Republic Airways Holdings Inc.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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In re: Chapter 11
REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HOLDINGS INC., et al., Case No. 16-10429 (SHL)
Reorganized Debtors. (Jointly Administered)
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
A P P E A R A N C E S :
ZIRINSKY LAW PARTNERS PLLC
Attorneys for the Reorganized Debtors
375 Park Avenue, Suite 2607
New York, New York 10152
By: Bruce R. Zirinsky, Esq.
Sharon J. Richardson, Esq.
Gary D. Ticoll, Esq.
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
Attorneys for the Reorganized Debtors
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, New York 10004
By: Christopher K. Kiplok, Esq.
Erin E. Diers, Esq.
Daniel M. Nuzzaci, Esq.
MCDOWELL RICE SMITH & BUCHANAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Jet Midwest, Inc.
604 West 47th Street, Suite 350
Kansas City, Missouri 64112
By: James F.B. Daniels, Esq.
SEAN H. LANE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Before the Court is Jet Midwest, Inc.’s (“JMI”) motion for allowance of an unsecured
rejection damages claim (the “Motion”). [See ECF No. 1630]. JMI seeks allowance of its claim
for damages arising from the debtors’ rejection of an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property, despite having missed the deadline for filing such a claim. See Motion ¶ 23. The
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debtors oppose the Motion, arguing that JMI received proper notice of the deadline. See
Debtors’ Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) ¶ 2 [ECF No. 1808]. For the reasons
explained below, the Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2016, Republic Airways Holdings Inc. and certain of its wholly-owned
direct and indirect subsidiaries (“Republic” or the “Debtors”) filed for Chapter 11 relief. One of
the Debtors, Republic Airline Inc., was a party to a lease with JMI for a portion of Building
Number 1 at Kansas City International Airport Overhaul Base (the “Hangar Lease”). See Hangar
Lease, attached as Exh. A to Opposition. Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, Republic
had 120 days to file a motion to assume or reject leases of nonresidential property such as the
Hangar Lease, a deadline that can be extended for at most 90 days. See 11 U.S.C. §
365(d)(4)(B)(i). Before the expiration of the 120-day deadline, in fact, Republic did request an
extension of the time to assume or reject its nonresidential leases. [See ECF No. 611]. The
extension motion was served by overnight mail on JMI, attention: Karen Kraus, 9200 NW 112th
Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 64153, consistent with the service instructions in the Hangar
Lease. See Exh. B, attached to Aff. of Service [ECF No. 626]; see also Hangar Lease § 13.2
(setting forth where notice should be sent). The Court granted the extension of time to assume or
reject nonresidential real property leases to September 22, 2016. [See ECF No. 688].
On June 23, 2016, Republic notified the Chief Executive Officer of JMI, Patrick Kraus,
that Republic intended to reject the Hangar Lease and would return the keys to the hangar on
August 31, 2016. See Decl. of Ethan J. Blank in Support of Opposition (“Blank Decl.”) ¶ 3,
attached as Exh. C to Opposition. The keys were in fact returned to JMI’s facility director Rick
Pyburn on August 26, 2016. See id. ¶ 4.
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On August 31, 2016, Republic filed a motion seeking to reject the Hangar Lease (the
“Rejection Motion”). [See ECF No. 949]. Republic’s claims and noticing agent—Prime
Clerk—served the Rejection Motion on JMI via first class mail that day, once again to Karen
Kraus at 9200 NW 112th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64153. See Aff. of Service at 2 [ECF
No. 967]. On September 13, 2016, Mr. Daniels, counsel to JMI, filed a notice of appearance and
request for service papers in the Debtors’ cases and listed his e-mail address as:
jdaniels@mcdowellrice.com. [See ECF No. 980]. JMI did not object to the Rejection Motion.
On September 22, 2016, an order approving the Rejection Motion was granted. See Order
Authorizing (i) Rejection of Unexpired Lease of Nonresidential Real Property Between Republic
and JMI and (ii) Abandonment of Certain Property of the Estate (the “Rejection Order”) [ECF
No. 1030]. Under the Rejection Order, JMI was required to file a claim for damages arising
from the rejection of the Hangar Lease within 30 days (the “Rejection Bar Date”). See id. at 2.
The Rejection Order was served by (1) e-mail upon JMI’s counsel at
jdaniels@mcdowellrice.com, and (2) first class mail on JMI, attention Karen Kraus, once again
at 9200 NW 112th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 64153. See Aff. of Service (“Rejection Order
Service Aff.”) at 2, Exh. A at 5 [ECF No. 1047]. Neither the Rejection Motion nor the Rejection
Order were returned as undeliverable. See Decl. of Herb Baer in Support of Opposition (“Baer
Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, attached as Exh. B to Opposition.
On March 22, 2017—some five months after the Rejection Bar Date—JMI filed this
Motion to seek allowance of an unsecured rejection damages claim.1 The Motion asserts that
JMI never received actual notice of the Rejection Motion or Rejection Order; therefore, the
Court should allow its claim for rejection damages as if it was timely. See Motion ¶¶ 23, 30;
1 The Court confirmed the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code in April 2017, and it went effective that month. [See ECF Nos. 1722, 1748].
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Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion (“Reply”) ¶¶ 23, 30–37 [ECF No. 1816]. In
the alternative, JMI seeks leave to file an amended proof of claim. See Motion ¶ 25. The
Debtors contend that they followed all procedures required for notice set by the Court and that
JMI’s late claim should not be allowed. See Opposition ¶¶ 2–4.
DISCUSSION
The constitutional standard for due process requires that known creditors in a bankruptcy
case receive actual notice of a bar date. See City of New York v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S.
293, 296–97 (1953). “It is well settled that proof that a letter was properly addressed and placed
in the mail system creates a presumption that the letter was received in the usual time by the
addressee.” In re AMR Corp., 492 B.R. 660, 663 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). Accordingly, one
would normally assume that JMI is bound by the Rejection Bar Date here given that the Debtors
served the Rejection Order on both JMI and JMI’s counsel. See Rejection Order Service Aff. at
2; Exh. A at 5. But JMI makes three arguments for the allowance of its unsecured rejection
damages after the Rejection Bar Date. First, JMI relies upon statements about the Hangar Lease
in Republic’s Rejection Motion in seeking to judicially estop Republic from challenging JMI’s
claim. See Motion ¶ 28. Second, JMI contends that Republic’s Rejection Motion should be
considered an informal proof of claim for JMI’s rejection damages. See id. ¶ 29. Finally, JMI
argues that its failure to timely file a claim for rejection damages was due to excusable neglect.
See id. ¶ 30.
A. Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel
The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “[w]here a party assumes a certain position
in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply
because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice
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of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)). Judicial
estoppel aims “to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from
deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.” Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). There are several factors typically used to determine if judicial
estoppel applies in a particular case: (1) whether a party’s later position is “clearly inconsistent
with its earlier position”; (2) whether the party’s former position was accepted by the court in the
earlier proceedings; and (3) “whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”
Id. at 750–51. Courts in the Second Circuit grant relief under the doctrine “only when the risk of
inconsistent results with its impact on judicial integrity is certain.” Republic of Ecuador v.
Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see
also Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 748 F.3d 110, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2014).
JMI notes that Republic’s Rejection Motion set forth facts, statements, and amounts
related to the terms of the Hangar Lease, and argues that these “admissions” are sufficient to
judicially estop Republic from denying JMI’s rejection damages claim. See Motion ¶ 28. But
JMI fails to satisfy the three prongs required for judicial estoppel. As to the first prong, Republic
has not made statements now that are “clearly inconsistent” with any earlier statements presented
to the Court. In its earlier Rejection Motion, Republic provided the Court with the necessary
information to seek relief under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. It did not take a
position on the amount of damages to which JMI might be entitled by virtue of rejection but
rather explicitly contemplated that the issue would be left to another date. See Rejection Order at
2 (“[JMI] may assert an unsecured claim for damages arising from the rejection of the MCI
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Hangar Lease . . . . The deadline to file a proof of claim against the Debtors with respect to any
Rejection Claim shall be 5:00 p.m. prevailing Eastern Time on the date that is thirty (30) days
after the date of this Order.”).
The second prong—whether the party’s former position has been adopted in some way by
the court in the earlier proceedings—also has not been established. The Rejection Order was
granted by the Court, thus adopting Republic’s position that rejection was appropriate under
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. But the Rejection Motion did not set forth an amount of
the rejection damages, nor did the Court adopt any amount of rejection damages in the Rejection
Order. Rather, the Rejection Order signed by the Court specifically allows the Debtor to review
and object to any rejection claims. See id. (“Nothing contained in [the Rejection] Order shall be
construed as a waiver by the Debtors or the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the
right to review any such Rejection Claim and, where appropriate, object to the allowance of any
or all of the Rejection Claim.”).
As to the third prong, JMI does not argue that the Debtors intended to act unfairly. See
Motion ¶ 46. Rather, JMI argues that because the Rejection Motion itself did not request a bar
date, it would be generally unfair for Republic to object on the grounds of untimeliness. See id. ¶
48. But this argument is meritless given that Rejection Order explicitly establishes a deadline for
JMI to file any claim. See Rejection Order at 2. Indeed, the content of the Rejection Order is
consistent with the practice used in most Chapter 11 cases of notifying the party to the rejected
contract that it has thirty days after the date of the rejection order to file a proof of claim. See 9-
3002 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3002.03[5] (16th ed. 2017) (“A claim arising from rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease must be filed within whatever period the court fixes.”); see
also United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, Procedural Guidelines for
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Filing Requests for Orders to Set the Last Date for Filing Proofs of Claim at 10, 20, available at
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/3003-1-guidelines.pdf (updated 12/01/2015).
As this deadline was clearly set forth in the Rejection Order, Republic’s reliance on this bar date
does not rise to the level of unfairness.
B. Informal Proof of Claim
Under Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2) “[a]ny creditor or equity security holder whose claim
or interest is not scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof
of claim or interest within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule; any creditor who
fails to do so shall not be treated as a creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of
voting and distribution.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2). The Second Circuit has held “that it is
not essential that a document be styled a ‘proof of claim,’ or that it be filed in the form of a
claim, if it fulfills the purposes for which the filing of proof is required.” In re Dumain, 492 B.R.
140, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting In re Lipman, 65 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1933)).
Thus, under certain circumstances, bankruptcy courts may elect to treat pleadings filed in a
bankruptcy case as an “informal proof of claim.” This is an equitable remedy available where a
creditor failed to comply with the proper procedures for filing a proof of claim, but still took
some action to preserve its interests and put the debtor on notice of its claim. See Barlow v. M.J.
Waterman & Assocs., Inc. (In re M.J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc.), 227 F.3d 604, 608–09 (6th Cir.
2000); In re Dana Corp., 2008 WL 2885901, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2008) (discussing
informal proof of claim doctrine in a Chapter 11 case); see also In re WPRV-TV, Inc., 102 B.R.
234, 238 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (“The intent of the informal [p]roof of [c]laim concept is to
alleviate problems with form over substance; that is, equitably preventing the potentially
devastating effect of the failure of a creditor to formally comply with the requirements of the
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Code in the filing of a [p]roof of [c]laim, when, in fact, pleadings filed by the party asserting the
claim during the claims filing period in a bankruptcy case puts all parties on sufficient notice that
a claim is asserted by a particular creditor.”).
Courts in the Second Circuit require that to be an informal proof of claim, “a document
must have been 1) timely filed with the bankruptcy court and become part of the judicial record,
2) state the existence and the nature of the debt, 3) state the amount of the claim against the
estate, and 4) evidence the creditor’s intent to hold the debtor liable with the debt.” In re
Dumain, 492 B.R. at 149 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also In re Dana, 2008
WL 2885901, at *3. The burden of proof is on the party seeking to apply the informal proof of
claim doctrine. See In re Dumain, 492 B.R. at 149.
JMI fails to satisfy the requirements for an informal proof of claim. Most obviously, JMI
failed to take any action to preserve its interests and put the Debtors on notice of its claim. See
In re M.J. Waterman, 227 F.3d at 608–09. Instead, JMI relies on an action taken by the Debtors:
the filing of the Rejection Motion. But JMI cites no authority—and the Court is aware of none—
where a creditor relied upon actions of a debtor to satisfy the requirement for filing a claim.2 See
In re Dumain, 492 B.R. at 149 (“The doctrine of informal proof of claim provides that a
creditor's filing of a document . . . which indicates, at a minimum, the basis for a claim and the
creditor's intent to hold the estate liable . . . .”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); In re WPRV-TV, Inc., 102 B.R. at 238 (observing that the informal proof of claim
doctrine is intended to prevent “the potentially devastating effect of the failure of a creditor to
formally comply with the requirements of the Code in the filing of a [p]roof of [c]laim, when, in
2 See Transcript of Hearing Held on June 15, 2017 (“Hr’g Tr.”) 18:6–23, 19:20–25 [ECF No. 1832] (JMI
conceding that it was unaware of any case law to support argument that a debtor’s writing could be an informal
proof of claim).
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fact, pleadings filed by the party asserting the claim during the claims filing period in a
bankruptcy case puts all parties on sufficient notice that a claim is asserted by a particular
creditor.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, adopting such a lax and unclear standard is inconsistent
with the statutory mandate in Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2) that a proof of claim is required
except in specified circumstances. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2) (a creditor “whose claim . . .
is not scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof of
claim . . . .”). Even if the Court were somehow to look to the Rejection Motion as some kind of
supplement to the Debtors’ schedules—an approach which is not supported by the Bankruptcy
Code or case law—the Rejection Motion did not in any way establish that the Debtors owed a
claim to JMI.3 See supra Section A.
Not surprisingly, JMI fails to satisfy the four-part test to qualify the Rejection Motion as
an informal proof of claim. See In re Dumain, 492 B.R. at 149. As to the first two prongs, one
might argue that the Rejection Motion was filed timely with this Court and stated the existence
of a debt. But JMI cannot satisfy the third prong because the Rejection Motion does not “state
the amount of the claim against the estate.” Id. The Rejection Motion merely states that the
monthly rent for the Hangar Lease is approximately $129,885, and that rejecting the Hangar
Lease would save approximately $1.56 million annually. See Rejection Motion ¶¶ 8, 13. But it
does not calculate the amount of any potential claim JMI may have against the estate. The fourth
prong of the test is also not satisfied because the Rejection Motion provides no evidence of an
3 Under Bankruptcy Rule 3004, Republic has the right to file a proof of claim on behalf of JMI. See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 3004. But an actual filing of a claim is still required and it must be within thirty days of the bar date. See
Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 532 B.R. 486, 488 n.2 (S.D.N.Y 2015). The Debtors never
filed such a claim here.
In June 2016, the Court entered an order establishing the deadline of July 22, 2016 as the general bar date
for filing a proof of claim and the procedures for filing proofs of claim. [See ECF No. 649]. On June 16, 2016,
Prime Clerk, the Debtors’ claims and noticing agent, served the notice of the general bar date on JMI. [See ECF No.
707]. That notice also included procedures for filing proofs of claim with respect to rejected leases.
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intent by JMI to hold the Debtors liable for a debt because, as stressed earlier, the Rejection
Motion is not a pleading filed by JMI. In fact, JMI concedes, as it must, that the Rejection
Motion does not provide evidence of JMI’s intent to hold Republic liable for any rejection
damages stemming for the rejection of the Hangar Lease. See Motion ¶ 63 (stating the “fourth
attribute of an ‘informal proof of claim’ . . . appears to be missing from this otherwise sufficient
‘informal’ proof” but arguing that the filing of a formal or informal proof of claim by a debtor
“on behalf of a creditor evidences the debtor’s intention to pay or otherwise treat the claim”).
C. Excusable Neglect
Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1), the court has discretion to
enlarge the time to file claims “where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” In
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Supreme
Court interpreted excusable neglect as a flexible and equitable standard, “taking account of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,” including “the danger of prejudice to
the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for
the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the
movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 395. The moving party bears the burden of proof to establish
excusable neglect. See Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. P’ship v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron
Corp.), 419 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2005).
The Second Circuit has adopted a strict approach to excusable neglect. See Asbestos Pers.
Injury Plaintiffs v. Travelers Indem. Co. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 476 F.3d 118, 124 (2d
Cir. 2007); In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d at 123 (“[T]he equities will rarely if ever favor a party
who fail[s] to follow the clear dictates of a court rule, and . . . where the rule is entirely clear, we
continue to expect that a party claiming excusable neglect will, in the ordinary course, lose under
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the Pioneer test.”) (internal quotations omitted). However, “[t]he Pioneer factors are not given
equal weight.” Weisfelner v. Blavatnik (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 543 B.R. 400, 409 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2016). In particular, “three of the [Pioneer] factors—the length of the delay, the
danger of prejudice, and the movant’s good faith—usually weigh in favor of the party seeking
the extension.” In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d at 122 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, the focus must be on the “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant.” Id.; see also In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 543 B.R. at 409. The
Second Circuit’s hard line application of the Pioneer test is informed by the fact that bar dates
are strictly observed in the Second Circuit. See In re Musicland Holding Corp., 356 B.R. 603,
607 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting the critical role a bar date serves in administration of a
Chapter 11 case). Indeed, “[a] bar date order is ‘an integral step in the reorganization process.’”
In re AMR Corp., 492 B.R. at 663 (quoting In re Best Prods. Co., 140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Under the Pioneer analysis, the Court must consider JMI’s reason for delay in filing its
proof of claim and whether that reason was within JMI’s control. Here, JMI states that it did not
receive notice of the Rejection Bar Date by mail or by Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”)
notification. See Motion ¶¶ 15, 18. But Republic’s claims and noticing agent, Prime Clerk,
served JMI by first class mail notice of the bar date, the Rejection Motion, and the Rejection
Order to the address set forth in the Hangar Lease. [See ECF Nos. 707, 967, 1047]; see also
Baer Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7. Not only was JMI itself served by first class mail4 but also JMI’s counsel
was e-mailed the Rejection Order. See Baer Decl. ¶ 9; see also Hr’g Tr. 49:11–20. JMI’s
4 The Court notes that notice to JMI was consistent with the instruction given by JMI in the Hangar Lease.
See Hangar Lease § 13.2.
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attorney concedes that he was signed up for ECF notifications, but claims that he never received
any. See Hr’g Tr. 31:19–32:18.5 Even assuming that JMI and JMI’s counsel did not receive
such notice, however, JMI’s counsel had a duty to monitor the docket. See Goris v. Goord, 2006
WL 2850198, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2006) (“Second Circuit case law demonstrates that
[c]ounsel has a duty to monitor the docket and to stay current with court entries.”). This is
particularly true given that Republic had returned the keys to the leased premises to JMI at the
end of August 2016, thus putting JMI on notice of the lease rejection. JMI’s counsel had the
ability to monitor the docket through ECF and the Prime Clerk website.6
The Court also considers the length of JMI’s delay and its impact on the case. There is no
concrete formula governing when the lateness of a claim is “substantial.” In re Enron, 419 F.3d
at 128. “Instead, courts consider the degree to which the delay might disrupt the judicial
administration of that particular case.” In re AMR Corp., 492 B.R. at 667. JMI missed the
Rejection Bar Date here by over five months, an inexcusable amount of time given these
circumstances. See id. (noting that a motion filed “more than five months after the Court entered
the [b]ar [d]ate [o]rder and more than three months after the [b]ar [d]ate had passed” was a
5 In passing, JMI suggests that notice was “miscarried in this case and none of the declarations attached to
[the Opposition] establish anything to the contrary.” Reply ¶ 40; see also id. ¶¶ 39, 41. But JMI does not provide
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt of notice. See Surabian v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff
Inv. Sec. LLC), 2014 WL 1302660, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Courts have routinely held that an affidavit of
service is sufficient evidentiary material to raise the presumption [of receipt after proper mailing]. This presumption
is not rebutted simply by . . . denying receipt of the notice.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); In re AMR,
492 B.R. at 664–65 (setting forth examples of instances where the presumption was rebutted).
6 JMI’s counsel represents that the firm ran searches on the Prime Clerk website but that these were not
helpful because the results identified all pleadings rather than a smaller subset. See Hr’g Tr. 62:3–12. Such search
results, however, only indicate the need for more due diligence in monitoring the docket because they are
inconclusive at best. In fact, the Court was able to conduct a search on the Prime Clerk website by entering “Jet
Midwest” as a search term and that search produced only twenty results. See Hr’g Tr. 35:22–25, 36:25–37:21
(JMI’s counsel stating it would be okay, as an evidentiary matter, for the Court to search the Prime Clerk website);
cf. United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding it was not reversible error for District
Court to conduct “an independent Internet search to confirm its intuition that there are many types of yellow rain
hats for sale.”).
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significant delay); cf. In re Dana Corp., 2007 WL 1577763, at *5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 30,
2007) (finding that a “six-month delay is not excusable” especially when creditor was inter alia
well aware of its claim and was mailed notices of the bar date). The Court is also very concerned
about the possibility of opening the floodgates to potential claims, particularly in a large case like
this. See In re Dana Corp., 2007 WL 1577763, at *6; see also In re Enron, 419 F.3d at 132 n.2
(“[C]ourts in this and other Circuits regularly cite the potential ‘flood’ of similar claims as a
basis for rejecting late-filed claims.”). The concern is especially high here because the case has
already been confirmed. See In re AMR Corp., 2016 WL 1068955, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.
17, 2016) (“[C]oncern is heightened where . . . the request for relief from a bar date is made
when a case is well advanced.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies the Motion. The Debtors shall submit a
proposed order on five days’ notice. The proposed order must be submitted by filing a notice of
the proposed order on the docket, with a copy of the proposed order attached as an exhibit to the
notice.
Dated: New York, New York
August 28, 2017
/s/ Sean H. Lane______________________
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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