DigitalDoors, Inc. v. Flushing Bank

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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DIGITALDOORS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
v. 	AND ORDER
25-CV-1895-SJB-SIL
FLUSHING BANK,
Defendant.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Defendant Flushing Bank’s letter-motion to dismiss
Plaintiff DigitalDoors’s Amended Complaint for patent infringement. (Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss dated July 11, 2025 (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 21). Flushing Bank previously
submitted a request for a premotion conference (“PMC”) to dismiss the original
Complaint. (Def.’s Mot. for PMC dated May 5, 2025, Dkt. No. 16). After holding a
PMC, the Court directed DigitalDoors to file an amended complaint and the parties to
submit additional letter-briefing on a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Min.
Entry dated June 12, 2025).
DigitalDoors filed its Amended Complaint on June 27, 2025, (Am. Compl., Dkt.
No. 20), which Flushing Bank now seeks to dismiss. For the reasons explained below,
the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
DigitalDoors owns a series of patents covering methods for data processing,
storage, and security. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–29, 32, 34). DigitalDoors alleges that
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Flushing Bank, a New York State-chartered bank, infringed four separate patents, and
brings an additional, related claim for willful infringement. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 104–236).
In its Amended Complaint, DigitalDoors alleges that financial institutions,
including Flushing Bank, are required to comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”) and its accompanying regulations, which require banks to establish
standards to ensure security of customer information. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7). And New York
banks also must comply with state regulations that require covered entities to maintain
cybersecurity systems and set guidelines for data security. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (citing N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. and Regs. tit. 23 §§ 500.2, 500.3, 500.16; N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 899-bb(2))).
In essence, DigitalDoors’s lengthy and repetitive Amended Complaint alleges that to
comply with these regulations, the financial services industry developed a standard for
cybersecurity called “Sheltered Harbor,” which necessarily—because of its design—
infringes on DigitalDoors’s patents. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 11, 70–103).
With respect to Flushing Bank, DigitalDoors alleges, upon information and
belief, that Flushing Bank either uses “systems and methods for processing data” that
are Sheltered Harbor compliant, or uses a system with “substantially equivalent
functionality.” (Id. ¶ 103). DigitalDoors further alleges that Flushing Bank uses
Sheltered Harbor Certified systems provided by Q2 Software to protect customer data
in accordance with the aforementioned regulations. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12).
DISCUSSION
The Second Circuit has “occasionally affirmed the granting of dispositive
motions without full briefing . . . only when the issues were predominantly legal and
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the complaint had ‘substantial deficiencies.’” Kowalchuck v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 94
F.4th 210, 217 (2d. Cir. 2024) (quoting Grossman v. GEICO Cas. Co., No. 21–2789, 2022
WL 1656593, at *4 (2d Cir. May 25, 2022)). The parties have been heard for oral
argument previously, and the legal and factual issues are straightforward. The Court
deems additional briefing unnecessary (and no party has requested additional briefing
beyond the letters submitted or in their supplemental submissions),1 and the motion is
granted for the reasons explained below. See, e.g., Kapitalforeningen Lægernes Inv. v.
United Techs. Corp., 779 F. App’x 69, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s
dismissal of an action by way of premotion letter construed as a motion to dismiss).
“To survive a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain more than “naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotations omitted). In other
words, a plausible claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
1 After DigitalDoors filed a letter indicating that it was satisfied that the Q2
software used by Flushing Bank was not used to infringe the patents, (Pl.’s Letter dated
Nov. 11, 2025, Dkt. No. 26), the parties filed additional letters supplementing their
briefing on the motion to dismiss, (Def.’s Suppl. Mot. to Dismiss dated Nov. 21, 2025,
Dkt. No. 27; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Suppl. Mot. to Dismiss dated Nov. 24, 2025,
Dkt. No. 28).
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speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact)[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
omitted). The determination of whether a party has alleged a plausible claim is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
This pleading requirement “does not impose a probability standard at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.” Mosaic Health, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 156 F.4th 68, 77
(2d Cir. 2025) (noting that plausibility does not equate to probability). To avoid
dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Evaluating a complaint on a
motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from
them all reasonable inferences; but [is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th
86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021).
Direct patent infringement claims “are subject to the pleading standards
established by [Twombly and Iqbal].” Golden v. Apple Inc., 819 F. App’x 930, 930–31 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “There must be some allegation of specific services or products
of the defendants which are being accused,” Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v.
Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added), to avoid dismissal.
As the Federal Circuit has noted, “[i]t is not enough to say ‘you infringe my patent.’”
Id.
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DigitalDoors alleges that Flushing Bank infringes its patents because a series of
federal and state regulations require Flushing Bank to adopt standards and develop
systems for protecting customer data, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–11), Flushing Bank utilizes
Sheltered Harbor Certified software provided by Q2—as well as other unidentified
“systems and methods”—to comply with these regulations, (id. ¶¶ 12, 103), and
Sheltered Harbor Certified software infringes DigitalDoors’s patents by design, (id.
¶¶ 11, 71–103). The Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, describes how
the Sheltered Harbor standard works, and that for it to be effectively applied, using the
standard necessarily infringes DigitalDoors’s patents. (Id. ¶¶ 70–103).
On November 11, 2025, DigitalDoors filed a letter indicating that after
discussions with Flushing Bank’s counsel and investigation of the Sheltered Harbor
Certified Q2 software Flushing Bank uses, it was satisfied that Flushing Bank’s use of
the Q2 software does not infringe the patents. (Pl.’s Letter dated Nov. 11, 2025 (“Pl.’s
Letter”), Dkt. No. 26).
Flushing Bank contends that the remaining allegations in the Amended
Complaint fail to state a claim for patent infringement. (Def.’s Mot. at 1–3). The Court
agrees. Even taking all of DigitalDoors’s allegations as true, the Amended Complaint
fails to state a claim for patent infringement for two reasons.
First, the Amended Complaint fails to identify an actual accused “service[] or
product[]” Flushing Bank uses that infringes. See Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C.,
620 F. App’x at 937. Because the Q2 software was the only specific product alleged in
the Complaint, and DigitalDoors has conceded that it does not infringe the patents,
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DigitalDoors is back where it started—without any allegations of an actual accused
product or service used by Flushing Bank which infringes. Such gaps require dismissal
of infringement claims. As the Federal Circuit explained in a similar case:
[Plaintiff’s] third amended complaint described the patents and the parties
and alleged that Ball infringes the ’492, ’907, ’998, ’999, and ’347 patents by
use of one or more of the machines at least at the Bristol Plant. The third
amended complaint did not otherwise identify the accused machines . . . .
The complaint also identified additional Ball packaging plants across the
country, and alleged that on information and belief, machines in each of
these plants similarly infringe one or more of the asserted patents. 	We
agree with the district court that these allegations are insufficient to state a
plausible claim for direct infringement. Even taken as true, the facts alleged
in the third amended complaint are insufficient to state a plausible, rather
than merely possible, claim for relief. . . . [T]he third amended complaint
does not sufficiently identify, for example, by photograph or name, any of
the 	particular 	machines 	that 	allegedly 	infringe 	other 	than 	by 	broad
functional language. . . . [Plaintiff] did not fairly identify the accused
machines. The third amended complaint is thus insufficient; under any
pleading standard[.]
Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 F. App’x 708, 714–15 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quotations and citations
omitted); e.g., Arunachalam v. Apple, Inc., 806 F. App’x 977, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he
Complaint never identified even a single specific app, nor did it specifically allege how
such an app (or platform) actually infringes the . . . patent. Such overly broad
allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Upstream Holdings, LLC v.
Brekunitch, No. 22-CV-3513, 2022 WL 17371052, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2022) (dismissing
patent infringement claim because plaintiff’s allegations “[u]pon information and
belief . . . do not clearly identify an accused product, let alone provide factual content
demonstrating that an accused product would meet the claim limitations of one or more
of the claims in the [patent]” (quotations omitted)).
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DigitalDoors’s allegations that Flushing Bank still uses other unidentified
“systems and methods for processing data” that infringe the patents, (see Am. Compl.
¶ 103; Pl.’s Letter; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Suppl. Mot. to Dismiss dated Nov. 24,
2025, Dkt. No. 28 at 1), cannot save its claims. Such broad, indefinite allegations do not
identify an actual accused product or service used by Flushing Bank that infringes
DigitalDoors’s patents. The Court recognizes that DigitalDoors “is not required to
plead infringement on an element-by-element basis.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4
F.4th 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2021). But the vague allegations of the existence of infringing
products—encompassing a supposed system and method used by Flushing Bank to
comply with the federal and state regulations—are so broad that they cannot put
Flushing Bank “on notice of what activity . . . is being accused of infringement.” See id.
(quoting Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); e.g.,
Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C., 620 F. App’x at 937 (“The bare allegation that
Defendants make, use, sell, and offer for sale undefined ‘activities, methods, and
procedures’ provides no detail whatsoever that would put Defendants on notice as to
what activity, method, or procedure is alleged to infringe.”); Big Baboon, Inc. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., No. 17-CV-2082, 2018 WL 1400443, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (“The Court finds
it unnecessary to delve into the myriad ways in which these allegations are insufficient
because nowhere do they allege that a specific product of Defendants’ infringes.”).
Second, even if DigitalDoors had identified an accused product, the Amended
Complaint still lacks sufficient facts to plausibly allege that these unidentified systems
infringe the patents. See Adnexus Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 160 F.4th 1216, 1221 (Fed.
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Cir. 2025) (“[T]here must be some factual allegations that, when taken as true, articulate
why it is plausible that the accused product infringes the patent claim.” (quoting Bot M8
LLC, 4 F.4th at 1353)). The Amended Complaint fails to demonstrate why
implementing systems compliant with the Sheltered Harbor standard necessarily
infringes DigitalDoors’s patents. DigitalDoors alleges, for example, that the Sheltered
Harbor specifications “require participants to protect critical data sets, including by
creating dedicated, isolated environments which are physically separated from
corporate networks and backup systems,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 81), and “require[] a data
vault, which is an ultra secure environment where data can be safely stored,” (id. ¶ 93
(quotations omitted)). But DigitalDoors presumes, without explanation, that to comply
with these specifications, a financial institution like Flushing Bank must develop or use
systems that infringe on DigitalDoors’s patents (and that their patents cover all systems
that could be designed to meet the regulatory requirements). The allegations in the
Amended Complaint about what the Sheltered Harbor standard requires are broad,
(see, e.g., id.), and do not lead to the inference that the only way to satisfy regulatory
specifications is by infringing on the methods for data storage and security protected by
the patents. And critically, DigitalDoors’s concession—that the Sheltered Harbor
Certified Q2 Software used by Flushing Bank does not infringe the patents—
undermines its theory of patent infringement. DigitalDoors has conceded that
compliance with the regulations, and even use of Sheltered Harbor Certified software,
does not necessarily infringe its patents. (See Pl.’s Letter). Ultimately, DigitalDoors’s
Amended Complaint fails to “nudge[] [its] claims across the line from conceivable to
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plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; e.g., Huang v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 24-1428, 2025
WL 314718, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) (“[Plaintiff] contends that, because all the cell
phones in [the Complaint’s] list of accused products have EEPROM chips, and because
all such EEPROM chips (or, at the very least, the EEPROM chips of major providers)
have the infringing circuit in Figure 1 of Exhibit X1, all cell phones thus infringe claim
29 of the ‘259 patent . . . these statements fall short. They simply assume that either all
or a majority of cell phones have the infringing circuit.”). Accordingly, the first four
claims for direct infringement are dismissed.2
Lastly, the fifth claim, for “Knowledge and Willfulness,” is also dismissed.
(Def.’s Mot. at 4). A claim for willful infringement of a patent requires a properly pled
claim for patent infringement, which is absent.3
2 Flushing Bank also argues that the patents are invalid as a matter of law
because they pertain to “abstract ideas.” (Def.’s Mot. at 3). “[P]atent eligibility can be
determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But, “[t]his is true only when there are no factual
allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of
law.” Id. Here, patent validity would require discovery, including expert witness
testimony, to determine whether DigitalDoors’s patents cover patent-eligible concepts.
3 Flushing Bank seeks attorney’s fees under the Patent Act, which allows the
prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases.” (Def.’s Mot. at 4); 35
U.S.C. § 285. This case does not “stand[] out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party’s litigating position,” and DigitalDoors has not litigated this case in
an “unreasonable manner.” See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572
U.S. 545, 554 (2014). Therefore, Flushing Bank’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court grants Flushing Bank’s motion and
dismisses DigitalDoors’s Amended Complaint in its entirety. DigitalDoors did not seek
leave to amend or provide any indication of allegations it might add to the Amended
Complaint to make it viable, so the dismissal is with prejudice. See Horoshko v. Citibank,
N.A., 373 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because an amendment is not warranted
[a]bsent some indication as to what appellants might add to their complaint in order to
make it viable, the District Court was under no obligation to provide the [plaintiffs]
with leave to amend their complaint, much less provide such leave sua sponte. The
[plaintiffs’] contention that the District Court abused its discretion in not permitting an
amendment that was never requested is frivolous.” (quotations omitted)); Univ. of
Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 569 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“In reviewing a
district court’s determination that a dismissal should be with prejudice, we apply the
procedural law of the pertinent regional circuit.”). The Clerk of Court is directed to
close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge
Date: 	January 16, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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