Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick,
Debtor.
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 25-30619
Chapter 7
Judge Crist
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (I) REJECTING PAPERS RECEIVED
FROM THE FORMER, PRESENTLY BARRED, DEBTOR TO INITIATE AN
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING IN A DISMISSED CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION; AND (II) ORDERING THE CLERK TO RETURN THE
ORIGINAL PAPERS TO THE FORMER DEBTOR
I. 	Introduction
This matter is before the Court on an attempt by the former and currently barred Debtor,
Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick (“Ms. Kilpatrick”), to file an adversary proceeding within this
bankruptcy case over five (5) months after it was dismissed on October 1, 2025, due to her abuse
of the bankruptcy process as a serial filer, through the Order Granting U.S. Trustee’s Motion to
Dismiss with Prejudice and One (1) Year Bar to Refiling (Doc. 79) (the “Dismissal and Bar Order”)
entered on the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 38) and the United
States Trustee’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc.
52) (the “Memorandum in Support”).
Because this case was previously dismissed, because Ms. Kilpatrick was at the same time
barred from filing any further cases in this Court for one (1) year due to her bad faith filings, not
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 8, 2026
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to mention her subsequent barrage of twenty-seven (27) voluminous filings espousing sovereign
citizen theories, because there was no, and certainly is not now, any automatic stay in place, and
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed complaint (in addition to the
claims being based on false allegations in a last-minute, last-ditch frivolous effort to halt a writ of
restitution for her to vacate the property previously foreclosed), the Court determined upon receipt
of the complaint that there was no subject matter jurisdiction to open a new adversary proceeding.
Moreover, the claims alleged therein are premised on Ms. Kilpatrick’s false assertions that there
is a pending bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy estate, and an automatic stay, none of which is true,
such that the complaint is, in that respect, frivolous.
In addition to the foregoing, the attempted adversary proceeding appeared to largely
duplicate a civil action that Ms. Kilpatrick had already filed the month before with the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton (the “District
Court”) on February 20, 2026, in Case No. 3:26-cv-00058-WHR-PBS,1 in which the District Court
entered a Decision and Entry Overruling Plaintiff’s Motion for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and
Injunctive Relief (Doc. #2) and Overruling Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Enforce Automatic
Stay and for Sanctions (Doc. #3) (Doc. 4) (the “Decision and Entry”) on February 23, 2026, finding
and concluding as follows:
The Court turns now to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Enforce Automatic
Stay and for Sanctions. Doc. #3. In this motion, Plaintiff argues that she has an
active bankruptcy case and is entitled to a stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Further,
she argues that this stay must apply to Defendants Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC
and the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. She brings this motion in an
emergency fashion because she has been issued a Notice to Vacate a property
located at 108 Barnside Drive, Englewood, Ohio, by March 12, 2026.
Certainly, 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides a stay to parties who have an active
bankruptcy case underway, but that protection ends once the case has been closed.
See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 503 (2015) (“Dismissal lifts the
automatic stay entered at the start of bankruptcy, exposing the debtor to creditors’
1 In addition to the Complaint, filed on February 20, 2026, and Amended Complaint filed on February 23, 2026 (Docs.
1 and 4, No. 3:26-cv-00058-WHR-PBS), the Debtor filed an Emergency Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay and
for Sanctions (the “Motion to Enforce”) and also a Motion for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Injunctive Relief on
February 20, 2026 (Docs 2 and 3, No. 3:26-cv-00058-WHR-PBS). However, the Motion to Enforce was denied
“because Plaintiff has not identified a pending bankruptcy case upon which she premises an entitled to a stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362[.]” (Doc. 4 at 3, No. 3:26-cv-00058-WHR-PBS.) Nevertheless, Ms. Kilpatrick has repeated this same
argument in her latest filing in this Court.
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legal actions and collection efforts. And it can limit the availability of an automatic
stay in a subsequent bankruptcy case.”)
Notably, Plaintiff does not provide any details on the bankruptcy case under
which she claims entitlement to a stay. A review of the bankruptcy court’s records
indicates that Plaintiff has been involved with three bankruptcy cases in the
Southern District of Ohio in the past two years. See [I]n re: Marguerite Latete
Kilpatrick, 	3:24-bk-31698 	(Bankr. 	S.D. 	Ohio); 	[I]n 	re: 	Marguerite 	Latete
Kilpatrick, 	3:24-bk-32461 	(Bankr. 	S.D. 	Ohio); 	[I]n 	re: 	Marguerite 	Latete
Kilpatrick, 3:25-bk-30619 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio). However, all of these cases are
closed, as the bankruptcy court recently noted on February 10, 2026. [I]n re:
Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, 3:25-bk-30619, Doc. #98 (“Her bankruptcy case is
still dismissed, and she is still barred from filing another bankruptcy.”).
Because Plaintiff has not identified a pending bankruptcy case upon which
she premises her entitlement to a stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the Court will not
enter a stay, award damages, or provide any other relief requested in the motion.
The Emergency Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay and for Sanctions, Doc. #3, is
OVERRULED.
Decision and Entry at 2-3. Similarly, because her last of three successive bankruptcy cases was
dismissed on October 1, 2025, and because she is barred from filing any more bankruptcies until,
as of now,2 October 1, 2026, this Court rejects her proposed complaint and will not open a new
adversary proceeding in her dismissed bankruptcy case.
There presently is no subject matter jurisdiction in this Court to hear Ms. Kilpatrick’s
complaint and she is not entitled to any relief in this Court. Accordingly, denying her the ability to
file such a frivolous complaint, based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) (made
applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b)), this Court’s inherent authority and
11 U.S.C. § 105, is necessary and appropriate in order to prevent her from running “ ‘roughshod
over the court system[.]’ ” In re Nyamusevya, 654 B.R. 581, 589 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2023) (citing
In re Jones, 632 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2021) (cleaned up)). Therefore, for the reasons
2 Ultimately, as a sanction for her conduct in her dismissed case the Court could determine to impose a longer bar, as
well as enter a standing order that as a “vexatious litigator” any proposed filings with this Court would have to be
reviewed before being accepted for filing. See, e.g., Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting
that it is proper for federal courts to enter orders requiring leave of court before “vexatious litigants who have filed
many complaints” concerning the same incident are allowed to file any further complaints, and it is appropriate for
federal courts to refuse permission to file frivolous complaints) (cited in In re Nyamusevya, 654 B.R. 581, 589 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2023)).
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set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order the Court hereby, nunc pro tunc,3 rejects the
papers (as described below) and orders the Clerk to forthwith return the original papers to the
former Debtor, Ms. Kilpatrick.
II. 	Background
The history of Ms. Kilpatrick’s serial cases, dismissal of her cases, and the imposition of a
bar to her filing any further bankruptcy cases has been recounted several times such that it will not
be fully repeated here. A quick recap, however, is appropriate for context.
The above-captioned pro se chapter 7 case was dismissed on October 1, 2025, with a one
(1) year bar to re-filing, based on the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice
(Doc. 38) and the United States Trustee’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 52) (the “Memorandum in Support”), due to Ms. Kilpatrick’s
conduct in abusing the bankruptcy process with her bad faith filings. See Dismissal and Bar Order
(Doc. 79). The U.S. Trustee’s Memorandum in Support, which was filed in response to this Court’s
Order Requiring a Supplemental Filing Concerning the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice (Doc. 38) (Doc. 48),4 sums up the reasons why Ms. Kilpatrick’s third bankruptcy
case filed in the span of just over seven months was dismissed with a one (1) year bar to refiling:
3 The Court is cognizant of the Supreme Court of the United States’ pronouncement on the use of nunc pro tunc orders
in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 65 (2020) (“[p]ut colorfully, ‘[n]unc pro tunc
orders are not some Orwellian vehicle for revisionist history—creating ‘facts’ that never occurred in fact.’ ” (quoting
United States v. Gillespie, 666 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1987) and citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 49
(1990))). However, in this unique circumstance in which the Court had already reached the conclusion explained in
more detail in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, but was simultaneously presented with the Motion to Recuse
and subjected to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, which have since been decided, the Court believes this remains
an appropriate use of a nunc pro tunc order. Id. (stating that “Federal courts may issue nunc pro tunc orders, or ‘now
for then’ orders, Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1287, to ‘reflect[] the reality’ of what has already occurred” (quoting
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 49)).
4 Out of an abundance of caution, the Court entered this Order (Doc. 48) because it appeared from the docket that Ms.
Kilpatrick had appeared for her meeting of creditors on August 18, 2025, approximately one (1) month after the U.S.
Trustee had filed his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38), and the Court wanted to know whether this changed the position
of the U.S. Trustee that Ms. Kilpatrick’s case should be dismissed, and dismissed with a bar to refiling. However, as
set forth in the Supplemental Declaration of Patricia J. Friesinger (Doc. 52-1), attached to the Memorandum in
Support, “[t]he fourth scheduled 341 Meeting of Creditors was set to be heard on August 7, 2025” and “[t]he Debtor
failed to attend the meeting” and failed “to produce the documents after multiple attempts” by the Chapter 7 Trustee
to obtain those documents as set forth in her prior Declaration of Patricia J. Friesinger (Doc. 38-1), such that the
docket entry was incorrect that the meeting of creditors had been held; rather, the Chapter 7 Trustee simply concluded
the meeting because it was the fourth time it had been scheduled and Ms. Kilpatrick never appeared.
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The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that the Debtor is a serial filer that
repeatedly files for bankruptcy protection on the eve of the foreclosure sale of the
Property and who has failed to comply with the Trustee’s reasonable, routine, and
repeated requests for information and documents. The Debtor’s conduct in this case
constitutes bad faith and cause for the dismissal of this case, with prejudice, under
11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
Memo. in Supp. at 2, ¶ 7.
Following the filing of the U.S. Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, and subsequent to the conduct
that warranted barring her from filing any further bankruptcy cases for one (1) year, Ms. Kilpatrick
began to file what ended up being a total of twenty-seven (27) filings with this Court (Docs. 44,
45, and 53-77) (the “Filings”), not in her capacity as a “natural person,” but as, amongst other
assumed titles, an “Ambassador for Christ and Minister within The Embassy of Living FaithTM .”
See Ministerial Decl. of Fiduciary Breach and Judicial Trespass (Doc. 53) at 4. Thus, in order to
address Ms. Kilpatrick’s numerous filings in full (rather than ignore or summarily reject them),
contemporaneous with entering the Dismissal and Bar Order, the Court prepared and entered its
eleven (11) page Order Denying All Filings,5 in which the Filings were accurately described
therein as follows:
It is readily apparent that the Filings, perhaps best described as missives,
are a convoluted linguistic effort, built on baseless artificial constructs that lack any
legal basis, similar to or in the same nature and vein as sovereign citizen theories,
to dream up an alternate reality in which everyone potentially owes money to the
Debtor’s trust, rather than the Debtor owing money to creditors, which is what this
case was actually about. And the Filings were clearly intended by the Debtor to
threaten innocent people who have done absolutely nothing wrong, nor anything to
invite these baseless threats of monetary liability for a slew of completely made-up
offenses. The Filings are frivolous and harassing. And this is not the first
bankruptcy case before this Court in which Ms. Kilpatrick has submitted such
baseless filings. See No. 24-32461 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio) (Legal Notice (Doc. 21),
including a number of similar filings); No. 24-31598 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio) (Writ of
Quo Warranto (Doc. 19), including similar filings).
The themes invoked by the Debtor in her Filings are “commonly associated
with the so-called ‘sovereign citizen’ movement” and “have been uniformly
5 See Order: (I) Denying All Assertions, Purported Claims, Relief, and All Other Matters Set Forth in Filings Received
from Debtor on September 2, 2025 (Docs. 44 & 45) and on September 24, 26, 29 and 30, 2025 (Docs. 53 through 77);
(II) Giving Notice to Debtor that the Filings Violate Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(a) and Will be
Stricken if Not Withdrawn; (III) Requiring Debtor to Show Cause Why She Has Not Violated Rule 9011(b) if the
Papers are Not Withdrawn; and (IV) Ordering the Immediate Return of All Purported Tenders as Expressly Rejected
and Not Recognized by Law (Doc. 78) (the “Order Denying All Filings”).
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rejected by every federal court to confront them.” [In re] Morgan-Grant, [No.
24-18665-PDR,] 2025 Bankr. LEXIS [1335,] at *2[, 2025 WL 1571024 (S.D. Fla.
June 3, 2025) (“addressing similar baseless legal theories relating to a ‘private
ecclesiastical trust’ ”)] (citing United States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306, 1308 (11th
Cir. 2022); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013)). “The
rule of law is not so fragile as to be undone at the whim of a litigant through
invocation of spiritual sovereignty or divine right. Federal jurisdiction cannot be
waived or revoked by incantation.” Id. at *2.“There is no parallel legal system
grounded in personal belief that exempts one from the obligations of debt, the
authority of a duly appointed trustee, or the jurisdiction of this Court.” Id. at *7.
Previous courts within the Sixth Circuit have found that these types of arguments
lack merit. See Clinton v. Coyaleski, No. 4:25-cv-1363, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186480, 2025 WL 2711413 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases that reject
jurisdictional arguments based on similar sovereign citizen arguments), Watts v.
Cleveland Heights, No. 1: 25 CV 1582, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176338, 2025 WL
2615846 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2025) (finding Defendant’s arguments claiming that
that he was not subject to traffic laws, similar to those advanced in the filings, as
being “devoid of merit”), and Burks v. Licking Cnty. Child Support Enf’t Agency,
No. 2:24-cv-2330, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31341, 2025 WL 580389 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 21, 2025) (describing the voluminous filings related to sovereign citizen
arguments as frivolous and wasteful of court resources).
Order Denying All Filings at 2. And for those reasons, the Court denied any and all relief sought
through the Filings, as explained therein as follows:
After a careful review of the Filings, the Court is unable to discern any relief
requested by the Debtor that is available under Title 11 of the United States Code
(the 	“Bankruptcy 	Code”) 	or 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Bankruptcy 	Procedure.
Accordingly, all of the Filings are hereby DENIED with prejudice, and the Clerk
of Court is hereby instructed to forthwith return all of the original Filings, which
the Court rejects and does not accept tender of, to the Debtor by first class U.S.
mail. In addition, the Court hereby, as more fully set forth below, gives notice to
the Debtor that her Filings will be stricken as not properly signed in her individual
capacity and lacking her current address and telephone number, all as required by
Rule 9011(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy
Rules”), within seven (7) days from the date of entry of this Order.
In the alternative, Debtor may withdraw her Filings through submitting a
notice of withdrawal properly signed in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a),
which must be filed within seven (7) days from the date of entry of this Order.
Absent withdrawal, the Filings will be stricken.
If, however, the Filings are not withdrawn, then Debtor shall show cause,
within twenty-one (21) days from the date of entry of this Order, why she has not
violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b) by submitting the Filings to this Court, which
were presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass the Court and the people
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named therein, have caused unnecessary delay, contain legal contentions not
warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous arguments, and contain allegations
and factual contentions that lack any evidentiary support.
Order Denying All Filings at 2-3.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of her last serial bankruptcy case on October 1, 2025, since
then Ms. Kilpatrick has filed various papers with this Court focused on attempting to prevent this
Court from holding a hearing under its “clean up” jurisdiction to consider whether to impose
sanctions on her for the aforementioned Filings. Her post-dismissal filings, along with this Court’s
orders addressing those filings, are as follows:
1. 	Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Determination of Motion to Withdraw
the Reference (Doc. 85);
2. 	Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 86);
3. 	Notice of Errata Regarding Debtor’s Capacity (Doc. 87);
4. 	Order Denying Former Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Stay Pending
Determination of Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 85) (Doc. 89)
(the “Order Denying Stay”);
5. 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	Concerning 	Motion 	to 	Withdraw 	the
Reference (Doc. 86) (Doc. 90) (the “Report and Recommendation”);
6. 	Motion for Reconsideration of Orders and Request to Docket Revised
Procedural Notice Regarding Potential Competing Claims (Doc. 94); and
7. 	Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Orders and Request to
Docket Revised Procedural Notice Regarding Potential Competing Claims
(Doc. 94) (Doc. 98).
On March 11, 2026, however, Ms. Kilpatrick attempted to file a new adversary proceeding
in her last dismissed bankruptcy case, which went far beyond the very limited “clean up”
jurisdiction that this Court had retained post-dismissal to consider whether to impose sanctions.
Namely, Ms. Kilpatrick submitted the following papers, in-person, to the Clerk’s office staff:
a. 	an Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet (Official Form B1040), listing
herself as the Plaintiff, pro se, and “Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC;
Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office; Deputy Kevin Kerschner, in his
individual and official capacity; [and] Brandon Hedrick, Esq.” as the
Defendants;
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b. 	an Adversary Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Injunctive
Relief for Violation of Automatic Stay (the “Complaint”) against the four
named Defendants;
c. 	four Summonses (Official Form B2500A) for issuance by the Clerk of
Court to purportedly be served on the four named defendants by the U.S.
Marshals Service (Doc. 102); and
d. 	four USM-285 Process Receipt and Returns required by the U.S. Marshals
Service to manage service of legal documents, presumably because she
intended 	to 	request 	that 	the 	U.S. 	Marshals 	Service 	serve 	process
(collectively, the “papers”).
This attempted adversary proceeding was apparently her last-ditch effort to stave off the
enforcement of a writ of restitution to lawfully evict her from the real property, for which relief
from any automatic stay had been granted in this Court in July 2025, and which had been sold
through the foreclosure action in Montgomery County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
2023 CV 03656, in enforcement of both a foreclosure decree and an order of sale entered therein
prior to her serial bankruptcy cases. In short, based on this Court’s review of the online docket for
the foreclosure action, Ms. Kilpatrick had been submitting numerous filings in the Montgomery
County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas to avoid her eviction, but was unsuccessful, such that she
had come back to this Court. However, in doing so, she simply ignored that she no longer has an
active bankruptcy case, there is no bankruptcy estate, and there is no automatic stay, such that
there is no subject matter jurisdiction in this Court for her to open a new adversary proceeding
concerning matters that occurred after her case was dismissed, not to mention that her claims are
frivolous.
The day before submitting her papers for filing, Ms. Kilpatrick had filed a Motion for
Recusal and Disqualification of the Honorable Tyson A. Crist Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and
(b) (Doc. 101) (the “Motion to Recuse”), “from any and all remaining proceedings in this matter,
including but not limited to the pending Rule 9011 sanctions proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) and (b).” Mot. to Recuse at 1. Therein, Ms. Kilpatrick acknowledged that “[a]s noted in
the Court’s own Order (Doc. 89), the only remaining matter before this Court is the potential
imposition of sanctions against Movant pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9011(c).” Id. at 2. In conjunction, also on March 10, 2026, Ms. Kilpatrick filed a Petition for Writ
of Mandamus (Doc. 1) (the “Petition for Writ”) with the United States District Court for the
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Southern District of Ohio in Case No. 3:26-cv-00080-TMR-KLL, in which Ms. Kilpatrick asked
for a writ of mandamus to require this Court to recuse from “the remaining proceedings in
Bankruptcy Case No. 3:25-bk-30619.” Again, Ms. Kilpatrick acknowledged therein that her
“bankruptcy case has been dismissed.” Pet. for Writ at 2, ¶ 2. And that “[n]o appeal lies from the
dismissed case because the dismissal order was not timely appealed.” Id. Accordingly, she further
acknowledged that “[t]he only remaining matter is the imposition of Rule 9011 sanctions . . . .”
Ms. Kilpatrick’s Petition for Writ was ultimately dismissed with prejudice through a Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 4), entered on March 30, 2026, and an Order Adopting Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 4) and Dismissing the Petition (Doc. 1) with Prejudice (Doc. 5) entered
on 	April 	28, 	2026. 	See 	Case 	No. 	3:26-cv-00080-TMR-KLL 	(S.D. 	Ohio). 	In 	addition,
contemporaneously with entering this Order, the Court is entering an order denying the Motion to
Recuse. Accordingly, now that the Petition for Writ and Motion to Recuse have been resolved, the
Court issues this Order to address Ms. Kilpatrick’s last attempted filing in her dismissed case.
III. 	Analysis
Without an active bankruptcy case, or even the possibility of filing another bankruptcy case
prior to expiration of the one (1) year bar (prior to October 1, 2026), there is no jurisdiction or any
possibility of jurisdiction in the near future in this Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), for the former
Debtor, Ms. Kilpatrick, to initiate a new adversary proceeding in this Court. See, e.g., In re Solar
Equip. Corp., 19 B.R. 1010, 1011-13 (W.D. La. 1982) (concluding, on appeal, that “[o]nce a case
is dismissed, there is no longer a bankruptcy estate” and there is no longer jurisdiction for a
bankruptcy court to continue the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which terminates upon
dismissal). “As explained in Jevic, once a bankruptcy case is dismissed, the bankruptcy estate
ceases to exist and the parties are returned to their pre-bankruptcy positions as far as is possible
with their rights and obligations relative to one another governed by applicable non-bankruptcy
law.” See In re Cent. Processing Servs., LLC, 607 B.R. 625, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2019) (citing
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 456 (2017) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3)).
“Federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1334.” Elam v. Nationstar
Mort., LLC (In re Elam), No. 22-8012, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 2135, at *10 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Aug. 29,
2023). 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) grants “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” Here, there is no remaining
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case under title 11 in which Ms. Kilpatrick can file a civil proceeding. See, e.g., In re Tiggs, No.
22-48356, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 255, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2023) (analyzing that once a
main bankruptcy case has been dismissed, “there is no longer any pending ‘case under title 11’
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), 157(a) and 157(b)(1).”). In this situation, and
particularly when the debtor did not attempt to file the adversary proceeding until after the main
case had been dismissed and has alleged that actions taken after the dismissal of her case form the
basis for the complaint, an “adversary proceeding can no longer be considered a proceeding
‘arising under title 11, or arising in or related to’ a case under title 11 within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a) and 157(b)(1).” Id. This situation is somewhat unique, involving a serial
filing Debtor whose third case was dismissed with a one (1) year bar imposed, and is likely
distinguishable from situations in which the main case was not dismissed, but rather was only
closed subject to being reopened. Additionally, there are specific limited situations in which this
Court can retain jurisdiction concerning a previously dismissed case in order to address the conduct
before the Court within that case as this Court previously discussed in its Order Denying Stay
(Doc. 89) and the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 90) concerning Ms. Kilpatrick’s Emergency
Motion for Stay Pending Determination of Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 85) and
Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 86), as quoted below; however, that does not mean that
there remains a case, a bankruptcy estate, or an automatic stay, only that there is limited “clean
up” jurisdiction for the Court to deal with certain issues originating from the case while it was
pending. See, e.g., In re Periwinkle Partners, LLC, No. 9:18-bk-06721-FMD, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS
2759, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 6, 2020) (“Generally, the dismissal of a bankruptcy case
terminates a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over all issues other than administrative matters
necessary to wind up the case, such as approval of a trustee’s final report or approval of
pre-dismissal fees incurred by the estate.”).
“Under 	certain 	circumstances, 	a 	bankruptcy 	court 	may 	[] 	exercise 	post-dismissal
jurisdiction to effectuate its orders and vindicate its authority.” Id., at *5-6. Though the underlying
bankruptcy case has been dismissed, this Court retained jurisdiction over any sanctions hearing
under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and any related proceedings. In re Balistreri, No. 4:25-bk-2956, 2025
Bankr. LEXIS 3326, at *6-7 & n.8 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2025) (citing Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 385 (1990) (holding “that ‘[i]f a litigant could purge his Rule 11
violation merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to investigate more carefully
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before serving and filing papers.’ ”). This Court has made it clear, and Ms. Kilpatrick in her filings
has 	acknowledged, 	that 	this 	Court 	only 	retained 	“clean 	up” jurisdiction 	over 	this 	case,
post-dismissal, in order to address the issue of whether to impose sanctions against the former
Debtor for filing the voluminous twenty-seven (27) sovereign citizen style documents that the
Court determined to be frivolous after careful review and, despite warnings from this Court,
continuing to submit filings in this Court that do not appear to have a legitimate purpose and might
also violate Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(b). In the Order Denying All Filings (Doc.
78),6 entered the same day as this chapter 7 case was dismissed, the Court wrote as follows:
The Court has since received a barrage of seventeen (17) additional and
duplicative filings on September 29 and 30, 2025 (Docs. 61-77).[] Again, none of
these papers were appropriate to file with this Court, and they have nothing to do
with the legal matters pending before this Court under its original and exclusive
jurisdiction over this chapter 7 case. The Filings all violate Bankruptcy Rule 9011,
which applies to all documents filed with this Court, including these Filings
(regardless of how Debtor attempts to characterize the Filings) . . . .
* 	* 	*
As this Court has previously stated: “Bankruptcy ‘gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt. What the law
does not do[,] however, is give a debtor . . . unrestrained freedom to run roughshod
over the court system[.]’ ” In re Nyamusevya, 654 B.R. 581, 589 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2023) (quoting In re Jones, 632 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2021) (cleaned
up)). Further, it is well established that “Federal courts, including Bankruptcy
Courts, are vested with the inherent power to control [their] proceedings and the
conduct of the parties involved.” Id. (quoting In re Dekom, No. 19-30082-KKS,
2020 WL 4004116, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) (cleaned up)).
In the event that the Filings submitted by the Debtor are not withdrawn
within seven (7) days from the date of entry of this Order, they will be stricken
pursuant to Rule 9011(a) due to Debtor’s failure to sign them in Debtor’s individual
capacity, the failure to provide her address and telephone number, and the baseless
and harassing nature of the Filings. The Court not only has inherent authority to
control this proceeding, but also has the statutory authority under section 105(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code “to redress Rule 9011 violations, bad faith, and unreasonable,
6 See Order: (I) Denying All Assertions, Purported Claims, Relief, and All Other Matters Set Forth in Filings Received
from Debtor on September 2, 2025 (Docs. 44 & 45) and on September 24, 26, 29 and 30, 2025 (Docs. 53 through 77);
(II) Giving Notice to Debtor that the Filings Violate Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(a) and Will be
Stricken if Not Withdrawn; (III) Requiring Debtor to Show Cause Why She Has Not Violated Rule 9011(b) if the
Papers are Not Withdrawn; and (IV) Ordering the Immediate Return of All Purported Tenders as Expressly Rejected
and Not Recognized by Law (Doc. 78) (the “Order Denying All Filings”).
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vexatious litigation.” Id. at 590 (quoting In re United States Corp., No. 20-40375-
KKS, 2021 WL 1100078, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021) (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, in the event that the Filings are not withdrawn by the Debtor, then
Debtor is hereby ORDERED to show cause within twenty-one (21) days after the
entry of this Order, why she has not, through her Filings submitted to this Court on
September 2, 24, 26, 29 and 30, 2025 (Docs. 44, 45, and 53-77), violated Rule
9011(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure . . . .
Order Denying All Filings at 7-8. It does not follow from this approach that there remains subject
matter jurisdiction in this Court to address any other matters, and absent this Court’s limited and
specific retention of jurisdiction, which was set forth in the Dismissal and Bar Order as permitted
by 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 349, there would be none, absent an appeal from or motion to reconsider
the dismissal, neither of which was timely filed. Otherwise, the dismissal of this case would have
had no significance. See, e.g., In re Periwinkle Partners, LLC, No. 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2759, at
*6-7 (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
when the debtor had no pending case under title 11, even “to the extent that any of his claims
[we]re valid, [as] ‘they have no bearing on the administration of the bankruptcy estate because no
bankruptcy estate exists to administer.’ ”).
Notably, given that her case was dismissed (as opposed to simply closed), this is not a
situation in which the former Debtor, Ms. Kilpatrick, could move to reopen her case in order to
file a new adversary proceeding. And she is presently barred, and will remain barred until at least
October 1, 2026, from filing any further bankruptcy cases. Accordingly, there is no basis upon
which this Court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) over a
new adversary proceeding concerning actions that she alleges to have transpired, vis-à-vis the
alleged but non-existent automatic stay, over four (4) months after Ms. Kilpatrick’s former chapter
7 case was dismissed. Moreover, Ms. Kilpatrick is already pursuing claims in the District Court.
Accordingly, the adversary proceeding that she attempted to file in this Court, five (5) months after
her chapter 7 case was dismissed, and after she was barred from filing any new bankruptcy case,
cannot fit within the very limited “clean up” jurisdiction that this Court retained.
Because of the dismissal of Ms. Kilpatrick’s last case there is also no possibility that any
state law claims she alleged in her Complaint, such as Count IV – Fraud and Perjury Upon the
Court (discussing filings made in the Foreclosure Action in the Montgomery County, Ohio Court
of Common Pleas) and Count V – Lack of Standing and Real Party in Interest, which both
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reference Ohio law, would meet the criteria in the Sixth Circuit to establish “related to”
jurisdiction, which is the outer bounds of bankruptcy jurisdiction. “ ‘Related to’ proceedings are
those where ‘the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy.’ ” In re Elam, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 2135, at *12 (quoting Kelley v.
Nodine (In re Salem Mortg. Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 634 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Gen. Oil
Distrib., Inc., 21 B.R. 888, 892 n.13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982))). Due to dismissal of her case, there
is no estate being administered in bankruptcy. Thus, because the “litigation [] would not have an
impact upon the administration of the [non-existent] bankruptcy case, or on property of the estate
[that has revested in the former Debtor], or on the distribution to creditors [which cannot happen
in a dismissed case], [it] cannot find a home in the district court based on the court’s bankruptcy
jurisdiction.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[3][e][v] & n.107a (Alan N. Resnick and Henry
J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed.) (citing Inmet Mining, LLC v. Blackjewel Liquidation Tr. (In re Inmet
Mining, LLC), No. 23-7002, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 2081 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2023); Northen
v. MDC Innovations, LLC (In re C&M Invs. of High Point, Inc.), No. 14-2005, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS
2497 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2018); AY McDonald Indus. v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 590
B.R. 506 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2018)).
To illustrate the absence of jurisdiction within Ms. Kilpatrick’s previously dismissed case
to hear the Complaint, the following facts she alleged as forming the jurisdictional basis on March
11, 2026, over five (5) months after her case was dismissed, were plainly false:
4. Plaintiff is the “Debtor” in the above-captioned bankruptcy case . . . .
* 	* 	*
16. Upon filing, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362(a) went into
immediate effect . . . .
17. The property at 108 Barnside Drive constitutes property of the bankruptcy
estate under 11 U.S.C. section 541.
* 	* 	*
22. No order granting relief from the automatic stay was entered prior to any
of these enforcement actions.
* 	* 	*
57. The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362 is in full force and effect,
and any eviction action constitutes a willful violation thereof.
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Compl. at 2, ¶ 4; 3, ¶¶ 16, 17; 4, ¶ 22 (emphasis added); 7, ¶ 57 (emphasis added). None of the
foregoing were true when Ms. Kilpatrick attempted to file her Complaint. Moreover, she fails to
mention in her Complaint, and specifically makes a false representation to the contrary, that relief
from any automatic stay7 had been granted on July 18, 2025 when the Court entered the Order
Granting Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay (Rel. Doc. No. 30) (Doc. 34). Said Order
permitted Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, “to pursue its in rem remedies under non-bankruptcy
law regarding the real property located at 108 Barnside Drive, Englewood, Ohio 45322.” This
relief from any automatic stay, which was neither opposed nor appealed by Ms. Kilpatrick, was
granted nearly seven (7) months before the purported violations of the automatic stay that she
alleges occurred in February of 2026, as set forth in the following paragraphs of her proposed
Complaint:
19. Despite the automatic stay, Defendant Brandon Hedrick filed a Praecipe for
Writ of Restitution on February 12, 2026 (Docket ID: 197405925) on behalf of
Defendant Lakeview.
20. On February 12, 2026, a Civil Writ of Restitution was issued (Docket ID:
116338756) by Mike Foley, Montgomery County Clerk of Courts, commanding
Wenrick Family Limited Partnership be placed in possession.
21. On February 24, 2026, Defendant Deputy Kevin Kerschner personally signed
and served a Notice to Vacate, requiring Plaintiff to leave the premises by March
12, 2026. The Notice threatened arrest for failure to comply.
22. No order granting relief from the automatic stay was entered prior to any
of these enforcement actions.
23. All of these actions were taken with knowledge of the bankruptcy filing
and constitute willful violations of the automatic stay.
Compl. at 13, ¶¶ 19-21; 14, ¶ 22-23 (emphasis added).
Once again, none of the foregoing could possibly be true because there was no automatic
stay in place in February 2026 for all the reasons stated herein, including but not limited to the fact
that her last serial filed case was dismissed on October 1, 2025. Thus, notwithstanding that relief
from the automatic stay actually was granted on July 18, 2025, any remaining automatic stay
(which there was none as to her real property) terminated at the very latest when her case was
7 As note elsewhere, no automatic stay went into effect because this was Ms. Kilpatrick’s third bankruptcy case in the
span of just over seven (7) months. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i).
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dismissed by operation of law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 349(b)(3), and 362(c)(1) and (c)(2)(B).
Moreover, on top of all the other reasons why the automatic stay did not apply, within the
Dismissal and Bar Order this Court specifically ordered, as requested by the United States Trustee,
that “[t]he automatic stay is hereby TERMINATED.” Dismissal and Bar Order at 5, ¶ 5.
Accordingly, not only does this Court not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
proposed Complaint, but it is based upon frivolous and false factual allegations regarding the
existence of a bankruptcy, bankruptcy estate, and automatic stay, not to mention or even get into
her alleged “newly discovered” issues with Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC’s standing to bring the
foreclosure action, which is a common tactic by those seeking to challenge a foreclosure action
other than on the merits of whether the borrower is in default of payment, and which is squarely
contradicted by the Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage recorded in Montgomery County, Ohio
on June 21, 2023, which was attached to the Motion for Stay Relief as Exhibit D in the
now-dismissed chapter 7 case (Doc. 30 at 34), and was addressed in the foreclosure decree issued
by the Montgomery County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas in the foreclosure action, Case No.
2023 CV 04539, which Ms. Kilpatrick references in her proposed Complaint. See Entry Granting
Summ. J. and Decree of Foreclosure, Lakeview Loan Serv., LLC v. Kilpatrick, Case No. 2023 CV
04539 (Montgomery Cnty. C.P. Dec. 21, 2023) (finding that “Plaintiff was the real party in interest
when it filed its Complaint and has maintained the requisite standing at all times material to this
action.”). Thus, even if the Court could exercise jurisdiction, it would not. See In re Cent.
Processing Servs., LLC, 607 B.R. at 632 (observing that “[a] bankruptcy court has discretion to
consider [] matters [that are ‘part of the original proceeding’ such as fee applications], but that the
“ ‘exercise of such jurisdiction is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (quoting Javens
v. City of Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 364 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997))).
In summary, the residential property that Ms. Kilpatrick was attempting to hold onto
through her serial bankruptcy filings was: (a) never protected by the automatic stay in her last
dismissed case filed on April 8, 2025, given that it was her third case filed in just over seven (7)
months and no automatic stay ever went into effect pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4);8 (b) even if
the property was initially protected by an automatic stay somehow, the Mortgagee, Lakeview Loan
8 In addition, Ms. Kilpatrick did not file a motion to request the Court to order that the stay take effect pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B).
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Servicing, LLC (the primary would-be Defendant to the attempted Complaint) obtained relief from
the automatic stay through the entry of the Order Granting Motion for Relief from the Automatic
Stay (Rel. Doc. No. 30) (Doc. 34) entered on July 18, 2025,9 before the U.S. Trustee filed his
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38) on July 31, 2025, which stay relief Ms. Kilpatrick neither opposed
nor appealed; and (c) pursuant to §§ 349(b)(3), and 362(c)(1)10 and (c)(2)(B), even if an automatic
stay had gone into effect notwithstanding § 362(c)(4), and even if the automatic stay had not been
terminated by this Court’s Order (Doc. 34), the stay terminated as to both the property and Ms.
Kilpatrick when this chapter 7 case was dismissed, both by operation of law and the terms of the
Dismissal and Bar Order. See also, Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. at 503 (stating that
“[d]ismissal lifts the automatic stay entered at the start of bankruptcy, exposing the debtor to
creditors’ legal actions and collection efforts.” (citing § 362(c)(2)).
Given all of the foregoing, it is appropriate for this Court to address the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction at the outset of Ms. Kilpatrick’s effort to initiate a new adversary proceeding,
before the time and effort of Clerk’s office staff, United States Marshals, and the Court are further
taxed as part of Ms. Kilpatrick’s on-going effort to forestall the action in the Montgomery County,
Ohio Court of Common Pleas through yet another frivolous filing and continuing abuse of the
bankruptcy process.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), which is made applicable to
adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b), it was clear to this
Court, given its intimate knowledge of Ms. Kilpatrick’s prior filings and review of the submitted
Complaint that this adversary proceeding would need to be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, such that it would have been burdensome and wasteful to even permit the opening of
an adversary proceeding before proceeding to dismiss the same. Thus, upon the Clerk’s receipt of
the papers on March 11, 2026, the Court determined there was no subject matter jurisdiction for
this Court to hear the Complaint, such that the effective date of this Order should be considered to
9 Although Ms. Kilpatrick had filed two (2) prior chapter 13 cases on August 22, 2024 (No. 24-31598) and December
17, 2024 (No. 24-32461), such that her last case was her third in the span of just over seven (7) months, such that no
automatic stay went into effect under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), the Mortgagee, Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC,
did not utilize the procedure available under § 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) to seek an “order confirming that no stay is in effect[,]”
opting instead to simply file a motion for relief from the automatic stay (Doc. 30).
10 Upon dismissal of Ms. Kilpatrick’s chapter 7 case the property of the estate revested in Ms. Kilpatrick pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3).
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be nunc pro tunc to March 11, 2026. Moreover, pursuant to its inherent authority and 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a), the Court determined that although the Clerk has received the Complaint and
accompanying papers, the Court would reject them, would not allow a new adversary proceeding
to be opened, and would ultimately order the Clerk to return the papers to Ms. Kilpatrick,
consistent with the approach taken in other federal courts to ameliorate the impact of such frivolous
filings. See, e.g., In re Nyamusevya, 654 B.R. at 589 (citing In re Jones, 632 B.R. at 141)).
IV. 	Conclusion
There is no subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) for this Court to
adjudicate Ms. Kilpatrick’s Complaint, at this time, and there will not be any such jurisdiction at
least until October 1, 2026, or such later date as any future bar to her filing another bankruptcy
case might expire or be lifted. As the Court has previously explained, the only jurisdiction left in
this Court is “clean up” jurisdiction to address possible sanctions against Ms. Kilpatrick for her
conduct within her dismissed case. See Doc. 90 at 3 (“[T]he only jurisdiction this Court still has
relating to Ms. Kilpatrick’s prior bankruptcy is ‘clean up’ jurisdiction concerning the potential
imposition of sanctions concerning her violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9011(b), which the Court has not yet scheduled.”). Thus, there was no subject matter jurisdiction
in this Court to open an adversary proceeding for the Complaint submitted by Ms. Kilpatrick.
Opening a new adversary proceeding would have clearly been at odds with the reason that
this Court entered the prior Dismissal and Bar Order, which is that Ms. Kilpatrick was abusing the
bankruptcy process for the purpose of forestalling a foreclosure action. Moreover, the Dismissal
and Bar Order not only barred Ms. Kilpatrick “from filing for bankruptcy protection anywhere in
the United States for a period of one (1) year from the date of entry of this Order pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 109(g)(1), and 349(a)[,]” but also provides that if Ms. Kilpatrick attempted to
file for bankruptcy protection during such period any filing “shall be void and subject to dismissal
without the need for formal objection by any party in interest.” Dismissal and Bar Order at 5, ¶¶ 3,
4. Her proposed Complaint was nothing more than an attempted continuation of her abuse of the
bankruptcy process. Thus, even if there were any jurisdiction, because there is no legitimate basis
for the claims in the absence of a bankruptcy, bankruptcy estate, or automatic stay, the Court would
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decline to exercise jurisdiction. Ms. Kilpatrick’s original documents shall be returned to her
forthwith by the Clerk by regular first-class U.S. mail.11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to: Default List
11 Although not accepted for the purpose of opening a new adversary proceeding, Ms. Kilpatrick’s papers have been
docketed in her dismissed chapter 7 case (Doc. 102) for the record.
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