Shabazz v. LaRose, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TARIQ K. SHABAZZ, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:26-cv-01032-BMB
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
)
v. 	)
)
FRANK LAROSE, in his official capacity 	) 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
as the Ohio Secretary of State, et al. 	) 	AND ORDER
)
Defendants. 	)
Before the Court is Defendant Frank LaRose’s (“Defendant LaRose”) Motion to Dismiss
the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13). Pro se Plaintiff Tariq Shabazz (“Plaintiff”) responded
in opposition (Doc. 15), and Defendant LaRose replied. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons stated
herein, the Motion is GRANTED. Also, as explained herein, Eleventh Amendment immunity
bars Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Cuyahoga County Board of Elections (“BOE”).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Independent and partisan candidates seeking ballot access are subject to different
requirements. In countywide elections, Ohio Revised Code § 3513.05 (“§ 3513.05”) requires
partisan candidates to collect at least 50 signatures from members of the candidate’s party to be
placed on the primary election ballot.1 Ohio Revised Code § 3513.257 (“§ 3513.257”) requires
independent candidates to gather signatures totaling at least one percent of votes cast in the
county during the most recent gubernatorial election, provided at least 5,000 votes were cast in
1 This requirement is different for ward-elected municipal legislative candidates, who need only
25 signatures. § 3513.257.
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 1 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

the county. Partisan candidates must win their primary to advance to the general election ballot,
while qualifying independent candidates skirt the primary election process.
Plaintiff brings his second challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes. See
Shabazz v. LaRose (Shabazz I), No. 1:24-cv-604 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2024) (Doc. 1 at 1).
A. 	The Previous Action
In 2024, Plaintiff sought to run as an independent candidate for United States Senate in
that year’s general election. (Id.). On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against Ohio Secretary of
State Frank LaRose in his official capacity alleging the signature requirements stated in
§§ 3513.05 and 3513.257 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with
Disability Act, and the Voting Rights Act. (Id. at 3.) 2 In relevant part, Plaintiff alleged Ohio’s
ballot access laws unduly burdened independent candidates. (Id.) He sought a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of §§ 3513.05 and 3513.257 and an injunction placing him on
the ballot as an independent candidate. (Id.)
On May 16, 2024, Defendant LaRose moved to dismiss the action under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Shabazz I, No. 24-cv-604 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2024)
(Doc. 5). The Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim and denied the request for a
preliminary injunction. Shabazz I, No. 1:24-cv-604, 2024WL 3567706, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132895, at *7-15 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2024).
B. 	The Present Action
Now in 2026, Plaintiff seeks to appear on this year’s general election ballot as an
independent candidate for Cuyahoga County Executive. (Doc. 6 ¶ 4.)3 Cuyahoga County is one
2 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document
and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
3 Citations to the initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint are to the paragraph number
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 2 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

of only two Ohio counties with an elected county executive. (Id. ¶ 12; see also Doc. 13 at 63.)
Section 3513.257 requires candidates to obtain signatures from one percent of all votes cast in
the county in the most recent gubernatorial election. So, Plaintiff needed to obtain 4,164
signatures to appear on the ballot. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10.) Across multiple weeks, he attempted to gather
the required signatures before the May 4, 2026 deadline to file his nominating petition. (Id.
¶¶ 13, 15.)
The day his nominating petition was due, Plaintiff filed this action pro se and sought a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction directing Defendants to accept
Plaintiff’s nominating petition and place his name on the ballot. (Doc. 1.) He also asked the
Court to declare §§ 3513.05 and 3515.257 unconstitutional. (Id. at 10.) While these requests
were pending, Plaintiff timely submitted his nominating petition to the BOE. (Doc. 6 ¶ 7.) The
petition contained only 1,650 signatures. (Id.) On May 11, 2026, the BOE notified Plaintiff that
only 1,030 signatures were validated. (Id. ¶ 8.) The petition was invalid because it did not
satisfy the 4,164-signature threshold. (Id. ¶ 8.) The BOE demanded Plaintiff withdraw his
candidacy by June 1, 2026, or face removal from the ballot at a BOE meeting scheduled for June
16, 2026. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff responded in writing, declining to withdraw his candidacy. (Id.)
Defendant LaRose moved to dismiss this action on June 4, 2026. (Doc. 5.) On June 6,
2026, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”), adding the BOE as
a defendant and revising the factual allegations. (Doc. 6.) On June 15, 2026, the Court denied
the request for a TRO and ordered Defendants to respond to the preliminary injunction request.
Two days later, Plaintiff moved for clarification and reconsideration of that order. (Doc. 11.)
On June 29, 2026, Defendant LaRose moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1),
assigned therein.
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 3 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

asserting the Eleventh Amendment deprives the Court of jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc.
13.) The BOE did not move to dismiss the case but filed a response to Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff opposed the
motion to dismiss and replied to Defendants’ opposition to injunctive relief. (Doc. 15.)
Defendant LaRose replied. (Doc. 17.)
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Standard of Review
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only decide disputes as
authorized by the Constitution and federal statutes. Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 7, 142 S.
Ct. 1310, 212 L.Ed.2d 355 (2022).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge jurisdiction facially or
factually. Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 175 F.4th 692, 699 (6th Cir.
2026). A facial attack argues the allegations in the complaint fail to invoke federal jurisdiction,
while a factual attack disputes the truth of the allegations that would invoke federal jurisdiction.
Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130
(6th Cir. 1996). When the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the Court must dismiss the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Rule 12(b)(6) motions challenge the legal sufficiency of the claims presented. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To avoid dismissal, a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Id. (citation modified). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[a]ll
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 4 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed to be true, and reasonable inferences must
be made in favor of the non-moving party.” Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must plead “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The
claim must be plausible, meaning “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The Court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Id.
Pro se filings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct.
700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551, (1982) (per curiam). But such liberal construction is not without
limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction does not
“abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989). Nor does it allow district courts to conjure up allegations, draw unsupported inferences,
or construct claims on a pro se plaintiff’s behalf. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir.
2004).
B. 	Eleventh Amendment
Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Doc. 13 at 64-66, Doc. 14 at 75.)
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars lawsuits against states and state officials in their
official capacity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134
L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); T.M. v. DeWine, 49 F.4th 1082, 1087 (6th Cir. 2022). When it applies,
Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives courts of jurisdiction. Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes,
784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, “a state seeking to assert sovereign immunity as a
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 5 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

threshold defense will move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).” Does v. Whitmer, 69 F.4th 300,
305 (6th Cir. 2023).
The Supreme Court recognized a notable exception to state sovereign immunity in Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). “In order to fall within the Ex
parte Young exception, a claim must seek prospective relief to end a continuing violation of
federal law.” Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing MacDonald
v. Vill. of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 970-72 (6th Cir. 1999)). Prospective relief can include
declaratory or injunctive relief. Mikel v. Quin, 58 F.4th 252, 256 (6th Cir. 2023). The suit may
not seek retroactive relief, which seeks to “compensate[] the plaintiff for a past violation of his
legal rights” rather than prevent future violations. Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir.
1994).
Notably, the plaintiff must sue a state official, not the state itself. Puckett v. Lexington-
Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2016). When a complaint against a state
official alleging an ongoing violation of federal law properly characterizes the relief sought as
prospective, the suit falls within Ex parte Young. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002).
Defendant LaRose is a state official being sued in his official capacity. The Ex parte
Young exception applies to him. However, the Ex parte Young exception permits suits against
officials, not agencies. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 598; Beiersdorfer v. LaRose, No. 4:19-CV-260,
2020 WL 2085140, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76010, at *24-25 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2020) (finding
county board of elections immune), aff’d, No. 20-3557, 2021 WL 3702211, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24988 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2021); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp.
2d 795, 801 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (“[T]he Board functions as an arm of the State and is entitled
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 6 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). For this reason, the Ex parte Young exception does not
apply to the BOE, and Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim. 4
Defendant LaRose argues Plaintiff’s action falls outside of the Ex parte Young exception
because it seeks retroactive relief. (Doc. 13 at 66.) Plaintiff’s desired relief amounts to an order
unwinding the BOE’s decision not to place him on the ballot, Defendant LaRose urges. (Id.)
This argument mischaracterizes the relief sought.
Although no controlling Sixth Circuit decision addresses this issue, courts routinely hold
that an injunction placing a candidate on a ballot is prospective relief sufficient to invoke the Ex
parte Young exception. See, e.g., MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1977) (suit to
place Libertarian Party candidate on election ballot fell within Ex parte Young’s exception);
Bogaert v. Land, 572 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892-93 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (suit to restore stricken
signatures and place recall of a representative on the ballot fell within Ex parte Young even
though doing so required overturning a past action); Kay v. Mills, 847 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (Eleventh
Amendment did not bar action seeking to have candidate’s name placed on ballot); cf. also
Moore v. Johnson, No. 14-11903, 2014 WL 4924409, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70951 , at *27
(E.D. Mich. May 23, 2014) (ordering candidate suing secretary of state to be placed on the
ballot).
Defendant LaRose directs the Court’s to Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio
Supreme Court & to Preclude Special Legal Status for Members & Employees. of the Ohio
General Assembly v. Ohio Ballot Board, 275 F. Supp. 3d 849 (S.D. Ohio 2017), aff’d sub
nom. Committee to Impose Term Limits on Ohio Supreme Court & to Preclude Special Legal
4 Although the Board did not formally move to dismiss the suit, it invoked Eleventh Amendment
Immunity. (See Doc. 14.) The Court may also “sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction
because of the applicability of the [E]leventh [A]mendment.” Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397
(6th Cir. 1999).
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 7 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

Status for Members & Employees of Ohio General Assembly v. Ohio Ballot Board., 885 F.3d 443
(6th Cir. 2018). That case is inapposite. There, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against election officials but did not seek to place the disputed initiative on the ballot. Id. at 854.
Here, Plaintiff’s requested relief includes an order placing his name on a future election ballot.
Although it may undo a past action, an order to place Plaintiff on the ballot is necessarily
prospective—it “compels the state officers’ compliance with federal law in the future.” Doe, 21
F.3d at 737.
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant LaRose, but
it does bar Plaintiff’s claims against the BOE.
C. 	First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff alleges §§ 3513.05 and 3513.257 violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court dismissed constitutional challenges to the same statutes in Shabazz I. Defendant is
correct that the reasoning in Shabazz I is dispositive here.
Ballot-access restrictions are subject to the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Hawkins v.
DeWine, 968 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.
Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S. Ct. 1564,
75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)); Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745, 749 (6th 2020). Courts first must
determine the burden imposed on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Hawkins, 968 F.3d at
605. If that burden is severe, then strict scrutiny applies. Id. When the “rights are subjected
only to reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” rational-basis review applies, and “the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restriction.” Id.
(citation modified).
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 8 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

As the Court noted in Shabazz I, rational basis review applies to statutes requiring
independent candidates to obtain more signatures than partisan candidates—including to
§§ 3513.05 and 3513.257. Shabazz I, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132895, at *9-10 (collecting
cases). In Miller v. Lorain County Board of Elections, the Sixth Circuit upheld Ohio’s signature
requirements under the Anderson-Burdick framework. 141 F.3d 252, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1998). In
light of the state’s legitimate interests, including preserving the electoral process and regulating
the number of candidates to avoid voter confusion, the burden imposed by the increased
signature requirement was “not so burdensome as to render it unconstitutional.” Id. at 258.
Another court in this District followed suit. See Phillips v. Lorain Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No.
1:16-CV-1689, 2016 WL 8224361, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206844 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 16, 2016).
Applying Miller, that court upheld the application of § 3513.257 in countywide judicial
elections. at *7-9. Miller remains controlling law, and its reasoning applies with equal force to
this action.
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently distinguish this action from Shabazz I. He argues that the
disparity in signatures required by partisan candidates was only five times greater in Shabazz I,
while it is 83 times higher here. (Doc. 15 at 82.) This argument finds no support in Sixth Circuit
precedent. Miller did not adopt a ratio-based approach when assessing the magnitude of the
asserted injury. See Miller, 141 F.3d at 257. Regardless, the Sixth Circuit has upheld ratios
higher than the 83-to-1 ratio identified by Plaintiff. Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 607 (6th
Cir. 1981). Though predating the Anderson-Burdick framework, Anderson affirmed the
constitutionality of a statute requiring independent candidates to obtain 5,000 signatures to
access the general election ballot and partisan candidates to obtain only two signatures to access
the primary election ballot—a ratio of 2,500-to-1. Id. Moreover, the United States Supreme
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 9 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>

Court upheld a statute requiring independent candidates to obtain signatures from a larger
percentage of the electorate than Ohio law demands. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442,
91 S. Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (upholding Georgia law requiring independent candidates
to obtain signatures from at least five percent of the number of registered voters in the last
election for the office in question). The fact that only one candidate ran for Cuyahoga County
Executive in either party’s primary is likewise of no consequence. The differences between the
2024 and 2026 election may alter the factual circumstances, but they do not alter the
constitutionality of Ohio’s ballot access laws.
As in Shabazz I, Plaintiff has not presented a plausible claim that §§ 3513.05 and
3513.257 violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Frank LaRose’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is
GRANTED, and Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff Tariq Shabazz’s claims against
the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections. This action is DISMISSED. All pending motions are
DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Date: October 16, 2026 	BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 1:26-cv-01032-BMB Doc #: 20 Filed: 10/16/26 10 of 10. PageID #: <pageID>