United States of America v. City of New York et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
N o 25-CV-04084 (RER) (PK)
_____________________
U NITED STATES OF AMERICA
VERSUS
C ITY OF N EW YORK, Z OHRAN KWAME M AMDANI , N EW YORK CITY COUNCIL, J ULIE
M ENIN, N EW YORK CITY D EPARTMENT OF C ORRECTION, STANLEY RICHARDS,
N EW YORK CITY D EPARTMENT OF PROBATION, SHARUN GOODWIN, N EW YORK
C ITY POLICE D EPARTMENT, AND COMMISSIONER J ESSICA S TISCH.
___________________
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
___________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
The United States of America (the “United States”) brought this action against the
City 	of 	New 	York 	and 	several 	of 	its 	agencies 	and 	officials 	(“New 	York 	City” 	or
“Defendants”) “to preempt several local provisions of law—namely, the New York City
Administrative Code §§ 9-131, 9-205, 14-154, 10-178, and New York City Police
Department 	Operations 	Order 	No. 	4 	[] 	(‘Sanctuary 	Provisions’ 	or 	‘challenged
provisions’)—that are designed to impede the Federal Government’s ability to enforce the
federal immigration laws.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4). The United States contends these Sanctuary
Provisions violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States, art. VI,
cl. 2. (Id.) Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. (ECF Nos. 52, 53).
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After carefully reviewing the record, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses the complaint.1
BACKGROUND
I. 	Federal Statutory and Regulatory Framework
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the
subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
394 (2012) (citation omitted). “This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s
constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.’” Id. at 394–95
(quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 4). “The foundation of our laws on immigration and naturalization
is the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq., which sets out the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the
subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.” Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191,
195 (2020). Two categories of immigration law are relevant to this case: (1) law regarding
administrative warrants and detainers; and (2) law related to information sharing and
cooperation. See Boston, 833 F. Supp. 3d at 35–37; Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 505.
1 This is among nearly a dozen recent cases in which the United States has challenged state and local so-
called “Sanctuary Provisions” that purportedly effect the federal government’s immigration enforcement
activities in violation of the Supremacy Clause. In all prior cases, the United States’ challenges to such
provisions have been rejected. See United States v. the State of New Jersey et al., No. 26-CV-1770 (GC)
(JTQ), 2026 WL 2621025 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2026); United States v. City of Rochester, et al., No. 25-CV-6226
(FPG), 2026 WL 2581845 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2026); United States v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, No. 26-11166
(FKB), 2026 WL 2453724 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2026); United States v. Minnesota, No. 25-CV-3798 (ECT)
(JFD), 2026 WL 2085701 (D. Minn. July 20, 2026); United States v. City of Newark, No. 25-CV-5081 (EP)
(AME), 2026 WL 1816022 (D.N.J. June 24, 2026); United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 25-CV-5917
(FMO) (AYPX), 2026 WL 1790971 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2026); United States v. City of Bos., 833 F. Supp.
3d 30 (D. Mass. 2026); United States v. Colorado, 831 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (D. Colo. 2026); United States v.
New York, 814 F. Supp. 3d 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2025); United States v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d 329 (N.D.N.Y.
2025); United States v. Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d 494 (N.D. Ill. 2025). Because much has already been written
about these issues with which this Court agrees, this decision will be relatively brief.
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a. 	Administrative Warrants and Immigration Detainers
To facilitate enforcement of the United States’ immigration law, federal officers may
effectuate arrests pursuant to a warrant issued by the Attorney General, i.e. an
administrative warrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Further, federal immigration officers can
request assistance from any other federal, state, or local law enforcement agency that
has custody of an individual the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or the
“Department”) seeks to arrest and remove by issuing a section 287.7 detainer. 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(a). A section 287.7 detainer has two components. First, a “request that such
agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien.” Id. Second, a request that
“such agency shall maintain custody of the alien” for up to forty-eight hours. Id. at (d).
Compliance with section 287.7 detainers is not mandatory. See Hernandez v. United
States, 939 F.3d 191, n.11 (2d Cir. 2019); Orellana v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 17-CV-4267
(WFK), 2025 WL 481723, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025). Federal immigration officers may
detain any non-citizen awaiting a removal decision from immigration court. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a). Federal immigration officers must detain “criminal aliens” (as defined under id.
§ 1226(c)) and non-citizens subject to a final order of removal during the pendency of the
“removal period” (as defined under id. § 1231(a)(1)–(2)).
b. 	Information Sharing and Cooperation
“Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the
immigration system.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411. To that end, federal law bars federal,
state, and local governmental entities and officials from “prohibit[ing]” or “in any way
restrict[ing]” the flow of “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful
or unlawful, of any individual” to and from DHS. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a); see also id. § 1373(b)
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(similar); id. § 1644 (similar). Many federal courts have found, “the phrase ‘information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual’ is
naturally understood as a reference to a person’s legal classification under federal law.”
Boston, 833 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (quoting United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 891 (9th
Cir. 2019)); see also Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 516–19 (collecting cases). Federal law
allows states and localities to expand their participation in immigration enforcement by
entering a “1357(g) agreement.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). A 1357(g) agreement authorizes
state and local officials to perform functions of federal immigration officers “to the extent
consistent with State and local law.” Id.
II. 	State and Local Law
a. 	Judicial Warrants and Detainers
“New York state and local law enforcement officers are not authorized by New York
law to effectuate arrests for civil law immigration violations.” People ex rel. Wells v.
DeMarco, 168 A.D.3d 31, 34 (2nd Dep’t 2018) (granting a habeas petition on the basis
that local law enforcement’s detention of petitioner pursuant to a section 287.7 detainer
was unlawful); see also Orellana, 2025 WL 481723 at *13 (“The Court declines to declare
the reasoning of the Wells court ‘unsound.’”).2 Considering the interplay between federal
and state law, New York City’s administrative code dictates when its officers may give
2 Wells is binding on trial courts throughout the state since neither the Court of Appeals nor any other
appellate department has addressed this issue. See, e.g., Phelps v. Phelps, 128 A.D.3d 1545, 1547 (4th
Dep’t 2015) (“where the issue has not been addressed within the Department, Supreme Court is bound by
the doctrine of stare decisis to apply precedent established in another Department, either until a contrary
rule is established by the Appellate Division in its own Department or by the Court of Appeals”).
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effect to a section 287.7 detainer. N.Y.C Administrative Code §§ 9-131(b), 9-205(b), 14-
154(b).
New York City’s Department of Correction, Department of Probation, and the
Police Department may honor a section 287.7 detainer request only if (a) federal
immigration authorities provide a “judicial warrant” and (b) the individual “has been
convicted of a violent or serious crime” or “is identified as a possible match in the terrorist
screening database.” N.Y.C Administrative Code §§ 9-131(b), 9-205(b), 14-154(b)(1). In
addition, 	the 	Police 	Department 	may 	honor 	a 	section 	287.7 	detainer 	request 	in
anticipation of receipt of a judicial warrant, if the individual (a) “has been convicted of a
violent or serious crime and has illegally re-entered the country after a previous removal
or return” or (b) “is identified as a possible match in the terrorist screening database.”
N.Y.C Administrative Code § 14-154(b)(2). “[H]owever, . . . if federal immigration
authorities fail to present the department with a judicial warrant for such person” within
forty-eight hours “such person shall be released and the department shall not notify
federal immigration authorities of such person’s release.” Id.
b. 	Information-Sharing and General Cooperation
In general, New York City has prohibited the expenditure of “city resources,
including, 	but 	not 	limited 	to, 	time 	spent 	by 	employees, 	officers, 	contractors, 	or
subcontractors 	while 	on 	duty, 	or 	the 	use 	of 	city 	property” 	towards 	“immigration
enforcement.” N.Y.C Administrative Code § 10-178(c). However, “nothing in this section
shall prevent any city officer or employee from complying with federal law or restrict their
discretion to take any action if such restriction is prohibited by federal law.” Id. at (e). In
particular, New York City forbids its agencies from “subject[ing] its officers or employees
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to the direction and supervision of the secretary of homeland security or the head of any
non-local law enforcement agency primarily in furtherance of immigration enforcement”
(id. at (b)), and bars the use of Department of Correction property by federal immigration
authorities for “an office or quarters” (N.Y.C Administrative Code § 9-131(h)(2)).
New York City has limited the flow of certain information to federal immigration
authorities. Except for information “related to a person’s citizenship or immigration status,”
the Department of Correction may only disclose information concerning individuals
“convicted of a violent or serious crime or identified as a possible match in the terrorist
screening database” or where such disclosure “is otherwise required by law.” N.Y.C
Administrative Code § 9-131(h)(1). New York City Police Department Operations Order
Number 4 (“NYPD Ops. Order No. 4”) states that, per section 10-178, officers cannot
“contact[] federal civil immigration authorities to let them know where an individual is
located.” NYPD Ops. Order No. 4 ¶ 6(a).
III. 	Procedural History
On July 24, 2025, the United States initiated this action. (ECF. No. 1 (“Compl.”)).
The United States brings this case against (1) the City of New York, (2) Zohran Kwame
Mamdani, the Mayor of the City of New York, (3) New York City Council, (4) Julie Menin,
Speaker of the New York City Council, (5) New York City Department of Correction, (6)
Stanley Richards, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction, (7) New
York City Department of Probation, (8) Sharun Goodwin, Commissioner of the New York
City Department of Probation, (9) New York City Police Department, and (10) Jessica S
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Tisch, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department as defendants (collectively
“New York City” or “Defendants”). (Id.)3
The United States targets select provisions of New York City law regarding
cooperation with the federal government on immigration enforcement, in particular
execution of section 287.7 detainers and information sharing. (See generally Compl.).
The United States asserts the challenged provisions violate the Supremacy Clause on
three bases: (1) the challenged provisions are preempted by federal immigration law (id.
¶¶ 104–06), (2) “enforcement of the challenged provisions . . . discriminates against the
Federal Government” (id. ¶ 108), and (3) “enforcement of the challenged provisions . . .
effects direct regulation of the Federal Government” (id. ¶ 112). The United States seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. ¶ 4).
On December 2, 2025, New York City moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 52 (“Defs.’
Mot.”); ECF No. 53 (“Defs.’ Mem.”)). The United States opposed. (ECF No. 54 (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”)). Defendants replied. (ECF No. 55 (“Defs.’ Reply”)). After Defendants’ motion to
dismiss was fully briefed, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the United States’
Article III standing to bring suit. (Order dated June 29, 2026; see also ECF Nos. 68, 73,
and 75).
3 The United States sued individual officers in their official capacities. (See generally Compl.). Since filing
their complaint, the United States has substituted defendants to reflect the current occupants of the named
offices. (See Order dated 2/27/26).
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LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move to dismiss a civil action for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Bare conclusory statements
will not suffice. Id. at 681. When courts consider whether a complaint “states a plausible
claim for relief,” they must accept all factual allegations stated in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 679; see also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curium).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The United States Lacks Article III Standing
Article III standing is a “threshold question in every federal case” that “determine[s]
the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). “If
plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their
claim.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The
United States, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing
the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing for each claim asserted. Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation omitted). “Standing is not dispensed in
gross . . . to the contrary, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks
to press and for each form of relief that is sought.’” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests.,
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Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (citation modified). To establish standing, “plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).
A. 287.7 Immigration Detainers and Administrative Warrants
One of the United States’ purported injuries is New York City’s non-adherence to
section 287.7 detainer requests that “such agency shall maintain custody of the alien” for
up to forty-eight hours. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). The United States alleges, “[b]y . . . barring
DHS access to aliens in local custody upon their release as provided by federal law (e.g.,
an 	administrative 	warrant), 	New 	York 	City’s 	Sanctuary 	Provisions 	require 	federal
immigration officers to engage in difficult and dangerous efforts to re-arrest aliens who
were previously in local custody, endangering immigration officers, the particular alien,
and others who may be nearby.” (Compl. ¶ 95). The United States asks this Court to
“issue a permanent injunction that prohibits Defendants as well as their successors,
agents, and employees, from enforcing N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 9-131; 14-154; 9-
205.” (Compl. at 36).
“For standing purposes, redressability refers to a ‘non-speculative likelihood that
the injury can be remedied by the requested relief.’” Guan v. Mayorkas, 530 F. Supp. 3d
237, 262–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation omitted). “Plaintiffs’ injuries are redressable if their
requested relief can compensate them for their losses or eliminate any effects caused by
the defendants’ challenged conduct.” Id. (citation modified). A “partial remedy satisfies
the redressability requirement.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021).
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Here, New York law forecloses relief. “As a general rule, it is not a crime for a
removable alien to remain present in the United States.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407. New
York law does not authorize state and local law enforcement officers to “effectuate arrests
for civil law immigration violations.” Wells, 168 A.D.3d at 34. Further, New York City
officers are not empowered to make arrests pursuant to administrative warrants. Id. at 42.
Thus, even if this Court eliminated sections 9-131(b), 9-205(b), 14-154(b) of New York
City’s Administrative Code, New York City officers would still be unable to execute a
section 287.7 detainer request to maintain custody of a non-citizen without a judicial
warrant.
As in Boston, “an order enjoining” the City of New York “from enforcing” its
“prohibition on detaining noncitizens solely pursuant to a civil immigration detainer or
administrative warrant—could not alter this status quo.” Boston, 833 F. Supp. 3d at 43.
Other actors, not this Court, hold the authority to grant the United States the redress it
seeks. The New York legislature “could enact a statute authorizing . . . law enforcement
officers to arrest people pursuant to federal civil immigration detainers . . . [o]r Congress
(but not this Court) could enact federal legislation granting local law enforcement officers
this authority.” See id. at 44. Therefore, the United States’ claims regarding New York
City’s execution of section 287.7 detainer custody requests are not redressable by the
relief it seeks, and it therefore lacks standing to challenge the same.
B. Information Sharing
The United States seeks “a judgment declaring that the challenged provisions
(N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 9-131 and 14-154; 9-205; 10-178 and NYPD Ops. Order
No. 4) violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and are therefore invalid.” (Compl. at 36). “The traceability
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requirement for Article III standing means that the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal
nexus between the defendant's conduct and the injury.” Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833
F.3d 74, 121 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation modified). As in Boston, “[a]ny injury the United States
has suffered from alleged violations of § 1373 is not traceable” to the challenged
provisions, “which are facially consistent with § 1373.” Boston, 833 F. Supp. 3d at 48.
In relevant part, section 1373(a) bars local governments from restricting their
agencies 	and 	officials 	from 	disclosing 	“information 	regarding 	the 	citizenship 	or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful” to federal immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. §
1373(a). Whereas, sections 9-131 and 14-154 restrict execution of section 287.7 detainer
“request[s] that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien.” N.Y.C
Administrative Code §§ 9-131 and 14-154. The United States’ assertion “that information
concerning 	the release 	of aliens 	from 	local 	custody is 	information ‘regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual,’” is contrary to law.
(ECF No. 73 at 2). As noted above, numerous federal courts have interpreted this
language to mean “a person’s legal classification under federal law.” Boston, 833 F. Supp.
3d at 37 (quoting California, 921 F.3d at 891–92; see also, e.g., Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d
at 516–19 (collecting cases).
Further, New York City’s other provisions that limit information-sharing with federal
immigration authorities exempt information regarding a person’s legal classification under
federal law. Section 9-131(h)(1) of the NYC Administrative Code prevents Department of
Correction personnel from disclosing information to federal immigration authorities in
general, e.g. “any person’s incarceration status, release dates, court appearance dates,
or any other information related to persons in the department’s custody,” but explicitly
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allows for the disclosure of information “related to a person’s citizenship or immigration
status.” Id. Section 10-178(c) bars the use of City resources towards immigration
enforcement, including information disclosure. N.Y.C Administrative Codes § 10-178(c).
However, section 10-178(e) establishes “nothing in this section shall” . . . “restrict” a “city
officer or employee[’s]” . . . “discretion to take any action if such restriction is prohibited
by federal law.” N.Y.C Administrative Code § 10-178(e). Thus, in adherence to section
1373 as well as 1644, section 10-178 does not restrict the disclosure of information
regarding persons’ legal classifications to federal immigration authorities.
There is no nexus between section 1373 and the challenged provisions. Since the
United States alleged 1373 injuries are not traceable to the challenged provisions, the
United States does not have standing to bring its related claims.
II. 	The United States’ Preemption Claims Fail
Even if the United States has standing—and it does not—its preemption claims
fail.
When courts are called upon to address preemption questions, “the analysis
always begins with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation
modified). “A state’s ability to control its officers and employees lies at the heart of state
sovereignty.” Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 523; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 931 (1997) (“To say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can
control all of its officers, is to say nothing of significance.”). Further, “[t]he regulation of
health and safety matters is primarily and historically a matter of local concern.”
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Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985). Since
quintessential police powers are implicated here, a presumption against preemption
applies.
All of the United States’ preemption claims—express, conflict, and field—fail
because the relevant federal statutes do not regulate private actors. In order for a federal
law to preempt state law, “it must satisfy two requirements . . . [f]irst, it must represent the
exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution; pointing to the Supremacy
Clause will not do” and “[s]econd, since the Constitution ‘confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States,’ . . . the . . . provision at issue must be best read
as one that regulates private actors.” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S.
453, 477 (2018) (citation omitted). The United States alleges sections 1373(a) and 1644
have preemptive effect. (Compl. ¶ 105). Sections 1373(a) and 1644 contain nearly
identical language and therefore will be analyzed together.
Neither section 1373(a) nor section 1644 “confers on private entities . . . a federal
right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints.” Murphy,
584 U.S. at 479. Facially, “[t]he plain text of § 1373 only operates on State and local
government entities and officials.” Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 521. In effect, sections
1373(a) and 1644 regulate “how information ‘regarding citizenship or immigration status’
of a private individual might be distributed between governments”; they do not “create or
restrict the rights of any private actor.” Id. Numerous federal courts have found that
sections 1373(a) and 1644 do not regulate private actors and therefore lack preemptive
effect. See id.; Colorado v. United States Dep’t of Just., 455 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1059 (D.
Colo. 2020); Cnty. of Ocean v. Grewal, 475 F. Supp. 3d 355, 372 (D.N.J. 2020).
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The United States argues the proper question “is whether the INA as a whole
regulates private actors.” (Pl.’s. Opp’n at 27). The Court disagrees. The United States’
proposed 	lens 	would 	allow 	the 	federal 	government 	to 	“smuggle 	unconstitutional
commands to States into specific provisions of a broader statute, and then rely on
separate provisions for cover.” Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 521–22. This approach was
rejected in Murphy where the Court focused its analysis on the challenged section of the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PAPSA), despite recognizing a “closely
related provision of PASPA, § 3702(2) does restrict private conduct.” Murphy, 584 U.S.
at 480. The United States’ argument rests exclusively on commentary from a footnote in
State of New York v. Department of Justice. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 27 (citing New York v. Dep’t
of Just., 951 F.3d 84, n. 27 (2d Cir. 2020))). New York analyzed section 1373 as applied
to a federal funding requirement and did not conclusively address the preemption issue
raised here, accordingly the Court respectfully declines to follow its dicta. Since sections
1373(a) and 1644 do not regulate private actors, they do not preempt the challenged
provisions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the United States’ preemption arguments fail for
other reasons.
A. Express Preemption
“Express preemption arises when a federal statute expressly directs that state law
be ousted.” Island Park, 559 F.3d at 101 (citation modified). The United States claims
“federal immigration law’s protections for information sharing . . . [e].g. 8 U.S.C. §§
1373(a), 1644” expressly preempt the challenged provisions. (Compl. ¶ 105). The United
States fails to establish that sections 1373(a) and 1644 “oust” the challenged information
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sharing provisions, nor could they. These statutes only apply “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State, or local law.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373(a), 1644. Against the police
power presumption and absent clear language, the United States’ express preemption
claims fail.
B. Field Preemption
New York City notes that the complaint “contains one generic reference to
‘occupy[ing] the field’ in paragraph 105. However, Plaintiff does not even clearly identify
what the field is.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 27). The United States counters that through the INA,
“Congress intended to occupy the field of apprehension and detention of aliens, but
Defendants’ enactment of the Sanctuary Provisions attempts to invade and regulate
within this field.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 28; see also Compl. ¶ 29). Irrespective of whether the
United States sufficiently pled field preemption, the challenged provisions do not regulate
the apprehension and detention of non-citizens. The challenged provisions govern the
allocation of municipal resources towards federal immigration enforcement. Since the
challenged provisions and the INA occupy different fields, the United States’ field
preemption claim fails.
C. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption is present where “‘compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility” or “the challenged state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (citation modified). “‘The burden of establishing obstacle
preemption, like that of impossibility preemption, is heavy: the mere fact of tension
between federal and state law is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting
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preemption, particularly when the state law involves the exercise of traditional police
power.’” New York State Telecommunications Ass’n, Inc. v. James, 101 F.4th 135, 155
(2d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). The United States alleges the challenged provisions
“constitute and create obstacles to the enforcement of federal immigration law” and
“undermine federal immigration law’s protections for information sharing and thus are
preempted under . . . conflict preemption principles.” (Compl. ¶¶ 104–05).
Here, the challenged provisions involve the exercise of traditional police power.
Further, the United States delineates in its papers the avenues available to affect its
enforcement scheme against the backdrop of federalism. The federal government may
receive 	New 	York 	City’s 	assistance 	detaining 	individuals 	and 	receive 	information
regarding their release where “federal immigration authorities present a judicial warrant
and the alien has a specified prior conviction within the past five years.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at
30). The federal government may “facilitate congressionally-authorized arrests” without
the “most basic information about the alien” in New York City’s possession and instead
rely on their own information sources. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 31). In order for the federal
government to maintain an office on Department of Correction land, the Attorney General
may enter into a cooperative agreement with New York City, New York City Department
of Correction, or the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction. (See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 22). New York City has currently opted not to enter into such agreements,
which may upset the federal government’s immigration enforcement priorities. N.Y.C
Administrative Code § 10-178(e). But the “possibility that federal enforcement priorities
might be upset is not enough to provide a basis for preemption.” Kansas, 589 U.S. at 212.
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New York City’s exercise of volition is evidence of non-conscription; it is not a basis for
preemption.
The proffered conflicts amount to mere tensions, as opposed to true obstacles,
and the United States’ conflict preemption claim therefore fails.
III. 	The Tenth Amendment’s Anticommandeering Doctrine Precludes Relief
Even were the Court to find that the United States has standing and the challenged
provisions are preempted—both answered in the negative above—United States’ claims
would still fail because the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States precludes relief.
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const.
amend. X.
The legislative powers granted to Congress are sizable, but they are not
unlimited. The Constitution confers on Congress not plenary legislative
power but only certain enumerated powers. Therefore, all other legislative
power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth Amendment confirms. And
conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power
to 	issue 	direct 	orders 	to 	the 	governments 	of 	the 	States. 	The
anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit
on congressional authority.
Murphy, 584 U.S. at 471.4
4 Adherence to anticommandeering is important for three reasons. First, “a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”
Id. at 473 (citation modified). Second, it promotes “political accountability” . . . “if a State imposes regulations
only because it has been commanded to do so by Congress, responsibility is blurred.” Id. at 473–74. Third,
it “prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.” Id. at 474. States are tasked with
“govern[ing] in accordance with the will of their citizens” and “[t]oday, as at the time of the founding, the
allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the political
process.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999).
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The United States argues it is “not seeking to compel participation in immigration
enforcement . . . but rather to remove Defendants’ express and implicit obstacles to the
Executive’s duty to carry out its immigration enforcement duties.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 35) (citing
Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, 90). New York City replies “if accepted, [the United States’ claims] would
require the City to affirmatively assist the federal government in enforcing immigration
laws in violation of the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering doctrine.” (Defs.’ Reply
at 19). New York City is correct, at least partially.
The 	United 	States 	seeks 	injunctive 	and 	declaratory 	relief 	to 	preempt 	the
challenged provisions. (Compl. ¶ 4). If the challenged provisions were struck, while New
York City would not be obligated to carry out federal immigration enforcement, they would
be barred from prohibiting their agencies and employees from engaging in federal
immigration enforcement by expending personnel, property, and other resources to (1)
detain 	individuals 	and 	(2) 	implement 	inter-agency 	information-sharing, 	including
disclosing personally identifiable information, all potentially in violation of state law. And
of course, there is nothing within federal law that obligates states to participate in federal
immigration enforcement or compels states to comply therewith.
The 	United 	States’ 	preemption arguments amount 	to 	nothing more than 	a
backdoor around the Tenth Amendment and rest on a false distinction between (a)
compelling local governments’ participation in federal immigration enforcement and (b)
prohibiting local governments from dictating how their personnel and other resources may
be utilized towards federal immigration enforcement. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 35 (“And §§ 1373
and 1644 only forbid restricting assistance to immigration authorities—they do not
mandate action—and they leave states free to control how employees keep data and
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spend their time—so long as employees remain permitted to voluntarily share information
with federal immigration authorities.”)). “The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue
direct orders to state legislatures—applies” to commands for “affirmative action” and the
imposition of “prohibitions.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 455 (citation modified). If states cannot
remain free to control their agencies and employees to resist federal immigration
enforcement, which is within states’ constitutional prerogatives, the Tenth Amendment
anticommandeering doctrine means nothing.
“Congress cannot circumvent” the Court’s bar on “compelling States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program” by “conscripting the State’s officers directly.” Printz,
521 U.S. at 935. If we take the United States’ argument to its logical end, it would have
New York City’s agencies and their individual employees determine for themselves the
extent to which they will comply with state and local law in the course of their duties. Such
a regime would preclude states and municipalities from controlling their agencies and
employees in the performance of their duties and directing the expenditure of municipal
resources and obviously violate federalism, contravene due process, and foreclose
efficiencies available through the implementation of uniform processes.
The United States’ claims hinge in large part on the applicability of City of New
York. (Compl. ¶¶ 43, 90; Pl.’s Opp’n at 35–36). In City of New York, the court found:
[W]e need not locate with precision the line between invalid federal
measures that seek to impress state and local governments into the
administration of federal programs and valid federal measures that
prohibit states from compelling passive resistance to particular
federal programs. It suffices to say that, at least in the context of the
City's facial challenge, Sections 434 and 642 are of the latter variety.
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City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).5 City of New York’s
continued viability post-Murphy however, is questionable. See New York v. United States
Dep’t of Just., 964 F.3d 150, 165 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[O]ur Circuit’s previous reliance on the
distinction between ‘measures that seek to impress state and local governments into the
administration of federal programs’ and ‘federal measures that prohibit states from
compelling passive resistance to particular federal programs’ in striking down a Tenth
Amendment challenge to Section 1373, City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35, is no longer
valid in light of Murphy.”) (Pooler, J. joined by Chin, J. and Carney, J., dissenting).6
Considering its questionable viability and the growing contrary authority, the Court
respectfully declines to follow City of New York and finds sections 1373(a) and 1644
violate the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine.
IV. 	The United States’ Intergovernmental Immunity Claims Fail
The 	intergovernmental 	immunity 	doctrine 	prohibits 	“state 	laws 	that 	either
‘regulat[e] the United States directly or discriminat[e] against the Federal Government or
those with whom it deals’ (e.g., contractors).” United States v. Washington (Washington
II), 596 U.S. 832, 838–39 (2022) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423,
435 (1990) (plurality opinion) (other citations omitted).
5 Section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act has been codified as
8 U.S.C. § 1644. Section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act has been
codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
6 Numerous other federal courts post-Murphy have found similar challenges based on sections 1373 and
1644 to violate the Anti-Commandeering doctrine. E.g., Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 1057; Grewal, 475 F.
Supp. 3d at 378.
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a. 	Direct Regulation
The Court has “decisively rejected the argument that any state regulation which
indirectly regulates the Federal Government’s activity is unconstitutional.” North Dakota,
495 U.S. at 434–35 (citations omitted). “The Court has more recently adopted a functional
approach to claims of governmental immunity, accommodating of the full range of each
sovereign’s legislative authority and respectful of the primary role of Congress in resolving
conflicts between the National and State Governments.” Id. at 435.
The 	United 	States 	argues 	New York 	City’s 	enforcement of 	the 	challenged
provisions “effects direct regulation of the Federal Government” . . . “[b]y refusing to honor
civil detainers and warrants expressly authorized by Congress,” “restricting access to
detention facilities and the aliens within them,” and “limit[ing] the circumstances in which
federal immigration authorities may interrogate illegal aliens.” (Compl. ¶¶ 112–14).
The parameters of direct regulation is an open question in this Circuit. New York
City advocates this Court adhere to McHenry County. “As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, while ‘States may not regulate the federal government directly,’ a regulation
prohibiting state or local government cooperation with the federal government ‘regulates
only State and local entities and law enforcement—not the federal government.’” (Defs.’
Mem. at 33 (citing McHenry Cnty. v. Kwame Raoul, 44 F.4th 581, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2022)).
Whereas the United States propones this Court follow CoreCivic. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 20). In
CoreCivic, the Third Circuit rejected New Jersey’s assertion that “a law regulates the
federal government directly only if the law’s text applies to it” and that in effect the
challenged provision “carries the same sting as a law whose text applies expressly to the
federal government.” CoreCivic, Inc. v. Governor of New Jersey, 145 F.4th 315, 321–22
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(3d Cir. 2025). Since neither case binds, the Court looks to the doctrines “constitutional
foundations” and “the actual workings of our federalism.” United States v. New Mexico,
455 U.S. 720, 731 (1982).
The intergovernmental immunity doctrine originates from McCulloch v. Maryland.
In McCulloch the Court held that under the Supremacy Clause, “[t]he states have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into effect the powers
vested in the national government.” McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819).
Originally we understood it as barring any state law whose effect . . . was or
might be to increase the cost to the Federal Government of performing its
functions, including laws that imposed costs on federal contractors. We later
came to understand the doctrine, however, as prohibiting state laws that
either regulate the United States directly or discriminate against the Federal
Government or those with whom it deals. (e.g., contractors).
United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832, 838 (2022) (citation modified).
One obvious and natural constraint of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine is
the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Although the anticommandeering principle is simple and basic, it did not
emerge in our cases until relatively recently . . . The pioneering case was New
York. . . Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court traced this rule to the basic
structure of government established under the Constitution. The Constitution,
she noted, “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States.” In this respect, the Constitution represented a sharp break from the
Articles of Confederation. “Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress
lacked the authority in most respects to govern the people directly.” Instead,
Congress was limited to acting “only upon the States” . . . The Constitutional
Convention considered plans that would have preserved this basic structure,
but it rejected them in favor of a plan under which “Congress would exercise
its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over States” . . .
“We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”
. . . “Congress may not simply commandee[r] the legislative processes of the
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States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.”
Murphy, 584 U.S. at 471–72 (2018) (citation modified) (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162–66, 170 (1992)).
“At least to some degree, the doctrines are opposite sides of the same coin . . . a
finding that any of the challenged provisions violates intergovernmental immunity would
imply 	that 	a 	Defendant 	must 	assist 	with 	the 	federal 	government’s 	immigration
enforcement effort.” Minnesota, 2026 WL 2085701 at *22; see also California, 921 F.3d
at 891 (“A finding that SB 54 violates the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity would
imply that California cannot choose to discriminate against federal immigration authorities
by refusing to assist their enforcement efforts—a result that would be inconsistent with
the Tenth Amendment and the anticommandeering rule.”)
This Court declines to define the bounds of direct regulation here but finds that
enjoining the challenged provisions would result in the commandeering of state and local
resources. Such a holding would not “accommodate the full range of each sovereign’s
legislative authority.” North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 435 (citation modified). Therefore, the
challenged provisions cannot be classified as functionally regulating the United States.
b. 	Discrimination
“[A] state law is . . . no longer unconstitutional just because it indirectly increases
costs for the Federal Government, so long as the law imposes those costs in a neutral,
nondiscriminatory way.” Washington II, 596 U.S. at 839. “The State does not discriminate
against the Federal Government and those with whom it deals unless it treats someone
else better than it treats them.” Washington v. United States (Washington I), 460 U.S.
536, 544–45 (1983) (citation omitted).
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The United States argues that Washington I and North Dakota “did not create a
comparator requirement, but simply made the common-sense observation that the
Federal Government cannot be said to experience discrimination when it receives more
favorable treatment than someone else.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 24). The United States is wrong.
“Differential treatment is critical to a discrimination-based intergovernmental immunity
claim.” New York, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 282 (citation modified) (citing McHenry Cnty., 44
F.4th at 594). “[A] comparator is necessary.” New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 353. The
United States discrimination claim fails for lack of a comparator.
The United States does not and cannot identify a similarly situated entity. State
and local agencies and their officers do not enforce immigration law, nor do members of
the public. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 22). As the United States concedes, the Federal Government
holds the “exclusive charge of enforcing immigration law.” (Id. at 23). Not only are other
federal law enforcement agencies with different charges differently situated, “[f]or a state
law to unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government, it must treat
comparable classes of federal and non-federal employees differently, not different
classes of federal employees.” Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (citing Washington I, 596
U.S. at 839) (citation omitted). “[T]he fact that a law affects an exclusively federal domain
is not evidence of discrimination,” rather “failure to identify a comparator ends the inquiry.”
New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 353.
In alignment with other federal courts, this Court finds that New York City’s
provisions that single out immigration enforcement do not discriminate against the federal
government. See, e.g. Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34; Minnesota, 2026 WL 2085701,
at *19–22.
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* * *
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: October 15, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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