Khiyana De'Ann Preston

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In Re 	)
)
KHIYANA DE’ANN PRESTON 	) 	Case No. 26-10127
) 	Chapter 7
Debtor(s) 	) 	Judge Buchanan
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
FOR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
[Docket Number 17]
[This opinion is not intended for publication.]
This case is before this Court on the Debtor Khiyana De’Ann Preston’s Emergency Motion
for Sanctions for Willful Violation of the Automatic Stay [Docket Number 17] (the “Motion”) and
Creditor 2900 Colerain Ave OZ LLC’s Response [Docket Number 30].
An evidentiary hearing was held on April 23, 2026. Ms. Preston, proceeding pro se,
testified on her own behalf. Mr. Stasiu Geleszinski testified on behalf of 2900 Colerain Ave OZ
LLC, which entity was represented by counsel at the hearing. By agreement of the parties, the
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 19, 2026
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documents attached to Ms. Preston’s Motion were admitted into evidence. 2900 Colerain Ave OZ
LLC presented no exhibits.
In her Motion, Ms. Preston alleges that 2900 Colerain Ave OZ LLC violated the automatic
stay pay seeking to collect pre-petition rent, including
The following are this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. 	Findings of Fact
2900 Colerain Ave OZ LLC (“Creditor”) owns a six-unit apartment building located at
2900 Colerain Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio 45255. Mr. Stasiu Geleszinski is a co-owner and managing
member of the company and is the property manager for the apartment complex. Creditor
purchased the property in late July 2023. Mr. Geleszinski testified that, at the time of the purchase,
the building was about to be torn down but he and his partners rehabilitated the property into a
multi-unit apartment building. Mr. Geleszinski has resided in the building on and off since
February or March of 2026.
On or about August 1, 2025, Khiyana De’Ann Preston and Creditor entered into a lease
agreement for Ms. Preston to reside at the premises located at 2900 Colerain Avenue, Apartment
#6, Cincinnati, Ohio 45255. Ms. Preston’s monthly rent payment is $1,495 plus $50 for utilities
and $50 for a parking permit fee, for a total of $1,595 per month.1 Ms. Preston made only one
payment in August 2025. On October 6, 2025, Creditor initiated an eviction proceeding in the
Hamilton County Municipal Court. The eviction was set for hearing on January 23, 2026. On
January 22, 2026, Ms. Preston filed her bankruptcy petition. Besides the August 2025 payment,
Ms. Preston has not made any pre-petition or post-petition rent payments.
1 The lease agreement was not entered into evidence. It is unclear from the testimony whether the monthly utility
charge ($50) and the parking permit fee ($50) were provisions in the lease agreement or charges pursuant to a separate
agreement between the Creditor and Ms. Preston.
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Mr. Geleszinski testified that he was not aware of the bankruptcy filing until informed by
his counsel at the eviction hearing on January 23, 2026. That same day, Ms. Preston and Mr.
Geleszinski exchanged the following text messages:
Ms. Preston: Parking is part of my lease at a monthly fee of $100,
and any past-due rent or parking charges were included in my
bankruptcy filing. Withholding my parking access due to pre-
petition debt constitutes a violation of the automatic stay. Please
restore my parking access immediately. Thank you, Khiyana
Mr. Geleszinski: Please pay your rent – Stash
Ms. Preston: Are you saying refusing?
Mr. Geleszinski: Sure go ahead
Debtor Ex. E [Docket Number 17].
Mr. Geleszinski testified that he did not initiate the discussion regarding rent and other
charges. Rather, he was simply responding to Ms. Preston’s text message. He stated that the
reference to rent in his response related to post-petition rent, and regardless, he authorized her to
park on the property.
On February 2, 2026, there was another round of text messages between Ms. Preston and
Mr. Geleszinski:
Ms. Preston: Did you go to the building to get your package today
or yesterday? I recall seeing a package yesterday near the mail area
with your name on it
Mr. Geleszinski: Did you pay your rent?
Ms. Preston: 	Two of my packages were delivered outside of the
building door sometime this morning. They were found in the
recycle bin (along with your already open package). DON’T touch
any of my s[***]!! I don’t touch anyone else’s things. Your response
tells me you did it. Idc what you’re mad about. Do not touch my
stuff.
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Mr. Geleszinski: Just pay your rent You don’t know why I’m mad
you’ve been living rent free since September you never paid the
deposit. You’ve tricked me. You declare bankruptcy the day before
that we went to eviction court you don’t know why I’m mad. Take a
guess. May the Lord have mercy on your soul
Ms. Preston: 	Don’t touch anything that doesn’t belong to you
Stash. Point blank, period
Mr. Geleszinski: Pay your rent Point blank Period
Debtor Ex. F and G [Docket Number 17].
Mr. Geleszinski explained that this series of text messages was again simply a response to
the messages initiated by Ms. Preston and that any reference to rent related to post-petition rent.
With respect to the packages at issue in the text messages, Mr. Geleszinski testified that he did not
put Ms. Preston’s packages in the trash nor did he instruct anyone to do so. Ms. Preston affirmed
that she did not witness Mr. Geleszinski taking her packages. She surmised that he did so because
Mr. Geleszinski’s empty package containers were in the trash bin along with her unopened
packages.
On or about February 6, 2026 an incident occurred at the apartment building around
midnight. Ms. Preston testified that she heard yelling toward her window saying, “get the f[***]
out” and that the person yelling said he “would give her a check.” When she looked outside, Ms.
Preston saw Mr. Geleszinski attempting to get into the apartment building but a woman, who was
arguing with Mr. Geleszinski, was holding him back. Being fearful of her safety, Ms. Preston called
the police. When the police arrived, they spoke with the woman who was outside and then the
woman left. The police asked Ms. Preston to let them into the building, which she did. At some
point prior to the police’s arrival, Mr. Geleszinski apparently entered the building as the police
found him in one of the apartments that are reserved for Airbnb tenants. Mr. Geleszinski was
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handcuffed and placed in the police car. Ms. Preston did not go outside so she did know what the
conversation was between Mr. Geleszinski and the police.
Mr. Geleszinski testified that the incident was an altercation with his significant other. He
stated that he never threatened Ms. Preston.
The final incident relates to Ms. Preston’s mailbox. The timing of the incident is unclear
but Ms. Preston alleges that Mr. Geleszinski removed her name from her mailbox and posted a
sign that stated only tenants receive mail. Ms. Preston testified that she almost missed receiving
important mail regarding her bankruptcy case. Mr. Geleszinski testified that he did not remove Ms.
Preston’s name from her mailbox nor did he instruct anyone to do so. When he learned that Ms.
Preston’s name was not on her mailbox, he put a new name tag on her mailbox. Mr. Geleszinski
further testified that the sign which stated that only tenants receive mail was placed there by the
post office. Ms. Preston affirmed that she did not witness Mr. Geleszinski remove her name from
her mailbox.
With respect to damages, Ms. Preston testified that Mr. Geleszinski “scared the mess” out
of her. She noted that Mr. Geleszinski was frequently at the apartment building. She was fearful to
leave her home because she did not know what Mr. Geleszinski might say or do to her.
II. 	Legal Analysis
The filing of a debtor’s bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities.”
11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The scope of the automatic stay is extremely broad and, aside from the limited
exceptions set forth in § 362(b), applies to almost any type of formal or informal action taken
against a debtor or property of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, para. 362.03
(16th ed. 2026). As courts often recognize, “[t]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor
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protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.” Fed. Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn),
760 F.2d 1428, 1435 (6th Cir. 1985).
A court may award damages for a violation of the automatic stay. Specifically, an individual
debtor who is injured by a “willful” violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11
U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). To recover damages, an individual must prove by a preponderance of that
evidence that: “(1) the actions taken were in violation of the automatic stay; (2) the violation was
willful; and (3) the violation caused actual damages.” Mitchell v. Anderson (In re Mitchell), 545
B.R. 209, 220 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2016) (citations omitted). “A willful violation does not require
proof of a specific intent to violate the stay. Rather, a violation of the automatic stay can be willful
when the creditor knew of the stay and violated the stay by an intentional act.” Dawson v. Ram
Motors, LLC (In re Dawson), 665 B.R. 796, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2025) (citation modified).
Ms. Preston asserts that Creditor violated that automatic stay by (1) withholding her
parking, (2) texting her, (3) disposing of her personal property, (4) threatening her physical safety,
and, (5) interfering with her mail, all in an effort to collect a pre-petition debt. Of these, this Court
finds that only the texts were proven to be a violation of the automatic stay.
With respect to parking, Ms. Preston did not prove that Creditor withheld her parking in an
effort to collect pre-petition rent and other charges. On the contrary, the January 23, 2026 text
messages reflected that Mr. Geleszinski, as the agent of Creditor, said Ms. Preston could go ahead
and park at the property. Ms. Preston argued that his response was sarcastic and in any regard
Creditor did not provide her with a parking pass. However, Creditor did not condition receiving a
parking pass on payment of the pre-petition obligation. Moreover, Creditor had no obligation to
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provide Ms. Preston with a parking pass without payment for the post-petition right to park on the
property.
Regarding the disposal of her packages and removal of her name label from her mailbox,
without some corroborating evidence, these assertions are speculative and insufficient to refute
Mr. Geleszinski’s testimony that he did not dispose of her personal property or remove her mailbox
label, nor did he direct anyone to do so.
Ms. Preston also failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the February
6th police incident was a violation of the automatic stay. This Court has no doubt that Ms. Preston
was understandably fearful from the commotion occurring outside of her apartment in the wee
hours of the morning. While disturbing, however, the more probable explanation is that the incident
was a domestic altercation between Mr. Geleszinski and his significant other, as he testified, and
had nothing to do with Ms. Preston.
Ms. Preston herself testified that Mr. Geleszinski and a woman were arguing and that the
woman was trying to keep Mr. Geleszinski from entering the building. She further testified that
she heard Mr. Geleszinski say, “get the f[***] out” and that he “would give her a check.” If these
statements were directed at Ms. Preston, it would make no sense why Mr. Geleszinski would state
that he would give Ms. Preston a check. Rather, these statements and actions would seem to be a
dispute between these two parties.
This supposition is further supported by the events that occurred after the police arrived.
The police questioned the unidentified woman and she was released. Mr. Geleszinski was then
located and detained following that interview. The police did not question Ms. Preston. Nor did
the police follow up with Ms. Preston after speaking with and detaining Mr. Geleszinski. If the
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incident had something to do with Ms. Preston, one would assume the police would want a
statement from Ms. Preston and would inform her of their intended course of action.
This Court does, however, find that Mr. Geleszinski’s text messages to Ms. Preston were a
violation of the automatic stay. The January 23, 2026 text to “pay your rent” was only one day
after Ms. Preston’s bankruptcy case was filed. Therefore, Mr. Geleszinski’s claim that he was
referring to post-petition rent is not believable. While the February 2, 2026 demand to “pay your
rent” was further removed in time, the context of the text chain supports that the demand
encompassed pre-petition rent. Mr. Geleszinski stated that he was angry that Ms. Preston had been
“living rent free since September” and that she “never paid the deposit.” These references clearly
refer to pre-petition obligations.
Moreover, this Court finds that these stay violations were willful. Mr. Geleszinski was
aware that Ms. Preston had filed bankruptcy yet he intentionally made statements seeking to collect
an obligation in violation of the stay. The fact that Mr. Geleszinski did not initiate the conversation
does not excuse his statements.
Although this Court finds that Creditor willfully violated the stay, Ms. Preston has not
established quantifiable actual damages. The sole harm claimed by Ms. Preston is emotional
distress. There is some debate as to whether emotional distress damages may be recovered as actual
damages under § 362(k). See In re Paige, 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 419, at *14, 2026 WL 493391, at
*6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2026); In re Tapp, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *5-8, 2020 WL
4810074, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 10, 2020). Those courts that do find emotional distress
recoverable under § 362(k) require a strong evidentiary foundation—including corroborating
proof typically in the form of medical evidence—and a causal connection between the violation
and the injury. In re Tapp, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *9-10, 2020 WL 4810074, at *4. Ms.
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Preston failed to satisfy this burden. She presented no evidence of physical symptoms, or inability
to go about daily activities such as work, shopping, or attending appointments. Her generalized
fear is insufficient proof of a compensable emotion distress injury.
Furthermore, the Court questions the causal connection between the text messages and Ms.
Preston’s anxiety. It appears to the Court that her emotional distress came from a culmination of
acts that she attributed to Mr. Geleszinski but did not prove he committed, or in the case of the
February 6th police incident, did not show that his actions were directed towards her.
This Court certainly does not doubt that Ms. Preston felt distressed. Nor does this Court
condone Mr. Geleszinski’s inappropriate and hostile text messages to Ms. Preston. Indeed, this
Court cautions Creditor and Mr. Geleszinski to guide their actions accordingly in the future.
However, not every stay violation is compensable. And this Court is bound by the parameters of
the law.
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Preston’s Motion is granted to the extent set forth in this
opinion. Specifically, this Court finds that Creditor 2900 Colerain Ave OZ LLC willfully violated
the automatic stay by virtue of Mr. Geleszinski’s January and February 2026 text messages to Ms.
Preston; however, no compensable damages were proven.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution List:
Default List
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