omitted). Establishing
that a defendant violated one of the “rules of conduct” established by the VTL is sufficient to
establish a presumption that he was behaving negligently, and the burden of proof shifts away
from the plaintiff. See Vaselli, 2014 WL 4961421, at *5 (“a violation of the VTL constitutes
negligence per se” (quoting Lee v. Charles, 986 F. Supp. 2d 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))) (collecting
cases).
Furthermore, “New York courts have long recognized that ‘[a] rear[-]end collision with a
stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of
the rearmost vehicle.’” Turansky-Frances v. United States, No. 17-CV-2548 (JS) (ARL), 2022
WL 991979, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (quoting Comba v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 3d
97, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)); see also N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1129(a) (“The driver of a motor
vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.”). The
defendant must provide “a non-negligent explanation of the collision in order to overcome the
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
inference of negligence and defeat the motion for summary judgment” to escape liability in such
a case. Turansky-Frances, 2022 WL 991979, at *8 (quoting Luizzi v. Pro Transp. Inc., No. 02-
CV-5388 (CLP), 2009 WL 252076, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2009)). “Accepted examples of ‘non-
negligent explanations’ include mechanical failure of the rearmost vehicle, a sudden stop of the
lead vehicle, and unavoidable skidding on wet pavement.” Id. (citing Comba, 535 F. Supp. 3d at
106); see also Lhotan v. Cahill, No. 22-CV-7681 (VB), 2025 WL 2051625, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 2025) (“a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead” is a non-negligent explanation that may rebut the
presumption of negligence). But “[c]onclusory allegations of a sudden and unexpected stop are
insufficient” to do so. Moskovitz v. Dean, No. 99-CV-6085 (TPG), 2001 WL 1442674, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2001); see also Randhawa v. Otero, No. 22-CV-10479 (KMK), 2024 WL
4150335, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2024) (collecting cases regarding foreseeable and unforeseeable
stops in rear-end collision cases). “What matters . . . is that Defendants put forward some evidence
of a non-negligent explanation for the collision, which suffices to defeat summary judgment.”
Randhawa, 2024 WL 4150335, at *6; cf. Espinoza, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 352 (granting summary
judgment where the defendants “fail[ed] to point to any evidence in the summary judgment record
. . . to suggest that Plaintiff abruptly changed speeds, thereby causing an accident”).
Here, there is no dispute that the parties were involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision.
See Dkt. No. 46-1 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 58 at 3-4. But there is a genuine dispute of fact as to Defendants’
proffered non-negligent explanation for the accident. Defendants assert that Reilly’s non-
negligent explanation for the accident is Gutierrez’s unsafe and erratic driving and abrupt stop of
her vehicle. See Dkt. No. 56 at 13, 17-20; Dkt. No. 58 at 8-9. Specifically, Defendants contend
that the vehicle operated by Gutierrez was traveling at approximately twenty-five to thirty miles
per hour when Reilly first saw the vehicle, and that Gutierrez’s brake lights were going on and off
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
as she “increasingly slow[ed]” her speed. See Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 28-29. Reilly
testified that he began gradually applying his brakes when he noticed Gutierrez’s brake lights
going on and off. Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 30-31. Reilly testified that Gutierrez’s vehicle
continued slowing down, veered to the right lane, and “then she came back over to the middle lane
and just stopped the car,” without using any turn signals. Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 31.
“Prior to coming to a complete stop, [Gutierrez] braked suddenly, as soon as she veered into the
center lane.” Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 34. The collision occurred “almost in the center
lane.” Dkt. No. 58 at 8; Dkt. No. 57-3 at 32-33.
Indeed, photos of damage from the collision show that the impact occurred on the rear-left
side of Gutierrez’s vehicle. Dkt. No. 57-2 at 95-98; see also Dkt. No. 57-1 at 157 (Gutierrez’s
testimony that her vehicle “was more severely damaged on the driver’s side”). In addition, the
parties agree that Defendants’ vehicle skidded after Reilly applied the brakes, but dispute the
distance of the skidding. See Dkt. No. 46-1 ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 58 at 4, 9. The parties also dispute
whether Gutierrez even pressed the vehicle’s brakes or changed lanes prior to the collision. See
Dkt. No. 46-2 at 5; Dkt. No. 56 at 13.
At bottom, a genuine issue of fact exists as to liability. Defendants have sufficiently set
forth a non-negligent reason for the collision: that Gutierrez unexpectedly turned back into the
middle lane, without using a turn signal, and suddenly stopped without sufficient time for Reilly
to come to a complete stop before colliding with Gutierrez’s vehicle. See, e.g., Randhawa, 2024
WL 4150335, at *6 (“Unexpected or unforeseeable slowdowns may be entirely ‘needless,’ result
from unobservable ‘road conditions,’ or may follow from unanticipated events like a deer jumping
into the road.” (internal citations omitted)); Guerrero, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (“Sharp conflicts of
evidence regarding the circumstances of a vehicle collision present questions of fact and credibility
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
that properly belong to the jury.” (quoting Son v. Lockwood, No. 07-CV-4189 (JMA), 2008 WL
5111287, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2008))); Munoz v. 640, LLC, No. 19-CV-5751 (BMC), 2021
WL 1176168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (denying summary judgment where parties’
diverging stories created a material fact dispute about whether the defendant “maintained a safe
distance behind plaintiffs’ vehicle and did not expect a sudden stop”); Torres v. Mamadou, No.
19-CV-6973 (SLC), 2021 WL 3682906, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 19, 2021) (denying summary
judgment where there was a dispute about whether the plaintiff “suddenly stopped” and whether
the defendant “might not have been expected to anticipate the stop”). “What matters . . . is that
Defendants put forward some evidence of a non-negligent explanation for the collision, which
suffices to defeat summary judgment.” Randhawa, 2024 WL 4150335, at *6. Defendants did so
here.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.8
8 In opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants also attempt to invoke the emergency doctrine as a defense
to liability. See Dkt. No. 56 at 18. Defendants’ non-negligent explanation and the factual disputes identified
by the Court preclude summary judgment on the issue of liability. Thus, the Court need not further consider
whether “(1) [Reilly] ‘was faced with a sudden and unexpected situation which left him little to no time for
deliberation; and (2) . . . acted as a reasonable and prudent person would once he was in that situation.’”
Dones v. United States, No. 15-CV-5332 (ARR) (RML), 2019 WL 332175, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019)
(citation omitted). Similarly, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that Gutierrez was
comparatively negligent given its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion. See Guerrero, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 64
(“Because this Court has determined that Plaintiff has not demonstrated an absence of genuine disputes of
material fact regarding Defendants’ negligence, the Court need not further address the parties’ arguments
regarding whether Plaintiff was comparatively negligent.”).
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
V. Conclusion
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment
on liability is denied.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York SO ORDERED.
January 14, 2026
/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-03953-JAM Document 77 Filed 01/14/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>