Parsons v. Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Plaintiff, Michael Parsons (“Plaintiff” or “Parsons”), challenges the final decision of Defendant,
Frank Bisignano, 1 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for a Period
of Disability (“POD”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. (“Act”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to an automatic referral under
Local Rule 72.2(b) for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that this matter be REMANDED pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2023, Parsons filed an application for POD and DIB, alleging a disability onset date of April
5, 2020, 2 and claiming he was disabled due to borderline personality disorder, bipolar disorder, depression,
anxiety, unexplained weight loss, and cognitive issues – trouble concentrating and learning. 	(Transcript
1 On May 7, 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security.
2 Parsons later amended his alleged onset date to August 1, 2022. (Transcript (“Tr.”) 24.)
MICHAEL PARSONS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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)
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)
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)
)
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CASE NO. 5:25-CV-01163-BYP
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JONATHAN D. GREENBERG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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(“Tr.”) 24, 79.) 	The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Parsons requested a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 24.)
On September 11, 2024, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Parsons, represented by counsel, and
an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 	(Id.) 	On September 30, 2024, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding Parsons was not disabled. (Id. at 24-36.) The ALJ’s decision became final on April 23,
2025, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at 1-7.)
On June 4, 2025, Parsons filed his Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc.
No. 1.) The parties have completed briefing in this case. (Doc. Nos. 7, 9-10.) Parsons asserts the following
assignment of error:
(1) THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) BECAUSE THE
POST-HEARING 	COGNITIVE 	EVALUATION 	IS 	NEW 	AND 	MATERIAL
EVIDENCE, AND PARSONS HAS GOOD CAUSE FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO
SUBMIT THE SAME PRIOR TO THE HEARING/DECISION.
(Doc. No. 7 at 12.)
II. 	EVIDENCE
A. 	Personal and Vocational Evidence
Parsons was born in February 1985 and was 39 years-old at the time of his administrative hearing
(Tr. 24, 35), making him a “younger” person under Social Security regulations. 	See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c). 	He has at least a high school education. 	(Tr. 35.) 	He has past relevant work as a binding
machine feeder/off-loader. (Id. at 34.)
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B. 	Relevant Medical Evidence3
1. 	Evidence Considered by the ALJ
Parsons was in special education classes in school. (Id. at 328-98.) 	A Multifactored Evaluation
conducted in 1998 revealed “an overall delay in the areas of cognitive ability, academic skills, adaptive
behavior, language, and motor skills.” (Id. at 332.) Evaluators noted Parsons’ attendance “continue[d] to
be an ongoing issue related to his education.” (Id.) Evaluators further noted Parsons “doesn’t seem to have
basic work-related skills of attendance, initiative, and effort toward doing a good job.” 	(Id.) 	Cognitive
testing revealed a full-scale IQ of 71. (Id. at 338.) The testing examiner noted that he/she was “confident
that nine times out of ten [Parsons’] score will fall in the range of 67-77.” (Id.) Evaluators found Parsons
“could not solve two-step word problems, count coins, or answer questions involving time.” (Id. at 339.)
At the time of the Multifactored Evaluation, Parsons had missed 76 ½ days of school. (Id. at 341.) When
Parsons attended school, he “demonstrate[d] the ability to function in the DH program,” but Parsons was so
often absent that he could not keep up with lessons. (Id.) An evaluation in 2001 revealed Parsons’ adaptive
functioning was in the low end of the average range, but Parsons had weaknesses in his abilities in home
living, self-direction, and functional academics. (Id. at 390.) Evaluator Patti Grimes noted that Parsons’
teacher “indicates that he has the greatest difficulty applying functional skills to daily living situations and
that he is not consistently self-motivated.” (Id.)
On August 5, 2022, Parsons saw Jill Thewlis, LICDC, for counseling and reported improved mood
and no anger issues. (Id. at 575-77.) Parsons told Thewlis he was caring for his mother, who lived next
door, without any help from his siblings. (Id. at 576.)
3 The Court’s recitation of the medical evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is limited to the
evidence cited in the parties’ Briefs. As Parsons challenges only the ALJ’s findings regarding his mental
limitations, the Court further limits its discussion to Parsons’ mental impairments.
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On August 17, 2022, Parsons saw Syeda Arshiya Farheen, M.D., for an initial visit regarding his
bipolar disorder and personality disorder. (Id. at 512.) Parsons reported cycles of two or more weeks of a
“‘wild version’ of himself” followed by one or more weeks of a “‘depressed’” version of himself. 	(Id.)
Parsons endorsed distractibility, impulsivity, increased activity, recklessness, decreased sleep, paranoia, and
flight of ideas during his “wild” phases. (Id.) Parsons endorsed depression, poor appetite, extreme fatigue,
and increased sleep during his “depressed” phases. (Id.) He told Dr. Farheen he saw a therapist regularly.
(Id.) On examination, Dr. Farheen found Parsons cooperative with good eye contact, spontaneous, normal
speech, calm mood, appropriate affect, logical, coherent, and rational thought process, normal thought
content, full orientation, intact attention and concentration, intact memory, and good insight and judgment.
(Id. at 514.) 	Dr. Farheen noted Parsons’ estimated intelligence was “good.” 	(Id.) 	Parsons’ diagnoses
consisted of Bipolar II disorder, bipolar affective disorder, currently depressed, moderate, and recurrent
major depressive disorder, remission status unspecified. 	(Id. at 515.) 	Dr. Farheen started Parsons on
aripiprazole. (Id.)
On August 31, 2022, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported that while he had not
experienced any side effects on Abilify, he wanted to stop taking it because his family members told him
about side effects they had experienced while taking Abilify. (Id. at 520.) Parsons told Dr. Farheen that
since his last appointment he had been feeling depressed with a lack of motivation, lack of interest, and lack
of energy. (Id.) Parsons also endorsed anxiety, manic episodes, and insomnia. (Id.) Parsons reported he
enjoyed spending time with his pet monkey. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Farheen found good eye contact,
appropriately interactive but defensive/hostile demeanor, normal motor activity, appropriate speech,
anxious and reportedly depressed mood, constricted and reactive affect, linear, logical, and goal-directed
thought process, normal associations, appropriate thought content but blame projecting, perseverating on
stressors, and themes of worthlessness and revenge, intact cognition, “poor and good” insight, and good
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judgment. (Id. at 522-23.) Dr. Farheen discontinued Abilify and increased Parsons’ Depakote dose. (Id. at
524.)
On September 16, 2022, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and reported that he had not worked
for two years and preferred to stay home with his pets. (Id. at 578-80.)
On September 30, 2022, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported improvement in his
irritability, mood swings, anxiety, and racing thoughts. (Id. at 527.) He told Dr. Farheen he spent his time
caring for his pet monkey, sketching, and assembling complicated Lego sets. (Id.) He loved to play video
games but was not playing them now. 	(Id.) 	Parsons endorsed continued anxiety, depression symptoms,
reduced appetite, and good sleep. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Farheen found appropriate eye contact, normal
speech, anxious mood, constricted affect, linear, logical, and goal-directed thought process, normal thought
content, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at 529.) Dr. Farheen continued Depakote and
added Lithium. (Id. at 531.)
On October 10, 2022, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and reported a “mostly stable” mood. (Id.
at 581-83.)
On November 3, 2022, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported he was doing well. (Id.
at 534.) Parsons complained of an inability to sleep at night and daytime sleepiness. (Id.) On examination,
Dr. Farheen found appropriate eye contact, normal speech, alexithymic mood, constricted affect, linear,
logical, and goal-directed thought process, normal thought content, intact cognition, and good judgment and
insight. (Id. at 536.) Dr. Farheen instructed Parsons to take his Depakote at bedtime. (Id. at 538.)
On November 14, 2022, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and asked whether she would support
him applying for disability. (Id. at 584-85.) Thewlis told Parsons she was “neutral” but would send records
as requested. (Id. at 585.) Thewlis also encouraged Parsons “to have support from CHS vocational services
to possibly find work that would suit him.” (Id.)
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On January 3, 2023, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported doing well. (Id. at 540.)
Parsons told Dr. Farheen his Christmas had been okay, but he was glad the holidays were over. (Id.) Parsons
endorsed continued tiredness as well as a fluctuating mood. 	(Id.) 	On examination, Dr. Farheen found
appropriate eye contact, articulate speech, depressed and anxious mood, congruent affect, linear, logical,
and goal-directed thought process, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. 	(Id. at 542.) 	Dr.
Farheen continued Parsons’ medications. (Id. at 544.)
On March 8, 2023, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and reported that his mother had died in
January. 	(Id. at 590-91.) 	Parsons told Thewlis his psychiatrist suggested he apply for disability, which
Parsons planned to do, as he felt “much less angry, tense and anxious” after staying home most of the time
for the past three years. (Id. at 591.) Parsons feared decompensation if he started working again. (Id.)
On April 14, 2023, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and reported that he was feeling good and
enjoying the weather. (Id. at 596-97.) He continued to enjoy caring for his pets, although he was sad that
one of his cats had died the week before. (Id. at 597.) Parsons agreed to schedule his next session for five
weeks out because he was doing well. 	(Id.) 	Thewlis noted “[a]ll symptoms are currently better and
[Parsons] is coping well.” (Id.)
On May 10, 2023, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported doing well. 	(Id. at 552.)
Parsons told Dr. Farheen he had several pets, including a cat, a dog, a cockatiel, a pig, and a monkey, and
that he loved caring for his animals. 	(Id.) 	On examination, Dr. Farheen found appropriate eye contact,
articulate speech, depressed and anxious mood, congruent affect, linear, logical, and goal-directed thought
process, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. 	(Id. at 554.) 	Dr. Farheen continued Parsons’
medications. (Id. at 556.)
On August 22, 2023, Parsons saw Thewlis for counseling and reported he had applied for disability.
(Id. at 599-600.) 	Parsons told Thewlis he and his wife had met up with other people who owned pet
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monkeys. (Id. at 600.) Parsons stated he did not want to work because he is “‘not for this world,’ referring
to how people act in public.” (Id.)
On September 11, 2023, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported doing well. 	(Id. at
938.) Parsons told Dr. Farheen he had “been doing well emotionally,” although he got stressed sometimes
when he had a “lot of things on his plate.” 	(Id.) 	Parsons denied any mood concerns. 	(Id. at 940.) 	On
examination, Dr. Farheen found appropriate eye contact, articulate speech, constricted affect, linear, logical,
and goal-directed thought process, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. 	(Id.) 	Dr. Farheen
continued Parsons’ medications. (Id. at 942.)
On September 18, 2023, Dr. Farheen completed a Mental Medical Source Statement and opined that
Parsons was unable “to perform designated task or function on regular, reliable, and sustained schedule” in
the following areas: remember locations and work-like procedures; understand and remember detailed
instructions; carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of
time; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and/or be punctual within customary
tolerances; sustain ordinary routine without special supervision; work in coordination with or proximity to
others without being distracted by them; make simple work-related decisions; complete a normal workday
and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent
pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general
public; ask simple questions or request assistance; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism
from supervisors; get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes; maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness;
be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; travel in unfamiliar places or use public
transportation; and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (Id. at 886-88.) Dr. Farheen
further opined Parsons would be absent more than four days per month and would be off task more than
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20% of the workday. 	(Id. at 887.) 	Dr. Farheen further opined Parsons would need to take unscheduled
breaks of more than 15 minutes more than four times per day. (Id.) In support of these opinions, Dr. Farheen
explained:
Michael Parsons has a working diagnosis of Bipolar 2 disorder generalized
anxiety 	disorder, 	which 	has 	been 	causing 	impairment 	in 	his 	mood,
concentration, attention and thought process limiting his ability to perform
tasks, understand instructions, procedures, or take any work related decisions.
He has poor insight into work related matters due to his psychological issues.
He will be unable to perform any job related duties or have good relationship
with co-workers.
(Id. at 888.)
On September 26, 2023, Parsons saw Thewlis for his final counseling session with her before her
retirement and thanked her for the help he had received from her. 	(Id. at 898-99.) 	Thewlis noted the
“significant progress” Parsons had made since starting counseling years ago, including his improved insight
and ability to manage his behavior when angry or frustrated. (Id. at 899.) Parsons agreed to having his file
closed out and would return to counseling if necessary. (Id.)
On November 28, 2023, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported doing well. 	(Id. at
944.) Parsons told Dr. Farheen he had been working on his home, although he was stressed about the work
he had to do at home, working on himself, and using coping skills. (Id.) He also stated he had been caring
for his animals “very well.” (Id.) Parsons denied any mood concerns. (Id. at 946.) On examination, Dr
Farheen found appropriate eye contact, articulate speech, constricted affect, linear, logical, and goal-directed
thought process, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. (Id.) Dr. Farheen noted no symptoms of
depression or anxiety. (Id. at 948.) Dr. Farheen continued Parsons’ medications. (Id.)
On December 4, 2023, Parsons saw Tricia Podkowa, LSW, for a Diagnostic Assessment. 	(Id. at
904-17.) 	Parsons reported he struggled with anger and “everyday things,” as well as getting along with
people. (Id. at 904.) Crowds annoyed him, and he became agitated when in public. (Id.) He avoided going
to the grocery store. (Id.) Parsons also endorsed anxiety, which caused occasional depression. (Id.) He
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told Podkowa he was to undergo “‘neuropsychological testing’” in January 2024 to determine whether he
had a learning disability and ADD. (Id.) On examination, Podkowa found Parsons cooperative with normal
eye contact, clear speech, full affect, concrete thought process, normal thought content, impaired ability to
abstract, impaired attention/concentration, poor focus, and fair insight and judgment. (Id. at 908.)
On January 4, 2024, Parsons saw Podkowa for counseling and reported that he had found out that
his older brother has Stage 4 cancer. 	(Id. at 901-02.) 	Parsons told Podkowa his mood swings were still
“moderate to severe”; while his medication helped stabilize his moods, he still struggled with mood stability
at times. (Id. at 902.) Parsons stated that he was going to have testing done in February 2024 to evaluate
whether he had a learning disability and cognitive deficits “due to past poor performance while working.”
(Id.)
On January 18, 2024, Parsons saw Podkowa for counseling and reported that he felt he would never
be able to return to work “because of his intellectual functioning & allowing others to ‘manipulate him.’”
(Id. at 951-52.) Parsons told Podkowa he had “accepted that he may have an intellectual disability & this
has made it easier for him to cope….” (Id. at 952.) Parsons stated that he coped with his depression by
interacting with his pet monkey. (Id.)
On February 27, 2024, Parsons saw Deanna Frye, Ph.D., for an assessment of cognitive functions
due to a learning disability. (Id. at 1027.) Parsons reported taking Depakote, topiramate, and Vitamin D.
(Id.) He told Dr. Frye he was independent with his activities of daily living. (Id.) Parsons reported a history
of poor academic performance and special classes because of spelling difficulties. (Id. at 1028.) Dr. Frye
noted Parsons “was frequently truant from school and reported at one point his mother was incarcerated for
three days due to his truancy.” (Id.) Parsons reported alcohol problems and behavioral issues and told Dr.
Frye that “he ‘got into a lot of trouble’ both at the workplace and outside the work environment, which
[Parsons] attributed to acting out and his drug and alcohol use.” (Id.) Parsons could complete his activities
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of daily living, but he needed reminders to care for his personal hygiene and his wife shaved his face. (Id.
at 1029.) Parsons refused to wash his hair because of sensory issues and also refused to cut his toe nails.
(Id.) He could do laundry, clean the house, and cook simple foods. (Id.) He did not like to go to the store
because he would have to be around other people, but his wife reported Parsons could go into the store alone
to buy things if she sent him photos of what she wanted him to buy. (Id.)
Parsons last worked at a print shop in April 2020, when the business shut down because of the
COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. at 1028.) Parsons’ wife told Dr. Frye that Parsons “could have returned to this
employment but she instructed him not to as she noted he was functioning much better without the stress of
the job.” (Id.) Parsons’ wife further reported that Parsons’ counselor at the time also recommended Parsons
not return to work. (Id.)
On examination, Dr. Frye found Parsons appropriately groomed and casually dressed, with logical
coherent, and goal-directed thought processes, euthymic mood, and congruent effect. (Id. at 1027-28.) Dr.
Frye encouraged Parsons to call and schedule a psychological evaluation for autism spectrum disorder. (Id.
at 1029.)
On April 4, 2024, Parsons saw Tiesha Purnell, Ed.S., for a neuropsychological testing intake after
being referred by his psychiatrist for a learning disability evaluation. 	(Id. at 1249.) 	Parsons reported
difficulty being around others, and he held his wife when in large groups of people. 	(Id.) 	Going to the
grocery store made him anxious. (Id.) Parsons told Purnell he could not count money, and his 11-year-old
stepson had to show Parsons how to lace up Parson’s work boots. (Id.) He struggled with adaptive behavior
skills and depended on his wife for many things. (Id.) His wife helped him with his hygiene and reminded
him to shower. (Id.) Parsons could not “consistently” drive a car, and he was a dangerous driver. (Id.)
On examination, Purnell found Parsons casually groomed, cooperative, and fully oriented with
normal psychomotor activity. (Id.) Purnell further found a helpless mood, flat, appropriate affect, slow and
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clear speech, normal thought process, concrete thought process, loose/disorganized cognition, impaired
memory, below average intellect, both “fair” and “poor” insight and judgment, and fidgety attention. (Id.
at 1249, 1251.) Purnell diagnosed Parsons with unspecified adjustment disorder. (Id. at 1252.)
On May 2, 2024, Parsons saw Podkowa for counseling and reported doing well. (Id. at 1257-58.)
Parsons told Podkowa he and his wife had driven to Michigan to buy cannabis gummies. (Id.)
On May 28, 2024, Parsons saw Dr. Farheen for follow up and reported he was stressed because he
was moving to a new house that day. 	(Id. at 1178.) 	Parsons told Dr. Farheen that when he reduced his
Depakote dose to 1000 mg, he had become more irritable and angrier, so he increased his dose back to 1250
mg. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Farheen found appropriate eye contact, articulate speech, constricted affect,
linear, logical, and goal-oriented thought process, intact cognition, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at
1180.)
On June 11, 2024, Parsons saw Tiesha Walker, Ed.S., for psychological testing follow up. (Id. at
1253.) Walker noted Parsons had started cognitive testing and was “[n]early finished.” (Id.) Walker further
noted that, “[o]n observation, client appears to have very low cognitive abilities.” (Id.) Walker stated they
would continue testing. (Id.)
On June 17, 2024, Parsons saw Podkowa for counseling and reported that he was doing well overall,
although he continued to have intermittent anxiety. 	(Id. at 1263-64.) 	Parsons told Podkowa he had
completed the first part of the standardized cognitive testing the Tuesday before, and he had to return in
October 2024 for the second part. (Id. at 1264.) He stated he and his wife had gone to Indiana to attend a
monkey convention and had stayed overnight in a hotel. (Id.) Parsons reported that he was able to cope
with the social setting because of the focus on the monkeys. (Id.)
On June 29, 2024, Walker completed a Mental Medical Source Assessment and opined that Parsons
was unable “to perform designated task or function on regular, reliable, and sustained schedule” in the
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following areas: complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically
based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest
periods; interact appropriately with the general public; accept instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors; get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting
behavioral extremes; and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (Id. at 1161-63.) Walker
further opined Parsons would be absent more than four days per month and off task over 20% of the
workday. (Id. at 1162.) Walker further opined Parsons would take unscheduled 20-minute breaks about
three times a day. (Id.) Walker explained the basis for her opinions as follows:
During the typical workday, based on psychological observations and patient
input, mental health impairments directly related to suspected low cognitive
abilities will impact daily living tasks. Client’s clinical diagnosis is in progress.
However, practitioner suspects Autism and/or ADHD. 	Presently, client is
diagnosed w/ adjustment disorder – NOS.
* * *
Client has low cognitive abilities; needs assistance with typical/basic living
tasks; in the past previous practitioners have used terms related to “mental
retardation.” This would now be classified as significant intellectual disability.
(Id. at 1162-63.)
2. 	Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council
After the hearing, Walker completed Parsons’ clinical psychological evaluation. 	(Id. at 15-20.)
Deborah Koricke, Ph.D., was also listed on the report. (Id. at 20.) The testing dates consisted of June 11,
2024, October 15, 2024, and October 22, 2024. 	(Id. at 15.) 	Walker administered the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition (“WAIS-IV”), Personality Assessment Inventory (“PAI”), and Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales, Third Edition (“Vineland-3”) to assess Parsons’ cognitive abilities. (Id.) Testing
revealed a full-scale IQ of 60, which Walker opined “confirms global cognitive deficits that severely impact
all areas of [Parsons’] daily functioning.” (Id. at 16.) Walker explained that the WAIS-IV results further
revealed “severely impaired verbal reasoning and comprehension skills,” which “significantly hinder
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[Parsons’] ability to participate in social or occupational settings requiring verbal exchanges,” as well as
“significant challenges in nonverbal reasoning and problem-solving tasks.” (Id.) Parsons’ WAIS-IV results
also showed “profoundly impaired cognitive processing speed,” which Walker opined caused Parsons to
“likely experience[] extreme difficulty completing tasks efficiently, particularly those requiring sustained
attention and rapid decision-making,” and “significantly impacts his ability to functional independently in
both personal and occupational domains.” (Id.) Walker explained that Parsons’ “Vineland-3 scores indicate
significant deficits across all areas of adaptive functioning.” (Id. at 17.) Parsons’ diagnoses consisted of
intellectual disability, severe, major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, generalized anxiety disorder, and
substance use disorder, in remission. (Id. at 19.) Walker opined:
Michael 	Parsons 	demonstrates 	profound 	cognitive 	and 	psychological
impairments that 	render 	him 	incapable of independent functioning. His
conditions significantly impair his ability to work, maintain relationships, and
manage 	daily 	responsibilities. 	Comprehensive 	support 	services 	and
accommodations are essential to ensure his safety and quality of life.
(Id.)
C. 	State Agency Reports
On October 30, 2023, Mary Hill, Ph.D., reviewed the file and opined that Parsons had moderate
limitations in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information, interact with others, concentrate,
persist, or maintain pace, and adapt or manage himself. (Id. at 82-83.) Dr. Hill further opined Parsons could
perform one to three step tasks, complete repetitive, short-cycle work in a static environment without high
production expectations, and maintain brief, superficial interactions with coworkers and supervisors. (Id.
at 85.) Parsons should avoid working with the public. (Id.) Dr. Hill further opined Parsons could respond
to changes in the work routine that were predictable and explained in advance. (Id. at 86.)
On March 13, 2024, on reconsideration, Audrey Todd, Ph.D., affirmed Dr. Hill’s findings. (Id. at
93-94, 96-98.)
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D. 	Hearing Testimony
During the September 11, 2024 hearing, Parsons testified to the following:
• 	He lives with his wife. (Id. at 47.) He has never held a driver’s license. (Id. at 48.) He
cannot drive, and being behind the wheel of a car scares him. (Id.) His wife drives him
places. (Id. at 49.) She drove him to work when he was working. (Id.) He never takes
the bus or Uber. (Id.)
• 	He graduated high school. (Id.) He was in special needs classes while in school. (Id.)
He struggled with reading “bigger words” and staying on track. 	(Id.) 	He got lost in
paragraphs and would have to reread things to make sure he understood them. (Id.) He
can add and subtract small numbers, but not larger numbers. (Id.) He’s not very good
at it. (Id.)
• 	His mother-in-law got him his last job at a printing company. (Id. at 50.) He stacked
paper into a machine. (Id.) They tried to have him perform other jobs at the facility,
but he couldn’t catch on, so they put him back on stacking paper into the machine. (Id.)
It was a very simple job, and he would still mess it up. (Id. at 63.) He stopped working
in 2020 because his anxiety got the better of him and he thought it best to quit. (Id. at
52.) He was “mentally deteriorating well beyond before that ever became a thought,
the COVID thing.” (Id. at 53.) He was anxious, irritable, and using alcohol and drugs.
(Id.) 	He stopped using alcohol in September 2019. 	(Id.) 	His anxiety has improved
since he stopped working. (Id.) He feels better now that he is not around people all the
time and “not under the microscope,” having to perform a task he doesn’t know how to
do and feeling judged for doing it wrong. (Id.)
• 	He was fired twice, once for attendance and once for doing drugs with a coworker in
the parking lot. (Id. at 55.)
• 	He sees Dr. Farheen and a counselor for his anxiety. (Id. at 54.) He sees Dr. Farheen
every three months, and she prescribes his medication. 	(Id.) 	He takes 1500 mg of
Depakote. (Id. at 57.) He takes marijuana gummies for anxiety once a week or less.
(Id. at 58.) He gets them on his own since it is legal now. (Id.)
• 	He sees his counselor every month. (Id. at 54.) He recently started an evaluation for
autism. (Id.) The symptoms he feels affect his ability to work consist of not being able
to understand things, such as the concept of money, and his anxiety around people,
which causes him to lose focus. (Id. at 55.) His 11-year-old stepson had to help him
lace his boots because he didn’t know how to do it. (Id. at 56.) He still does not know
how to lace his boots. (Id.) His wife does it for him. (Id.)
• 	He was able to work for several years despite struggling with basic things such as tying
his shoes because his job wanted him to pick something up and carry it, and he thought
that was “the most easiest thing you can ask anyone to do.” (Id.) He could not catch
on to doing anything else, so he always ended up being the guy that picks things up.
(Id. at 57.) He could not do that job today because being in a work environment scares
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him and he cannot physically do it anymore. (Id. at 63.) His fear of being around people
is worse now than it was before. (Id. at 63-64.) If a supervisor was telling him what to
do or correcting his work, he would be very upset and standoffish. 	(Id. at 66.) 	He
wouldn’t take someone telling him what do very well, and his anxiety would cause him
to respond in a negative way. (Id.) He would walk off, or not do the job at hand, or not
go to work the next day. (Id. at 67.)
• 	The first thing he does in the morning is take the dog out. (Id. at 59.) He watches TV.
(Id.) He’s on his phone for most of the day. (Id.) He did not leave the house the day
before. 	(Id. at 60.) 	His wife watched the debate, they ate dinner, and he did some
coloring. (Id.) He shaded a picture of three horses. (Id.) He has been doing that since
he’s been off work, and it is very relaxing. (Id.) Nobody came over. (Id.)
• 	He can microwave things. (Id.) He occasionally puts clothes in the wash, but he hardly
ever does, and he might take the clothes out of the wash and put them in the dryer. (Id.
at 60-61.) His wife folds the clothes. (Id. at 61.) He occasionally mows the lawn. (Id.)
His wife does most of the grocery shopping because he hates going inside the store.
(Id.) He feels like people are staring at him and he gets very anxious. (Id.) His wife
may send him in for one or two items, and she will put a picture of the item and the aisle
number on his phone so he can find them. (Id.) He sees his stepson a few times a week
and his wife’s ex once a week. (Id. at 62.) His stepson comes over to the house to hang
out, and his wife and stepson will go places together. (Id.) Sometimes his stepson helps
with things around the house. (Id.) He leaves the house a few times a week. (Id. at
68.) His anxiety or PTSD prevents him from leaving the house somedays; he feels like
most people are not kind and don’t mean well, and that scares him. (Id.) He doesn’t
even want his wife to go out, but he realizes that they have to leave the house on some
days. (Id.) He takes extra medication if they are going to leave the house. (Id. at 68-
69.)
• 	He is not good with interacting with people. (Id. at 66.) He feels judged when he goes
out in public. (Id.)
• 	Lately he has been obsessed with the Starliner space craft and has been reading
everything he can about space travel in the last 60 years. (Id. at 59.) He can read, but
he has to reread things because he doesn’t retain information like everyone else. (Id. at
65.) He obsesses over things a lot, and all his attention and focus go to that obsession.
(Id.) He will not do things he should be doing or is supposed to be doing because of
that obsession. 	(Id.) 	He has been that way his entire life. 	(Id.) 	The day before, he
should have gotten up and fed the animals before his wife did it instead of sitting on his
phone. (Id. at 66.)
• 	He recently attended a conference for people with pet monkeys in Indiana, and it was
“terrifying.” (Id. at 64.) He did not want to go, but his wife wanted to go, so he went.
(Id.) He “stay[ed] engaged with [his] monkey the entire time and that got [him] through
it.” (Id.) He was there for a night and a half. (Id.) The drive to and from the conference
was stressful because he doesn’t like interstates. (Id.) He thought thirty people attended
the conference, and that was too many. (Id.) He kept thinking, “How do I get out of
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here?” 	(Id.) 	His monkey helps him in situations like that because it gives him
something to focus on and is a stress reliever. (Id. at 65.)
The VE testified Parsons had past work as a binding machine feeder. 	(Id. at 70.) 	The ALJ then
posed the following hypothetical question:
The first hypothetical, assume a hypothetical individual of the claimant’s age
and education and that past job that you identified. Further assume the
individual has the following non-exertional limitations. No unprotected heights,
no moving mechanical parts, no operating a motor vehicle, limited to simple
instructions and work-related decision, but not at a production rate pace,
occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers, but not with the public,
occasional change in a routine work setting. Can that hypothetical individual
perform that past job?
(Id. at 70-71.)
The VE testified the hypothetical individual would not be able to perform Parsons’ past work as a
binding machine feeder. (Id. at 71.) The VE further testified the hypothetical individual would be able to
perform other representative jobs in the economy, such as packager, kitchen helper, and office cleaner. (Id.)
The ALJ modified the hypothetical to add that the hypothetical individual would require supervisory
redirection every hour to stay on task. 	(Id. at 72.) 	The VE testified that additional limitation would not
change the VE’s opinion regarding the previously identified jobs. (Id. at 72-73.)
III. 	STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
In order to establish entitlement to DIB under the Act, a claimant must be insured at the time of
disability and must prove an inability to engage “in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, that can be expected to “result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315, 404.1505(a).
A claimant is entitled to a POD only if the claimant: (1) had a disability; (2) was insured when the
claimant became disabled; and (3) filed while the claimant was disabled or within twelve months of the date
the disability ended. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320.
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The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-
stage process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). See also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th
Cir. 2010); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must demonstrate that
they are not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time of the disability application. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must show that they suffer from a “severe impairment” in order
to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly
limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 	Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923. 	Third, if the
claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for
at least twelve months, and the impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or medically equals a
required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled
regardless of age, education, or work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 	Fourth, if the claimant’s
impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant
work, the claimant is not disabled. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the
claimant’s impairment does prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant work, if other work exists
in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 	20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 404.1560(c).
Here, Parsons was insured on the alleged disability onset date, August 1, 2022, and remains insured
through December 31, 2025, the date last insured (“DLI”). (Tr. 24.) Therefore, in order to be entitled to
POD and DIB, Parsons must establish a continuous twelve-month period of disability commencing between
these dates. Any discontinuity in the twelve-month period precludes an entitlement to benefits. See Mullis
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 994 (6th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1967).
IV. 	SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
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1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”) through December 31, 2025.
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2022,
the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, other trauma- and stressor-related disorder, and polysubstance
abuse (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels
but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant must avoid all
exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and operation of a motor
vehicle; the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions and to make no more than simple, work-related decisions, conducted in
a work setting free of production-rate pace, which setting does not require
interaction with the public and does not require more than occasional interaction
with co-workers and supervisors, which setting is routine, in that it requires no more
than occasional changes.
6. 	The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. 	The claimant was born on February **, 1985, and was 35 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR
404.1563).
8. 	The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. 	Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant’s past
relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568).
10. 	Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
11. 	The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from August 1, 2022, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
(Tr. 26-36.)
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act authorizes narrow judicial review of the final decision of the Social Security
Administration (SSA).” 	Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).
Specifically, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence has been defined as “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance;
it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 	In determining whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or
weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
Review of the Commissioner’s decision must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal,
however, merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.
1986)); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the evidence
could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the
evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached.”). This is so because there is a “zone of choice”
within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference. 	Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545
(citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
In addition to considering whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, the Court must determine whether proper legal standards were applied. Failure of the
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Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations is grounds for reversal.
See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error
prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”).
Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence in the
record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and
logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)); accord Shrader v. Astrue, No.
11-1300, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (“If relevant evidence is not mentioned, the
Court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.”); McHugh v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-734,
2011 WL 6130824 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2011); Gilliam v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 2837260
(E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2010); Hook v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-1982, 2010 WL 2929562 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2010).
VI. ANALYSIS
In his sole assignment of error, Parsons argues that this case should be remanded under sentence six
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) as the “post-hearing cognitive evaluation is new and material evidence, and Parsons
has good cause for not being able to submit the same prior to the hearing/decision.” (Doc. No. 7 at 12.)
Parsons asserts that the evidence is new, as the final date of the cognitive testing was October 22, 2024. (Id.
at 13.) Parsons also argues that the evidence is material, as testing revealed a full-scale IQ of 60. (Id. at
14.) 	Parsons maintains that the ALJ rejected Parsons’ low IQ scores from his school records “because
Parsons was absent from school so often,” and “[i]n doing so, the ALJ did not even find that Parsons had a
step 2 severe learning disability (step 2 is a de minimis standard).” (Id. at 15.) Parsons asserts the ALJ also
rejected his claims of low intellect because Parsons “had ‘good intellectual functioning’, ‘intact fund of
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knowledge[’], ability to reason in abstract and intact memory functioning on examination.” (Id.) However,
Parsons argues:
[T]hese are just general observations that providers have made of Parsons in the
course of treating him for his emotional difficulties and not his intellectual
problems. Instead, these informal observations, without testing, are far less
reliable and valuable as an indicator of one’s intellectual functioning as
compared to formal cognitive testing. In fact, that is exactly why such testing is
done.
Had the ALJ seen the post-hearing cognitive testing, he may very well have
believed that Parsons met the [listing12.05(B)] at Step 3. Further, he also may
have credited the limitations reached by Dr. Farheen and Dr. Walker. At step 5,
he may have believed that Parsons would be off task at work too often, he may
have 	believed 	that 	Parsons 	would 	require 	five 	minute 	supervisory
prompts/reminders once per hour, or he (or counsel) may have put forth/adopted
additional hypothetical questions that would more fully encompass Parsons’
limitations in light of this recent cognitive testing.
(Id.)
Finally, Parsons maintains that he has good cause for not completing the cognitive testing until after
the hearing, as shown by the affidavit Parsons attached to his Complaint and the treatment records
documenting his efforts to obtain this testing “well before the hearing.” 	(Id. at 16.) 	Although Parsons
started the cognitive testing in June 2024—three months before the hearing—the evaluator required Parsons
to return in October 2024 to complete the testing. (Id. at 17.) Parsons asserts that he did not cause the delay,
and in fact complained to his therapist about the delay. (Id.)
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ told Parsons he would hold the record open for 14 days,
and would then close the record unless he heard from Parsons that there was “‘good cause to extend the
time.’” (Doc. No. 9 at 2.) The Commissioner asserts that Parsons did not contact the ALJ during those 14
days to request to keep the record open, and the ALJ issued his decision on September 30, 2024. 	(Id.)
Parsons did not submit additional evidence until December 16, 2024, when he requested the Appeals
Council revisit the ALJ’s decision in light of the additional evidence. (Id.) 	The Commissioner argues that
Parsons did not meet his burden of showing good cause: “It is well-established Sixth Circuit law that where
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Plaintiff’s counsel does not seek to have the record remain open to submit additional evidence after a
claimant’s hearing, this ‘in and of itself shows a lack of good cause.’” (Id. at 3) (citations omitted). The
Commissioner maintains that “under Sixth Circuit law and the law of this Court, because Plaintiff did not
seek to hold open the record for post-hearing evidence to be submitted to the ALJ nor contact the ALJ to
request the record remain open, his request for a sentence six remand is not supported by good cause and
must be denied.” (Id.) (citations omitted).
In reply, Parsons argues that the Commissioner is “misguided” as to why the ALJ left the record
open. 	(Doc. No. 10 at 1.) 	The ALJ kept the record open to get outstanding records from Coleman
Professional Services, the place where Parsons received mental health treatment, and not for Parsons to
complete his cognitive testing. (Id.) Parsons asserts that the ALJ “knew that the cognitive testing would
not be available for more than forty days after the hearing at the very earliest,” and the ALJ’s “willingness
to leave the record open for only 14 days clearly suggests that he was not willing to wait more than a month
for testing to be complete and that he was instead referring to records from Coleman regarding mental health
treatment….” (Id. at 2.) Parsons maintains that the cases cited by the Commissioner are distinguishable,
as in each of those cases the claimants “made no argument detailing why there was good cause to present
evidence after the hearing” and the ALJ in this case “implicitly denied the request to hold the record open
to obtain the post hearing cognitive testing.” (Id. at 3.)
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held “evidence submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s
decision cannot be considered part of the record for purposes of substantial evidence review.” Foster v.
Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001). A district court can, however, remand the case for further
administrative proceedings in light of such evidence, if a claimant shows the evidence satisfies the standard
set forth in sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id. See also Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148
(6th Cir.1996); Lee v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F. App’x 706, 717 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that “we view
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newly 	submitted 	evidence 	only 	to 	determine 	whether 	it 	meets 	the 	requirements 	for sentence-
six remand”). Sentence Six provides that:
The court may ... at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the
Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the
Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and after
hearing 	such 	additional 	evidence 	if 	so 	ordered, 	modify 	or 	affirm 	the
Commissioner's findings of fact or the Commissioner's decision, or both, and
shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and
decision, and, in any case in which the Commissioner has not made a decision
fully favorable to the individual, a transcript of the additional record and
testimony upon which the Commissioner's action in modifying or affirming was
based.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Interpreting this statute, the Sixth Circuit has held that “evidence is new only if it was ‘not in
existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding.’” Foster, 279 F.3d at
357 (quoting Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 626). Evidence is “material” only if “there is ‘a reasonable probability
that the Secretary would have reached a different disposition of the disability claim if presented with the
new evidence.’” Id. (quoting Sizemore v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir.
1988)). See also Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that evidence is “material”
if it “would likely change the Commissioner’s decision.”); Courter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 479 F. App’x
713, 725 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Evidence is not material if it is cumulative of evidence already in the record,
or if it merely shows a worsening condition after the administrative hearing. See Prater v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 876, 880 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2017). See also Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d
469, 478 (6th Cir. 2003); Sizemore, 865 F.2d at 712 (“Reviewing courts have declined to remand disability
claims for reevaluation in light of medical evidence of a deteriorated condition”); Deloge v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 540 F. App’x 517, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2013) (same). Similarly, “[t]o be material, the evidence must relate
to the time period at issue – i.e., from the alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s
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decision.” Malanowksi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13CV763, 2014 WL 2593960, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June
10, 2014) (citing Casey v. Sec’y of Helath & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1992)).
In order to show “good cause,” a claimant must “demonstrat[e] a reasonable justification for the
failure to acquire and present the evidence for inclusion in the hearing before the ALJ.” Foster, 279 F.3d at
357. See also Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 727 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1984). “The mere fact
that evidence was not in existence at the time of the ALJ’s decision does not necessarily satisfy the ‘good
cause’ requirement.” Courter, 479 F. App’x at 725. Rather, the Sixth Circuit “takes ‘a harder line on the
good cause test’ with respect to timing, and thus requires that the claimant ‘give a valid reason for his failure
to obtain evidence prior to the hearing.’” Id. (quoting Oliver v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 804 F.2d
964, 966 (6th Cir.1986)). This includes “detailing the obstacles that prevented the admission of the
evidence.” Courter, 479 F. App’x at 725. See also Bass, 499 F.3d at 513.
The burden of showing that a remand is appropriate is on the claimant. See Foster, 279 F.3d at
357; Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 2010). When a district court grants
remand pursuant to sentence six, it “neither affirm[s] nor reverse[s] the ALJ’s decision, but simply
remand[s] for further fact-finding.” Courter, 479 F. App’x at 725. See also Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S.
89, 98, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). Under these circumstances, the district court retains
jurisdiction and enters final judgment only “after postremand agency proceedings have been completed and
their results filed with the court.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239
(1993). See also Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98; Marshall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 444 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir.
2006).
The Court finds Parsons has demonstrated a sentence six remand is appropriate. First, this evidence
is “new,” as it post-dates both the administrative hearing and the ALJ decision. See Cross v. Comm’r of
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Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 734 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2005). Second, the Court finds Parsons has shown
good cause for failing to present this evidence sooner, as the testing was not completed until October 2024,
and Parsons was not responsible for the delay. (Tr. 1253, 1263-64.) Furthermore, Parsons notified the ALJ
of the ongoing testing during the hearing:
ALJ: Are you still waiting on anything from the letter?
ATTY: I don’t think we need to leave it open for it. He probably has one or two
more therapy sessions at Coleman since the last set we have.
ALJ: We have a lot from Coleman.
ATTY: We have quite a bit from there.
ALJ: So, he has been there a while?
ATTY: Yes.
[ATTY]: He is in the middle of sort of a neurocognitive evaluation for autism.
He had the first appointment for it, but he has to go back on October 14 and
then again on October 26 for them to complete it.
ALJ: And, that’s through whom, Cleveland Clinic?
ATTY: No, they actually sent the very beginning of the evaluation effective
(INAUDIBLE). That’s at 28F.
ALJ: Okay.
ATTY: That’s actually one of the people who filled out the one assessment. I
thought it was his therapist because it’s pretty illegible, but it’s Tiesha Walker.
ALJ: Yes, that’s right.
ALJ: I would like to get whatever is there from Coleman. If there’s something,
I would like to have it in there.
ATTY: Okay.
ALJ: I will hold the record open for 14 days to get that and I will close the
record unless I hear from you that there’s good cause to extend the time. I will
admit into the record Exhibits 1 through 4A, 1 through 16B, 1 through 11D, 1
through 13E and 1 through 32F.
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(Tr. 45-46.) Parsons’ attorney also informed the ALJ that he thought Parsons was “going to be getting I.Q.
tests with this new information coming.” (Id. at 46.)
Later in the hearing, when questioning Parsons, the ALJ stated, “You’re still being evaluated for the
autism. Are there symptoms that you have? Things that you do that you think affect your ability to work in
that regard?” (Id. at 54.)
In the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ found:
In addition to those impairments identified as severe, either the claimant has
alleged, or an independent review of the evidence has suggested the existence
of the following conditions, which I do not find to be medically determinable:
autism spectrum disorder and learning disability. Investigation for these
diagnoses is ongoing but will not be completed until mid-to-late October
2024 [hearing testimony]. Thus far, diagnosis has been deferred (19F/7).
(Id. at 27) (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, the Court rejects the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ held the record
open for submission of the cognitive testing and that Parsons was required to notify the ALJ of the ongoing
testing within 14 days of the hearing and request that the ALJ continue to hold the record open. 	“As in
Harrison, there is no indication that [Parsons] or [his] attorney ‘sandbagged’ the ALJ, staying silent about”
the cognitive testing “only to have the tests performed after an unsuccessful hearing or decision.” Hickey
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action No. 17-10123, 2017 WL 5710459, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 5667977 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2017).
“The question of whether the new evidence is ‘material’ is a somewhat closer call.” 	2017 WL
5710459 at *7. At Step Two, the ALJ founds as follows:
Records of special education are acknowledged; however, those records also
describe a long-standing history of absenteeism [absent more than seventy days,
tardy when not absent, stretching back to elementary school days] (1F/5, 14).
Even assuming, arguendo, that these diagnoses were medically determinable
and severe, given the state of the overall evidence, I find that the residual
functional capacity as assessed would remain viable.
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(Tr. 27.) At Step Three, while the ALJ did not consider Listing 12.05(B), part of the criteria for that listing
includes a finding of one extreme limitation, or two marked limitations, in the areas of mental functioning
identical to those set forth in the “Paragraph B” criteria (20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1), and the ALJ
found only moderate limitations in all four areas. (Tr. 27-28.)
However, the Court agrees with Parsons that the cognitive testing may have caused the ALJ to
evaluate the opinions of Dr. Farheen and Walker differently. In evaluating the opinions of Dr. Farheen and
Walker, the ALJ found as follows:
The claimant’s psychiatrist, Syeda Farheen, M.D., indicated that the claimant
would have marked to extreme limitations in his ability to understand,
remember, and carry out instructions, his ability to adapt to the stressors of day-
to-day work. In addition, she indicated that the claimant would be absent more
than four days per month, off-task more than twenty percent of the time, would
need more than four extra breaks of more than fifteen minutes each day. Dr.
Farheen has treated the claimant since August of 2022 and is reporting within
the bounds of her professional certifications and specialty. However, her
treatment records show that the claimant has missed only one appointment, of
which he advised staff ahead of time (9F/8). He typically presents as and when
appointed and is able to participate in his treatment and planning fully, and
without need for additional breaks and without off-task behaviors documented,
such that there is really no objective basis for her opinion on absenteeism, off-
task behavior, or the need for additional breaks. Otherwise, her opinion
overstates, to significant degree, the extent of the limitations in each of the four,
psychologically based, work-related areas of function. This opinion is only
marginally consistent with, and supported by, the overall evidence of record
and is not persuasive.
Although not received of an acceptable medical source, an opinion dated June
29, 2024, illegibly signed, unattributed, and uncredentialed [hence its treatment
as though from an unacceptable medical source] indicated that the claimant
would have mild-to-extreme limitations in his ability to understand, remember,
and carry out instructions, in his ability to interact with others, in his ability to
concentrate, persist and maintain pace and in his ability to adapt to the stressors
of day-to- day work. In addition, this opinion indicated that the claimant would
miss more than four days per month, that he would be off-task more than twenty
percent of the time, and would need unscheduled breaks three times per day of
twenty minutes in length. The basis for this opinion included the claimant’s
input, 	suggestive 	of 	a 	substitution 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	judgment 	for 	the
respondent’s own, statements from providers remote to the period relevant to
this claim, and diagnoses not yet rendered (25F/3-4). For these reasons, and
because the opinion is not consistent with the overall evidence of record,
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described above in digest form in the analysis of the opinions of Drs. Hill, Todd,
and Farheen, this opinion is not consistent with, or supported by, the overall
evidence of record and is not persuasive.
(Tr. 33-34.) At least with respect to the second paragraph, which deals with Walker’s opinion,4 the cognitive
testing establishes Walker’s credentials and provides a basis for her opinion that is not substituting Parsons’
judgment for Walker’s own.
It is also possible the ALJ may have weighed the evidence at Steps Two and Three differently
considering this cognitive testing.
Finally, the Court notes that the Commissioner does not argue that the evidence is immaterial, or
that Parsons failed to meet his burden of showing the evidence is material, and therefore, Parsons’ arguments
regarding materiality are uncontroverted. (Doc. No. 9.)
For all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that “there is at least a ‘reasonable probability’
that [the ALJ] would have reached a different disposition.” Hickey, 2017 WL 5710459 at *8. Therefore,
the new evidence is material, and the undersigned recommends the Court find remand under sentence six is
warranted.
VII. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this matter be REMANDED
pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Date: December 23, 2025 	s/ Jonathan Greenberg
Jonathan D. Greenberg
United States Magistrate Judge
4 The Court notes that Parsons’ counsel told the ALJ at the hearing that the cognitive testing evaluator,
Tiesha Walker, was the person who completed 28F, even though it was illegible. (Tr. 45.) Furthermore, as
an aside, the Court fails to understand how the ALJ can discredit Walker’s opinion for being inconsistent
with Dr. Farheen’s, when the ALJ also rejected Dr. Farheen’s opinion as unpersuasive. (Id. at 33-34.)
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OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections
within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 	Berkshire v.
Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019)
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