USA v. Ceasar

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	Case No. l:24-cr-117
Plaintiff, 	Judge MatthewW. McFarland
V.
DAMEON CEASAR,
Defendant.
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 35). The
Government filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to which
Defendant filed a Reply in Support. (See Docs. 36, 37.) The Court held a hearing on the
Motion on December 18, 2025. (See 12/18/2025 Minute Entry.) Thus, this matter is ripe
for the Court's review. For the reasons below, Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 35)
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case began with an investigation of Defendant Dameon Ceasar that started at
least as far back as May 2024. (Transcript, Doc. 38, Pg. ID 101-02, 185-86.) On May 15,
2024, agents with Hamilton County, Ohio's Regional Narcotics Unit ("RENU") observed
Defendant engaging in a hand-to-hand drug transaction during a controlled buy in which
Defendant sold approximately a half ounce of cocaine. (Id. at Pg. ID 103-04, 117-18.)
Then, on June 20, 2024, REND agents attempted a traffic stop of Defendant, but he fled
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from the agents at speeds exceeding 95-100 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.
(Id. at Pg. ID 105-06, 152, 160-62, 186-88.) The agents abandoned their pursuit when they
determined it was no longer safe to continue. (Id. at Pg. ID 152, 162.) The investigation of
Defendant continued after the controlled buy, and agents surveilled him. (Id. at Pg. ID
104-05, 166-67, 188.) Through their research of Defendant's background, agents were
aware of Defendant's criminal history, which includes felony convictions, and therefore
knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. (Id. at Pg. ID 189-90, 193.) On
September 9, 2024, 	a 	RENU agent swore out three 	criminal complaints charging
Defendant with drug trafficking, drug possession, and fleeing and eluding. (Transcript,
Doc. 38, Pg. ID 106-07; Gov't Exs. 1, 2.)
The next day, RENU agents observed Defendant leave his residence and begin
driving a white pickup truck. (Transcript, Doc. 38, Pg. ID 135, 137-38, 196-97.) Moments
after Defendant's departure, agents executed a vehicle intercept. (Id. at Pg. ID 144-46.)
During this maneuver, an unmarked truck stopped in front of Defendant's truck and an
unmarked van rammed Defendant's truck from behind. (Id. at Pg. ID 140-42, 190-92.)
The unmarked truck then rammed Defendant's truck in reverse, confining Defendant's
truck and preventing another automobile pursuit. (Id.) Agents exited the unmarked van
and approached Defendant's truck, and Defendant stepped out of his truck. (Id. at Pg. ID
169-70, 191-92.) The agents immediately brought Defendant to the ground, arresting him
a few feet away from his truck. (Id.)
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After arresting Defendant, the agents seized U.S. currency from his pants pocket.
(Transcript, Doc. 38, Pg. ID 115, 170-71.) Agents then observed a firearm in plain view on
the driver's side floorboard of Defendant's truck. (Id. at Pg . ID 115-16, 170.) An agent
read Defendant his Miranda rights, and Defendant made statements to the agent. (Id. at
Pg. ID 171.) Another agent took photos of Defendant's truck and secured his firearm. (Id.
at Pg. ID 192.) Next, a RENU agent drove Defendant's truck to the Hamilton County
Sheriff's District 1 Office. (Id. at Pg . ID 192-93.) Agents searched the truck and found
narcotics in the center console. (Id. at Pg. ID 193-94.)
LAW&ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop,
presumably including the evidence seized from his person and from his truck. (Motion
to Suppress, Doc. 35, Pg. ID 82.) The arrest-based and search-based arguments are both
grounded upon the Fourth Amendment, which protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Court will address each of Defendant's arguments
in turn.
I. 	Lawfulness of Defendant's Arrest
Defendant first argues that because the Government did not have an active arrest
warrant at the time of his arrest, the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should be
excluded. (Motion to Suppress, Doc. 35, Pg. ID 86.) While a warrant is generally required
to make an arrest, "a police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer
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upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411,417 (1976) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)). "The lawfulness
of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must be based upon probable cause, which exists
where the facts and circumstances within [the agents'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963) (quotation omitted). "Whether probable cause exists
is determined by the totality of the circumstances ... analyzed from a law enforcement
officer's perspective." Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills, 693 F. App'x 417, 423 (6th Cir.
2017) (citation omitted).
A warrantless arrest for a felony is lawful where the agent has probable cause,
even if the arrest was delayed and the felony was committed outside the presence of the
arresting agent. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 417-18. "The necessary inquiry, therefore, [is] not
whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was
probable cause for the arrest." Id.; accord United States v. Dickens, 748 F. App'x 31, 36 (6th
Cir. 2018). And, the Sixth Circuit has found that "[r]easonable jurists could not debate
th[e] conclusion" that "while information used to obtain a search warrant may go stale,
the same is not true for information underlying an arrest warrant." Guadarrama v. United
States, No. 16-6218, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14975, at *6 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2017). Indeed, the
passage of time may decrease the likelihood that evidence of a crime will be found during
a search, but it does not affect the probable cause an agent has already obtained to make
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an arrest, regardless of whether a warrant is sought. See United States v. Sanchez, No. 5:15-
CR-50077, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17115, at *8 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 9, 2016). Similarly, other
circuits have explicitly held that the mere passage of time does not necessarily weigh
against probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Haldorson, 941 F.3d 284, 291-92
(7th Cir. 2019) (finding that officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest three
weeks after a controlled buy); United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009)
(finding that officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest one month after a
controlled buy); see also Sanchez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17115, at *8-9 (finding that officers
had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest eleven months after a controlled buy).
Here, it appears from the record that while three criminal complaints were active
at the time of Defendant's arrest, there was no active arrest warrant. Yet, the arresting
REND agents had probable cause to believe that Defendant committed a felony drug
trafficking offense, as agents had observed him engaging in a hand-to-hand drug
transaction during a controlled buy around four months earlier. Further, agents observed
Defendant fleeing and eluding law enforcement during the attempted traffic stop in June
2024. It is true that the controlled buy and subsequent police pursuit took place around
four months before Defendant's arrest, so there arguably could have been time for the
agents to obtain an arrest warrant. But, turning to the critical question, the probable cause
that agents obtained in observing Defendant's participation in the controlled buy and
police pursuit still existed at the time of his arrest. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 417. Thus, a
warrant was not required to execute a lawful arrest of Defendant.
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Defendant also alleges that the vehicle intercept maneuver violated the policy of
the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office. (Motion to Suppress, Doc. 35, Pg. ID 85.) But,
Defendant does not provide, and the Court is unaware of, any precedent that requires
suppression of evidence collected as a result of an arrest or search that violates
department policy. 	As such, Defendant's arrest, supported by probable cause that
Defendant had committed a felony, was lawful and does not warrant suppression.
II. 	Lawfulness of the Search of Defendant's Truck
Defendant next argues that because he did not consent to the search of his vehicle,
and because he was no longer within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of his
arrest, the evidence obtained from his truck should be excluded. (Motion to Suppress,
Doc. 35, Pg. ID 86.) In general, the Fourth Amendment requires that police searches be
performed pursuant to a valid search warrant. Williams v. Maurer, 9 F.4th 416,431 (6th
Cir. 2021). However, under the search incident to lawful arrest ("SILA") exception to the
warrant requirement, "[p]olice may conduct a search of a vehicle incident to a lawful
arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle." 	United States v. Alexander, 954 F.3d 910, 917 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quotation omitted). The SILA exception permits a search of both the person of the
arrestee and the area within his control. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,224 (1973).
The SILA exception is grounded in the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, as well as the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. Id. at 234.
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Under the SILA exception, police may search a motor vehicle incident to arrest if
it is "reasonable to believe" that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). The Sixth Circuit has not defined the phrase
"reasonable to believe" in the context of the SILA exception, but it has stated that
"reasonable belief is a lesser standard than probable cause" and "is established by looking
at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances." United States
v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2006). Other circuits have found that this
"reasonable to believe" standard may be less than probable cause and more similar to the
"reasonable suspicion" standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). See
United States v. Odoms, No. 2:17-CR-210, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96452, at *10 (S.D. Ohio
June 8, 2018) (collecting cases). "A suspect can be arrested for multiple crimes, and
' [w ]hen that's the case, the police can search a vehicle incident to arrest if they have reason
to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of any of the offenses of arrest. Nothing in
Gant prohibits this."' Id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509,515 (7th Cir. 2014)).
Here, the Government concedes that the conduct encompassing the criminal complaint
for fleeing and eluding would not justify the search of Defendant's truck because the
RENU agents could have no reasonable belief that evidence of that crime might be found
therein. (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 92.) That said, the agents could and did have a
reasonable belief that evidence of Defendant's conduct encompassing the criminal
complaints for drug possession and trafficking could be found in the truck. See United
States v. Johnson, 627 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that, after an arrest for
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possession of a firearm, "police could have reasonably believed that ammunition or
additional firearms were in the car or in containers in the car, especially in the passenger
area searched by police that was formerly occupied by [the defendant]"); United States v.
Bobo, No. 2:24-CR-20200, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135591, at *15 (W.D. Tenn. July 16, 2025)
(concluding that "it was permissible for the officers to search [the defendant's] vehicle for
evidence related to the drug possession, the crime of arrest"). The reasonable belief here
was bolstered by the discovery of U.S. currency on Defendant's person during the time
of his arrest, as well as the agents' observation of a firearm in plain view on the driver's
side floorboard of his truck. See United States v. Gibson, No. 3:12-CR-72, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136692, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 24, 2013) (finding that an officer possessed the
requisite reasonable belief to search a defendant's vehicle incident to an arrest for drug
trafficking after the discovery of $5,605 in cash in the defendant's pocket corroborated
the officer's preexisting probable cause for arrest).
Defendant argues that because he was no longer within reaching distance of the
truck at the time of the search and the RENU agents had not obtained an arrest warrant,
there was no arresting offense of which agents could find evidence in the truck. (Motion
to Suppress, Doc. 35, Pg. ID 86.) This argument ignores the fact that the agents arrested
Defendant for drug trafficking and possession, as well as fleeing and eluding, prior to
searching Defendant's truck. Indeed, an agent had sworn out three criminal complaints
charging Defendant with theses offenses prior to his arrest. And, Defendant does not
provide, and the Court is unaware of, any precedent that mandates an arrest warrant for
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the SILA exception to apply. Thus, because the SILA and automobile exceptions apply
here, the search of the truck was lawful, and suppression is not warranted.
The Government also contends that the agents knew Defendant was prohibited
from possessing firearms at the time they observed the firearm within the vehicle.
(Transcript, Doc. 38, Pg. ID 189, 193, 204-06.) "Under the automobile exception, police
officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime." United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641,
647 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Moore, 487 F. Supp. 3d 652,
660 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (emphasizing that the automobile exception applies to "evidence of
any offense, not necessarily the offense of arrest"). Here, the discovery of the firearm in
plain view, coupled with the agents' knowledge of Defendant's past felony convictions,
would independently open the door to a search of the vehicle under the automobile
exception. See United States v. Pigg, No. 1:17-CR-5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21814, at *19-20
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2019) (applying automobile exception when officer knew that the
defendant was a felon and observed a firearm in the vehicle); United States v. Matthews,
422 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1253 (W.D. Ky. 2019) ("The officers were therefore justified in
believing that there could be other guns in the car, and the search of the vehicle was valid
under the automobile exception.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 35) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By ~;,tt,.'W, 414&:JJUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND
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