Rodriguez v. Delamater

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________
IN RE:
Chapter 7
ROBIN DELAMATER, 	No. 25-10872-1-PGR
Debtor.
__________________________________________
AURELIO N. RODRIQUEZ,
Plaintiff, 	Adv. Pr. No. 25-90027-1-pgr
v.
ROBIN DELAMATER,
Defendant.
__________________________________________
APPERANCES:
AURELIO N. RODRIQUEZ 	PRO SE
Signed this 5 day of August, 2026.
Patrick G. Radel
_______________________________
United States Bankruptcy Judge
So Ordered.
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O’CONNOR, O’CONNOR, 	MICHAEL J. O’CONNOR, ESQ.
BRESEE & FIRST, PC
Attorney for Debtor-Defendant Robin Delamater
20 Corporate Woods Blvd.
Albany, NY 12211
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Presently pending are the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint and the
Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss this adversary proceeding.
Jurisdiction
The Court has core jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
contested matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b)(2). Venue is
proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
Background
On July 31, 2025, Robin Delamater, by and through counsel, filed a
Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (25-
10872-1-pgr, Docket No. 1).
On November 5, 2025, Aurelio N. Rodriguez (the “Plaintiff”) filed this
adversary proceeding against Robin Delamater (the “Debtor-Defendant”). (Docket
No. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action: (1) denial of
discharge for false oath or account pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), and (2)
denial of discharge for concealment of property pursuant to § 727(a)(2)(A).
On January 23, 2026, Defendant-Debtor filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Docket
No. 23). This Court held a hearing on March 3, 2026, at which Plaintiff indicated he
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failed to respond to the Motion. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a late response to
the Motion and if such response included a request to file an amended complaint
then Plaintiff was ordered to include a copy of the proposed amended complaint.
(See Docket Nos. 33 & 34).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint and an Objection to
Defendant-Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss on March 16, 2026. (Docket Nos. 36 & 38).
Debtor filed a reply objecting to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (Docket No. 42).
This Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Defendant-
Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss on April 16, 2026. Plaintiff appeared pro se and Michael
O’Connor, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Debtor. The motions were deemed
submitted and this Court reserved decision.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Docket No. 36) is
DENIED, in part, and Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23) is GRANTED, in
part.
Motion to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, as made applicable by Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7015, provides generally that if a party does not amend its
pleading within twenty-one days after service of a motion to dismiss, then “a party
may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or with the
court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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Plaintiff’s complaint was served on November 5, 2025 and Debtor’s Motion to
Dismiss was filed on January 23, 2026.1 The Motion to Amend was not filed until
March 16, 2026.
As the Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint more than twenty-one days
after Defendant-Debtor filed her Motion to Dismiss and did not receive written
consent to amend, Plaintiff must seek leave from the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
A court should give leave to amend freely and should only deny a request “for
such reasons as unduly delay, bad faith, futility of the amendment, and perhaps
most important, resulting prejudice to the opposing party.” State Teachers
Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Ellis v.
Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It is well established that leave to amend a
complaint need not be granted when amendment would be futile.”).
“Futility is directly intertwined with the standard for a motion to dismiss. A
court may properly deny leave to amend where the amended complaint would not
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Pergament v. Yerushalmi (In re
Yerushalmi), No. 07-72816-478, 2009 WL 2982964, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2009).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint purports to add additional facts to the same
causes of action made in the original Complaint. As the arguments supporting
dismissal and the arguments made in the Amended Complaint are the same, this
1 The Court held a hearing in another, related adversary proceeding and Debtor’s counsel requested
time to file dispositive motions in both proceedings. The Court entered a text order stating that any
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was to be filed be filed on or before
January 26, 2026. (Docket No. 6).
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Court will address them together in the context of the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss.
Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as made applicable in adversary
proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b), empowers the
bankruptcy court to dismiss a complaint that “fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all factual
allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Glob. Network
Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
§ 727(a)(2)(A)
Section 727(a)(2) denies a Debtor their discharge when “the debtor, with
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with
custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated,
or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed—(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
To sufficiently plead a concealment claim under § 727(a)(2)(A), the Complaint
must allege that “(i) the property at issue belonged to [Defendant-Debtor]; (ii) she
concealed it; (iii) she did so with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her
creditors; and (iv) she either did so within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition or her initial act of concealment took place before this one-year period
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but she then allowed the property to remain concealed into the critical year.” Aspire
Fed. Credit Union v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 595 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2019); see also Republic Credit Corp. I v. Boyer (In re Boyer), 328 Fed. Appx. 711,
714-15 (2d Cir. 2009).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss his concealment claim, Plaintiff must
allege that the property at issue (a 2022 Honda Accord) belonged to the Debtor.
There is no dispute that Debtor does not own the vehicle. Debtor’s relative
purchased the vehicle over three years ago and holds title to the vehicle. Plaintiff
argues that Debtor concealed her equitable interest in the property. (Docket No. 36).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Debtor exercises exclusive control over the vehicle –
she drives it to work, uses it for personal errands, and refers to it as “my vehicle” to
law enforcement. Id. Thus, according to the Plaintiff, Debtor holds an interest in the
vehicle, and Debtor concealed that interest by not disclosing the information on her
bankruptcy petition.
While a debtor’s failure to disclose assets on a bankruptcy petition may
constitute concealment, for purposes of a § 727(a)(2)(A) claim, the property must
have belonged or belong to the debtor. See Ruter v. Schryver (In re Schryver), 558
B.R. 856, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Deliberate withholding of information about
assets in a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules. . .can constitute concealment of those
assets.”); see also Mazer-Marino v. Levi (In re Levi), 581 B.R. 733, 744 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2017) (Concealment typically happens when (1) “a debtor transfers legal
title to property to a third party while retaining a secret interest in that property”;
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or (2) “when a debtor places assets beyond the reach of creditors or withholds
pertinent information when he has a legal duty to disclose it.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “property of the debtor” for purposes of
§ 727(a)(2)(A). Many courts look towards state law and § 541(a) for guidance in
determining a debtor’s interest in certain property. See Mazer-Marino v. Levi (In re
Levi), 581 B.R. 733, 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Kaufman v. Chalk &
Vermilion Fine Arts, LLC, 31 Fed. Appx. 206, 208 (2d Cir. 2002)).
In New York, “an asset is any form of personal property with value, including
[chattel] that creates, acknowledges, or evidences a financial obligation, not exempt
from liability by statute or common law.” Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43, 62
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (cleaned up).
Section 541(a)(1) defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” “Congress
[therefore] intended to limit the reach of § 727(a)(2)(A) only to those transfers of
property in which the debtor has a direct proprietary interest.” Mcorp Mgmt. Sols.,
Inc. v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 901 F.2d 839, 841 (10th Cir. 1990).
Under New York law, the definition of a vehicle owner can be broken into the
following three parts:
(1) A person, other than a lien holder, having the property in or title to
a vehicle or vessel;
(2) the term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a
vehicle or vessel subject to a security interest in another person; and
also includes
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(3) any lessee or bailee of a motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive
use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than
thirty days.
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 128 (McKinney).
As previously established, Debtor does not hold legal title to the vehicle.
Debtor is therefore not an owner under part one.
For part two, Plaintiff alleges that Debtor exercises exclusive control over the
vehicle – she drives it to work, uses it for personal errands, and refers to it as “my
vehicle” to law enforcement. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege Debtor’s relative holds
a security interest in the vehicle. See McClaney v. Util. Equip. Leasing Corp., 560 F.
Supp. 1270, 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he meaning of the phrase, regarded in its
entirety [ – ‘a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a
security interest in another person’ – ] could not be more clear: in situations where a
vehicle is sold under contract which reserved a security interest in the vendor, it is
the vendee who is nevertheless the owner. . .Plaintiff’s reading of the phrase. .
.would extend ownership status to anyone using the vehicle with permission.”); see
also Rhett v. Griggs, 1991 WL 8491, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1991) (“[B]oth
Associates and N.C.N.B., as lessors and title holders of the tractor and trailer
respectively, are liable as ‘owners’ of the vehicles unless it is determined that they
hold only liens or security interests in them.”); see generally Matthews v. CTI
Container Transport Intern. Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 275-76 (2d. Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing certain elements that make a lease agreement intended for security
– whether the lessee is required to maintain insurance coverage upon the leased
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equipment, whether the purchase option price compared to the total lease rental is
nominal, and whether upon default, the lessee is liable for any deficiency in the
total rent in excess of the sale proceeds.). The facts are therefore insufficient to
indicate Debtor is the owner of the vehicle under part two.
As for part three, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to indicate Debtor is
either a lessee or a bailee of the vehicle “having exclusive use thereof, under a lease
or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.” Specifically, there are no facts
indicating a lease agreement or other contract/transaction, nor that Debtor had
“exclusive control” of the car for a period greater than thirty days. See Mays v. New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 197 Misc 1062, 1063-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950)
(Bailment is defined as “a delivery of personal property for some particular purpose,
or a mere deposit, upon a contract express or implied, and that after such purpose
has been fulfilled it shall be redelivered to the person who delivered it, or otherwise
dealt with according to the directions or kept until he reclaims it as the case may
be. It is essential that there be actual or constructive delivery by the bailor as well
as actual or constructive acceptance of the property of the bailee.”); see also Sullivan
v. Spandau, 589 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (App. Div. 1992) (“The agreement between [the
parties] is clearly a lease. It is denominated as a ‘lease’ and the parties are
described as ‘lessor’ and ‘lessee.’ It calls for the payment of ‘rent’. . . .).
Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to indicate Debtor is an owner of
the vehicle under New York law.
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To the extent Plaintiff argues Debtor holds an equitable interest in the
vehicle, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s statement to be conclusory.
An equitable interest in property is typically described as “rights in personam
against the holder of the legal title.” Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Nevius, 76 F.2d
109, 110 (2d Cir. 1935); see also Darwin (Huck) Spaulding Living Trust v. Carl (In
re Carl), 517 B.R. 53, 65-66 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that while debtor was
not legal owner of property in question, debtor has been found to have equitable
interest in property where the property was transferred but debtor retains benefit
of beneficial ownership).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to establish that Debtor holds an
equitable interest in the property. As mentioned previously, Plaintiff only alleges
that Debtor “drives [the vehicle] to work, uses it for personal errands, and refers to
it as ‘my vehicle’ to law enforcement.” (Docket No. 36). There is no allegation that
Debtor pays for auto insurance, monthly car payments, or regular repairs. See
McCarthey Invs., LLC v. Shah (In re Shah), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1621, at *22
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010) (finding the Debtor concealed his interest in
property when he transferred his interest in real property to his wife for no
consideration while he retained possession and use of the property and also made
all the payments required to maintain it, including the mortgage, common charges,
utilities, real estate taxes, and property insurance). Nor are there any facts pled
that indicate there was a constructive or resulting trust with respect to the vehicle
that would show the debtor’s relative only holds title in whom no equitable interest
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is reposed. See Geltzer v. Balgobin (In re Balgobin), 490 B.R. 13, 19, 21 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Under New York law, an express trust in real or personal property
must meet certain statutory requirements, including that the trust be in writing.” A
constructive trust generally requires “(1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2)
a promise, express or implied; (3) a transfer of the subject res made in reliance on
that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment.” Lastly, a resulting trust can arise when
(1) an express trust fails; (2) “an express trust is fully performed without exhausting
the trust estate; or (3) where the property is purchased and the purchase price is
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor conveys the property to another
person.”).
Plaintiff, therefore, fails to adequately plead that the Debtor concealed her
property.
Accordingly, the vehicle concealment cause of action is dismissed.
§ 727(a)(4)(A)
Section 727(a)(4)(A) denies a Debtor their discharge when “the debtor
knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case. . .made a false oath
or account.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). To sufficiently plead a claim under §
727(a)(4)(A), the Complaint must allege that “(1) the debtor made a statement
under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor knew the statement was
false; (4) the debtor made the statement with fraudulent intent; and (5) the
statement related materially to the bankruptcy case.” Republic Credit Corp. I v.
Boyer (In re Boyer), 328 F. App’x 711, 715 (2d Cir. 2009).
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“A debtor makes oaths in the bankruptcy case through the debtor’s petition,
schedules, and statements upon executing those documents with a declaration
under perjury that the information provided therein is true and correct.” Schall v.
Kupperstein (In re Kupperstein), 624 B.R. 515, 521 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2021).
Fraudulent intent is shown through actual fraud, not constructive fraud – the
debtor must be aware of their interest in an asset or a past event or condition in
their financial history that should be disclosed; and the debtor must have intended
to induce creditors to a particular course of action or inaction based on their reliance
of the debtor’s omission or misrepresentation. Mazer-Marino v. Levi (In re Levi), 581
B.R. 733, 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). However, “[a] reckless disregard of both the
serious nature of the information sought and the necessary attention to detail and
accuracy in answering may rise to the level of fraudulent intent necessary to bar a
discharge. Field v. Irving (In re Irving), 27 B.R. 943, 946 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
“A statement materially relates to the bankruptcy case when it contains
relevant information that creditors and the trustee reasonably would have regarded
as significant in identifying the assets of the estate that could be liquidated and
used to satisfy claims.” Sanango v. Mi Young Kal (In re Mi Young Kal), 665 B.R.
688, 699 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Levi, 581 B.R. at 754) (internal quotation
mark omitted). In other words, the false statement or omission must relate “to the
debtor’s business transactions, or if it concerns the discovery of assets, business
dealings, or the existence or disposition of the debtor’ property.” Id. “An undisclosed
asset having little value, being unreachable by creditors, or causing no detriment to
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creditors is not material.” Kupperstein, 624 B.R. at 522. Lastly, “[a] collection of
false statements may be material in the aggregate, even if individually they would
be less significant.” Levi, 581 B.R. at 746.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor violated § 727(a)(4)(A) by (1) omitting
her equitable interest in the 2022 Honda on the bankruptcy petition; (2) omitting
her litigation history; (3) misstating a judgment date; (4) omitting her prior
addresses then, when confronted with a document at the § 341 meeting that listed a
previous address, stating it was a “false statement”; (5) and omitting a closed
financial account.
With respect to the vehicle, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor violated §
727(a)(4)(A) when she (1) omitted her equitable interest in the 2022 Honda even
though she exercises exclusive control over it; and (2) failed to disclose with the
intent of concealing it from creditors. For the reasons listed above in the previous
section, the Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to indicate Debtor holds an
equitable interest in the vehicle. Therefore, this portion of the claim cannot survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
With respect to litigation history, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor failed to
disclose in her Statement of Financial Affairs an Albany Family Court case and an
Albany City Court case from the past year. Plaintiff states that the Debtor
concealed these cases to hide judicial rulings that found Debtor to “unbelievable”
and “lacking credibility.” The Court finds the Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled how
omitting the two previous cases is material to the bankruptcy case. A judge’s finding
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of credibility in a separate legal action does not bear a relation to the Debtor’s
“business transactions or estate, or concern[] the discovery of assets, business
dealings, or the existence and disposition of her property.” See generally 784 Cafe
Inc. v. Lang Chin (In re Lang Chin), 617 B.R. 761, 769 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(holding that plaintiff did not allege that the defendant made a false oath or
misstatement with respect to his assets, income, business dealings, or other
finances; plaintiff instead argued that the materiality of the defendant’s omission
“relates to the underlying claim within which [the defendant] is seeking a
discharge” and this argument does not meet the legal standard under §
717(a)(4)(A)). Therefore, this portion of the claim cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.
With respect to the misstated judgment date, Plaintiff states that the Debtor
listed January 12, 2024, on her petition as the date in which the state court entered
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that the actual date the state
court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was on July 14, 2025, and Debtor
wrote the wrong date to obscure that fact that the bankruptcy petition was “an
immediate reaction to a trial loss 17 days prior.” The Court finds the Plaintiff has
failed to adequately allege how misstating the judgment date is material to the
bankruptcy case. See generally id. Therefore, this portion of the claim cannot
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
With respect to the prior addresses, Plaintiff states that Debtor failed to list
any prior physical address in her bankruptcy petition. She only disclosed a P.O.
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Box. However, DMV and employer records show that she resided at a physical
address within the last three years. Plaintiff also argues that Debtor’s statement at
the 341 meeting that the DMV records containing Debtor’s previous address were
false was to cover up the original omission in the Debtor’s petition. Debtor argues
that she only disclosed the P.O. Box based on her participation in the New York
State Address Confidentiality Program. Debtor states she was concerned about her
safety and took steps to prevent Plaintiff from knowing her whereabouts. While this
Court agrees that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts in regards to Debtor’s failure to
disclose prior address to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, this Court nevertheless
dismisses this portion of the Plaintiff’s § 727(a)(4)(A) claim. This Court
acknowledges the letter from the New York State Confidentiality Program that
Debtor has been enrolled in the program since May 19, 2023 and her current and
former addresses are confidential and protected. (See Docket No. 23, Exhibit C).
Therefore, this Court does not require Debtor to disclose her prior addresses in this
bankruptcy and, regardless of the sufficiency of the facts pled, the Court will not
grant the relief Plaintiff seeks in this regard. Cf. S.L. v. City of New York, 2026 WL
948339, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2026) (noting that the plaintiff is enrolled in New
York State’s Address Confidentiality Program and nothing prevents her from
keeping her address confidential). Therefore, this portion of the claim cannot
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Debtor failed to disclose an account with
Broadview Federal Credit Union in her Schedules. Plaintiff alleges that Debtor’s
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purpose in omitting the account was to prevent the Trustee from subpoenaing
account statements that would reveal some of her financial transactions. Debtor
appears to concede the non-disclosure, but argues, through counsel, that she
believes Broadview charged off the account more than a year before she filed for
bankruptcy relief and that the non-disclosure was not material because the balance
in the account was zero. However, in the present posture, this Court must assume
true the facts as pled in the proposed Amended Complaint. See Glob. Network
Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
This Court finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to survive a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss as to this aspect of his claim. Plaintiff is therefore permitted to amend his
complaint to assert an objection to discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A) based on Debtor’s
failure to disclose the Broadview account.
Conclusion
The Court grants Debtor’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 23) in part and
grants Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint (Docket No. 36) in part. Plaintiff’s
request to amend his complaint is granted as to his claim under § 727(a)(4)(A) that
the Court should deny Debtor a discharge based upon her failure to disclose an
account with Broadview and Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss is denied solely as to that
aspect of Plaintiff’s claim.
Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims seeking to (a)
deny Debtor a discharge for allegedly concealing property under § 727(a)(2)(A) and
(b) deny Debtor a discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A) for allegedly (i) omitting her
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equitable interest in a 2022 Honda sedan on the bankruptcy petition; (2) omitting
her litigation history; (3) misstating a judgment date; and (4) omitting her prior
addresses and Plaintiff’s request to file an Amended Complaint asserting these
claims is denied.”
On or before August 20, 2026, Plaintiff shall file and serve an Amended
Complaint, asserting only an objection to discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A) based on
Debtor’s failure to disclose the Broadview account.
The Clerk’s Office is requested to mail a copy of this Decision and Order to
Plaintiff.
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