Rocke v. ACS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PAULINE ROCKE,
Plaintiff,
– against –
ACS, POLICE PSAI, MARLBORO
HOUSING, CONEY ISLAND HOSPITAL,
and WOODHULL HOSPITAL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-cv-04912 (NCM) (JRC)
PAULINE ROCKE,
Plaintiff,
– against –
MARLBORO HOUSING, WOODHULL
HOSPITAL, and CONEY ISLAND
HOSPITAL,
Defendants.
26-cv-05813 (NCM) (JRC)
PAULINE ROCKE,
Plaintiff,
– against –
ACS, PSAI, EMT, and VNS WORK,
Defendants.
26-cv-05814 (NCM) (JRC)
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NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On August 11 and September 16, 2026, plaintiff Pauline Rocke, proceeding pro se,
commenced the three above-captioned actions. See Complaint, Rocke v. ACS, No. 26-cv-
04912, ECF No. 1 (“Rocke XVII Compl.”) (Aug. 11, 2026); Complaint, Rocke v. Marlboro
Housing, No. 26-cv-05813, ECF No. 1 (“Rocke XVIII Compl.”) (Sep. 16, 2026); Complaint,
Rocke v. ACS, No. 26-cv-05814, ECF No. 1 (“Rocke XIX Compl.”) (Sep. 16, 2026)
(collectively, the “Complaints”). In each action, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mot. for Leave to Proceed IFP,
Rocke v. ACS, No. 26-cv-04912, ECF No. 2; Mot. for Leave to Proceed IFP, Rocke v.
Marlboro Housing, No. 26-cv-05813, ECF No. 2; Mot. for Leave to Proceed IFP, Rocke v.
ACS, No. 26-cv-05814, ECF No. 2.
The Court grants plaintiff’s applications to proceed IFP and consolidates the three
actions solely for purposes of this Order. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s
complaints are DISMISSED. Within fourteen (14) days of this Memorandum and Order,
plaintiff is directed to show cause why the Court should not enter a filing injunction
barring plaintiff from commencing any future action in the Eastern District of New York
without first seeking leave from the Court.
BACKGROUND
On August 11 and September 18, 2026, plaintiff initiated three actions, which are
her seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth case filed before this Court. See generally
Rocke XVII Compl.; Rocke XVIII Compl.; Rocke XIX Compl. All Complaints allege similar
or the same facts as her sixteen prior actions. 1 None of plaintiff’s prior submissions alleged
1 	Rocke v. Hettleman, No. 24-cv-05874 (dismissed); Rocke v. Hettleman, No. 24-cv-
05961 (dismissed); Rocke v. Turbow, No. 24-cv-06041 (dismissed); Rocke v. USA, No. 25-
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a viable federal claim, nor has any complaint lent clarity to the basis or bases for her
claims. Like all prior submissions, the instant Complaints, to the extent comprehensible,
seemingly concern the custody of her children, her mental health care, and alleged false
accusations of criminal activity. Rocke XVII Compl. 5–8; 2 Rocke XVIII Compl. 5–6;
Rocke XIX Compl. 5–6.
In the Rocke XVII Complaint, plaintiff asserts that the police and ACS, among
other things, “pursue[d] . . . a false mental psychological diagnosis” to punish her with a
crime. Rocke XVII Compl. 6. She alleges every time she becomes pregnant, “ACS pop up
secretly start investigation” and that they “keep[] coming for [her] kids based [on] one
false allegation[.]” Rocke XVII Compl. 7. The Complaint is otherwise unintelligible. For
example, the relief plaintiff seeks from the Court is:
The Police and acs for mishandling Evidence my case negligence claim
ground to pursue action create a false mental Psychological diagnosis
Record so Punish me crime didn’t commit spreading false new admission of
guilt force to the hospital unaware track have accession me denied how
Received false diagnose Perpetuate Being Torture denied
Rocke XVII Compl. 6. In a subsequent filing on August 20, 2026, plaintiff requested
reversal of an unspecified judgment. Notice 1, No. 26-cv-04912, ECF No. 4.
cv-00040 	(dismissed); 	Rocke 	v. 	Coney 	Island 	Hospital 	EMT, 	No. 	25-cv-00627
(dismissed); Rocke v. PSA1 ACS, N o . 25-cv-00628 (dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8 with warning); Rocke v. Coney Island Hospital, No. 25-cv-00983
(dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8); Rocke v. Rodricus, No. 25-cv-
00986 (dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 with warning); Rocke v.
ACS, No. 25-cv-02529 (dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 with
warning); Rocke v. Judge Hettleman, No. 25-cv-02619 (same); Rocke v. Coney Island
Hospital, No. 25-cv-02622 (same); Rocke v. Sacco, No. 25-cv-02929 (same); Rocke v.
ACS, No. 25-cv-04542 (same); Rocke v. U.S.A., No. 25-cv-04793 (same); Rocke v. ACS,
No. 26-cv-03818 (dismissed for filing deficiency); Rocke v. Coney Island Hospital, No.
26-cv-03819 (NCM) (dismissed for filing deficiency).
2 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
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Plaintiff’s 	Rocke 	XVIII 	Complaint 	alleges 	she 	was 	“false[ly] 	accuse[d]” 	of
nonconsensual distribution of an intimate image, “den[ied] market access,” and “los[t]
custody.” Rocke XVIII Compl. 5. She states the following facts underlie her claims:
criminal offense for knowingly distributing Intimate Image without consent
additional Provision with from Online sexual Exploitation in front of minor
with harm The Intent to Exploit nude Images while asleeping after
criminalizing The distributing vulnerable to Exploitation By group watch
Pornography scandal unauthorized Entry in the Interest of Justice To lose
custody Parental alienation sneaky tactics Emergency of my son
Rocke XVIII Compl. 5. The statement of relief begins with “modify the order” but the
remainder strings together various words that do not make out an intelligible request for
relief. See Rocke XVIII Compl. 6.
Finally, in Rocke XIX, plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to her claims took
place in:
Cultural and Test Bias In Education Psychology unfairly Penalizes Bias
assessment how End up in mental ward after woodhull hospital change
diagnosis Implicit Bias characterizes External motivation lose custody Deny
who telling me condition unjust normalized violence
Rocke XIX Compl. 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 3 A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While all
3 	Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
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factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this presumption
is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Nonetheless, when the Court reviews a pro se complaint it must hold it to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see
also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly,
courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff must provide
a short, plain statement of her claim against each named defendant so that they have
adequate notice of the claims against them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Rule 8 . . . demands
more 	than 	an 	unadorned, 	the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 	accusation.”). 	A
pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will
not suffice. Id. To satisfy this standard, the complaint must, at a minimum, “disclose
sufficient information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the
plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.”
Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000). “The basic requirements of Rule 8
apply to self-represented and counseled plaintiffs alike.” Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F. 3d
138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019). A court is empowered to dismiss a complaint on its own initiative
where the complaint does not comply with Rule 8. Id.
Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an IFP
action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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DISCUSSION
The Court must dismiss plaintiff’s Complaints because, even construed liberally,
each complaint fails to meet Rule 8’s minimal pleading requirements. Specifically,
plaintiff fails to provide a “short and plain” statement of her claims so that each defendant
in each case has a “fair understanding of what [] plaintiff is complaining about and . . .
know[s] whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Harnage, 916 F.3d at 141.
As with her prior actions, plaintiff appears to seek relief from entities who were
involved in her healthcare, the removal of her children from her custody, and a criminal
case. However, the Complaints fail to suggest a basis for relief or allege intelligible facts
for the Court to discern what relief is requested. For example, in the Rocke XVII
Complaint, plaintiff appears to assert a claim for negligence against defendants ACS,
Police PSAI, Marlboro Housing, Coney Island Hospital, and Woodhull Hospital, but fails
to allege any facts that suggest what duty was owed to plaintiff by each defendant or how
each defendant violated that duty. Rocke XVII Compl. 5–6. With respect to defendant
Marlboro Housing, all that is alleged is that her neighbor’s daughter went there. Rocke
XVII Compl. 8.
The Rocke XVIII Complaint does not list a claim for relief, nor can one be
construed from the pleading’s “rambling accusations.” Infanti v. Scharpf, No. 06-cv-
06552, 2008 WL 2397607, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2008); see Rocke XVIII Compl. 6.
While plaintiff seeks to modify an order, she fails to provide any detail about the “order”—
what it concerns, who issued the order, or even on what basis the Court could modify such
an order—anywhere in the complaint. See Rocke XVIII Compl. 5–6. The Rocke XIX
Complaint is similarly difficult to parse, and any facts alleged are impossible to discern.
Even when read with the “special solitude” afforded pro se pleadings, Triestman
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v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006), the Complaints fail to state a
claim for relief. See Hall v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dep’t, No. 22-cv-06692, 2022 WL 17253530, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2022) (dismissing pro se complaint where the court was “unable to
determine exactly what claims [the] [p]laintiff [was] attempting to allege”).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Complaints are dismissed.
* 	* 	*
The Court has considered affording plaintiff an opportunity to amend 	the
Complaints. Based on the incomprehensible nature of the Complaints and plaintiff’s
litigation history, it is unlikely that plaintiff can cure the defects by amendment. Thus, the
Court concludes that granting plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. See O’Hara v.
Weeks Marine, Inc., 294 F.3d 55, 69 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] district court may deny leave to
amend the complaint if the amendment would be futile.”); Clifton v. Office of Temp.
Disability OTDA, No. 15-cv-06806, 2016 WL 482021, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016)
(“Whereas ordinarily the [c]ourt would allow [the] plaintiff an opportunity to amend . . .
it need not afford that opportunity here where it is clear from [the] plaintiff’s submission
and prior litigation history with the [c]ourt that he cannot state a plausible claim for relief.
As such, any attempt to amend . . . would be futile.”).
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
District courts may enjoin filings by litigants who persist in filing repetitive suits
that lack merit. Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996); see
Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc., 704 F. Supp. 3d 502, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (observing
that the Second Circuit has approved anti-filing injunctions that “prohibited the filing of
any matters in a designated category[,] against designated parties in demonstrated need
of protection[, and] that required leave of court for future filings”).
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In nine of plaintiff’s prior cases, the Court previously warned that it will not
tolerate frivolous litigation. See Coney Island Hospital, No. 25-cv-02622, ECF No. 4 at
5–6; Hettleman, No. 25-cv-02619, ECF No. 4 at 5–6; PSA1 ACS, N o . 25-cv-00628, ECF
No. 10 at 4–5; Rodricus, No. 25-cv-00986, ECF No. 5 at 5; ACS, No. 25-cv-02529, ECF
No. 4 at 5–6; Rocke v. Coney Island Hospital, No. 25-cv-02622, ECF No. 4 at 5–6; Rocke
v. Sacco, No. 25-cv-02929, ECF No. 4 at 5; Rocke v. ACS, No. 25-cv-04542, ECF No. 4 at
5; Rocke v. U.S.A., No. 25-cv-04793, ECF No. 4 at 5. For example, in Coney Island
Hospital, the Court explained that “it would likely be a waste of resources for plaintiff to
amend,” and that the Court and defendants should not be expected to “expend resources
on patently frivolous litigation.” Memorandum & Order, No. 25-cv-02622, ECF No. 4 at
5–6. Despite the Court’s prior warnings, the three consolidated actions in this Order
follow a pattern of similarly incomprehensible complaints.
“[D]istrict courts have the power and the obligation to protect the public and the
efficient administration of justice from individuals who have a history of litigation
entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to other parties and an unnecessary
burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121,
123 (2d Cir. 2000). “If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative
lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the
judicial system.” Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005). Prior to imposing
such sanctions, the district court should provide the litigant with notice of the proposed
sanction and an opportunity to be heard. Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir.
1998).
Accordingly, within 30 days of this Order, plaintiff is hereby directed to show cause
in writing why she should not be enjoined from filing any new IFP action in the Eastern
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District of New York without first obtaining permission from this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1651;
see, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the “less
drastic remedy of subjecting a vexatious litigant to a ‘leave of court’ requirement with
respect to future filings” was a reasonable response to harassing, abuse of the litigation
process); Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005)
(affirming district court’s order enjoining plaintiff from future filing without seeking leave
of the court). The Court will evaluate the following factors to determine whether to impose
such an injunction:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by
counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other
parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect
the courts and other parties.
Stora v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 25-cv-05004, 2026 WL 41247, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2026) (quoting Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Israel, 919 F.3d 709, 714
(2d Cir. 2019)).
Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s order to show cause must explain why these
factors do not weigh in favor of imposing an injunction. If plaintiff fails to show cause
within the time allotted, or should her affirmation fail to set forth good cause as to why
this injunction should not be entered, the Court shall impose an injunction prohibiting
her from future filings without seeking leave of the Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s Complaints are dismissed for failure to
comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim
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for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). On or before October 23, 2026, the
Court directs plaintiff to file a response to the Court’s order to show cause stating why she
should not be prevented from filing any new civil actions without first obtaining the
Court’s permission.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing the
actions, mail a copy of the judgments and this Memorandum and Order to plaintiff, note
the mailing on the docket, and close the cases.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be
taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	October 9, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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