Betsa v. City of Avon Lake, Ohio et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JEREMY BETSA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF AVON LAKE, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2478
DISTRICT JUDGE
DONALD C. NUGENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
The City of Avon Lake, Ohio and eleven other Defendants move to stay
this litigation. Doc. 38. As is discussed, Defendants’ motion is denied.
Discussion
In November 2025, Plaintiff Jeremy Betsa filed a complaint against the
City of Avon Lake and several city officials. See Doc. 1. Betsa raised federal
and state-law claims. Id. at 23–62.
On December 15, 2025, Betsa filed in the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas a complaint against the City for declaratory and injunctive
relief. See Doc. 32-1. With that complaint, Betsa filed an “emergency motion
for temporary restraining order and request for expedited hearing.” Doc. 25-1.
Later that day, he filed in this action a similar “emergency motion for a
temporary restraining order.” Doc. 23.
After a hearing in this case, the Court issued a report recommending
that Betsa’s motion for a temporary restraining order be denied. Doc. 33. In
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doing so, the Court noted that “[a] federal court must abstain under [Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)] from granting injunctive [relief] when three
requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 5. The Court then determined that the
requirements were met such that injunctive relief was not warranted. Id. at 6–
9.
The City Defendants now move to stay this litigation under Younger.
Doc. 38. Betsa opposes Defendants’ motion, Doc. 40.
At 	the 	outset, 	it 	is 	important 	to 	distinguish 	the 	circumstances
surrounding Defendants’ request to stay this litigation from the circumstances
surrounding Betsa’s motion for a temporary restraining order. Betsa’s motion
in this case asked the Court to intervene and stop an on-going disciplinary
process. See Doc. 23, at 4. But Betsa sought this relief in this Court after filing
an emergency motion in state court seeking similar relief. See Doc. 25-1, at 5.
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, abstention in this circumstance under Younger
is appropriate. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008); Doc.
33, at 6–9; cf. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (“the normal thing to do when federal
courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue
such injunctions”).
By contrast, Defendants don’t want the Court to intervene to stop
anything. They want the Court to decline to adjudicate this case in favor of
litigation in state court. See Doc. 38, at 2–4. But declining to adjudicate a case
within a court’s jurisdiction is not how federal courts ordinarily operate.
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Instead, “federal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits
an action within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not ‘refus[e] to
decide a case in deference to the States.’” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (citation omitted).
Somewhat recognizing this fact, Defendants cite O’Neill and say that
they’ve met the three criteria discussed there for abstaining. Id. at 3–4; see
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
432–34 (1982) (setting out the criteria). But this assertion puts the cart before
the horse.
Before deciding whether a case fits under the Middlesex criteria, a court
considering whether to abstain under Younger must first decide whether the
state-court proceeding at issue fits within one of the three categories set out in
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989) (“NOPSI”). See Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir.
2017). Only if the state-court proceeding “fit[s] into one of the three NOPSI
categories …, [does] the court evaluate[] the proceeding using a three-factor
test” set out in Middlesex. See Doe, 860 F.3d at 369. Under that three-factor
test, the Court asks whether:
(1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) the
proceedings involve an important state interest; and
(3) the state proceedings will provide the federal
plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims.
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Id. (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432–34); see also Doc. 38, at 3–4 (arguing that
abstention is warranted under the three-factor test).
As to the threshold question, Younger abstention applies if a federal
proceeding 	would 	“interfer[e] 	with 	the 	functions 	of 	state 	criminal
prosecutions.” Doe, 860 F.3d at 368. And “[w]hile Younger abstention may
apply to” two other circumstances “outside of the criminal context, ‘such
applications are narrow and exist only in a few exceptional circumstances.’”
Snyder v. Vill. of Luckey, Ohio, No. 22-cv-2282, 2024 WL 556134, at *5 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 12, 2024) (quoting Doe, 860 F.3d at 369), aff’d, No. 24-3530, 2025 WL
3269361 	(6th 	Cir. 	Nov. 	24, 	2025). 	Outside 	the 	criminal 	context, 	those
circumstances include “‘certain civil enforcement proceedings’” that “‘are akin
to criminal prosecutions,’” and “‘civil proceedings involving certain orders that
are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions, such as contempt orders.’” Id. (quoting Doe, 860 F.3d at 369).
The action Betsa filed in Lorain County is not a criminal proceeding.
Defendants, though, claim that “the state and civil service proceedings below
are ‘akin’ to a criminal matter.” Doc. 43, at 3. The Lorain County action,
however, was not initiated by a state actor, as would be the case in a criminal
prosecution, and it was not “initiated to sanction” Betsa. Doe, 860 F.3d at 369.
Further, in their motion, Defendants ask this Court to “stay … this case until
resolution of the parallel state law proceeding,” Doc. 38, at 1, which they
identify as the action that Betsa filed in Lorain County, id. at 2. So Defendants
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haven’t moved to abstain in deference to state disciplinary proceedings.
Rather, they’ve asked to abstain in deference to the action that Betsa filed in
Lorain County. See Doc. 38, at 1–3. Defendants are therefore conflating the
underlying disciplinary proceeding and appeals from it with the state-court
action filed in Lorain County that is the basis for their motion. See Doc. 38, at
1 (“mov[ing] this Honorable Court for a stay of this case until resolution of the
parallel state law proceeding”), 3 (“The first criteria is satisfied. At the time
this action was filed Plaintiff had a parallel state law proceeding pending. That
action satisfies the parallel proceeding requirement.”); see also Doc. 43, at 5
(arguing in their reply that the state disciplinary proceedings “are parallel
state law proceedings sta[r]ted by the state”).
Moreover, 	although 	they 	recognize 	the 	third 	category 	to 	which
abstention might apply—“orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state
courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions, such as contempt orders,”
Doe, 860 F.3d at 369—they assert that these limited NOPSI categories are “not
so narrowly applied.” Doc 43, at 3. But the Sixth Circuit has made plain that
“applications” of Younger outside the criminal context “are narrow and exist
only in a few exceptional circumstances.” Doe, 860 F.3d at 369. Defendants’
motion thus fails at the threshold because they have not shown that Betsa’s
state-court action is among the narrow circumstances to which Younger might
apply.
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Even if Defendants showed that the Lorain County action meets one of
the NOPSI criteria, which they haven’t, they haven’t met the conjunctive test
in Middlesex. And this is because “[t]he first condition for the application of
Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be pending on the day
the plaintiff sues in federal court.” Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., 707
F.3d 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Here, Betsa filed his federal
action a month before he filed his state-court complaint.1 Compare Doc. 1, with
Doc. 32-1. This fact alone dooms Defendants’ request.
Further, while Defendants argue that they’ve met the second Middlesex
factor, that the proceedings involve an important state interest, they’ve once
again conflated Betsa’s state-court action, to which they’ve asked the Court to
defer, with the state disciplinary process. See Doc. 38, at 3.
Finally, although there is no reason to doubt that Betsa can vindicate
his constitutional claims in state court, in light of the foregoing, Defendants
have not shown that the Court should stay this litigation under Younger.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to stay, Doc. 38, is denied.
Dated: January 28, 2026
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
1 	In 	their 	motion, 	Defendants 	say 	that 	Betsa 	filed 	his 	state-court
complaint in November and his complaint in this Court in December. Doc. 38,
at 1–2. The Defendants have this backwards. Betsa filed his complaint here in
November and his state-court complaint in December. Compare Doc. 1, with
Doc. 32-1.
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